

The Space In-Between

Tracing Transformative Processes in Nicosia's Buffer Zone

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The Space In-Between

Tracing Transformative Processes in Nicosia's Buffer Zone

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Weimar, 05.07.2019

Zinovia Foka

To family

*'I don't feel it is necessary to know exactly what I am.
The main interest in life is to become someone else you were not in the beginning.
If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end,
do you think you would have the courage to write it?'*

(Foucault, in Martin et al, 1988, p. 9)

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Abstract

This thesis examines urban partition in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, and how its changing roles and shifting perceptions in a post-conflict setting reflect power relations, and their constant renegotiation. Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, was officially divided in 1974 in the aftermath of an eighteen-year-long conflict between the island's Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities. As a result, a heavily militarized Buffer Zone, established as an emergency measure against perpetuation of inter-communal violence, has been cutting through its historic centre ever since. Carved out of its urban fabric and under the control of the United Nations, this enclosed, abandoned and slowly degrading cityscape was impermeable until 2003. Over the years of unresolved conflict, it acquired the status of a symbol in Cypriot imagination, charged with emotions and vested with meaning for both communities, and was etched in popular perception as 'dead', 'unchanging', and 'stuck in time'. Being central to antipodal, state-produced, historical narratives that see their 'own' as victim and the 'other' as perpetrator, it has come to embody the Cypriot conflict itself. Moreover, employed to legitimize opposing political and territorial claims, it has also become a primary vehicle to sustain the state apparatus and its political elites in power on both sides of the divide.

The reinstatement of mobility between the city's two sectors in 2003 saw an unprecedented surge in local initiatives, as various actors gradually stepped forward to articulate new demands with Nicosia's Buffer Zone at their epicentre. Three contemporary examples serve as entry points for analysis. First, there was a shift in official planning strategy for Nicosia's urban development. Influenced by cultural policies of the European Union, the mixed team of professionals, which worked across the Buffer Zone on the city's Masterplan since the 1970s, promoted an urban heritage-driven strategy, seeking to regenerate Nicosia's historic centre economically and socially. Through ensuing narratives and practices of space- and heritage-making, Nicosia's Buffer Zone is being reimagined and claimed as common and shared heritage for all Cypriots. At the same time, two bottom-up initiatives have reclaimed and appropriated space in the Buffer Zone, contesting through new socio-spatial practices the official historical narratives, and producing new spaces to inhabit. The Home for Cooperation, an activity centre for institutionalized activism, offers a second example. Housed in a formerly abandoned building in the Buffer Zone, it offers office and meeting space to a wide range of bi-communal civil society organizations developing around it. Bringing people in the Buffer Zone, it is transformed into a bridge between communities in Nicosia, and aims to advocate from there a new norm for their interrelation. The third example is Nicosia's Occupy Movement, which developed from protests directed against neoliberal approaches to economic development of Nicosia's historic centre. Openly critical to existing systems of governance in Cyprus, this movement was generally concerned with peace and the island's demilitarization in the frame of an open, inclusive society, freed from known social norms. Occupying space in Nicosia's Buffer Zone, its participants performed sovereignty, realizing and inhabiting even briefly, in-between the polities they renounced, their own vision for Nicosia.

This thesis departs from a genuine interest in the material and ideational dimensions of urban partition. How is it constructed, not merely in physical terms but in the minds of the people affected by conflict? How is it established in official and everyday discourses? What kinds of mechanisms have been developed to maintain it, and make it an inseparable part of the urban experience? Moreover, taking into account the consensus in relevant literature pertaining to the imperative of its removal, this thesis is inquiring into the relevance of peace agreements to overcoming urban partition. For this purpose, it also looks at narratives and practices that have attempted to contest it. The examples examined in this thesis offer pregnant analytical moments to understand Nicosia's Buffer Zone as a dynamic social construct, accommodating multiple visions of and for the city. This space in-between allows and facilitates encounters between various actors, accommodates new meanings, socio-spatial practices and diverse imaginaries. It is there that the struggle over power and control is taking place, offering as well the possibility for production of space accessible both physically and mentally to all. In this sense, urban partition is explored in this thesis as a phenomenon that transcends scales as well as temporalities, entwining past, present, and future. Urban partition in this work is, thus, a concept open to reinterpretation, through an exploration of relations that expand in both space and time. To this end, this thesis prioritizes the study of space to explore the entanglement of space, power and knowledge in shaping urban partition in Nicosia.

Keywords: urban partition, in-between, conflict, peace-making, urban heritage, space, power, knowledge

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PART I
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1

Observation

1.1 Entering Nicosia's Buffer Zone

In March 2012, during my first fieldtrip in Cyprus, I was presented with the chance to visit the section of the Cypriot Buffer Zone within the historic centre of Nicosia. This was a unique opportunity to experience first-hand a space which only few individuals with civilian status could access. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force [UNFICYP], British Contingent, patrolling this narrow piece of land dividing Nicosia's historic centre is organizing educational visits for diplomats and military personnel as an introduction to the island's intriguing, complicated and long-lasting state of partition. This is not a trivial task. The UNFICYP has crafted its own (rather simplistic, but neither simple nor frivolous) narrative to tell a controversial story, in which they are supposed to remain and appear impartial. My newly established connections in Cyprus helped me sidestep the strenuous process of acquiring permission to enter the Buffer Zone, which normally involves a series of applications submitted to the local United Nations office well in advance. I found myself tagging along with a group of British militia newcomers, who would serve at the island's British bases, known as Sovereign British Areas [SBAs] and who were on this day introduced to the realities of Cyprus, and Nicosia. The entire process, organized, supervised and choreographed by the UNFICYP to the most trivial detail, started close to Famagusta Gate and ended near the Ledra Street / Lokmaci crossing. Our small group, including fifteen British soldiers, myself and two Master's students, also interested in the Buffer Zone for academic purposes, entered the Buffer Zone on foot with the escort of three UN troops, and followed by a UN jeep during our visit. We were then introduced to Ben, our guide and host, and started descending into the Buffer Zone.

This experience was to me, surprisingly, deeply emotional and simultaneously fairly disturbing for a number of reasons. Ben started his narration by unravelling the story of ethnic antagonism and conflict between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots with utter caution to keep equal distance from both. Not surprisingly, he did not include all (not even enough) aspects of the initiation and development of the Cypriot conflict, conveniently avoiding the subject of British involvement in the establishment of Nicosia's partition. For each story of hostility, aggression or wrongdoing on behalf of Greek-Cypriots he offered its Turkish-Cypriot counterpart. Certain structures were selected and pointed at during his narration as spaces of interest, such as the school of *Agios Kassianos*, shown in Figure 1, and the homonymous neighbourhood, which was turned into a battlefield and remains abandoned since 1968. We were gradually introduced to the details of the militarization of the Zone: where and how the outposts are positioned, when and how the change of shift is performed for each side, how the UN are patrolling the Zone, and in what manner they are allowed to intervene and alter the space according to their needs for this purpose. Ben's storytelling was embellished with fanciful details, sometimes even jests, mainly targeting certain exaggerated traits of each side's presumed mentality. For example, when he described the shift change for Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot soldiers of *Agios Kassianos* outposts, where the troops are in such proximity that they can actually see and hear each other during the process, he presented the Turkish-Cypriot soldiers as overtly

CHAPTER 1 Observation

disciplined. According to Ben's narration, shift changes happen in regular intervals. When soldiers replace each other, they follow a very strict protocol, standing at certain distance from each other, voicing commandments loudly, including their name, to be heard from the other side. During the shift they are remaining vigilant and perform certain duties. As the narration continues, the Greek-Cypriot soldiers are presented as significantly less vigilant, even relaxed, failing to follow protocols, on occasion distracted by passers-by, or simply falling asleep. The storytelling continues, orchestrated to the smallest detail. Nothing from what is being said is spontaneous; everything is premeditated, crafted and learned by heart. Ben and other guides before and after him are repeating the same story, stopping at the same carefully selected locations: a watchtower, on which we are allowed to climb, two abandoned outposts in formerly residential buildings, facing each other across a narrow street. Separated only by three meters, these were the closest opposing positions before military disengagement. There, standing between the two now abandoned and deteriorating buildings, we are allowed to take pictures (see Figure 2). As Ben warned us beforehand, photographs are generally prohibited in and around the Buffer Zone, except for the places designated by him. Equally prohibited, separating from the group and wandering off alone entails the danger of stepping into either Turkish- or Greek-Cypriot surveillance territory (in contrast to the neutral zone, which only the UN personnel like Ben know how to navigate), where soldiers are obliged and have the right to shoot. Entering buildings, touching objects or in any way altering the environment of the Buffer Zone is also prohibited, unless otherwise instructed.

The narration continued embellished with anecdotal incidents from an undefined past era: sentries garrisoned in the aforementioned outposts were so close that they could poke each other from the buildings' balconies using long sticks, and tension was easily escalating; soldiers positioned in the Buffer Zone were sometimes developing some type of communication with opposing parties exchanging cigarettes and other goods not available on their respective sides; even friendships were rumoured to have been formed. Incidents of occasional bloodshed were also mentioned, when for example a Greek-Cypriot soldier tried to greet opposing sentry on duty having mistaken him for his Turkish-Cypriot friend. He was consequently killed, and later on avenged by another Greek-Cypriot soldier. Another story was about an elderly civilian, Mrs. Annie (only first name was provided), who during the 1960s hostilities refused to evacuate and remained at her house, even after the Buffer Zone had been demarcated. The UNFICYP failed to convince her to leave and so she remained at her house, and was escorted in and out of the Buffer Zone for her occasional supplies' shopping until her death. Her house is now incorporated in the UNFICYP tour and it is even labelled 'Annie's House' by the UNFICYP. At the time, I thought this was a rather bizarre, in its given context, attempt of commemoration. In retrospect, marking 'Annie's House' offered a convenient reference, assisting patrols to navigate the Buffer Zone.

In Themistokleous Street, in the heart of an once buzzing commercial zone, our group was allowed to access the insides of two buildings, an old restaurant, renamed by the UNFYCIP 'Café Otto' (see Figure 3), and an old office building, now altered in order to accommodate the needs of the 40th Signal Regiment Group, Sector 2. UNFICYP's access to Buffer Zone's buildings and other structures is very limited. Under no circumstances are they supposed to interfere with the secluded cityscape, not even to support collapsing structures. According to Ben, their liberty of altering the Buffer Zone is restricted to the amount of interventions necessary to facilitate their patrolling duties, movement of people and vehicles for this purpose, and the establishment of operational headquarters. Therefore, the majority of buildings

PART I RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

inside the Buffer Zone have suffered significant damages due to dereliction and physical phenomena, as nature has slowly taken over during the long period of partition (see Figures 4-6). Ben repeated stories he allegedly heard about shops abandoned by their owners and houses abandoned by their residents in a hurry with the belief that they would soon return after the danger had passed, but never did. Such was the case of a now sealed shop close to 'Café Otto', which was locked by its owner and was opened to be utilized only years later by UNFICYP, who discovered that everything had remained untouched, with products being sold in the 1960s still intact on the shelves. Some of these objects were displayed in a makeshift exhibition, as shown in Figure 7.

From the rooftop of the nowadays UN Buffer Zone centre of operations one can moor over the collapsed roofs of the abandoned buildings, fully appreciating the reasons why Nicosia's Buffer Zone is known as the 'dead zone' or 'no man's land'. At the same time, one realizes as well the proximity of urban environment outside the Buffer Zone, adjacent to it from both sides. The busy Ledra Street / Locmaci crossing is not far away. From this rooftop, the divided realities of Nicosia became more apparent to me, more real, than before. Standing atop a structure in-between Nicosia's two sides, at the same time in the middle and at the edge, I started pondering over what kind of space Nicosia's Buffer Zone was. Ben's narrative offered only a limited, biased insight into its past and present. What other narratives are there, visible or obscure, influencing people's perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, its past, present and future?



Figure 1 (top left): The school of *Agios Kassianos*. January 13, 2000, by Europa Nostra.

Figure 2 (top right): Abandoned outposts 3 m apart. March 21, 2012, by the author.

Figure 3 (bottom left): 'Café Otto'. March 21, 2012, by the author.

Figure 4 (bottom right): Makeshift exhibition of old objects. March 21, 2012, by the author.




Figure 5 (top): View of Nicosia's Buffer Zone from above. January 9, 2002, by Europa Nostra.

Figure 6 (bottom left): Crumbling buildings in Nicosia's Buffer Zone. April 3, 2003, by Europa Nostra.

Figure 7 (bottom right): View of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, with UNFICYP tour. January 12, 2000, by Europa Nostra.

1.2 Introduction

This thesis focuses on Nicosia, the capital and largest city of the island of Cyprus, and the controversial boundary that divides its historic centre, known colloquially as the Buffer Zone, the 'Green Line', the 'Dead Zone' or 'No Man's Land'¹. Nicosia, known locally as *Lefkosia* (in Greek) and *Lefkosha* (in Turkish), is located on the River Pedieos, and situated almost at the centre of the island. It served as a seat of power for the Lusignans, the Venetians, the Ottomans, and the British before becoming the capital of the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960². It is rather notoriously known as a prime theatre of a long-lasting conflict between the island's two major communities, the Orthodox Christian Greek-Cypriot majority, and the Sunni Muslim Turkish-Cypriot minority (18 percent of the island's population at the time). As the conflict, known today as the Cyprus Problem, erupted in violence during the late 1950s and through the 1960s, the boundary was gradually consolidated, and became impermeable in 1974 following a short period of war.

In the aftermath of 1974, Nicosia's partition was extended island-wide based on the forward defended positions of each side to delineate a ceasefire zone (Christodoulidou, 2008, pp. 116-117). Maintained and patrolled until today by the UNFICYP, it remains under its military control. This is the United Nations Buffer Zone, separating the internationally recognized Greek-Cypriot Republic of Cyprus [RoC] in the south from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC], a self-declared state in the north, recognized only by Turkey (see Figure 8). Occupying 3 percent of the land, it stretches from the western point of the island 185 km to the east just south of the city of Famagusta, varying in width from 7,4 km in some rural areas to only 3,3 m at Nicosia's historic centre (Hadjichristos, 2006). Due to the lack of a formal agreement between the UNFICYP and the two sides in Cyprus, the legal status of the Buffer Zone remains obscure (Christodoulidou, 2008, p. 117). In accordance with the UN mandate, the UNFICYP has prohibited military activities in the Buffer Zone, while it has allowed peaceful civilian activities, such as construction, farming, work and short-term access. All activities, however, remain subject to UNFICYP Civil Affairs Section authorization, pending a limited-duration 'Buffer Zone permit', adhering to safety and the operational requirements of the UNFICYP.




Figure 8:
Map of Cyprus
(Ker-Lindsay, 2011,
p. xviii).

¹ These names are still in popular use, especially in conversations taking place in the Greek language, while the use of the term 'Buffer Zone' prevails in English. The Turkish term *Yeşil Hat* also translates to Green Line.


² For a chronology of events in Cyprus, see Appendix I.

Today, more than sixty years after its initial partition, Nicosia remains a divided city. Its parts serve as the capitals of the two polities south and north of the Buffer Zone. In Nicosia, the urban part of the Buffer Zone, with a length of 1,5 km, covers about 10 percent of the historic centre (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001). This is one of the urban areas in Cyprus most affected by the situation of partition, where the divide is an everyday experience. Streets and alleys lead to dead ends and barricades made of barbed wire, concrete wall segments, sandbags and barrels. In the areas adjacent to this boundary, neighbourhoods degrade, deprived of their most vital parts. The previously most vibrant part of the city, its market along Ermou and Themistokleous Streets, falls within the Buffer Zone. This historic city centre was turned into two edges, gradually abandoned by its old inhabitants, rendered unattractive and for many years considered dangerous (see Figure 9). The conditions of abandonment and degradation prevailing in the urban part of the Buffer Zone and its surrounding areas have encouraged its popular perception as 'dead' and 'unchanging', awaiting a solution to the Cyprus Problem.

In 2003, mobility between Nicosia's and the island's two sectors was re-established. Albeit controlled through designated checkpoints, it ended the long-lasting separation of the Cypriot communities. This newfound porosity of the Buffer Zone gave rise to a number of different local discourses, as Cypriots contemplated showing their identification documents to cross or not (Demetriou, 2007; Hadjipavlou, 2007a; Hatay, Mullen & Kalimeri, 2008; Jacobson, Musyck, Orphanides & Webster, 2009). In the sixteen years since the opening of the first crossing point, manifold opportunities for encounters, interactions, and synergies emerged, accompanied by an unprecedented surge in local initiatives centred around Nicosia's Buffer Zone, marking a prominent shift in local socio-spatial practices as well.

This thesis departs from a genuine interest in the material and ideational dimensions of urban partition. How is it constructed, not merely in physical terms but in the minds of the societies affected by conflict? How is it established in official and everyday discourses? What kinds of mechanisms have been developed to maintain it, and as in Nicosia's case, make it necessary and inseparable part of the urban experience? Moreover, taking into account the consensus in relevant literature pertaining to the imperative for its removal, this thesis is inquiring into the relevance of peace agreements to overcoming urban partition. For this purpose, it also looks at narratives and practices that have attempted to contest it. In this sense, urban partition is explored as a dynamic rather than fixed phenomenon; one that transcends scales as well as temporalities, entwining past, present, and future. Urban partition in this thesis is, thus, a concept open to reinterpretation, through an exploration of relations that expand in both space and time.

This thesis is primarily based on qualitative material. Research was conducted in a combination of content analysis of both primary and secondary sources spanning various disciplines, and empirical work in Nicosia, which took place in three research trips between March 2012 and June 2014. Information was gleaned from expert interviews with local actors, personal direct observations and participation in various events, the study of documents and archival material. Before extensively presenting this thesis' theoretical framework and methodology, it is necessary to explain the choice of Nicosia as an intrinsic case study, and the particular spatial conditions it demonstrates, which make it befitting for this kind of study.



Buffer Zone

Figure 9: Aspects of Nicosia's historic centre. March, 2012, by the author.



1.2.1 Why Nicosia?

The selection of Nicosia as a case study for this research project was not random. Nicosia is situated within a growing literature on 'divided cities' alongside Belfast, Jerusalem, Mostar, Sarajevo and Beirut, to name only a few, demonstrating a long-term partition associated with an intractable ethnic conflict. It is, thus, relevant as an extreme case that allows phenomena to be clearly observed. However, Nicosia, possibly due to its size and relatively isolated insular context, is not widely researched. Other 'divided cities', like Belfast, Jerusalem, or Beirut, have dominated the relevant research agenda; with Nicosia often serving as the complementary case study, testifying results (Bollens, 1998, 1999, 2001, 2009, 2012; Calame, 2005; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009; Charlesworth, 2006; Gaffikin, Karelse, Morrissey, Mulholland & Sterrett, 2016; Gaffikin, McEldowney & Sterrett, 2010; Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011; Gaffikin, Sterrett, McEldowney, Morrissey & Hardy, 2008; Morrissey & Gaffikin, 2006).

On the other hand, Nicosia-specific studies are few, all of which do not engage with the city from the perspective of space. Research is carried out by a small circle of scholars, most of whom come from or are related to Cyprus. Predominantly anthropologists and political scientists have worked on issues such as peace and reconciliation (Papadakis, 2005, 2006; Trimikliniotis, 2009; Hatay, 2008; Wolleh, 2001), displacement (Bryant, 2012; Demetriou, 2012a; Gürel, 2012), life during and after the conflict (Navaro-Yashin, 2012; Bryant, 2002, 2005, 2010; Anastasiou, 2002), memory and forgetting (Demetriou, 2006, 2012b), formation of nationalist narratives (Bryant, 2004; Faustmann, 2009), and lately crossing the border and formation of civil society initiatives (Demetriou, 2007; Dikomitis, 2005; Hadjipavlou, 2010; Loizos, 2006, Webster & Dallen, 2006). Despite this rich depository of knowledge, a holistic approach, linking existing research and bringing ethnographic material into an urban studies perspective is missing. Thus, Nicosia offers fertile grounds for interdisciplinary experimentation, wherein this knowledge depository can be mobilized and reinterpreted, theories can be tested, and new perspectives may emerge.

Moreover, bringing this knowledge to a wider audience by communicating research findings across disciplines will create an opportunity to open up Nicosia to so far unexplored space-related research beyond the narrow view of ethnic conflict. For this purpose, the momentum the island has gained since official negotiations to solve the Cyprus Problem resumed in 2008 and intensified through 2015 is of importance, despite their recent collapse in July 2017. Cyprus also received international attention in the media due to an economic crisis in 2012, an aftermath of the ongoing Greek crisis of 2008³. Nicosia is albeit due to this unfortunate conjuncture under the spotlight, offering incidentally a unique chance for urban researchers to utilize this momentum to communicate their findings with audiences beyond the limits of the island.

³ Here, it is important to note that, as economic developments are recent, uncertain and fluid, placing an interest in them in this research project was deemed unnecessary. Moreover, it is beyond the scope of this research to analyse how global economic shifts would affect realities on the ground in Nicosia. This would be a matter for further thorough investigation. Suffice is to say for now that economic factors are playing and have always been playing a grand role in shaping the conflict and the relations of the two opposing sides, as well as their relations with the rest of the world. This understanding includes the recent discovery of great hydrocarbon reserves in the Cypriot territorial waters. The status of these waters and the right to drill for energy reserves has become in the last years a matter of contestation between Cyprus and Turkey, increasing the tension between them.

1.2.2 Particular spatial conditions

Apart from relevance, Nicosia presents particular spatial conditions that contribute to its importance in contemporary scholarship about 'divided cities'. First, the nature of urban partition per se, i.e. a Buffer Zone cutting through the historic city centre, has shaped a compact and contained within medieval walls urban configuration, wherein the integration of partition into urban life can be observed. In this manner, Nicosia's cityscape enables the correlation between the overarching dispute, the ethnic conflict, and realities on the ground at different points in time. Moving away from a perception of urban partition as imposed on cities from the top down and from without, this thesis explores the social and political components of Nicosia's spatial predicament. It unpacks the narratives of partition, deeply rooted in pre-existing rival nationalisms, and traces the ways they have found spatial expression. It then examines the role of space and its diverse perceptions in changing the way people think, act, and understand themselves. As narratives of conflict and partition unfold, complex links between various scales are drawn, revealing the agency of different actors across time.

The second spatial condition is the establishment of the bi-communal Nicosia Master Plan [NMP] soon after Nicosia's official partition in 1974. It was initiated under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program to address the practical issue of an incomplete sewerage system. After bi-communal cooperation was proved effective in tackling infrastructural problems, a mixed team consisting of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot architects, planners, sociologists, engineers, economists and foreign advisors was formed, and under the patronage of Nicosia's two mayors worked effectively together in various projects. The NMP, being the first (and for some time the only) common project carried out by the two communities, brings to the foreground the issue of cooperation across the Buffer Zone. It was conceived as a framework that would guide and set out the overall planning strategy for Nicosia, ensuring the rational development of the city's two parts and preparing the ground for reunification, once a political settlement of the conflict has been achieved. Not only did the NMP recognize partition as a source of problems of planning, architectural, economic, environmental, and social nature, it also attempted to tackle them, proposing comprehensive policies and local interventions.

This is important for two reasons. First, it situates planning and larger processes of spatial transformation at the epicentre of the discourse about 'divided cities'. Indeed, in recent literature (Calame & Charlesworth, 2009; Charlesworth, 2006; Gaffikin, McEldowney & Sterrett, 2010; Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011; Gaffikin, Sterrett, McEldowney, Morrissey & Hardy, 2008; Morrissey & Gaffikin, 2006), scholars are supporting the idea that planners and architects should take immediate action after the end of the conflict even before an official settlement is reached; Nicosia emphasized as a positive such example, where interventions have taken place. This argument places emphasis on the role of urban planning in facilitating integrative cityscapes in the aftermath of conflict. It does not, however, delve into the terms and conditions under which such intervention becomes possible, and the consequences of compliance with them. Second, it attributes efficacy to planning as a platform for cooperation across ethnic lines in the aftermath of conflict, thus linking it to peace-making processes. The analysis of the NMP, of its achievements, its shortcomings, its context and its modes of operation, offers the possibility to interrogate not only the effectiveness of planning policies in ameliorating urban partition, in physical and social terms, but also their role in structuring local narratives of peace-making, and in providing the material spaces where peace is

supposed to take place. Planning as a predominantly political instrument serves as a revealing entry point into Nicosia's realities on the ground, while at the same time links them to high-level political peace-making processes.

The third of Nicosia's particular spatial conditions is the restitution of controlled mobility between the city's two parts in 2003. In place since 1964, Nicosia's Buffer Zone became impermeable ten years later, after the Turkish invasion in 1974. Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots had been living apart for longer than a generation, when in April 2003 the TRNC decided to ease travel restrictions across the Buffer Zone. The opening of the Ledra Palace checkpoint in Nicosia restored overnight mobility between south and north. Since then, another eight crossing points along the Buffer Zone have allowed controlled mobility between the island's two parts; two of them are located in Nicosia. Providing one's passport is a necessary condition for crossing. The opening of the crossings marked a milestone in recent Cypriot history. It opened up the possibility for casual effortless interaction between the two communities, an opportunity embraced by many Cypriots, who in those early days hurried to see the 'other side'. At the same time, this possibility enabled a number of shifts in perspective, as Cypriots faced a dilemma - to cross or not to cross - and the ensuing reality of encountering the 'other'.

For the part of civil society engaged in reconciliation and rapprochement initiatives, known as the bi-communal movement, the opening of the crossings signified the end of an era. Largely marginalized from the wider Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot societies, bi-communal groups held their meetings prior to 2003 in specific loci inside the Buffer Zone, relying on scarcely granted special authorization. Interaction, irregular and facilitated by external agencies (such as UNFICYP), was focused on simply achieving a meeting with the 'other' to understand their hopes and fears, and explore the possibility of constructing trusting relationships. The restitution of mobility catalysed this process in an unprecedented way, forcing diverse actors in the bi-communal movement to reinvent their agendas. This thesis tackles the restitution of mobility in Nicosia as a critical turning point. The opening of the crossings revolutionized intercommunal interaction in Cyprus. Moreover, it marked a fundamental change in local socio-spatial practices in Nicosia, as various actors came forth to pursue their visions for the city's and the island's future. The failure of peace negotiations in 2004 and the idleness of political elites in its aftermath boosted local initiatives. With the European Union invested in a solution of the Cyprus Problem, especially after the RoC became a member state in 2004, new frameworks and funding opportunities became available to promote confidence building measures. Especially Nicosia's historic centre, where both partition and mobility between south and north were experienced as part of daily routines, became the epicentre of various actions and activities. During my empirical work I came across a small but reinvigorated civil society of reconciliation, active not only in reference to but also inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone. Bottom-up initiatives, such as the Home for Cooperation, an activity centre for civil society organizations, and the local Occupy Movement of 2011/2012, have reclaimed space inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone crossings.

Nicosia's particular spatial conditions (partition of a compact historic centre, cooperation in urban planning and controlled mobility) and the radically spatialized form recent bottom-up initiatives have taken offer plentiful indications of a complex relation between urban partition, peace-making and local political and social realities. This merits in-depth exploration, the needs of which only an intrinsic case study analysis can meet. Prompted by my own first-hand experience in Nicosia's Buffer Zone, I focus my inquiries on the spatial practices in which local actors, much like my guide Ben, engage and the narratives

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that underpin them. The aim of this thesis is to decipher how the interpenetration of practices and narratives may elucidate perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone. In the present thesis then, space becomes a principal category of inquiry.

1.3 Research Interest

The present thesis investigates current spatial practices taking place in and around Nicosia's Buffer Zone within the context of Nicosia's partition. What is today the role of this space between two parts of the city and two polities in protracted conflict, and how has it changed over time?

1.4 Research Hypothesis

Over the years of unresolved conflict, Nicosia's Buffer Zone has become a symbol in Cypriot imagination, charged with emotions and vested with a diversity of meanings for Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots alike. Representing the city's partition, it is the embodiment of the Cypriot conflict and the locus of collective memory of past traumas. It has been, however, contrary to popular perception, neither 'dead' and 'unchanging' nor stuck in time, awaiting a solution to the Cyprus Problem to 'become' something else. Current spatial practices pertaining to Nicosia's Buffer Zone are indicative of changes in dominant perceptions about the city's partition, hence indicative of concurrent processes of transformation: spatial, political, social. Through these processes of transformation, the (material and ideational) space of the Buffer Zone has emerged with a spatial, political and social function different than that of a dividing boundary.

I argue that Nicosia's Buffer Zone has been a space in transformation, a dynamic social construct, which offers as well the possibility for production of space accessible both physically and mentally to all, Cypriots or otherwise. This space allows and facilitates encounters between various actors, accommodates new meanings, socio-spatial practices and diverse spatial imaginaries.

CHAPTER 2

Conceptualisation

2.1 State of the Art and Theoretical Exploration

The first section of this chapter presents the theoretical exploration that permeates this thesis. It begins with a review and state of the art of urban planning literature about 'divided cities', within which Nicosia is usually studied. This strand of literature offers, however, a very narrow scope of inquiry. Therefore, this section proceeds to review literature from border studies, which I consider being a most relevant field for the study of urban partition. Border studies offer a necessary toolbox of notions and concepts of broader scope. These two very concrete research agendas offer insightful perspectives that inform my understanding of the complexity of urban partition in Nicosia. The specific focus of the present thesis on spatiality, however, demands an expanded perception of space, which is found in Geography and particularly E. Soja's (1996) *Thirdspace*. Although the present thesis does not adopt his concept of *Thirdspace*, Soja's (1996) exploration of spatiality informs my understanding of space, operating as motivation and enriching the aforementioned approaches with a distinctly spatial thinking, allowing me not only to think about space, but to think *from space*. Within this frame, recent insights from Peace and Conflict Studies steer this thesis' theoretical exploration towards conceptualizations of place and agency.

It should be noted that this theoretical exploration was heavily influenced by material from my empirical work in various stages of material collection and assessment. It should not, therefore, be seen as following a unidirectional flow, in which theory is used a priori to organize the field of research or functions as an interpretive tool to explain observations. The actual process involved numerous literal and metaphorical journeys back and forth, from the field in Cyprus to my desk, library, colloquia and conferences in Germany and elsewhere, feeding back to each other and bringing each time this work one step forward. For the sake of clarity and coherence, the different perspectives are presented in this part of the thesis in a cumulative manner. The reader should expect to encounter them throughout the thesis interwoven with empirical material.

2.1.1 Urban planning, conflict and the divided city

Within the rather large urban studies literature concerned with conflict in cities, there is a distinct strand focusing on cities, such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Johannesburg, Nicosia, Algiers, Sarajevo, Beirut, or Brussels, where political contestation or conflict arise in relation to ethnic, nationalistic or political differences (Bollens, 1999, 2001, 2009; Brand, Gaffikin, Morrissey & Perry, 2008; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009; Charlesworth, 2006; Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011). Their focus is primarily on how ethnic affiliation and nationalism translate into demands for rights, autonomy and territory, expressed in the urban fabric in both physical as well as socio-economic terms (Bollens, 1999, 2009). They tackle the city as either the focal point of conflict or the stage, where issues of regional or national concern are played out (Bollens, 1999, 2009). According to this, urban areas become saturated with ideological, ethnic and nationalistic

grievances, hence prone to violent eruption. In extreme cases, physical partition is imposed as a short-term solution to lessen the violence, until a comprehensive settlement is achieved. The term 'divided city' summarizes, thus, physical urban partition related to ethnic or nationalistic conflict.

However, rather than being endemic in societies, ethnic conflict is primarily a symptom of pre-existing social pathogenesis, often expressed as discriminatory governance, inequality of opportunities, and oppression of political rights. Examining divided cities, Calame and Charlesworth (2009) summarize under the term 'urban contract' the set of obligations and rights that regulate urban life. According to this, urban dwellers offer their services in exchange for conditions favouring development, social opportunities and safety guaranteed by the city's government. When these conditions are not satisfied the 'urban contract' is breached, and parts of the society are likely to feel threatened, resulting in contestation. Where ethnic differences are prominent, ensuing demands for rights, autonomy and territory may be articulated in antagonistic ethnic or nationalistic terms. As a result, ethnic nationalism becomes the primary lens through which all other issues are examined. A violent escalation of such conflicts spells, however, a severe social breakdown, which urban partition cannot adequately address. Hence, divided cities are not only arenas of ethnic conflict but of simultaneous larger scale socio-political conflicts as well; an aspect that has often been downplayed as discourses become structured around ethnic and/or nationalistic binaries. When a political settlement of the conflict is not achieved, the underlying socio-political issues remain unaddressed, while partition turns permanent. Distrust, fear and hostility towards the ethnic 'other' become the norm, and stereotypes are reinforced, while the premises of the conflict remain unquestioned. Hence, urban partition, as a means targeting only the symptoms of conflict and contestation, is not considered an effective solution in the long-term (Bollens, 2001; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009). Moreover, the sustenance of dividing infrastructure, such as walls, fences, buffer zones and other boundaries, comes with high material, economic and social costs (Bollens, 2001; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009; Stanley - Price, 2005).

As a result, significant part of the scholarly production on ethnic conflict in various disciplines has focused on developing peace-making approaches towards social and political reconciliation and remedies to urban partition. This is often expressed in the notion of 'reunification' of the divided city. Bollens (1999) reflecting on four disciplines offering analytical perspectives on urban conflict – urban planning, geography, political science and social psychology – notes that none alone can capture fully "the complex social and physical aspects of urban strife" (p. 17). In urban planning, research has primarily focused on technical aspects of land use and development policies, without engaging, however, with issues of social justice or the built environment of conflict per se. These are pragmatic but only palliative approaches, targeting tangible aspects of socially, politically and economically embedded disputes. Since urban planning becomes necessarily entangled with dominant forms of power, Bollens (1999, p. 13) opines that such approaches presuppose the legitimacy of public authority, which is often an area of contestation in divided cities. As a result, they often legitimize the divisive status quo and institutionalize urban polarization. In geography, research has focused on territorial aspects and dynamics of ethnic polarization, understating, however, the interrelation between the spatial and the political. As Yiftachel (1996) notes, territorial policies reify power relations; they can, therefore, be used as "an instrument of control and repression" (p. 219). As political goals connect to specific territorial claims, dominant forms of power and state authority become manifest in urban spaces. A direct connection then becomes apparent between political imaginaries and spatial practices, which needs to be studied in depth and in specific contexts. In political science, research

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has focused on the effects of high politics, the political and legal arrangements operating at the state level, in diffusing conflict. Such formal political negotiations often adhere to zero-sum approaches, disregarding local politics and everyday practical issues caused or perpetuated by urban partition. On the contrary, research in social psychology has focused on intergroup contact with its main interest being on non-material concerns, values and fundamental human needs, such as security, identity, recognition, fair access to resources and political institutions (Bollens, 1999, pp. 15-16). Bollens (1999, 2009) notes, however, that these approaches have not been connected to formal policymaking.

In response to the shortcomings of the aforementioned approaches, Bollens (1999, 2009) argues for an integrative approach, wherein peace-making strategies engage with the regional and the local level, and result in specific policies on the ground, tackling not only the spatial manifestations of conflict but also the issues pertaining to the curtailing of fundamental human needs. He focuses on urban policymaking, addressing divided and contested cities in comparative frameworks, grounded on the premise that every case study can be located somewhere along a “conflict-stability continuum”, wherein conflict relates to unabated violence and stability is associated with a return to ‘normalcy’ (Bollens, 2009, p. 1). The underlying assumption is that general patterns can be identified across diverse contexts, linking urban policymaking to promoting peace on the city level by fostering urban interdependence to overcome ethnic polarization, thus contributing to larger processes of post-conflict societal reconciliation (Bollens, 1999, 2009). Within this framework, conflict management and urban governance are considered a domain regulated by the state and its various intersections with the city and regional authorities. Thus differentiation is foregrounded only in terms of areas of policy intervention and the levels of government involved in policy enactment, without acknowledging the potential contribution of bottom-up initiatives.

Besides Bollens, other scholars too have embraced interdisciplinary and integrative approaches to urban planning with reference to divided cities. Charlesworth (2006) focuses on professional responses to partition and post-war reconstruction, inquiring into the role of architecture as a peace-building tool. Emphasizing that the extent of architects’ and planners’ contribution to societal reconciliation is not limited to emergency interventions in the immediate aftermath of conflict, she suggests an interdisciplinary framework, wherein planning is integrated with approaches from sociology, psychology and environmental studies. Others too (Ascherson, 2005; Barakat, 2005; Calame, 2005; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009) support the idea that architects and planners should be involved in post-war recovery and reconciliation, even before an official political settlement is reached. Underlining a necessary departure from planning professionals’ assumed neutrality, these approaches foreground certain necessary skills for effective professional involvement, such as learning to operate under dysfunctional conditions, evaluating social needs under conditions of intolerance, shaping policies amidst group rivalry and engaging directly with urban partition. These approaches address divided and contested cities in comparative frameworks based on the assumption that urban partition is a plausible future for every city. In other words, they echo Bollens in arguing that all cities are located somewhere within a continuum from perfect spatial integration to complete spatial separation.

While these approaches acknowledge that contestation and urban partition are not occurring only in cases of war or armed conflict but may be encountered in various urban contexts, they demonstrate two fundamental shortcomings. One lies in the binary distinctions prominent in this strand of literature (conflict / stability, integration / separation); the other in the perception of space underlining them. Seeing conflict as

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the antipode to stability, places emphasis on the product, rather than the process from which it results. While the aforementioned approaches acknowledge that any mixture of stability and conflict, integration and separation, is indeed encountered in cities, they assume a linear transition from one distinct end of the binary to the other. Moreover, they assign negative value to conflict and separation, tackling them as conditions to be remediated. I argue, contrariwise, that conflict and stability always coexist and are constantly negotiated in urban space by different actors simultaneously. Such mixtures entail the danger of violent eruption; they may nevertheless be productive as well, give rise to opportunities, and lead to transformation. Indeed one needs to wonder, if a city void of such transformative contestations and conflicts is at all desirable. In a similar manner, complete spatial separation does not necessarily exclude contact or cooperation, as Nicosia's case well demonstrates. Vice versa, perfect spatial integration, assuming it exists, does not foreclose less visible (or yet to be spatially manifested) forms of contestation and conflict. Therefore, stability and integration cannot be addressed in terms of a rigid binary distinction as the opposites of conflict and separation. Moreover, they cannot be adequately defined without a qualifier and are necessarily context dependent. For example, class-, race-, or gender-related contestation often transcends ethnic binaries, and remains present even when ethnic conflict abates.

Hence, cities host multiple, overlapping and often interrelated contestations and conflicts unfolding simultaneously. Divided cities the likes of Nicosia are no exception. The narrow scope offered by the lens of ethnicity or nationalism cannot adequately address such complex phenomena. Urban partition in divided cities is not a mere product of ethnic or nationalistic conflict; it is a process shaped and reshaped by different actors over time, as they formulate different demands and negotiate various interests, resulting in power relations that define mixtures of conflict and stability, separation and integration. To approach urban partition in a coherent and all-encompassing manner, research needs to go beyond the narrow scope of urban policy-making and top-down interventionism, and reintroduce space as a category for inquiry. Space should be seen as more than a background against which social, political and economic realities unfold. Space and conflict are mutually constituted in power relations. Therefore, prioritizing the study of space may provide insights into how power operates through and beyond binary distinctions.

This has been recently acknowledged by Gaffikin and Morrissey (2011, see also Gaffikin, Karelse, Morrissey, Mulholland & Sterrett, 2016; Gaffikin, McEldowney & Sterrett, 2010; Gaffikin, Sterrett, McEldowney, Morrissey & Hardy, 2008; Morrissey & Gaffikin, 2006), in their inquiries about the role of urban planning in facilitating integrative cityscapes in divided cities. What differentiates Gaffikin and Morrissey's (2011) approach from the aforementioned ones is their engagement with identity politics, and their reflection on the concept of space in examining how planning policy can promote inclusivity in diversity. In their analysis, space is tackled as socially constructed, hence dynamic, constantly made and remade. While they too suggest that all cities are in some regard 'divided', they differentiate between cities contested around issues of pluralism (such as class, power or equity) and those contested around sovereignty as well (Gaffikin & Morrissey, p. 21). In the latter case, they claim, state legitimacy becomes entangled with ownership of urban space, complicating the role of planning in promoting social cohesion. To this end, they propose a reconceptualization of planning in a manner that integrates "conflict resolution, community cohesion and social inclusion" (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011, p. 115). Considering the merits and deficiencies of collaborative and agonistic planning approaches (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011, pp. 118-131), they praise the creation of 'shared' spaces that facilitate engagement across the divide and encourage

negotiation of diverse interests, values and needs (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011, pp. 260-263). These 'shared' spaces, they contend, must result from intensive participatory processes and with a necessary departure from market-oriented development and the authority of the expert professional. Moreover, they stress the need for interdisciplinarity, with architects, educators, artists, economists and others involved in planning, while simultaneously identifying the difficulties the polyphony of participation generates, and the evident disinclination to incorporate the ensuing public discourse into actual policymaking (Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011, pp. 265-272).

Hence, despite being underpinned by a perception of space as dynamic and relational, and promoting participatory planning, this approach too retains a top-down scope, and remains strictly focused on urban policymaking as the means to promote urban regeneration in tandem with conflict resolution and social inclusion. Within this frame, the process of building community capacity for peace and dialogue across the divide, on which it is based, is seen as strained by the exclusionary traits of each distinct community. Therefore, not only is such community capacity-building tackled as extraneous to local people, but is also yet again analysed in terms of an ethnic divide. In this view, all other issues, however existing, become subordinated to the ethno-nationalist conflict. A gap is then identified, as a complementary approach that directly engages with the urban dwellers to investigate bottom-up unplanned production of 'shared' space in divided cities is missing. Such approach necessitates a departure from binary distinctions, a perception of space that takes into account the agency of diverse urban dwellers, and the capacity of space to affect conflict perception. This approach should be underpinned by a correlation between political imaginaries and spatial practices.

2.1.2 The study of borders and boundaries

The post-cold war era, instead of witnessing the dissipation of states and the obsolescence of state borders as suggested by earlier globalization discourses, has seen more inter- and intrastate borders than ever before (Newman, 2006a, 2006b; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). Furthermore, the second half of the twentieth century has been dominated by a shift from inter- to intrastate conflicts, involving state as well as non-state actors. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [HIK] observed a steady increase in the number of conflicts worldwide, from 83 in 1945 to over 400 in 2013. Of these conflicts, the vast majority (337) were intrastate, constituting 80 percent of the global count (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict [HIK] Conflict Barometer, 2013, pp. 16-17). Moreover, conflicts have also been increasing in violence and intensity, with violent conflicts rising from 39,6 percent of the total count in 2007 to 53 percent in 2013, and 57 percent in 2017. This holds particularly true for intrastate conflicts, of which 67 percent displayed some degree of violence in 2017 compared to 62 percent in 2013, and 52 percent in 2007 (HIK Conflict Barometer, 2007, 2013, 2017). Although in the last ten years, the change of the political or economic system has prevailed as conflict impetus worldwide, followed closely by strife over either resources or national power; territory as well as autonomy / secession still figure prominently among the ten most frequent conflict causes (HIK Conflict Barometer, 2007-2017). Moreover, as this thesis is being finalized, war still rages in the Middle East, the European Union integration project continues to be challenged by the reinforcement of its external borders and the return of some member states' border

controls in the face of the ongoing refugee crisis, as well as by prolonged Eurozone crises, and by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union. Thus, despite the Eurocentric illusion of an increasingly borderless world, borders and boundaries emerge continuously. Hence, their study, both in the traditional (physical boundaries at the edges of nation-states) as well as in contemporary (non-material boundaries, for example social or cultural) sense, remains highly relevant. Border studies offer, therefore, a highly relevant field of broader scope within which urban partition can be studied. The following pages review some of the main notions and concepts contemporary border studies offer, and reflect on how situating Nicosia's partition within this field may be mutually enriching.

Borders and boundaries that occur in relation to or as a result of territorial conflicts, such as Nicosia's Buffer Zone, are often discussed within the more traditional strand of border studies concerned with geopolitical borders¹. Following the Second World War, studies on borders and boundaries, embedded in geography, tackled such borders as fixed and unchanging territorial lines separating states within an international system (Newman, 2003, p. 13). Main object of these studies was the categorization and systematic classification of borders (Newman, 2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2011; Scott, 2011). Borders and boundaries attracted new interest in the 1990s after the fall of the iron curtain and the multiplication of state borders in its aftermath. Border studies emerged as a multidisciplinary field, where historians, political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have joined geographers in analysing and understanding borders and boundaries, initially within their respective disciplines (Wilson & Donnan, 2012).

Studies of borders in geography shifted focus from concepts such as 'frontiers' and 'boundaries'² to studying the interrelations between state territory and social, political, cultural, and economic aspects of life in 'border landscapes', defined as the areas proximal to and including a state border, where cross-border activities take place (Wilson & Donnan, 2012, p. 8). Historians developed the concept of 'borderlands', understood as regions bisected by state borderlines, to explore the idea that people on either side of the border share multiple identities, networks and relationships, which in turn impacts on the relationship between each state and its territory (Wilson & Donnan, 2012, p. 9). In this sense, 'borderlands' are seen as transitional zones rather than strict separation lines (Newman, 2011, p. 37). Political science, concerned with international borders and forms of cooperation across them, explored the concept of 'border regions', which questions the congruence between nation, state and territory (Wilson & Donnan, 2012, p. 10). Anthropology of borders studied international borders and their role in everyday lives of local communities at borderlands, focusing on the dialectical relations between constructs of the nation and local border practices and narratives. With a particular emphasis on the local context, these studies shed light to 'a view of the border from below' (Wilson & Donnan, 2012, p. 8). Sociologists focused on border societies and the politics of identity at borderlands, studying groups, movements and institutions (Wilson & Donnan, 2012, p. 11). Within these disciplines, each using their theoretical apparatus and methodological arsenal, borders and boundaries emerged in the course of the last twenty years as complex spatial and social phenomena with changing roles and multiple functions.

¹ Green (2012, p. 577) underlines that based on the 'Westphalian logic of border construction' prevalent in Europe, political borders are thought to encompass territory, state sovereignty and people, are clearly delimited and internationally recognized.

² Prescott (1987) describes boundaries as formal border lines between nation-states, and frontiers as zones between nation-states or a state and its adjacent territory of potential expansion. Anderson (1996) offers an extensive historical analysis of the concept of 'frontier' and its utilization in various contexts.

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In their contemporary sense, borders are understood as institutions, socially produced phenomena as well as ongoing processes (Houtum & Naerssen, 2002; Houtum & Strüver, 2002; Houtum, 2011; Newman, 2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2011; Paasi, 2011; Popescu, 2012; Scott, 2011; Wastl-Walter, 2011) 'existing in boundary-producing practices and discourses' (Paasi, 2011, p.13). Hence, borders and boundaries are as much spatial as they are conceptual entities (Newman, 2003; 2006b; Houtum, 2011). In this sense, boundaries may be at the same time physical and social, economic, political, cultural, religious, ethnic, or any other determinant of affiliation or belonging (Paasi, 2011; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). Contemporary border studies are transcending disciplinary boundaries with a shared focus on culture, the adoption of ethnographic methods, a shift towards the study of everyday practices, and an emphasis on the relational and processual nature of borders, summarized in the term *bordering* (Wastl-Walter, 2011; Wilson & Donnan, 2012).

The idea that *bordering*, i.e. border-making, takes place not only at traditional borders at the edges of states but is diffused in societies has dominated contemporary scholarly production (DeChaine, 2012; Linde-Laursen, 2010; Nail, 2016; Popescu, 2012; Rumford, 2006; Wastl-Walter, 2011; Wilson & Donnan, 2012). May they be state borders, boundaries within regions, urban-rural divides, walls or fences within cities, symbolic cultural or social boundaries, they mark a difference between a perceived 'us' from an 'other'. Whether visible or not, borders and boundaries are constantly reproduced in social life by producing and sustaining homogenizing narratives that bind groups of people together. In this vein, *bordering* is understood as ordering of societies facilitated by processes of *othering* (Newman, 2011; Paasi, 2011). Following this understanding, this thesis considers societies as being ordered by multiple and overlapping borders and boundaries. Societies are not subjected to these processes, however, in a top-down fashion. *Bordering* places emphasis on identity-shaping processes (national, ethnic, religious etc.), and as such it involves power relations and their constant renegotiation, rather than some sort of imposition. Through the renegotiation of power relations, disjunction and reconstitution of boundaries, understood as *de-bordering* and *re-bordering* respectively, occur. Vice versa, power relations manifest in processes of *bordering*, *de-bordering* and *re-bordering* as different perceptions of borders and boundaries emerge.

As outlined above, the study of borders and boundaries in various disciplines since the 1990s has focused either on the relation between state and territory, and ensuing practices of state territoriality, or on the relation between state and people. As states have traditionally been considered the main actors in bordering processes, the relation between people and space has remained largely unexplored. Although today studies have shifted interest towards less state-focused approaches, the role of state is still considered pivotal in processes of border regulation, as well as in structuring narratives of difference between perceptions of 'us' and 'others' (Green, 2012; Newman, 2003; Paasi, 2001, Scott, 2011). For example, in studies of interstate borders state sovereignty and control remain important parameters, while cultural or social boundaries are also considered to reflect power relations negotiated at the level of the state, and propagated by central political structures (Newman, 2003; Paasi, 2011). However, practices of state territoriality are not exclusively shaping perceptions of the border. Although such analyses are still noteworthy, Paasi (2001) underlines that borders and boundaries are social and cultural constructs as well, hence not fixed but in constant transformation. In a similar vein, Rumford (2006) argues that the perception of borders and boundaries depends on people's experiences and practices; hence various actors besides

the state are involved in *bordering* processes. Moreover, he observes that social relations develop as an intrinsic characteristic of *bordering* and border crossings (Rumford, 2006). As a result, *bordering* (*de-bordering* and *re-bordering*) takes place at multiple scales simultaneously (Perkins, Cooper & Rumford, 2014; Newman, 2003; Paasi, 2011; Rumford, 2006, 2010). Thus, the different perceptions of borders and boundaries are not only state-produced; there are multiple mental and imaginative borders evident and reproduced in narratives, imagery, symbols, representations and practices. Hence, as Newman³ (2005) also notes, to unpack these multiple mental and imaginative borders studies need to refocus their scale away from the state, and towards local and micro-scale human activity and social relations.

The approaches in border studies presented above offer a comprehensive understanding of the *bordering* process. Not least due to past focus on the functional characteristics of geopolitical borders, however, analyses have been structured around multiple binaries: 'us' and 'them', 'here' and 'there', 'inside' and 'outside', 'centre' and 'periphery'. In this binary logic, one ethnic identity is understood in relational opposition to another; someone's inclusion means someone else's exclusion; borders are open and welcoming or closed and hostile; walls and buffer zones exist in conflict and are removed in times of peace. As the border discourse gradually expanded to include non-territorial boundaries, these binary distinctions came to epitomize borders as sharp edges between social categories as well (Newman, 2006). Physical boundaries are not necessary features of these *bordering* processes, although a spatial aspect might appear, for example in patterns of urban segregation. At the same time a recurrent subject in the contemporary study of borders and boundaries has been their degree of openness to the movement of people, goods and ideas, i.e. border/boundary crossing and transgression. For example, in the case of national borders openness is seen as a positive feature in terms of good-neighbourliness and effective interaction across the border in social, economic, cultural and political terms (Newman, 2003). A closed border functioning as barrier is associated with lack of interaction, hence lack of familiarity, and possibly fear and hostility (Newman, 2003, 2006). The contemporary high level of permeability of national borders has prompted theoretical explorations wherein the borderlands are seen as contact or transitional zones characterized by familiarity, cooperation or even cross-border governance and hybridity. These approaches too, however, have been grounded on a binary logic, postulating distinct categories between which transitional zones operate. Moreover, as Rumford (2006, 2010) notes, openness is selective and what is an open border to some might be a barrier to others. In a similar vein, Newman (2006) also emphasizes that crossing a national border, for example in the case of refugees or migrants, is but the first in a host of challenges, since crossing from 'here' to 'there' does not necessitate a shift in terms of understanding of belonging for either the newcomers or the various social groupings on the 'other' side. Border scholars emphasize that national borders have on the one hand become porous, facilitating increased physical mobility (for some), while on the other borders have been diffused in society, non-material conceptualizations of borders have been reinforced, and border securitization happens prominently but not at the geographical locations of borders (Newman, 2003, 2006; Paasi, 2011; Rumford, 2006, 2010). Hence, although binaries have provided in the past useful analytical tools, current realities challenge their prevalence, and necessitate different modes of thinking about borders.

³ Newman (2005, p. 19) encourages a shift of focus from the state to the local 'symbolic spaces and places'.

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In social theory, two approaches have contradicted the binary/borders-as-sharp-edges thesis within the frame of network society and critical cosmopolitanism (Newman, 2006b; Rumford 2006). Based on the idea that in the era of globalization flows and mobility render the territorial boundaries of the nation-state unimportant, the network society is organized in transnational flows of digital information exchanged through communication technologies (Castells, 1996). Fluidity and mobility across territorial borders is a prominent characteristic of this approach, which rejects rigid binary categories. In a similar vein, critical cosmopolitanism approaches on borders focus on their shaping and reshaping by “forms of governance beyond the national state” (Rumford, 2014, p. 2). Studies focusing on European integration are notable examples that expand their interest beyond cross-border mobility, increased securitization, and the role of state (Delanty, 2006). Notions of ‘global frontiers’ (Bauman, 2002), ‘global borders’ (Rumford, 2010) or ‘cosmopolitan borders’ (Rumford, 2014) offer theorizations of borders that take into account their transformation under conditions of globalisation, and tackle them as sites for cosmopolitan encounters through which societal transformation becomes possible. In these approaches *bordering* remains important, but becomes disengaged from the territory of the state. However, there are cases of conflict, such as Cyprus, where territorial issues are prominent, and the traditional discourse on geopolitical borders remains relevant. Instead of remaining faithful to the traditional mode of thinking, however, I believe it is important to develop ways of looking at such cases that while acknowledging the relevance of territory and the significant role of the state, they still embrace the idea of dynamic *bordering* processes, involving a variety of actors at different scales. As Newman (2011, p. 263) remarks, ‘parallel border dynamics’ are at play simultaneously.

In this respect, Nicosia’s partition is a promising case study, not often studied within border studies. Although discussed within the frame of a territorial ethnic dispute, it is illustrative of a boundary that was social, cultural and political before eventually finding material/physical expression. Its disputed status has for decades conditioned manifold aspects of life in Cyprus. Therefore, Nicosia’s Buffer Zone as a case study constitutes a highly complex boundary, where territorial and conceptual constructs become entangled. It thus challenges scholars to revisit both traditional and contemporary understandings of borders and boundaries. To this end, as scholars have emphasized (Paasi, 2011, pp. 21-22; Wastl-Walter, 2011, p.1), it is essential to study and understand *bordering* within specific contexts and as a ‘historically contingent process’. The present thesis, therefore, examines processes of *bordering*, *de-bordering* and *re-bordering* taking place in the Buffer Zone’s timeline, from its emergence, to deepening, to consolidation, through to its porosity until its present predicament. It studies the different perceptions of the boundary that emerge as a result of these processes, the way they exemplify power relations, and their impact on the relation between people and space in Nicosia.

Although in contemporary border studies the congruence of state, nation, territory and people is no longer presumed, in cases similar to Nicosia’s Buffer Zone, state territoriality remains a significant, if not authoritative, mode of societal ordering. As a result, the state and its institutions have dominated various studies and analyses (see for example, Asmussen, 2008; Attalides, 1979; Bryant & Papadakis, 2012; Calotychos, 1998; Papadakis, Peristianis & Welz, 2006; Ker-Lindsay, Faustmann & Mullen, 2011; Pericleous, 2009; Varnava & Faustmann, 2009). Only recently interest in the Cypriot divide turned to geographies above the state level. For example, Bueno Lacy & Houtum (2018) offer a comprehensive analysis of the Cyprus Buffer Zone as part of larger EU border-making, connecting local to global

processes to explore 'glocal' perceptions of the Buffer Zone beyond binary oppositions. The present thesis, departing from this rich depository of knowledge, reflects on state-produced perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, and the ways they relate to scales below the level of the state, and gradually shifts emphasis to people-produced perceptions. This is achieved through a refocusing of the scale away from the state and towards the spatiality, the spaces and places, of local and micro-scale activity in Nicosia's historic centre. There, I argue, emerge bottom-up through people's everyday experiences and practices differing perceptions of the boundary. Some of these perceptions affirm while others contest state-produced perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, indicating larger transformation processes underway.

Situating the study of Nicosia's partition within border studies provides the opportunity to move away from the narrow scope of ethnic polarization encountered in the 'divided cities' literature, and to shift focus towards power relations and their constant renegotiation. In this manner, urban partition is not primarily seen as the product of ethnic conflict and ensuing practices of state territoriality. Instead emphasis is placed on the process, or rather the processes, as the term *bordering* conveys. Studied within the contemporary frame of borders and boundaries, urban partition is seen as constantly made and remade through various contestations, renegotiations and appropriations. Ethnic conflict, however dominant it may be, is but one of many processes shaping Nicosia's partition. This enables a refocusing of the scale away from the state and towards people-produced perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone. As processes on the ground unfold, their complexity, entanglement and interpenetration substantiate the collapse of binary distinctions. In a perspective that shifts focus away from the state and from binary distinctions lies, I believe, an opportunity to enrich contemporary border studies. This necessarily involves a more encompassing understanding of spatiality.

In order to study people-produced perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, the present thesis turns to local narratives and spatial practices, as they provide a revealing lens through which *bordering*, *de-bordering* and *re-bordering* can be critically analysed. When processes of transformation unfold, changing narratives (and practices) are indicative, thus worth monitoring and reflecting upon. In the Cypriot case the partial opening of the boundary in 2003 has facilitated border crossings, bringing about encounters not possible for a generation. My fieldwork in Nicosia has additionally revealed practices of *crossing into*, appropriating and reclaiming the boundary itself. To avoid confusion with existing terminology, I will hereafter differentiate between border crossing/transgression and *transcendence*. *Transcendence* denotes according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary a condition beyond the limits of ordinary experience. In the frame of the present research project *transcendence* adds another layer of meaning to crossing, understood as the transformation of the ideational dimensions of the border/boundary with the potential to challenge power relations⁴, and not merely its function as physical or bureaucratic barrier. However, *transcendence* does not imply the dissolution or removal of borders and boundaries, rather a radical transformation in their conceptualization. In light of these findings, border porosity and removal need to be problematized as well. Nicosia's Buffer Zone has been discussed within a binary logic of permanence or removal; evidently there have been, however, instances of removal in its permanence, when it was there, yet it was not. In these instances an either-or logic is not instructive. A pregnant gap, thus, occurs at the interstices, in the grey matter in-between. To understand urban partition as simultaneously spatial and

⁴Newman (2003) observes that practices of border crossing and transgression do not necessarily challenge existing power relations.

conceptual entity necessitates contemplating the 'in-between', both in terms of its spatiality and sociality as well as its critical function and efficacy. Here arises the opportunity to open up research on borders and boundaries by introducing and exploring a more encompassing understanding of spatiality. As binary categories collapse (inside/outside, us/them), a way of looking which considers the simultaneity of phenomena in Nicosia, the parallel border dynamics, becomes necessary.

2.1.3 Thinking from space with Edward Soja

Space is central in my work, a preoccupation, which certainly derives from my vocation as an architect. It is through developing a keen eye for spatial forms that architects learn to explore and eventually understand the world. There is, however, more in space than form, as there is more in exploring the world than seeing. This thesis takes up a predominantly spatial perspective in studying Nicosia's partition first to satiate my need to expand spatial thinking. Second, identified gaps in the literature studied so far necessitate an understanding of space as more than a background against which things happen, and beyond practices of state territoriality. While conducting empirical work in Nicosia, I started seeking a broader, more encompassing conceptualization of space. When I came across Edward Soja's 1996 publication of *Thirdspace*, suddenly theories, own ideas, disparate concepts, and the realities I was researching on the ground came together. *Thirdspace* expanded my spatial thinking, and motivated me to think *from space* instead of thinking about space. In this part of the thesis I illustrate how this happens. It should be noted, however, that *Thirdspace* is not applied here as a concept; it rather serves as a guide to help navigate the complexity of spatial thinking.

Soja (1996) departs on his exploration of spatiality in *Thirdspace* from Henri Lefebvre's (1974/2007) conceptual triad, which provides a framework to understand space as both a product of social relations, and as itself producing social relations. In other words, space is both a social product and a social process. Lefebvre departs from the three traditional fields of knowledge about space, the physical (nature, the Cosmos), the mental (logical, abstractions) and the social, to proceed to a conceptualization of social space as an encompassing merging of all three. He focuses attention on the (social) production of social space, providing with his 'conceptual triad' three modes of thinking about space: *perceived space* (or spatial practice), *conceived space* (or representations of space), and *lived space* (representational space or space of representations). Soja (1996, p. 66), drawing on Lefebvre, interprets *perceived space* as 'both medium and outcome of human activity, behaviour, and experience'. It is where the material form of social space is produced, which we can experience with our senses, measure and describe. *Perceived space* comprises for example in the urban context everyday routes and routines, networks, relations, spaces of work and leisure. *Conceived space* is the space of scientists, planners and architects, politicians, artists and poets. It is the space of plans, regulations, policies and rules, visions and manifestos, known and understood in and through its various representations: verbal, visual, written, tactile. Soja (1996, p. 67) notes drawing on Lefebvre that *conceived space* is dominant in society, because it relates to order and control over the production of these representations. The array of spaces understood as *conceived* are "the representations of power and ideology, of control and surveillance" (Soja, 1996, p. 67). *Lived space* is on the other hand the space where domination is exercised and subordination takes place. It overlays

physical space, “making symbolic use of its objects” (Soja, 1996, p. 68). *Lived space* is both distinct from the *perceived* and the *conceived*, and it simultaneously encompasses them (Soja, 1996, p. 67). As I understand it then, *lived space* is social space as directly experienced by people unconsciously, as they move about their everyday activities, form interpersonal relations, make memories, logical, practical as well as emotional associations and attribute values and meanings. Moreover, *lived space*, Soja (1996, p. 68) remarks, is the space imagination “seeks to change and appropriate” and where “the power of spatial representations” is located. *Lived spaces* are, thus, as real as they are imagined, offering as such opportunities to resist the dominant order.

Soja (1996) sees Lefebvre’s *lived space* as closely approximating his *Thirdspace*. For Soja, it is the implicit openness and dynamism of *lived space*, its lack of cohesion, and its unknown limits that make it a space for social struggle as well, a space of the margins and the marginalized. But it is the notion of encompassing simultaneity that lends *lived space* and *Thirdspace* transformative potential and critical efficacy. In line with the spatial turn in social sciences, Soja’s *Thirdspace* invites scholars to think differently about space, to expand “the scope and critical sensibility of already established spatial or geographical imaginations” (1996, p.1), and to consider *spatiality* with similar gravity to *historicality* and *sociality*. Furthermore, he argues for an “interwoven complexity of the social, the historical, and the spatial” (1996, pp. 2-3). Conceptualizing *Thirdspace*, Soja attempts to straddle the modernist/postmodernist thinking divide with his strategy of ‘thirthing-as-Othering’ or ‘critical thirthing’. Through ‘critical thirthing’, he attempts to discard binary logics by offering an-other, a third, position, which is categorically different but also encompasses the initial two. This third position does not, Soja offers, occupy the middle ground. It introduces disruption and simultaneity. Therefore, Soja does not only embrace *lived space* as an approximation to his *Thirdspace* because of the qualities of the concept Lefebvre introduces. He appropriates and reinterprets Lefebvre’s mode of thinking as ‘critical thirthing’, and, as a result, produces his own conceptual triads, his *trialectics*⁵:

Historicality – Sociality – Spatiality

Modernism – Postmodernism – alternative Postmodernism⁶

And, finally:

Firstspace – Secondspace – Thirdspace

In this sense, Soja offers ‘critical thirthing’ as a way of making theoretical and practical sense of the world we live in. He then develops *Thirdspace* as an application of ‘critical thirthing’ to expand our understanding of the spatial dimension. In other words, much like Lefebvre, he prioritizes the study of space to emphasize its importance in our contemporary understanding, and its entanglement with the historical/temporal and

⁵ Soja coins the term *trialectics* to denote a triple dialectic (1996, p. 10).

⁶ Soja (1996) does not explicitly name the third option in this particular thirthing, but alludes to an alternative critical postmodern thinking throughout the introduction to *Thirdspace* (pp. 1-23).

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the social. Being in the world then is understood as “simultaneously historical, social, and spatial” (1996, p. 73).

The first two terms in Soja’s spatial trialectics, *Firstspace* and *Secondspace*, review and summarize the way he considers that knowledge about space has been produced up to the mid-1990s. Soja defines *Firstspace* as the perspective of space materiality (what is real). It comprises what is mapped and measured, as well as what is explained and analysed with assumingly non-spatial variables, for example social activity, behaviours, cultural differences etc. (1996, pp. 74-78). He underlines that explicit reverse inquiries as to how space affects “subjectivity, rationality, historicity, and sociality” are prominently missing in relevant epistemologies (1996, p. 77). Soja’s *Secondspace* is the perspective of cognitive, mental forms of spatiality (what is imagined), some of which are considered to have a real impact on *Firstspace*, as is for example the case of a city’s masterplan or the design of a building. Largely, Soja argues, *Secondspace* epistemologies consider it dominant over and definitive of *Firstspace* (1996, pp. 78-81). He also admits that his understanding of *Firstspace* and *Secondspace* more or less correspond to Lefebvre’s *perceived* and *conceived* space respectively. The conceptualization of *Thirdspace*, then, performs the ‘critical thirding’, completing the trialectics. *Thirdspace* is both ‘real-and-imagined’, encompassing the other two and expanding beyond them “in scope, substance, and meaning” (1996, p. 11). Soja, however, conceptualizes *Thirdspace* beyond Lefebvre’s *lived space*, scrutinizing the writings of various scholars from different disciplines. Therein he uncovers their prominent spatial awareness, which he then tackles as approximation to *Thirdspace*. Each and all of them together make up *Thirdspace*. Therefore, *Thirdspace* does not only function as a critique and reconstitution of the modes of spatial thinking prevalent thus far, but it also leaves the way open for limitless expansion through other approximations (1996, pp. 81-82). Here I would like to revisit and reflect upon approximations discovered in the writings of Bell Hooks, Barbara Hooper, Gloria Anzaldúa, Homi Bhabha, and Michel Foucault, which I consider most influential in the makeup of *Thirdspace*, and most relevant to my work in this thesis.

In his examination of Bell Hooks’s writings, Soja engages with the cultural politics of difference, wherein *Thirdspace* emerges as a highly political project. Difference is reproduced in space, which by perpetuating the dominant order, expressed in fixed binary categories (centre/margin)⁷, becomes a tool for social control. Soja describes how Hooks has chosen a marginal position in academia as well as in the Black community to argue from there for a ‘postmodern blackness’, a reconfiguration of the African-American subjectivity in a radical way that transcends binaries, such as these produced by conceptions of gender, class or sexual orientation (Soja, 1996, pp. 83-86). She has chosen, he asserts, the margin as a space of radical openness and a site of resistance to multiple hegemonic orders, providing the basis for an ‘African-American Thirdspace’ (Soja, 1996, p. 102). Seeing the reproduction of difference in space as a means of control, Soja argues that once beyond binary conceptions, a multiplicity of new spaces made by difference provide the basis for new radical subjectivities and new non-exclusionary communities (1996, p.96). Re-appropriating the margin becomes then a meaningful political act because it exposes the workings of hegemonic power that designated it as a site of oppression. Moreover, choosing the margin provides an advantageous way of seeing both from the perspective of the dominated/oppressed and the

⁷ I understand ‘centre’ here to represent the dominant position in a binary conception, while ‘margin’ to represent the dominated and often oppressed ‘other’. See for example: male/female, white/black, heterosexual/homosexual. These binary positions are produced by hegemonic discourses as exhaustively ordering the world we live in.

dominating 'other' (Soja, 1996, p. 100). *Thirdspace* encompasses then (also) the spaces that difference makes, from where to resist hegemonic power and envision another way of being and thinking. The political significance of spatiality is, thus, emphasized. This approximation to *Thirdspace* can inform a mode of thinking about borders and boundaries, and about urban divides beyond binary distinctions, as potentially inclusive localities of resistance where new subjectivities may find expression.

Soja expands the openness of *Thirdspace* with his explorations of spatial feminist debates. The different perspectives⁸ of the spatial feminist critique he presents continue his work against binaries, tackling specifically the male/female one, relocating the subject of feminism in social relations not exclusively defined by gender (Soja, 1996, pp. 109-111). Soja notes that the language used in these feminist writings does not simply use spatial metaphors, but consciously grounds "critique and resistance in the spatiality of social life" (1996, p. 112). Case in point is his examination, albeit brief, of Barbara Hooper's 'Bodies, cities, texts: the case of citizen Rodney King'⁹. According to Hooper (as cited in Soja, 1996, p. 114), the individual human body as a micro-geography of power is itself lived space, linked with the metaphorical social body, the body politic and the city. Of particular interest to the present thesis is the direct link that first appears here to *bordering* processes. Following Hooper (as cited in Soja, 1996, p. 115), when the binary logic of centre and margin is challenged, the boundaries separating them become unsteady, opening up possibilities for boundary transgressions that threaten the hegemonic order. As a result, hegemonic power seeks to reinforce the boundary to maintain a binary logic, while "counter-hegemons are working to harness the disorder ... for political use" (Hooper as cited in Soja, 1996, p. 115). Hooper locates this struggle in the spatiality of bodies, cities and texts. Soja seems to notice, although he does not explicitly mention it, that another binary appears when one thinks in terms of maintaining or transgressing a boundary. This is why, I believe, he steers his expansion of *Thirdspace* towards deconstructing the binary (Soja, 1996, pp. 116-119). He argues for a conceptualization of spatiality arising from 'disordering' difference, wherein choosing the margin opens up opportunities for synergies that challenge established power relations (Soja, 1996, pp. 117-118). The (chosen) margin, therefore, is not only a place straddling binary categories from where to advocate resistance against the dominant order; it becomes transformed in the struggle of countering hegemonic power in perpetuating its binary logic. Moreover, far from marginal, 'anything-goes' homogeneity, Soja introduces to his *Thirdspace* perspective fragmentation, disparity, discontinuities and ruptures as integral structural elements. It is in these elements, and not merely his 'both/and-plus-more' principle of 'critical thirding', that I see his deconstruction of binaries.

Another approximation to *Thirdspace* is provided by the postcolonial critique, which Soja sees as a reinterpretation, deconstruction and reconstitution of the binary colonizer/colonized, and the power relations implicated in its modern constitution (1996, p. 126). In this exploration, Soja chooses to venture first into actual real border spaces to expand *Thirdspace* (1996, pp. 127-134). He draws on the work of Gloria Anzaldúa, Maria Lugones and Guillermo Gómez-Peña on the USA/Mexican border, wherein he sees the borderlands as a space of radical openness (Soja, 1996, p. 127). He argues for example that

⁸ Soja draws primarily on Dolores Hayden, Gillian Rose, Sue Golding, Barbara Hooper, Rosalyn Deutsche, Iris Marion Young, Donna Haraway, Diana Fuss and Doreen Massey (1996, pp. 106-125).

⁹ It should be noted that in 'Thirdspace' Soja refers to Hooper's at the time unpublished manuscript as an ongoing project. She published 'Performativities of space: bodies, cities, texts' in 2002.

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Anzaldúa's conceptualization of the *mestiza*¹⁰ is not only straddling the binary produced by race, but also questions the definition of binary categories, appropriates them and vests new meanings in them (Soja, 1996, pp. 127-129). Anzaldúa's *mestiza* develops as an 'other' consciousness, which is neither merely a hybrid nor necessarily racially mixed; it is of mixed experience between different cultures in borderlands, amongst them prominently that of the colonized living in the world of the colonizer. The border emerges here as a way of thinking and being in the world, which is inclusive, incomplete, flexible and changing. Soja, however, does not explore further the (physical) border as an approximation to *Thirdspace*; he moves on to other explorations. After all, his approximations are never exhaustive of the scholarly fields in which he dives. Additionally, it is important to note that Soja's *Thirdspace* was contemporaneous with the beginnings of the border studies renaissance revisited earlier in this thesis. The revival of interest in borders and boundaries since the 1990s was informed by the spatial turn in social sciences as well, of which *Thirdspace* is part. Nevertheless, as demonstrated earlier, border scholars strove to disengage modes of thinking about borders from their geographical locations (an expression of Soja's *Firstspace*), concentrating their intellectual efforts on *Secondspace* analyses (the border as a mental construct). When traditional borders were considered, state territoriality led analyses structured around binaries. Considering this, an opportunity arises here to *re-spatialize* the concept of border. Rereading Soja's conceptualization of space in *Thirdspace* does not only provide a mode of thinking *about* the border, but *from* the border.

The exploration of the postcolonial critique continues with two short excursions in the writings of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Edward Said. In Spivak's deconstruction of (hegemonic) historiography Soja (1996) finds an emphasis on heterogeneity and discontinuities beyond mere pluralism or multiculturalism (1996, pp. 134-136). In Said's deconstruction of the binaries of Orientalism, he finds a "critical re-elaboration of geopolitical spatial arrangements and the politics of place" (Soja, 1996, pp. 136-139). Despite addressing interesting points in their work, Soja's hurried examination fails to convey clearly the essence of their contributions to *Thirdspace*. He then proceeds to explore Homi Bhabha's intriguingly homophonous *Third Space*. Responding to conceptualizations of cultural difference and diversity from the perspective of the colonizer, which he sees, according to Soja, as "acts of cultural translation" resulting in containment and misrepresentation, Bhabha argues for hybridity as a constituent part of culture (Soja, 1996, pp. 140). Bhabha's *Third Space* embodies this cultural hybridity, which is more than a blend of the original positions of the colonizer and the colonized. Rather, it is an act of displacement of the original positions, which (originating from the social margin) gives rise to "something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation" (Bhabha as cited in Soja, 1996, p. 140). *Third Space* is a position of enunciation *in-between*, challenging established perceptions of culture and facilitating the production of new – hybrid – forms of cultural meaning. Soja's particular emphasis on the notion of *in-between* in his analysis of Bhabha's writings does not only offer another opportunity to move away from binary logics. It reveals, I believe, a quality he wants to inscribe into his *Thirdspace*, an inherent opportunity for self-transformation. To think from Bhabha's *Third Space* (beyond binaries, transcending perceived cultural boundaries) is revisionary and forward-looking, entailing transformation in understandings of self and community in the present (Bhabha in Soja, 1996, pp. 142-144). *Thirdspace* emerges, thus, from this approximation as not merely a site where visions for the future are produced, but

¹⁰ The original use of the word 'mestiza' denotes a person who is of mixed racial ancestry, Anglo-American and Mexican.

from where they can effectuate change in the present. In other words, *Thirdspace* is a site of empowerment.

Soja's last extensively explored approximation to *Thirdspace* is found in the work of Michel Foucault, in which he discerns a 'critical understanding of spatiality' beyond his abundant use of spatial metaphors, and his preoccupation with architecture (Soja, 1996, p. 147). Soja argues that Foucault's problematic of power/knowledge was embedded in space, identifying an implicit trialectic, power-knowledge-space, evident in Foucault's own proclamations as well, such as "space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power" (Foucault in Rabinow, 1984, p. 252). Soja (1996) offers that for Foucault "space is where the discourses about power and knowledge are transformed into actual relations of power" (p. 234). He draws extensively on Foucault's 1967 lecture entitled 'Of Other Spaces' [Des Espace Autres]¹¹, and finds in *heterotopias* semblances of *Thirdspace*. *Heterotopias* are construed as counter-sites where all the real sites are "simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted" (Foucault, 1986, p. 24). As such curious 'other spaces', *heterotopias* are challenging sets of relations, "juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible" (Foucault, 1986, p. 25). Foucault (1986) offers in total six principles¹² of *heterotopias*. Soja (1996) foregrounds as important to *Thirdspace* the relation between sites, and the relation between space and time. *Heterotopias* can only be understood in their relations to other sites, be it by reflection or negation, and in these relations real spaces are bared, exposed (for example, the brothel). Time is also an important variable as there are temporary (for example, a festival site) and permanent (for example, a museum) *heterotopias*. Moreover, the function and meaning of *heterotopias* can change over time. Another principle of *heterotopias*, particularly relevant to the present thesis, is their system of 'spatial regulation': "Heterotopias always presuppose a system of opening and closing that makes them both isolated and penetrable. In general, the heterotopic site is not freely accessible like a public place." (Foucault, 1986, p. 26). This introduces to *Thirdspace* the notion of access and accessibility. Foucault's *heterotopias*, Soja remarks, are micro-sites (the prison, the brothel, the cemetery) that seem "nearsighted and near-sited" and "frustratingly incomplete, inconsistent, incoherent" (1996, p. 162). Nevertheless Soja recognizes them as additional departure points for his exploration of *Thirdspace*.

Soja's *Thirdspace* offers a mode of thinking about spatiality, which he sees as challenging "all conventional modes of spatial thinking" (1996, p. 163). At the same time, he criticizes "unquestioned historicism" for limiting "critical spatial imagination" (1996, p. 171). He argues, again drawing on Foucault, for the necessity of finding another way to think about time and history too, a 'Geohistory', "explicitly focused on the spatio-temporal interpretation of the power-knowledge relation" (in Soja, 1996, p. 170). Soja, then comes full circle back to his trialectic 'Historicality – Sociality – Spatiality', emphasizing that his privileging of space is only tactical, aiming to restore its neglected importance in the triad. For all it

¹¹ 'Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias' is the manuscript of a lecture given by Michel Foucault in March 1967. It was released to the public for an exhibition in Berlin shortly before Michel Foucault's death and was published in the journal *Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuité* in 1984. It should be noted that Foucault did not review the text for publication.

¹² These are: 1. *Heterotopias* are found in all cultures. 2. As history unfolds, *heterotopias* may change function within society. 3. The *heterotopia* is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. 4. *Heterotopias* entail breaks with traditional time. 5. *Heterotopias* presuppose a system of opening and closing; they are not freely accessible. 6. There is a relation between *heterotopias* and the remaining space (Foucault, 1986, pp. 24-27).

promises, however, *Thirdspace* presents certain shortcomings. First, it introduces a hierarchy, evident in the trialectic 'Firstspace – Secondspace – Thirdspace', which seems misplaced amongst the various calls for simultaneous and inclusive consideration. Second, it leaves the connection of space to time unexplored. Third, despite its departure point being in Lefebvre's concept of 'lived space', it demonstrates a prominent absence of the agency of human actors inhabiting spaces, and the perspective of their actual affective experiences in space. The agency of space is certainly emphasized, but therein resides the danger of essentializing space as something of and in itself. Additionally, in the twenty-two years since the publication of *Thirdspace* scholarly production has been placing increasing emphasis on space. The present thesis, therefore, cannot and does not espouse *Thirdspace* as an all-encompassing theory of space. *Thirdspace* serves as a departure point, functioning, as Soja intended it, as a tool to expand spatial imagination. The qualities he inscribed into his *Thirdspace* – simultaneity and inclusivity (space as real-and-imagined), the margin as a site of resistance, thinking beyond binary logics, self/society-reflection and self/society-transformation, the politics of difference, empowerment, political importance, relation to power and knowledge – constitute in my view an ever-expandable spatial paradigm. This thesis then, does not seek to apply Soja's *Thirdspace* to explain a particular case study, but rather enrich and expand the spatial paradigm he initiated with empirical material, realizing in this manner Soja's urging to think 'from space'. In studying space (Nicosia's boundary) contextually and historically, the border studies agenda highlighted previously and the spatial perspective explored by Soja converge. In order to write about the interplays of space, time and society in Nicosia, another way of thinking about its history becomes necessary. This way of thinking is not organized in a linear temporal axis, but seeks to excavate, as Soja does in his approximations, 'events/episodes' that highlight complex and interweaving sets of relations between places (real, imagined, real-and-imagined) and between people and places. For this reason, in Chapter 3, this thesis turns again to Foucault, and adapts his concept of genealogy.

2.1.4 Insights from Peace and Conflict Studies: space, place and agency

Before concluding this theoretical exploration, this thesis reflects briefly on a couple of loose ends, namely the notions of place and agency in relation to space. Recent publications from the field of Peace and Conflict Studies offer useful insights. In relevant literature, war and conflict have traditionally been privileged as topics of research, with peace tackled as the endgame of conflict resolution processes (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017; Kirsch & Flint, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2016; Webel & Johansen, 2011). Two assumptions have dominated this strand of literature: a) a binary distinction between war - conflict and peace, in which the latter is considered to appear when the former abates, and b) a linear transition from war - conflict to peace (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017; Kirsch & Flint, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011). In their state of the art publication, Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) note that realities on the ground contradict both assumptions, underlining the complexity of phenomena, and the coexistence of peace and conflict prior to but also after the establishment of peace agreements. Drawing on recent publications in Critical Peace Studies that interrogate definitions of peace and peace-making, they place emphasis on the multiplicity of interrelated actors at various scales. Moreover, addressing another binary distinction between peace-making from above, involving international actors, and peace-making from below through

local social processes, the authors argue against a static perception of hybrid approaches. Peace-making involves various processes of transformation that unfold at different scales simultaneously and are mutually constituted (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, p. 4). Furthermore, Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) observe a shift in the research interests of Political and Human Geography from a preoccupation with geographies of violence, war and conflict to studying geographies of peace. Central in these studies is an understanding of peace as 'situated knowledge' beyond normative assumptions (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, p. 5). Bringing together these approaches from Peace and Conflict Studies and Geography, the authors emphasize a prominent silencing of space and place, both as entry points in analyses as well as a way to conceptualize peacebuilding agency through spatial practices. The central thesis in their work revolves around the idea of peace-making as a spatial project, or in other words place-making and space-making as peace-making. The relevance of their work for the present research arises not only from their focus on spaces and places of peace, but also from their study of such spaces and places contextually and historically. It becomes, thus, pertinent to take a closer look at their main concepts, namely space, place and agency.

Spatial and social transformation occupies a central position in Björkdahl and Kappler's (2017) conceptual framework. The authors posit that in post-conflict societies, transformative processes "can be understood as materializing through the active use and transformation of space and place" (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, p. 17). Space is framed as an immaterial, imaginary phenomenon, occupying the ideational dimension, while place as its material counterpart, i.e. space appropriated, inhabited, given meaning and interpreted. The authors note that this conceptualization refers to socially produced space, i.e. space as producing and produced by social relations. Space is transformed into place through people's lived experience, invoking a sense of belonging linked to processes of identity formation. As a material and social construct, place is entangled in power relations. As a result, place-making, i.e. the materialization of the ideational dimension of space according to the authors, may relate to either peace or conflict depending on power relations in each specific context (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, pp. 18-19). Vice versa, the authors consider space-making as the transformation of place into space by inscribing new meanings. In this sense, spaces are linked with the construction of new meaning, hence inherently political. Furthermore, rather than seeing space as "non-everyday and abstract", Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) emphasize a close connection to the notion of locale (p. 20). As a result, a relation between people, place and space always underlies their analyses of various contexts.

The authors note that the "neat distinction" between space and place "can be seen as artificial" but serves analytical purposes (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, p. 19). Indeed, I find such distinction overtly simplified. Beyond their use of 'space' and 'place' as analytical categories, however, Björkdahl and Kappler's work places spatiality in the foreground of their analyses. This preoccupation with space establishes a strong affinity between their work and mine. The authors' concept of spatiality shares with the existing framework of my research some fundamental traits, namely space as a social product and a social process, the role of people's lived experience, the entanglement in power relations, challenging binary distinctions, such as the one between conflict - war and peace, and last but not least, space as real-and-imagined. Moreover, their conceptualization of spatial transformation as involving ideational and material dimensions, and summarized as appropriation, inscription of new meanings and inhabiting of space, ties in with the existing framework and premises of the present thesis. I therefore argue that these

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shared traits situate the authors' understanding of spatiality within the framework of the present thesis, allowing the following conceptualization of agency to become relevant.

Björkdahl and Kappler (2017) situate the agentive subject in place and space. If a departure point to understand human agency is "the capacity to act", a distinction needs to be made, they argue, between actors and agentive subjects (p. 15). The authors differentiate between the two terms by linking agency to transformative processes. While actors are participants in various actions and activities, they posit, agentive subjects achieve change (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, p. 16). This change is achieved through social and spatial practices, which the authors see as taking place in everyday "experience, attitudes and beliefs" (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, p. 16). In other words, change may be achieved through thinking and acting differently, i.e. through everyday (spatial and social) practices that challenge established power relations. The authors note, however, that agency should not be seen only as reactionary to power, but as enabling and disabling, at times oppressive, at times resisting, or both simultaneously (Björkdahl & Kappler, 2017, p. 17). In this vein, agency is situated in everyday transformative practices. Viewing conflict - war and peace as always emplaced and manifested in spatial practices, Björkdahl & Kappler (2017) choose space and place as vehicles to explore peacebuilding agency. Their research focuses on spatial transformations to study how agency may transform spaces and places of peace and conflict. The authors situate peacebuilding agency at the intersection of place-making and space-making, in the capacity to transform place into space and vice-versa. In this framework, agency determines what kind of spaces and places emerge over time; therefore, agency, space and place are mutually constituted.

Björkdahl and Kappler's (2017) work supplies the present research with the missing understanding of agency, which is in line with conceptualizations of spatiality previously explored with *Thirdspace*. Hence, this research too considers agency as situated and manifested in processes of spatial transformation. Human (and non-human) agency is embedded in power relations and revealed in changing social and spatial practices in various specific contexts that need to be studied historically, i.e. over time. Agency in itself is neither positive in the sense of empowerment nor negative in the sense of oppression; it is enabling or disabling depending on social context. Furthermore, it operates at various scales and through various interrelated agentive subjects simultaneously; it is exercised as much in international high-level political negotiations as in local everyday practices of individuals and communities.

One clarification is necessary to conclude this part of the thesis, the use of the terms 'place' and 'space' from this point onwards. Björkdahl and Kappler's (2017) distinction between materiality (place) and imagination (space) is all too schematic. Following the conceptualization of spatiality explored with Soja's *Thirdspace*, neither 'space' nor 'place' can be divorced from material and ideational dimensions. If 'space' represents an all-encompassing spatiality as real and imagined, and real-and-imagined, then 'place' represents specificity in spatial, temporal and social terms. Rather than answering questions of 'what' as in Björkdahl and Kappler (2017), it is a response to 'where', 'when' and 'who'. A 'place' is a manifestation of 'space', one amongst its unlimited expressions. In the present thesis a 'place' can be located geographically, and at a specific point in time; it displays a set of social relations and it is imbued with meanings in each specific context; a 'place' reflects and is embedded in power relations. In this vein, a multiplicity of 'places' may be found in one and the same location, not only across time but also simultaneously.

2.2 Research Questions

Based on the theoretical exploration presented in this chapter and empirical work in Nicosia, the following research questions have been formulated to guide the analysis in this thesis:

1. If borders and boundaries are of processual nature, when, where and how was Nicosia's Buffer Zone established as a dividing boundary, in public discourse, in society, and on Nicosia's ground?
2. If boundaries exemplify power relations, in what ways is Nicosia's Buffer Zone implicated in the post-conflict status quo in Cyprus?
3. If peace-making can be seen as a spatial project, what is the relation between peace-making processes in Cyprus and spatial practices in Nicosia that provides the framework for the operation of the Nicosia Master Plan?
4. If social relations are constructed within power relations, how did the opening of the crossings in 2003 impact on the socialization of individuals across the Buffer Zone?
5. If space can reproduce social norms, what is the role of the socio-spatial practices of bottom-up initiatives in Nicosia today in critically looking at these norms, and the processes in which they were produced?

The five chapters in Parts II and III tackle these research questions in the order seen above. The explorations in these chapters provide insights into complex processes of spatial, political and social transformation, which can inform our understanding of *bordering*, space-making, and peace-making in relation to urban partition, and shed light on the interplay of power, knowledge, and space.

CHAPTER 3

Operationalization

3.1 Research Methodology

This thesis follows an intensive case study approach to study Nicosia's partition. It combines content analysis with empirical work conducted in Nicosia in three (3) fieldtrips, which have taken place in March 2012, February 2013, and June 2014. The duration of each fieldtrip was between 3 and 4 weeks. The information collected can be categorized in three sets of material that shed light on different aspects of the phenomenon that is Nicosia's Buffer Zone: 1) personal direct observations in Nicosia's historic centre, and participation in events and meetings, 2) 21 expert interviews with former and current employees of the Nicosia Master Plan, municipality employees, city residents, and civil society activists, and 3) documentation and archival material from the Nicosia Master Plan office, as well as libraries, museums, research institutes, and the databases of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the United Nations Development Programme, the European Commission, and local organizations. The collected material is correlated with secondary sources from the fields of history, political science, and social and cultural anthropology. In the following, I elaborate on these three sets of material:

1. *Personal direct observations in Nicosia's historic centre, and participation in events and meetings*

Personal direct observations involved extensive photographic explorations in Nicosia's historic centre. The photographic lens became my way to see and experience the city, capture its ambience, colour, and facets, and discover details. Some of these observations only became apparent to me, when I reviewed and analysed this material away from Nicosia. Most of the city's illustrations provided in this thesis have been captured by me.

Participation involved the visit inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, which opened the first chapter of this thesis. My impressions from this visit played a key role in shaping the focus of this research project. Coming into contact with civil society activists provided access to some of their events and meetings that were taking place during my empirical research. These were a group walk, an annually repeating demonstration for the city's demilitarization, and a civil society organization's board meeting. These events and meetings introduced me to the modes of operation of a vibrant part of the Cypriot civil society, and provided insights into their group dynamics, ideas, struggles and concerns.

2. *21 expert interviews with former and current employees of the Nicosia Master Plan, municipality employees, city residents, and civil society activists*

My first fieldtrip to Nicosia in March 2012 revealed a gamut of bottom-up initiatives, taking place not only in reference to but *inside* Nicosia's Buffer Zone, reclaiming and appropriating its space and meaning. These initiatives were the result of cooperation between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, made

possible after the opening of the crossings in 2003. Various bi-communal civil society organizations, with a consensus that collaboration and symbiosis shape their desired future, are addressing with their activities a wide range of issues: migrant rights, social inequalities, history education, gender inequality, unemployment, racism, discrimination, and militarization. The Home for Cooperation, their activity centre, is located within one of Nicosia's crossings. Radical leftist activists organized in 2011/2012 the local Occupy Movement, reclaiming and appropriating space inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone second crossing. These unofficial practices compete, converge or collide with planning practices in Nicosia, shaped by the successor of the Nicosia Master Plan, known as the New Vision Plan for Nicosia. This Plan promotes an urban heritage driven strategy, seeking to regenerate Nicosia's historic centre with revenue from tourism. The restitution of mobility was undoubtedly the enabling factor for all these official and unofficial initiatives. Interestingly, empirical work showed that they all discursively engaged with material and ideational dimensions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone too.

The interviews I conducted with active participants of those initiatives revealed the multiplicity of ways in which various actors relate to Nicosia's Buffer Zone, interpret its layered meanings, and in many cases add their own. These actions and activities challenge the popular perceptions of the Buffer Zone as 'dead' and 'unchanging'. The space I eventually came to know during my empirical work in Nicosia is not the empty, abandoned landscape, which I experienced during my visit in the Buffer Zone with UNFICYP. Although appearances may obscure its vibrancy, local initiatives taking place in and around it hold the promise of transformation.

Interviews were conducted with planning professionals and sociologists, who are former or current employees of the Greek-Cypriot Nicosia Master Plan office, with employees in the Greek-Cypriot municipality, with Nicosia residents, some of whom are architects and academics, and with civil society activists, active in the Home for Cooperation and in the Occupy movement. Initial contacts were made via telephone or email. Consequent contacts were referrals from initial contacts. The duration of interviews varies from thirty minutes to two hours. All except four interviews are audiotaped, as four individuals refused to be recorded. Interviews comprise the bulk of my collected empirical material.

3. *Documentation and archival material from the Nicosia Master Plan office, as well as libraries, museums, research institutes, and the databases of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the United Nations Development Programme, the European Commission, and local organizations*

Many of the expert interviewees, keen to help me advance my research, suggested visits in archives, libraries, museums, and research institutes, and invited me to participate in events and meetings mentioned above. Significantly, through interviewees of the Nicosia Master Plan I acquired access to documents of the Greek-Cypriot Nicosia Master Plan office. This material is unpublished, and can only be studied on site.

The next section of this chapter turns again to Foucault, and adapts his genealogy as a way to interpret the collected material.

3.2 Interpreting Collected Material: Adapting Foucault's Genealogy

"Fathers have only to mistake effects for causes, believe in the reality of an 'afterlife', or maintain the value of eternal truths, and the bodies of their children will suffer."

(Foucault, 1977, p. 147)

In his seminal work, 'Discipline and Punish', Michel Foucault, departing from the emergence of prison in Western societies in the 18th century, conducts a genealogical inquiry into the transformation of penal practices. Prison and the practices related to imprisonment, such as control, policing and surveillance, replaced former penal practices, such as public torture and execution. Foucault's (1979) inquiry results in the conceptualization of disciplinary power as prison's structural element. He argues for a historical transformation in the exercise of power from former feudal forms, based on fear and violence, to subtle control through discipline (Crowley, 2009). The rationality of disciplinary power is inscribed in practices of policing, control and surveillance, and reproduced in the institution of prison. Through these practices, power, working through the body of the individual, reshapes the imprisoned into a reformed subject. Therein lies, following Foucault (1979), discipline's potency for wider social control: disciplinary power produces subjectivities, i.e. how people see themselves and understand their relationships to others. Social control is then conceptualized as an internalization of the rationale of discipline by the subject, which then produces new practices, not imposed from the top but governed by the rationale of discipline. Foucault (1979) argues that these practices have the potential to function as norms in societies, and extends his analysis to other institutions and practices shaped by disciplinary power, such as schools, asylums, and hospitals. 'Discipline and Punish' is instructive for two reasons; first, it is exemplary of Foucault's genealogy as a method for analysis; second, it offers a conceptualization of power as networked rather than imposed.

Allow me to elaborate on these two points:

3.2.1 Genealogy

In his essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', Foucault (1977) examines Nietzsche's 'Genealogy of Morals' and adapts his idea of genealogy to challenge traditional – distant and objective – practices of history thus far conceptualized as a purposeful development towards an end. He develops genealogy as a method of critical inquiry to examine complex power relations, and the ways they shape systems of thought (ways of thinking, rationalities, concepts), practices (ways of conscious action) and subjectivities (ways of being, understanding one's self and place in the world). In other words, he focuses on the ability of power, and analyses its mechanisms/workings, to provide subjects with knowledge about their world, which, once internalized is reproduced in practices (Foucault, 1977). But rather than assuming the omnipresence of disciplinary power a priori to explain past and present predicaments, Foucault develops genealogy as a method for historical inquiry that *allows for* the development of 'discipline' as a concept. As Koopman (2015) underlines, Foucault, instead of looking for the mechanisms of the prison everywhere, "would have us look at it to see what it is that we have made and how we have made ourselves in making it" (p. 576). Based on this understanding of Foucault's approach then, genealogy as a method must be divorced from

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the concept of 'discipline'. In other words, concepts, such as 'discipline', are ideas that develop while inquiring, and should not organize the field of inquiry from the beginning.

In 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', Foucault (1977) pays particular attention to the different terms used by Nietzsche in German to denote 'origin', singling out *Herkunft* and *Entstehung*. Foucault interprets *Herkunft* as 'descent' and *Entstehung* as 'emergence', and frames genealogy as their meticulous examination away from teleological understandings. Following this, genealogy is not an ultimate search for 'origin':

"This search is directed to 'that which was already there', the image of a primordial truth fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity. However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is 'something altogether different' behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms."

(Foucault, 1977, p. 142)

Genealogy rejects notions of 'origin' as timeless and ever-present, as idealized and glorified historical foundations:

"What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity."

(Foucault, 1977, p. 142)

Genealogy, as an analysis of *Herkunft* (descent) does neither seek to restore continuity, nor to provide a seamless narrative where past exists in the present. It goes beyond a cause-and-effect binary to expose discontinuities, deviations, contingencies, errors and accidents that have shaped conceptions of things we consider given and immutable (Crowley, 2009; Foucault, 1977; Koopman, 2017). It traces difference and disparity. It traces transformations from an original condition into multiple and unexpected forms, challenging conformity and homogeneity. Origin as *Herkunft* (descent) takes no exalted form; it is the assemblage of humble processes that have shaped the things we consider valuable. Their value, however, is not on account of their origins. Therein lays genealogy's function as critique:

"[Genealogy] retrieves an indispensable restraint: it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history – in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Finally, genealogy must define even those instances where they are absent, the moment when they remained unrealized."

(Foucault, 1977, pp.139-140)

By rejecting the linear development of history, Foucault places emphasis on the singularity of events. Any present state of affairs is, thus, an event constituted at a particular historical conjuncture through power relations, an episode amidst other episodes (Tamboukou, 1999). The 'event/episode', however, should not be seen as a singular moment, a treaty signed, a green line drawn on a map, barbed wire unrolled on the

ground. The 'event/episode', the way things are at any moment in time, signifies a shift in power relations, the appropriation of means of 'domination'¹.

The idea of 'domination' is linked to the other crucial notion in Foucault's genealogy, *Entstehung* (emergence). Since genealogical inquiry is looking at the workings of power, paying attention to shifts in power relations, it follows as well the struggles between different forces that result in certain 'events/episodes'. Genealogy is therefore concerned with relations of 'domination' too. 'Domination' for Foucault rests upon a system of rules that imposes rights and obligations, the means of domination, and produces 'systems of subjection', in which people adhere to the aforementioned rights and obligations. The rules, however, possess no value themselves; their value is determined by the forces that use them, and they can be appropriated and redirected against those who used them before (Foucault, 1977, pp. 149-152). For Foucault, *Entstehung* (emergence) is "the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to centre stage" (Foucault, 1977, pp. 149-150). It is the accidental "moment of arising" rather than "the ultimate point of a historical evolution" (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 209). Genealogy, hence, examines the ceaseless struggle of forces, the emergence and succession of dominations².

3.2.2 Power

The notions of domination and subjection are intimately linked to conceptualizations of power. Koopman (2015) offers that in 'Discipline and Punish' power/knowledge "functions as a category of inquiry", while discipline "functions as a concept that results from an inquiry into forms of power/knowledge in the context of the emergence of the prison" (p. 576). Koopman's idea of a structural rather than exegetic role of power in Foucault's genealogical inquiries is in line with Crowley's (2009) observation that Foucault's genealogies lack explicit definitions of power, while focusing on power relations (pp. 5-6). According to Crowley (2009, pp. 5-6), Foucault denounces traditional understandings of power that structure binary oppositions: oppressor and oppressed, ruler and ruled. Power in Foucault is neither held nor seized, it is neither imposed from the top nor taken away; it does not adhere to social hierarchies. Power is networked, always and everywhere present, in human actions, constructs and interactions, the simultaneous outcome of all power relations. Moreover, power is not only repressive; it is heterogeneous. In Paul Rabinow's (1984, p. 61) 'The Foucault Reader', Foucault, responding to a question from the author, offers:

"If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a

¹ Throughout his essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' Foucault draws on and adapts from Nietzsche. From Nietzsche he derives the notion of 'domination' as well. He writes of 'the domination of certain men over others' and differentiates between power relations and relations of 'domination' (Foucault 1977, p. 150). Domination signifies the end result of a Nietzschean struggle between protagonists for the position and the ability to define, and therefore shape, the part of the world they have come to dominate (N. Hardy, 2010, p. 69).

² It should be noted, however, that while in 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' Foucault uses the term to denote the sudden appearance of a new 'domination', later in his work 'Entstehung' (emergence) is seen "as part of a developmental process" (N. Hardy, 2010, p. 69).

productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression.”

For Foucault, hence, power is productive and it is within power relations that knowledge is produced. Moreover, power is not a prerogative of the state:

“To pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue posing it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say, in terms of law. If one describes all these phenomena of power as dependent on the state apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially repressive [...]. I don't want to say that the state isn't important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. In two senses: first of all because the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations, and further because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already existing power relations.”

(Foucault in Rabinow, 1984, pp. 63-64)

Power relations are, however, not fixed; they should, hence, not be taken for granted. Rather, they should be explored and re-examined case by case in different contexts. Exactly this is in my understanding the purpose of genealogical inquiry, to trace and uncover the subtle workings of power in shaping what people know about their world, themselves, and the way they act and behave based on this knowledge. Thus, Foucault's genealogy as the simultaneous examination of 'descent' and 'emergence' of rationalities, practices and subjectivities opens up opportunities for resistance and subversion as well. Uncovering the ways in which modes of thinking, acting, and being in the present are constructed and constituted in power relations offers people the opportunity to find an-other way to pursue their interests. Hence, the possibility for transformation of the self and society is inherent in Foucault's genealogical inquiries. This is also observed by Crowley (2009), who notes that in 'The History of Sexuality' Foucault shifts focus from surveillance and discipline to the internalization of societal norms (pp. 8-10). People adhere to these norms by recognizing themselves "as particular types of subject, judging and monitoring themselves and others" (Crowley, 2009, p. 8). Thus the struggle over power and control as well as the potential for resistance take place first in the human body, the body of the conforming subject.

3.2.3 Spatial Genealogy

With genealogy Foucault offers a method of historical inquiry, through which to understand the interplay of power and knowledge in structuring rationalities, practices and subjectivities that constitute our perception of the world. In his critical interrogations possibilities for resistance and transformation open up, "of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do, or think" (Tamboukou, 1999, p. 203). Despite the emphasis on history and time, Foucault's analyses engage consistently with space as well (Crampton & Elden, 2007; West-Pavlov, 2009). At the beginning of his 1967 essay 'Of Other Spaces' Foucault declares the present epoch as that of space:

“The great obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and of suspension, of crisis, and cycle, themes of the ever-accumulating past [...]. The present epoch will perhaps be above all the

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epoch of space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein."

(Foucault, 1986, p. 22)

Soja (1996) may have identified Foucault's spatial thinking in *heterotopias*, but it is, I argue, his genealogies that best demonstrate his interest in the simultaneous engagement with space and time. The human body as the archetypal spatial unit figures prominently in Foucault's 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' and is discussed in spatial terms:

"The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body."

(Foucault, 1977, p. 148)

In 'Discipline and Punish' Foucault provides, as Crowley (2009) aptly remarks, "[...] an insight into how space is used politically in relation to deviant and non-conforming others", and focuses on the workings of power on the human body "as the site in which the most mundane social practices and local power relations feed into the constitution of large scale social and institutional power relations" (p. 6). In both 'Discipline and Punish' and 'The History of Sexuality' Foucault does not simply make use of spatial metaphors. He also tackles actual physical spaces³ (the prison, the brothel, the asylum) as sites where power relations are not only embedded but reproduced. It is in space, it follows, that the struggle over power and control unfolds. Space then in Foucault, as Crampton and Elden (2007, p. 9) note, is not simply an object to research, but a tool for analysis and interpretation. In a similar vein, West-Pavlov (2009, pp. 112) argues that there is a gradual shift in Foucault's writings from describing discourses with the help of spatial metaphors to 'discursive space', where discourses about space and actual material space come together.

Foucault intimately links in his genealogies power, knowledge and space in a way that makes it impossible to think of one without the other two. Nevertheless, Foucault's spatial thinking remains undeveloped. Harvey (2007) finds as a weak point Foucault's espousal of the Kantian sense of absolute space (pp. 45-46), while both Huxley (2007, p. 191) and Thrift (2007, pp. 55-56) observe the absence of the human subject's lived experience. On the other hand, Hannah (2007), drawing on Elden (2001), emphasizes that Foucault's scholarly production rather than theorizing space or writing histories of spaces is better understood as spatialization of history, an injection of spatial awareness "into all historical studies, to critically examine the power relations at play in the ways space is effected and effects" (p. 101). In

³ I choose to not refer here to the much-cited example of Panopticon. Despite its importance in Foucault, it remains in the realm of spatial discourse, while here the emphasis is on material spaces that come to embody such discourses. Moreover, as Hannah (2007) argues, emphasis on the Panopticon has rendered the complex relations of power and space in Foucault schematic.

Foucault's genealogy I see the potential for an-other way of thinking about history and space that shares the qualities of Soja's undeveloped 'Geohistory'. To remain faithful to Foucault's critique towards history I prefer to use the term 'spatial genealogy'.

Spatial genealogy is then spatial analysis as critique. I conceptualize it as a way to analyse, interpret and narrate the material collected in the frame of my research. It is the study of space, of spatial practices and spatial relations governed by and reflecting power relations. Following – and paraphrasing – Koopman's (2015) urging then, the present thesis adapts Foucault's method to examine Nicosia's Buffer Zone, to see what it is that Cypriots have made and how they have made themselves in making it. A spatial genealogy of Nicosia's Buffer Zone is not a story of the divide's origins, anticipating a city that has once been whole standing at the threshold. Neither is it based on a linear development expecting or seeking to prove possible a suture of the urban divide as a return to a supposedly lofty original condition of unification. It is an excavation of 'events/episodes' in the Buffer Zone's timeline that highlight complex and interweaving sets of relations between places (real, imagined, real-and-imagined) and between people and places. It aims to shed light on the interstices, on the grey matter in-between, to uncover the workings of power and the knowledge it has produced, as it is traced in rationalities, subjectivities and practices relating to the spatiality of Nicosia's Buffer Zone. At the same time, it exposes discontinuities in the official narratives of partition, uncovers silences, probes irregularities and deviations, tracing transformations in ways of thinking, acting and being that open up possibilities and spaces of resistance.

3.3 Outline of chapters

Part I has thus far presented the research framework of this thesis. Parts II and III compose a spatial genealogy of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, which provides an-other way of thinking about power, knowledge and space in Nicosia, and an-other way of studying urban partition. In Part II, chapters 4 and 5 analyse and reflect on material from secondary sources to trace the emergence and deepening of Nicosia's partition. In Part III, chapters 6, 7 and 8 analyse material gleaned from empirical work in Nicosia, and the study of documents, to trace the consolidation, crossing and transcendence of partition through encounters that take place at various scales simultaneously. Each chapter of Parts II and III performs an excavation of 'events/episodes' in the timeline of the Buffer Zone that mark shifts in power relations, revealing discrepancies, discontinuities, deviations, and silences, which contribute to my understanding of the Buffer Zone space. To facilitate this process, each chapter of Parts II and III tackles each of the research questions presented in chapter 2. The following part presents the outline of these chapters.

Chapter 4 Emergence – Understanding Conflict and Partition in Cyprus tackles the first research question of this thesis:

1. *If borders and boundaries are of processual nature, when, where and how was Nicosia's Buffer Zone established as a dividing boundary, in public discourse, in society, and on Nicosia's ground?*

The analysis in this chapter builds on the work of historians and anthropologists to trace the beginnings of conflict and partition in Cyprus. This chapter predicated an understanding of partition in

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Cyprus, not as a means to end interethnic violence, but as a *bordering* process developing within a particular historical conjuncture, involving international and local actors. It outlines the historical context within which Cyprus transitioned from an Ottoman province to a British colony, and explores the relation between processes of modernization, which this transition entailed, and the rise of competing nationalisms. It then examines the constituent elements of nationalist ideologies in Cyprus, and the ways they articulated each community's vision for the future. It explores how nationalist ideologies became dominant in each community between the 1920s and 1950s, popularizing nationalist demands, and traces the way in which the British administration handled this soon to be explosive situation. The antagonistic pursuit of these demands culminated in open violence between the Cypriot communities, marking the entrenchment of partition in politics, society and space. Through the analysis in this chapter, Nicosia's physical partition emerges as only one aspect of a wider *bordering* process, contradicting the ethnic origin of conflict and partition in Cyprus, which many studies take for granted.

Chapter 5 Deepening – Bordering and Re-Bordering in Official Historical Narratives tackles the second research question of this thesis:

2. *If boundaries exemplify power relations, in what ways is Nicosia's Buffer Zone implicated in the post-conflict status quo in Cyprus?*

This chapter focuses on the period between independence in 1960 and de facto partition in 1974 to trace the institutionalization of partition in administrative, political, and communal structures, which led to the collapse of the bi-communal Republic in 1963. The pre-existing political, social, and economic divide between the two communities collapsed onto the physical with the reestablishment of Nicosia's physical partition in 1964, which became permanent in 1974. This chapter explores the Cypriot traumas, which served as central cohesive elements of the two official historical narratives established in the aftermath of de facto partition. It analyses the official historical narratives, which present their own side as victim and blame the 'other' as perpetrator. These narratives have produced ethno-national myths, and rely on them to legitimize claims to statehood and territory that are part and parcel of the Cyprus Problem to date. This chapter also examines the dominant conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone, produced by the official historical narratives through processes of *bordering*, which help sustain and legitimize them. It concludes by reflecting on the deepening of partition in political, social and economic life in Cyprus, its physical manifestations, and its firm anchoring in land/space.

Chapter 6 Consolidation – Cooperation, Narratives and Practices of Peace-making tackles the third research question of this thesis:

3. *If peace-making can be seen as a spatial project, what is the relation between peace-making processes in Cyprus and spatial practices in Nicosia that provides the framework for the operation of the Nicosia Master Plan?*

This chapter focuses on narratives and practices of peace-making after 1974, and particularly on bi-communal cooperation between 1974 and 2004. It examines the consolidation of partition in Nicosia and in Cyprus on two levels; first, on the level of elite peace-making, and then on the level of peace-making on the ground. After briefly reviewing the repeated failures in high-level political negotiations, this chapter

CHAPTER 3 Operationalization

places particular emphasis on the latest settlement plan, known as the Annan Plan, exploring the ways in which its acceptance by the Turkish-Cypriots and its rejection by the Greek-Cypriots illustrate deviations from their respective official historical narratives. It then turns to bi-communal cooperation on the ground, to trace the consolidation of partition as a result of peace-making narratives developed within a depoliticized framework of technical projects undertaken in Nicosia since the 1970s. In this analysis, urban planning emerges as a principal field of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation. As supranational actors, especially the European Union, become involved in space- and heritage-making as practices of peace-making on the ground, the opportunity arises to examine shifts in power relations. At the intersection of the European/supranational and the local, peace-making narratives become embedded in Nicosia's historic centre, in due process reclaiming its Buffer Zone as common and shared heritage for all Cypriots. As long as this peace-making narrative does not address the traumatic past, and continues to rely on a depoliticized approach, it reproduces the status quo on the island, hence contributing to the consolidation of partition.

Chapter 7 Crossing – Controlled Mobility and the Normalization of Partition tackles the fourth research question of this thesis:

4. *If social relations are constructed within power relations, how did the opening of the crossings in 2003 impact on the socialization of individuals across the Buffer Zone?*

This chapter explores the initiation and development of bi-communal interaction and relations in Nicosia on the grassroots level. It begins with an examination of the bi-communal movement in the 1990s, and the ways in which interaction, initially within its frame, and later within the civil society of reconciliation, became depoliticized, structuring a socially acceptable 'norm of conduct'. It proceeds to examine how the opening of the crossings in 2003 shifted power relations by providing opportunities for encounters and synergies impossible in the past, challenging at the same time the established 'norm of conduct'. This chapter concludes with an analysis on how the de-politicization of bi-communal relations at large, rather than countering partition, which was the aim of rapprochement and reconciliation, contributed to the normalization of partition in public life after the failure of the Annan Plan.

Chapter 8 Transcendence – Spatial Practices of Compliance and Resistance tackles the fifth research question of this thesis:

5. *If space can reproduce social norms, what is the role of the socio-spatial practices of bottom-up initiatives in Nicosia today in critically looking at these norms, and the processes in which they were produced?*

This chapter examines the socio-spatial practices, developed by local initiatives in Nicosia, and the spaces and places they have produced as they acted politically, and exerted agency. The analysis focuses on two prominent local initiatives: the Home for Cooperation, an activity centre inside Nicosia's Ledra Palace Buffer Zone crossing, which has developed into the headquarters of institutionalized activism in Nicosia, and the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement, an initiative, which claimed Nicosia's Ledra Street/Lokmaçi crossing between 2011 and 2012. Both initiatives have reclaimed actual Buffer Zone

space, appropriated it, and vested it with new meaning, marking a prominent shift in local spatial practices. Through these processes, the space of the Buffer Zone becomes transformed, reflecting the involved actors' diverse intentions and associated imaginaries for Nicosia and for Cyprus. As Nicosia's Buffer Zone is *de-bordered* and *re-bordered*, power relations are renegotiated and reconstituted, posing challenges for the 'norm of conduct' perpetuated by official historical narratives and the status quo of partition. The Buffer Zone emerges as the locus for civic engagement and revolutionary praxis, the public domain of political contestation of norms as well as articulation of new ideas, visions and demands. This chapter elaborates on the changed socio-spatial practices of local initiatives as ruptures in the dominant historical narratives, highlighting their potential to 'transcend' partition. In this analysis, the Buffer Zone emerges as a real-and-imagined space, where domination, subjection and resistance are emplaced.

Conclusion – Chapter 9 The Space In-Between summarizes and discusses the findings of this thesis. It reviews the spatial genealogy undertaken in the present research, and its contribution to our understanding of urban partition in Nicosia. It reflects on the ways empirical work in Nicosia can further spatial thinking, by analysing the interplay of power, knowledge and space historically and contextually. Moreover, it explores the contribution of spatial genealogy as a mode of analysis to the study of divided cities, borders and boundaries, and peace and conflict studies.

3.4 A note on the position of the researcher, its limitations, and an aporia on the use of the terms 'Greek-Cypriot' and 'Turkish-Cypriot'

I carried out this research as a Greek, affiliated with a foreign to Cyprus institution. This position has afforded an insider/outsider perspective. Although I have the advantage of speaking Greek, I also have the considerable disadvantage of not speaking Turkish. The linguistic propinquity to Greek-Cypriots has in certain occasions prejudiced Turkish-Cypriot interviewees, while in other cases my status as a researcher at a German university, and the use of English have helped alleviate this prejudice by emphasizing my position as an outsider. Hence, this dual perspective has both helped and hindered my work. Large part of the documents and empirical material I have collected became available through networks that I could access as a Greek-speaking person. However, other material has remained out of reach for the same reason, as perusing databases and documents available only in Turkish has not been possible. Nevertheless, this research project would not have developed the ways it did without this insider/outsider perspective, and without my intense internal struggle to find a balance between them.

A limitation for this research project has been imposed by my geographical distance from Nicosia, Cyprus. This research project was supported by the DAAD, the German Academic Exchange Service, which necessitates a presence in Germany for the duration of funding. This applied certain restrictions, relating to the type of empirical work which could be carried out, limiting the duration of each fieldtrip to a maximum of three weeks. The methodology employed in this thesis aims to counterbalance this limitation. As a result, this project is not and could not have been a product of ethnographic research, social anthropological or sociological work, although it draws from existing literature in these fields. My point of view is that of the urban researcher with background in architecture. Thus, my empirical work in Nicosia is conditioned by the way in which architects are trained to see and navigate space. I have trained myself,

however, in the skills of qualitative research, employing tools from the aforementioned disciplines to analyze in the most comprehensive way a case with specific methodological challenges.

Last but not least, a note on the terms 'Greek-Cypriot' and 'Turkish-Cypriot' is necessary, as their use reiterates the binary of ethnicity, although this research project strives to work against it. The constitution of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 made use of the terms 'Greek Community' and 'Turkish Community', basing these groupings on cultural traditions, spoken language, and religion (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 1-2, 1960). The smaller Armenian, Maronite and Latin communities of Cyprus were forced by the constitution to choose to belong to either the Greek or the Turkish community as political subjects of the Republic (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 2, 1960). All three decided to be included in the majority group, the Greek Community. By the provisions of the constitution in 1960, belonging to the 'Greek Community' and 'Turkish Community' was linked to certain voting rights⁴, thus turning these groupings into political categories.

After 1974, when the two communities became firmly separated, the use of the terms subsided in both everyday use and political rhetoric within each polity. Ordinarily, people refer to themselves simply as Cypriots. The ethnic qualifier reappears when they differentiate themselves from 'others'. Greek-Cypriots, depending on political orientation, use the term Turk or Turkish-Cypriot to speak about those living north of the Buffer Zone. Turkish-Cypriots, depending on political orientation, use the term Greek or Greek-Cypriot to speak about those living south of the Buffer Zone. For those on the left of the political spectrum on both sides, the use of the terms Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot denotes an emphasis on Cypriotism, and their desire for a common future, rather than the ethnic difference. For those on the right of the political spectrum in the south, the terms Turk and Turkish-Cypriot are often interchangeably used, signifying an emphasis on ethnic difference and *othering* (Charalampous, 2018). This perspective was also cultivated in the north through nationalist rhetoric, education, and cultural policies, according to which Turkish-Cypriots were part of the Turkish nation, hence Turks who happened to live in Cyprus (Kizilyürek, 2003). However, as the people of TRNC grew distant from mainland Turkey in the 1990s, they also increasingly emphasized their local Cypriot identity. Within this frame, the term Turkish-Cypriot is used today by the Turkish-Cypriots themselves to differentiate between indigenous Turkish-Cypriots and settlers from Turkey, who came to Cyprus after 1974. Similarly, the use of the term Greek-Cypriot can be understood as exclusionary to immigrant 'others'.

In the academic literature relating to Cyprus, different variations of the terms include 'Greek Cypriot' and 'Turkish Cypriot' (without hyphen), 'Cypriot Greeks' and 'Cypriot Turks' (reversed), 'Greek-Cypriot' and 'Turkish-Cypriot' (with hyphen). It should also be noted that these terms are used in English. In other languages, they appear different, inviting different readings on ethnic and national identity. For example, in German, the use of one-word terms '*Zyperngriechen*' and '*Zyperntürken*' eliminates the discussion about the use of a hyphen. One word terms are also used in Greek: '*Ελληνοκύπριος*' (*Elinokiprios*, Greekcypriot) and '*Τουρκοκύπριος*' (*Turkokiprios*, Turkishcypriot), while in Turkish the terms consist of two words, '*Kıbrıs Rumları*' (Cypriot Greeks) and '*Kıbrıs Türkleri*' or '*Kıbrıslı Türkler*' (Cypriot Turks).

⁴ The 'Greek Community' elected the President of the Republic. The 'Turkish Community' elected the Vice-President of the Republic (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 21, 1960).

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Taking into account the variation in terminology, a decision on how to refer to the Cypriot communities in this thesis has not been unproblematic. In Chapter 4, which explores events before the independence of Cyprus, I decided to use the religious distinction, 'Orthodox Christians' and 'Muslims', on which the Ottoman millet system was also based, mentioning as well that other religious groups existed in Cyprus. From chapter 5 onwards, which explores events after the independence of Cyprus, I use the hyphenated terms 'Greek-Cypriot' and 'Turkish-Cypriot', in order to maintain a continuity between the present research project and existing literature. However, these terms should not be understood as signifiers of ethnic or national identities, but rather as political categories, which describe those who live south and north of the Buffer Zone, and who are considered to be neither immigrants nor settlers. This exclusionary function of the terms 'Greek-Cypriot' and 'Turkish-Cypriot' to other residents in Cyprus is emphasized in the present thesis, when approaches that reproduce the ethnic binary are analysed. In this sense, the use of these terms highlights the obsessive preoccupation with ethnicity in Cyprus, and the absence of consideration about other 'others'. This is the case, for example, in chapter 6, where emphasis on bi-communalism in urban planning disregards Nicosia's immigrant residents. In cases where the ethnic binary becomes irrelevant, such as the examination of the Occupy movement in chapter 8, other, more specific and inclusionary terms are used, such as 'activists', or 'civil society', which are not tainted by the ethnic binary.

Despite the aforementioned clarifications, I am acutely aware that the use of the terms 'Greek-Cypriot' and 'Turkish-Cypriot' inadvertently reproduces the ethnic binary, which this thesis aims to prove dysfunctional. Therefore, I invite a critical reading of this thesis, and I rely on its readers to be aware that the 'Turkish-Cypriots' and 'Greek-Cypriots' of this research project are heterogeneous groups in terms of class, gender, religion, sexual orientation, political orientation, economic status, and ethnicity as well.

PART II
PARTITION

CHAPTER 4

Emergence – Understanding Conflict and Partition in Cyprus

4.1 Introduction

“What is Cyprus? An island lying in the north-east corner of the Levant; the key of Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. These things are written on a map. At all times she has been what she is now – the watch-tower and the outwork of two continents. A race advancing on the East must start with Cyprus. Alexander, Augustus, Richard and Saint Louis took that line. A race advancing on the West must start with Cyprus. Sargon, Ptolemy, Cyrus, Haroun-al-Rashid took this line. When Egypt and Syria were of first-rate value to the West, Cyprus was of first-rate value to the West. Genoa and Venice, struggling for the trade of India, fought for Cyprus and enjoyed supremacy in the land by turns. After a new route by sea was found to India, Egypt and Syria declined in value to the Western Nations. Cyprus was then forgotten; but the opening of the Suez Canal has suddenly restored her to her ancient pride of place.”

(Dixon W. H., 1879, p. 9-10)

These celebratory words open W. Hepworth Dixon’s introduction to ‘British Cyprus’, an account of the author’s travel impressions through British Empire’s then newly acquired territory. Such accounts simultaneously reflected and shaped popular perceptions of the importance with which the island was vested. Indeed Cyprus, as this excerpt is rather lyrically enunciating, holds a diachronically important geostrategic position in the Middle East, evident in the succession of its rulers. And for all Dixon’s narration is omitting, it makes apparent one thing; Cyprus has always been on the margins of various constructs of West and an ‘other’, against which the West has defined itself. This marginal position allowed the small island to oscillate between the West and its reputed ‘other’, belonging to neither, and always becoming. A detailed recounting of Cyprus’s history is outside the scope of the present thesis; its focus being on Nicosia and its urban partition. However, in order to study Nicosia’s partition historically and contextually, it is considered an imperative to provide the historical context wherein the notorious Cyprus Problem developed, and trace the emergence and development of the competing nationalisms that are considered its constituent elements.

The analysis in this chapter builds on the work of historians and anthropologists to tackle the first research question of this thesis, concerned with the ways in which Nicosia’s Buffer Zone was established as a dividing boundary, first in political discourse, and then in society, and on Nicosia’s ground. This chapter predicates an understanding of partition in Cyprus, not as a means to end interethnic violence, but as a *bordering* process developing within a particular historical conjuncture, involving international and local actors. Following this introduction, the second section of this chapter outlines the historical context within which Cyprus transitioned from an Ottoman province to a British colony. The third section explores the relation between processes of modernization, which this transition entailed, and the rise of competing nationalisms in Cyprus. The fourth section examines the constituent elements of nationalist ideologies in Cyprus, while the fifth section relates this analysis to each community’s vision for the future, inexorably

linking people and space/land in Cyprus. The sixth section examines the predominance of nationalist ideologies in each community between the 1920s and 1950s, which saw the popularization of nationalist demands, and traces the way in which the British administration handled a soon to be explosive situation. The antagonistic pursuit of these demands culminated in open violence between the Cypriot communities, marking the entrenchment of partition in politics, society and space. Through the analysis in this chapter, Nicosia's physical partition emerges as only one aspect of a wider *bordering* process, contradicting the ethnic origin of conflict and partition in Cyprus, which many studies take for granted. The last section offers a summary of this chapter, and reflects on the emergence of partition in Cyprus with Foucault's (1977) ideas on power/knowledge.

4.2 From Ottoman province to British colony

Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans in 1570 A.D.. Until then, the island had been ruled for roughly 400 years by Latins, first by the Lusignan (Frankish, 1192-1489 A.D.), and then by the Venetians (1489-1571 A.D.) (Hill, 1972; Mallinson, 2009). During the Frankish and Venetian periods, a Western-style feudal system was introduced, along with juridical institutions, social structures and hierarchies, and economic foundations, imported and dominated by foreign to the island elites (Hill, 1972; Asdracha, 1994). These new structures were initially inaccessible to local elites, and in any case exclusionary to the majority of the population, at the time to great extent still rural (Trimikliniotis & Bozkurt, 2012). Indeed, institutions, secular as well as religious, were staffed and administered by a new imported urban class. A prominent among other consequences was the diminished power of the local Christian Orthodox Church, which became subjugated to the Catholic Church, and as a result lost its power and economic foundations. Although there are references of partial integration and social promotion, the majority of the local population, and particularly the lower classes of peasants and serfs, were not partaking of the system of power (Hill, 1972; Safty, 2011). When the Ottomans defeated the Venetians, they entered the elite Latin structures, and expunged the feudal system. Similarly to the rest of the empire, the Ottoman *millet*¹ system was introduced to organize the political and social life in Cyprus. Turkish-speaking Muslim settlers were relocated from other areas of the Ottoman Empire, and were given land, thus comprising the dominant *millet*, the subordinate ones being the Christians (Orthodox, Catholic, Maronite, and Armenian) (Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994). Arguably, within the *millet* system differences between Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects were to certain extent institutionalized (Dietzel & Makrides, 2009); for example, the state institutions were staffed exclusively by members of the dominant *millet*. The *millets* enjoyed a level of self-administration, arranged around their religious leadership (Attalides, 1979; Hook, 2015, Trimikliniotis & Bozkurt, 2012). Until the 19th century, ethnic heterogeneity was a facet of the Ottoman Empire, and certainly not the inherent weakness the West saw in it at the turn of the century.

At the beginning of the 20th century, about twenty-five percent of the Ottoman Empire's population was non-Muslim (Campos, 2011). Thus, Cyprus, with the majority of its population comprised by Greek-

¹ Millet is a demographic group in the Ottoman Empire, defined in terms of religious affiliation and enjoying a degree of legal autonomy (Tzermias, 2001).

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speaking Orthodox Christians, was certainly not an oddity in terms of heterogeneity; it was though in terms of an outnumbered dominant *millet*² within an isolated insular context at the edge of a vast Empire. The power relations between the ruling Muslim elites and the Christian majority were characterized by interdependence, and more or less peaceful coexistence³ (Dietzel & Makrides, 2009). The Christian majority was organized around the Church, and exercised political representation through the Archbishop, who held a prominent and influential position⁴, testifying to the important role the Church held in the Ottoman administrative structure (Hook, 2015). Under Ottoman rule religious difference was looked upon pragmatically rather than as an identity marker; in this sense, class and status were highly relevant. As a result, non-Muslims often enjoyed a higher and more stable socio-economic position than that of Muslim peasants and workers (Campos, 2011). For example, next to the Church, an oligarchy of large landowners was part of the Christian privileged elite (Kerr-Lindsay & Faustmann, 2009). Therefore, cultural difference amongst the *millets*, although evident in their religious practice and the variety of languages spoken, was not the sole determinant of intercommunal relations. The physical proximity of the *millets* facilitated familiarity and solidarity; yet, in times of crisis, it also entailed the danger of eruption in conflict. This conflict was, however, not inherent in society. In her study about intercommunal relations and conflict in early twentieth-century Palestine, Campos (2011) notes that the relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews, were conditioned by political, economic, and social factors relating to local, imperial, and global geopolitical concerns, rather than cultural differences. Similarly, in Cyprus too, intercommunal conflict was neither inborn nor solely the result of foreign interference; it was the product of particular political and socio-cultural conjunctures, which fell in place when Cyprus came under British administration.

Cyprus was leashed to the British in 1878 A.D. under the provisions of the Berlin Congress, about three hundred years after its Ottoman conquest. By then, the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815 A.D.) and the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire (1806 A.D.) had produced new power balances in the European West, wherein Great Britain emerged as a great world power. The Ottoman Empire, already the putative 'Sick Man of Europe', was in decline. At its expense, the Greek War of Independence (1821-1830 A.D.) had successfully resulted in the establishment of the Greek state. Similarly, accumulated tension in the Balkans had spawned in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War of 1878-1879 A.D. the states of Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro. During this era of national state-building, territorial reorganization, and border shifts, the European Great Powers⁵ competed for influence and control over Ottoman territories (Tzermias, 2001; Grandits, Clayer, & Pichler, 2011; Hook, 2015). In exchange for their support to the crumbling Ottoman Empire, the British were given Cyprus, which served as a military base of operation to control access to the Suez Canal, and to secure, alongside bases in Malta and Gibraltar,

² Large cities of the Ottoman Empire demonstrated high percentage of non-Muslim population. For example, at the beginning of the 20th century the population of Istanbul consisted of "about 50 percent Muslims, 20,4 percent Greek Orthodox Christians, 7 percent Armenian Christians, 5,5 percent Jews, and 15 percent European foreigners", while Salonica, the third-largest city in the Empire, had a population that was 38,9 percent Jewish, 29,1 percent Muslim, and 25,3 percent Greek in 1913", a year after being annexed to the Greek state (Campos, 2011).

³ That is not to say that disputes were absent. However, they entailed everyday trivial matters, rather than abstract conceptions of identity or ethnicity (Dietzel & Makrides, 2009).

⁴ The Orthodox Church had the authority to tax their faithful. Tithes were collected with the help of police (*zaptiehs*) (Hook, 2015).

⁵ The term refers to Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Germany and Russia (Campos, 2011)

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British supremacy in the Mediterranean (Attalides, 1979; Mallinson, 2009). The island remained, however, formally an Ottoman province; as such, it continued to pay its heavy annual tribute to the Sultan⁶. When the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on Germany's side, Great Britain annexed Cyprus in response. With the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the new national state of Turkey renounced jurisdiction over all Ottoman territories outside the Anatolian peninsula, and Cyprus was officially ceded to Great Britain, which declared it a Crown Colony in 1925 (Attalides, 1979; Mallinson, 2009).

However, it is not only within this changing geopolitical context of international power relations that the acquisition of Cyprus by Great Britain should be contemplated. This was also an era of ideological clashes between egalitarian and hierarchical belief systems that began with the intellectual transformations of the Enlightenment, and their political fermentation in the French and Russian revolutions (Bell, 2008). The rejection of tradition was paving the way to modernity. As the nation-state was emerging as the "primary model for European statecraft", empires (the Ottoman Empire in particular) were seen as backward and regressive, unable to face modern challenges (Campos, 2011, p. 5). Notwithstanding the perpetuation of colonial rule practiced by the Great Powers themselves, the ethnically homogenous nation-state was becoming the norm in the European West, and the Ottoman Empire a multi-ethnic anachronism of the East. Within this context, Cyprus passed swiftly from Ottoman to British rule, and was inevitably faced with fundamental changes in administrative and social structures, which entailed new hierarchies and negotiation of new power relations. These transformative processes removed Cyprus and its people from the ideological premises of the Ottoman imperial system and yanked them into modernity; yet Cypriot modernity and its ideological foundations were only beginning to form.

Under British rule, processes of modernization (and westernization) set in motion mechanisms that transformed the Cypriot Muslim and Christian, i.e. religious, communities into ethnic groups, progressively divided by competing nationalisms. The asymmetrical power relations of the two groups, the Orthodox (later Greek) Cypriots and the Muslim (later Turkish) Cypriots, to British colonial authority provided the fertile ground to not only challenge colonial power, but also to lay antagonistic claims to state authority as well as territory. These constituted in the 1950s the main components of the soon notorious Cyprus Problem, which eventually erupted in intercommunal conflict. Cyprus's passage to modernity holds key elements of the Cyprus Problem, later consolidated in the dominant historical narratives and state practices that have hindered its solution. Principal amongst these elements is the emergence and consolidation of ethnic nationalisms, and the translation of nationalist demands into spatial/territorial claims. The next section of this chapter looks closely at the ways the rise of nationalisms in Cyprus became entangled with processes of modernization.

⁶ According to Holland & Markides (2006) the Cypriot tribute was an amount of £ 92.000 payable to the Sultan, but in reality it was used to repay the 1855 Crimean War Loan the Ottoman Empire owed to British and French bondholders. The collection of the tribute continued even after Cyprus's annexation by Britain.

4.3 Modernization and the rise of nationalisms in Cyprus

Towards the end of the 19th century, the majority of Cypriots were peasants, living in villages under conditions of poverty. The levels of illiteracy were high, and the few schools that existed were controlled by religious institutions and offered religious curricula (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014; Pollis, 1973). The Church was a prominent institution within the socio-economic structure of the Christian community, as both a large landowner and the centre of communal administration. Additionally, few noble large landowners constituted the ruling elite within a semi-feudal system. A commercial urban middle class was at its early stages, as was a lower middle class of intellectuals and teachers. There was also a small group, comprising artisans and craftsmen, which resembled a working class (Bozkurt & Trmikliniotis, 2014, pp. 252-253). The socio-economic structure of the Muslim community involved, besides the peasantry, the Ottoman ruling elite (the Ottoman governor and higher officials), few rich businessmen and land owners, and the military personnel (Hook, 2015). As Muslims did not engage in commerce, a Muslim middle class had not yet been formed. These socio-economic structures and their power relations were significantly reorganized under British rule with the introduction of reforms that can be summarized as the beginning of modernization.

Three concomitant processes of transformation can be seen as characteristic manifestations of the Cypriot modernization during the British rule. The first was the institutional and administrative reforms the British introduced, which, combined with other transformative processes, caused the traditional Ottoman social order on the island to collapse. The second was the economic transformation, precipitated by the transition from barter to cash economy, the replacement of traditional modes of agriculture and farming by mechanized agriculture, light industry and services, and the bolstering of commercial activities and trade. The third was a process of urbanization, which saw a tendency for rural-urban migration in search of new employment opportunities away from the village life (Argyrou, 1996, p. 33; Attalides, 1979, pp. 88-89). Within these processes, each community responded and adapted to changes in different ways, resulting in unequal power relations between them, as well as with the British administration. This inequality offered fertile ground for nationalist ideologies, which eventually pitted one community against the other. The entanglement of the rise of nationalisms with processes of modernization can be traced through its manifestation in three areas of political, economic and social life: the advent and mode of implementation of representative politics, the growing economic disparity between the two communities, and the role of education.

Under British rule the power of political representation the Ottoman *millet* system granted to the religious leaders of each community was rescinded, severing as a result any direct ties with the state machinery (Trimikliniotis & Bozkurt, 2012; Bryant, 2004). Under a constitution, Cypriots turned from Ottoman subjects, relying for administrative, legal and financial matters on an established hierarchy, to equal before the law citizens. Such change blew up the existing social order by equating clergy and laity, peasants and urban elites, and disentangling religious from administrative matters. Moreover, these systemic changes, particularly the legal-bureaucratic and administrative reforms that replaced the Ottoman communal foundations with a centralized state, caused the collapse of traditional authority structures. The former Ottoman administrators and military personnel were given the choice to either depart or become British subjects in Cyprus; an estimated 5.000 departed (Holland & Markides, 2006). As a result, traditional

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Muslim ruling elites were disempowered. In their effort to modernize (and de-Ottomanize) administrative structures, the British abolished the office of Mufti, and brought the Evkaf, the religious foundation administering Muslim properties, under British control (Safty, 2011). The Church was also deprived of its administrative rights and privileges, but it was largely allowed the freedom to manage its own affairs. In due time, it was transformed into an arena of politics, embracing and promoting nationalist ideology. As traditional authority structures subsided, positions in state bureaucracy became available to non-Muslims⁷, attracting the interest of an emerging educated middle class. Simultaneously, however, the advent of representative politics disrupted the power balance between Muslims and Christians.

An illustrative example can be found in the establishment of the Legislative Council, an advisory to the High Commissioner body, through which political representation was to be performed. After only four years of operation in terms of equal representation, which was the case of similar structures during the Ottoman administration, it was remodelled into a proportionate system based on each community's size in the population (Safty, 2011, Pollis, 1998). Headed by the (British) High Commissioner, the Legislative Council comprised six appointed British officials and twelve elected members, nine Christians and three Muslims, and operated by majority rule. For the Muslim community, which had previously supplied the island's rulers, this change of their status was seen as a curtailment of their rights, placing them in an inferior position, and in competition for power and resources with the Christian majority (Safty, 2011). However, a combination of British and Muslim votes could still overrule a Christian majority, as the deciding vote remained with the High Commissioner⁸ (Hook, 2015). Progressively, the British and the Muslims exerted mutual interest in countering the Christian majority, especially in the light of its soon to be vociferous nationalist demands. It is widely accepted that asymmetrical power relations were instrumental in firmly establishing the colonial authority along the lines of 'divide and rule' (Hook, 2015). In Cyprus in particular, the policies of 'divide and rule' did not simply exploit differences between the Cypriot people, but actively contributed to their entrenchment and politicization, thus becoming conducive to the formation of ethnic identities and the preconditions for their eventual conflict.

The proportionate representation in the Legislative Council is illustrative of the British view on the local population. The cognitive framework of the British administration attributed meaning and significance to local cultural differences, which dictated a sectionalized conduct towards the Cypriot population. Cypriot people were seen as 'backward', captive of and defined by their cultural ties and customs (religion, language, family etc.), and relying on traditional modes of political and societal organization. The Cypriot religious communities were seen as naturally sharing characteristics among their members, and being prone to behaviours and tendencies symptomatic of a parochial system, and in need of reform. Thus, not only the Ottoman structures were to be replaced upon British arrival in Cyprus, but the systemic changes ought to lead to "civilizational and political maturation" of the local population as well (Bryant, 2004, p. 50). As Pollis (1998) and Loizos (1998) underline, however, the British superimposed their own perceptions of the social realities they encountered in Cyprus on the local population, reading the cultural differences between Christians and Muslims, their mores and interrelations as ethnic differences between Greeks and

⁷ According to Hook (2015), by the end of the 19th century Orthodox Christians occupied about fifty percent of positions in public service compared to forty-two percent of Muslims.

⁸ Safty (2011) notes that even in case of agreement between the two communities, the High Commissioner could still override the Council's decision with an 'Order in Council' to impose the colonial authority's will.

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Turks. This attitude led to a prominent institutionalization and legal entrenchment of cultural difference, as Christians and Muslims were segregated in almost all institutional structures under a presumed societal cleavage, and conflict of interests, which at the beginning of British rule did not correspond to social realities in Cyprus (Pollis, 1998). In other words, British policies to great extent politicized and institutionalized difference in Cyprus, facilitating antagonism between the Cypriot religious communities.

Various scholars have argued that the transformative processes precipitated under British rule, favoured the solidification of different nationalisms based on communal identification (Salih, 1978; Attalides, 1979; Argyrou, 1996; Papadakis, 2003; Bryant, 2004; Papadakis, Peristianis, & Welz, 2006). Particularly insightful is Bryant's (2004) anthropological take on the subject, who argues that the systemic changes introduced by the British generated new hopes and demands "for freedom, equality, and representative politics" that sought their fulfilment in culturally defined nationalist projects (p. 3). She underlines that these systemic changes and representative politics under British rule necessitated the transition from 'subject' to 'citizen', which called for a new understanding of 'community' beyond religion and kinship. This required the development of an 'identity of equal selves' to replace the identity of the villager, which was defined by particular religious and cultural affiliations. This new sense of 'community' was eventually imagined in ethnic-nationalist terms due to the concomitant assimilation of nationalist doctrines. In other words, the passage to modernity for the people of Cyprus entailed processes of 'othering', whereby one ethnic community came to define itself against the 'other', while seeing the realization of their future objectives for prosperity in contradictory and eventually antagonistic terms.

The growing economic disparity between the two communities further fuelled antagonism between them. By the beginning of the 20th century, the economic transformation in Cyprus had precipitated a transformation in class relations as well, wherein emerged a prominent middle class (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014). The British policies reinforced commercial activities and trade, in which primarily the Christian community engaged, thus benefiting from the expansion of this field. Thus, the emergent Cypriot middle class became dominated by urban educated Christian elites, including lawyers and doctors (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014; Pollis, 1998). On the other hand, the Muslim population remained largely rural, engaged in farming and agriculture. Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis (2014) offer that after the First World War 75 percent of the Muslim population were peasants, 15 percent were engaged in civil administration, and only 10 percent were engaged in commerce (p. 263). Thus, the Muslim community under British administration became highly dependent on the Christian community for tradeable goods, money-lending, legal and health matters, and economically subordinate. This situation increased as well their dependency on the British administration, on which the Muslim middle class came to rely for economic improvement (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014, pp. 254-255). Thus, education became for both communities a means for social mobility, which led to the employment of the young in towns and cities away from the agrarian village life (Argyrou, 1996). At the same time, education also emerged as the primary mechanism for the dissemination of nationalist doctrines, and the consequent transformation of religious into ethnic identities.

During Ottoman rule education in Cyprus was for both communities closely related to religion. The Orthodox Church had a monopoly over pedagogy⁹ of their faithful; in similar manner, literati of the Islamic

⁹ The Church and other Christian wealthy patrons funded the Orthodox (ecclesiastical) schools, as they were not supported by the Ottoman government, and they continued to do so under British administration (Hook, 2015).

faith monopolized Muslim education. Priests and imams were often serving as village teachers, a practice that continued well into the British era (Bryant, 2004). As religion was entangled with politics, education, hence knowledge, was politicized; all the more so under the British administration and the influence of representative politics. Control over education naturally meant control over the new educated elites assuming leading roles in Cypriot communities, as well as control over the electorate. The village school was an ideological bastion, whence each community's putative high culture¹⁰ was learned, ensuring its continuity (Bryant, 2004). It was thus challenging for the British administration to reform and secularize the educational system, a task on which they embarked quite late. But even then, secularization of education was undertaken along ethnic-communal lines¹¹, as Greek and Turkish, with the establishment of separate Boards of Education (Pollis, 1998, p. 589). Within British efforts to counter illiteracy, initial grants for the support of schools were being distributed to each community's own institutions. It was only in 1909 that increased control over schools was considered necessary; by then the overall number of educational institutions had not only grown significantly, but also Christian schools considerably outnumbered Muslim schools, with more than three times as many enrolled students (Bryant, 2004). Evidently, the British efforts¹² to bring under their control and reform the Cypriot educational system failed, allowing the continuous cultural influence of the Christian Orthodox and Islamic faiths, and their emissaries (Hook, 2015).

Progressively, the contents of school curricula attained nationalist tones, fermented by ideals developing outside Cyprus, i.e. in Greece and Turkey, with which Cypriot institutions had forged strong bonds. With the role of education as a means for social mobility becoming increasingly prominent, the emerging and expanding middle and lower middle class in both communities was educated within ethnic-nationalist frameworks. However, education should not be seen simply as a mode of nationalist propaganda. Nationalist ideas were not merely imported through school curricula, although teaching personnel certainly was imported from Greece and from the Ottoman Empire, and later from Turkey (Pollis, 1998); rather they were integral part of the communal-turning-ethnic experience. As Bryant (2004) notes "through education one became more fully what one was, in ethnic terms" (p. 127). Hence, education tapped into and simultaneously reproduced an 'eternal constituent truth' for each community. However, the two communities were claiming different-cum-adversarial 'constituent truths' as 'eternal'. Increasing awareness over and internalization of these 'constituent truths', eventually serving as the cohesive element

¹⁰ In Orthodox schools pupils were learning to read and write in high Greek, called *katharevousa* (an archaic version of Greek, different from the spoken Greek of Greece), as well as ancient Greek. In Muslim schools pupils were learning to read and write in Arabic (the language of the Qur'an), Persian (the language of literature and poetry), and Ottoman Turkish (the language of the administration and bureaucracy). The taught languages differed substantially from the locally spoken Kipriaka, which is considered a dialect of Greek so different from the Greek language that is more often than not incomprehensible to Greeks of Greece. The Turkish-speaking Muslims of Cyprus spoke a version of Turkish heavily influenced by Kipriaka (Bryant, 2004).

¹¹ This holds true for elementary school education, as well as gymnasium. Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots had the chance to be educated together at the English school, which was not well attended by Orthodox Christians / Greek-Cypriots, and in the college of Morfou for teachers (Bryant, 2004)

¹² For example, the British insisted on the use of the populations' native languages at school, a reform that was fervently resisted. Similarly, an effort to establish English as language of instruction at schools failed too. Bryant (2004) argues that both Orthodox and Muslim pupils were memorizing and reciting knowledge they were struggling to understand, as it was instructed in a language different than their spoken language, yet they came to embody this knowledge that represented the traditions of their community.

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for each community, contributed substantially to the transformation of religious into ethnic identities, and the consequent articulation of nationalist demands.

To summarize, under British rule the Cypriot society gradually underwent significant transformations in terms of social, economic and political developments that can be summarized as modernization. Pre-existing cultural differences were distorted and embedded in representative politics, placing the two major Cypriot religious communities in antagonism over power and resources at a time when a new sense of community was imperative. Due to concomitant assimilation of nationalist doctrines through education, this new sense of community was sought and eventually articulated along ethnic lines, Greek and Turkish. It should be noted, however, that Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot nationalisms did not develop simultaneously. The Orthodox Christian/Greek-Cypriot nationalist demands had by the 1930s already become vociferous, based on mainland Greek nationalism, while Muslim/Turkish-Cypriot nationalism developed later, based on Turkish mainland nationalism. The next section of this chapter explores the nature, origins and interrelationship of the adversarial constituent 'truths', i.e. Hellenism and Turkishness, structural of nationalist ideologies in Cyprus. This examination necessarily involves Greece and Turkey, the two states that are often referred to as 'motherlands' of Cypriots.

4.4 Of Hellenism and Turkishness: adversarial constituent 'truths'

Hellenism is one of the two foundational pillars of modern Greece, the other one being Orthodox Christianity. These two tendencies seem contradictory; Hellenism being the construct western European fascination with classical ancient Greece produced at the turn of the 19th century, while Orthodox Christianity, an inheritance of the Eastern Roman and Byzantine Empires, hence by the same measure inherently 'oriental'. However, these two seemingly contradictory tendencies were reconciled under Greek nationalism and irredentism as summarized in the concept of *Meghali Idea* [*Μεγάλη Ιδέα*, Great Idea]. Upon the establishment of the Greek state in the aftermath of the Greek War of Independence (1821-30), *Meghali Idea* professed the small state's expansion to encompass territories where (ethnic) Greek population resided. These territories largely corresponded with the extents of the former Byzantine Empire, the glory of which was to be restored at the expense of the Ottoman Empire still ruling over said territories. This was much more than mere rhetoric of expansionism; *Meghali Idea* had cultural underpinnings of kinship and continuity. Populations with such cultural affinity as that evidenced by language, traditions, customs, and religion were seen as belonging to the Greek ethnos, and longing for their *freedom* which would be achieved by means of union under one state (Clogg, 1994).

This idea remained central in foreign relations and dominated Greek domestic politics until 1922. And it was fruitful too. The first Greek state was established in the geographical area that corresponded with western imaginings of ancient Greece, thus offering substance to the idea of ancient Greece as 'the cradle of western civilization'. Without the help and machinations of the Great Powers, and specifically Great Britain, the Greek War of Independence was unlikely to yield results. However, historians agree that although the British considered the existence of a state under their influence essential to secure control in the Mediterranean, there is no indication that they intended for that state to grow (Holland & Markides, 2006). Yet, it did, with the Ionian Islands being the first annexed territory, followed by Thessaly, Epirus,

Macedonia, Crete, and more¹³. And it did so for nearly a century by creating a national (and nationalist) narrative that had at its epicentre the fight against a constructed archenemy, the Ottoman and later the Turk, from whom other ethnic Greeks should be 'liberated'. In this way, claims over Ottoman territories were not seen as expansionism; they were legitimized as reclaiming what was 'rightfully' Greek. In this narrative, cultural affinity did not only underpin territorial claims but was offered as undisputable proof of cultural continuity, linking ancient Greece to Byzantium, and from there through Orthodox Christianity to modern Greece. It was, thus, a primordial, timeless 'truth' reconciling Hellenism and Orthodox Christianity, which sought its realization in the nationalist project that was the expansion of the Greek state. Moreover, Cyprus was already part of this narrative before its people embarked on nationalist projects of their own. At the time when the Ottoman Empire handed over the island to the British in 1878, the Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians of Cyprus were already considered in Greece not only culturally but also ethnically Greek.

At the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence in 1821 Cypriots alongside Orthodox Christians elsewhere were called on to join the revolt of Peloponnese, but their response was anything but fervent. Hill (1972) notes that the Cypriot Christians were reluctant to participate in the revolt with the exception of few money subscriptions and some volunteers, but were subjected to the general disarmament of Christians that had been ordered in the Empire. They also experienced the repercussions of the Peloponnesian revolt in the form of oppression by the local Ottoman administration, which, according to Hill (1972), aimed to prevent them from uprising too. In July 1821 these repercussions turned quite bloody with the public executions of the Archbishop and three prominent Bishops in one of Nicosia's central squares, followed by the massacre of more than 400 notable Christians, whose property, as well as wealth from churches and monasteries, was confiscated. These nasty events, survived in collective memory, and were later translated into proof of Cypriot solidarity with and assumption of the Greek cause. This and other events were soon accommodated within a Greek-Cypriot¹⁴ rhetoric underlying a nationalist project, the union of Cyprus with Greece, also known as *Enosis*.

As the Greek state continued to expand its territory still harbouring the hope¹⁵ of annexing Cyprus too, it is not surprising that voices of *Enosis* had indeed been expressed on the part of Orthodox Christian/Greek-Cypriot political elites and the Church as well, already at the beginning of British rule. It took, however, the transformation of the Ottoman subjects to modern citizens with ethnic consciousness, which was achieved as elaborated previously first and foremost through education, to make this rhetoric dominant, and turn the ideal of *Enosis* into a mass social movement, mobilizing Greek-Cypriots against the British in the 1950s. Moreover, this nationalist struggle was already at its beginning considered of high morality, since it sought to free the Greek-Cypriots from British oppression, while serving and upholding a timeless 'truth'. The fact that the Greek-Cypriot timeless truth was not only ignoring but even denying the island's Ottoman history is essential to underline. Moreover, this 'truth' was crafted around the notion of the

¹³ Dodecanese was the last part to be ceded to Greece in 1947 (Holland & Markides, 2006).

¹⁴ From this point onwards, the terms Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are used to denote the Orthodox Christian and Muslim communities of Cyprus respectively. This does not imply a specific historical turning point, but the intensification of a process, in which significant parts of these communities came to understand themselves in terms of ethnicity. This process was more intense in cities than in rural areas. Hence, the use of the term does not imply homogeneity.

¹⁵ Although Holland & Markides (2006) note that the issue of Cyprus was not topping the Greek foreign policy agenda.

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Turk as the archenemy, the 'other' against whom a common Greek and Greek-Cypriot identity could be built. Thus, local antagonism for political and economic power found its ideological underpinnings.

After the First World War Greco-Turkish relations remained strained, not least because Greece was attributed with the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) more Ottoman territories, namely Thrace, the islands Gökçeada/Imbros and Bozcaada/Tenedos, and an administrative zone around the city of Izmir/Smyrna in Asia Minor. The Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922, an overtly ambitious Greek military operation in the depths of Anatolia in line with *Meghali Idea*, ended with catastrophic results for the Greek-speaking population of Asia Minor. A year later, the Turkish War of Independence/Liberation (1919-1923) ended with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Turkey, having achieved the return of eastern Thrace and the territories of the Treaty of Sevres, renounced all claims to former Ottoman territories outside the Anatolian peninsula. An emerging Turkish nationalism was central to the creation of the new nation-state. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk aimed to modernize both state and society according to western standards through self-remaking and improvement of the Turk. The Turkish capital was symbolically moved from Istanbul to Ankara, the Latin alphabet was adapted, and significantly the secularization of the state took place. Since rupture with the Ottoman past was the foundational condition of the new nation-state, its citizen had to be remade into culturally Muslim and ethnically Turk (Mills, 2010). Unlike the Greek eternal 'truth', which was based on continuity and the exercise of a primordial right, the Turkish one was based on *progress*, achieved through rupture with the traditions of the past. In other words, Turkishness, unlike Hellenism, was not inherited but had to be achieved.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the secular Turkish Republic had repercussions in Cyprus as well. Although it took the better part of a decade due to the conservatism of the Cypriot Muslims, eventually Turkish nationalism became a force in Cypriot politics to oppose both the British administration and the Greek-Cypriot nationalist campaign. From the early 1920s onwards, Turkish nationalism started entering the school curricula in mainland Turkey, and reached the Muslims of Cyprus through the existing ties between educational institutions. Bryant (2004) notes that for Muslim Cypriots education paved the way to *progress*; as it was through the mastery of knowledge that power and social mobility could be achieved. Turkish nationalism and the idea of *progress* appealed to a younger Muslim Cypriot generation, which rejected local traditional and religious mores, and particularly to the lower middle class intellectuals in Nicosia and elsewhere, who openly opposed the traditional Muslim elites that depended on the British administration (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014). The adaptation of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus offered the local Muslim minority the vocabulary and ideological underpinnings necessary for their autonomous political mobilization, and eventual articulation of their demands in response to the demand of *Enosis* (Dietzel & Makrides, 2009).

This part of the chapter examined the Cypriot communities' constituent 'truths', i.e. the notion of *freedom* implicit in Hellenism, and the notion of *progress* implicit in Turkishness, and discussed how claims to these 'truths' were underpinned by cultural continuity and rupture respectively. These claims to 'truth' were translated into claims to power, authority, and territory, leading to a most violent outbreak, as dying and killing in the name of the 'truth' was ennobled. However, the massiveness of mobilization that nationalist demands enjoyed in Cyprus after the 1930s presupposes not only an internalization of these constituent 'truths', but also a vision for a better future linked with them, which sees other visions as hostile

and antagonistic. The next section of this chapter presents Bryant's (2002, 2004) analysis of this linkage, predicated on a relation of people to land, which is highly relevant to this thesis.

4.5 Of people and land: understanding the premises of conflict in Cyprus

Bryant (2002, 2004) offers an insightful analysis of how claims to an eternal 'truth' were actually translated into each community's claims over power, authority and territory. She argues for a process of naturalization, wherein nationalist ideologies were naturalized in the individual, in the land and in the body politic. Of special interest is the relation between people and land, which, following Bryant (2002, 2004), is justified by a shared 'natural' substance. For the Greek-Cypriots this substance is the (Greek) soul/spirit that unyielding and pure was linking them to the land of their ancestors. This soul/spirit imbued both the people and the land, and as a result emerged as 'historically Greek'. Thus, an eternal, inherited Greekness was claimed as historical. For the Turkish-Cypriots this substance was the blood shed by their Ottoman ancestors when they conquered Cyprus (and later the Turkish-Cypriot blood shed by the Greek-Cypriots during intercommunal violence). The metaphor of blood implied neither continuity nor kinship; blood became the common substance of people and land by being spilled for and soaking in the land of Cyprus. The Turkish-Cypriots, unlike the Greek-Cypriots, did not inherit the land of Cyprus, but claimed it through fight and sacrifice. In both cases, the relation between people and land was naturalized through history; that is, through knowledge that was considered historical and undisputed: the island's eternal Greekness, and the island's conquest by the Ottomans.

These two cases differ, however, in their understanding of history. For Greek-Cypriots history stresses a primordial continuity, which justifies their relation to land, thus allowing territorial claims to be formed. For Turkish-Cypriots history is made, and is evidenced in recent events too, proving the relation of people to land (through their shedding of their blood). These two understandings of history, based on different assumptions, are irreconcilable as they function at different levels while translating cultural constructs into indisputable natural logics. In other words, the Greek-Cypriot understanding of history is based on an inherited primordial Greekness applying to both people and land, and which is undisputable and unalterable. Thus, the island's conquest by the Ottomans is merely a fluke in the natural order of things, which ought to be restored. Turkish-Cypriots on the other hand understand history as something 'being made', an idea that is incongruous with primordial inevitability. Thus, Greek-Cypriot claims to the primordial Greekness of Cyprus have for them no historical footing. As a result, each side's territorial claims (the claims to said land) were seen as unjustified by the other (Bryant, 2002, 2004).

It is important to emphasize here that the 'land' to which Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot people are linked, and which they claim, is not the land one owned, their homes and their fields, not even the land of their villages, but the 'land' of Cyprus in general, the soil of what both called their home country. Through Bryant's (2002, 2004) analysis, the Cypriot conflict is revealed as one firmly rooted in physical space, the land, which is part and parcel of Cypriots' understanding of being-in-the-world. Much more than an ethno-nationalist dispute finding spatial expression, and being translated into competing spatial/territorial claims, the Cyprus conflict is woven into and entwined with the 'land'; the two cannot be

understood separately¹⁶. The link of people to land as expressed in Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot discourses constitutes an ontology¹⁷ that provides the base of nationalist kinship, which underpins nationalist ideology. As Bryant (2002, 2004) notes, although many different ontologies may be influential at the same time, one might become dominant when it achieves the capacity to explain the world above all others. Through actions and decisions, that are social as much as they are political, ontology becomes nationalist ideology. The nationalist ideology that became the norm in Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities derived its resonance from adequately explaining the world people lived in, while at the same time providing a vision for their future. This brings me to the next point, the imaginings of a future for Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots that eventually came in conflict. Adhering to the naturalized cultural logic of primordial Greekness, the Greek-Cypriot demand was framed in nationalist terms as *Enosis* [Union] with Greece. It was through union with Greece that a polity could be achieved, wherein Greek-Cypriot *freedom* would be guaranteed. Greek-Cypriot fixation with the demand for *Enosis* and their growing intolerance of the British rule led to the political, social and eventually physical exclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots, which largely shaped their own political demand for *Taksim* [Partition], which was imagined to guarantee the *progress* of their community. The next section of this chapter examines these nationalist demands, and their popularization in the Cypriot communities.

4.6 *Enosis* and *Taksim* towards the end of British rule

Modernization under British rule did not necessarily mean prosperity for Cypriots. Although constitutionalism had animated the island's political and social life, and had some positive effects in the economy, heavy taxation and the effects of Great Depression in the 1930s, coupled with a concomitant agricultural crisis, led to the islands' economic deceleration (Apostolides, 2011). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, economic capital was being unequally distributed between the two communities, with the Greek-Cypriot new urban elites dominating the economic and social spheres (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2012; Holland, 1998). Under these conditions, the Turkish-Cypriot community, still largely agrarian, was growing worried and uncomfortable with the demand of *Enosis*, which they saw as promoting the Greek-Cypriot prepotency at their expense. The *Enosis* demand had over the years been expressed in various ways, such as delegations, chiefly led by the archbishop and the local clergy, addressing the matter with British as well as Greek officials in London and Athens respectively¹⁸ (Holland & Markides, 2006, Tzermias, 1991). In 1915 Cyprus had even been offered to Greece in exchange for entering the First World War on Britain's side. However, as Greece refused and only entered the war in 1917, the ceding was not granted,

¹⁶ This helps us understand one of many reasons trauma is collectively experienced by Greek-Cypriots. The occupation of the north by Turkish forces interrupted violently this perceived historic continuity between people and land. The loss is not only experienced and mourned individually, as described in the stories of refugees from the north, but collectively. Therefore non-refugee Greek-Cypriots who always lived in the south also feel deprived of land that is theirs. Turkish-Cypriots experience trauma collectively as well, however not the trauma from the disruption of a primordial order, but the trauma of recent events, of a very recent past when they were oppressed and discriminated by their Greek-Cypriot compatriots.

¹⁷ In Bruce Kapferer's (1988) terms an ontology "describes the fundamental principles of a being in the world and the orientation of such a being towards the horizons of its experience" (p. 79).

¹⁸ For a detailed analysis regarding the course of the Cypriot demand for *Enosis*, see Holland and Markides, 2006, pp. 162-188.

and Cyprus became officially a crown colony in 1925. Moreover, the ratification of Friendship Treaties between Greece and Turkey in 1930 normalized for a short time their relations, obscuring the demand for *Enosis* (Mallinson, 2009; Tzermias, 1991).

The year 1931, however, saw a massive uprising in Cyprus, in which *Enosis* occupied for the first time a central position¹⁹. The cause for this uprising was the imposition of extra tax on salaries, which a united front of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots had rejected in the Legislative Council, yet it was still imposed by the British administration (Apeyitou, 2003). The 1931 tax imposition scratched an old wound²⁰, therefore inevitably brought to the foreground the Greek-Cypriot demand for *Enosis*. Popular unrest resulted in the burning of the British governor's residence, and culminated in an island-wide bloody eruption in violence, which abated only with the interference of British military force (Holland, 1998). In its aftermath, the Cypriot constitution was suspended, elections were banned, the Legislative Council and other political institutions were dissolved, some Greek-Cypriot politicians and clergy were exiled, and eventually the opposition to the British rule was repressed. The 1931 mass mobilization was followed by a ten-year period of severe repression during which British efforts were concentrated on steering both communities away from nationalism, and stifling the *Enosis* demand. Restrictions were imposed on Church functions, and educational reforms were introduced, aiming to de-nationalize education by bringing schools under the control of the British administration (Apeyitou, 2003, p. 75). There was also a feeble, and doomed, effort to promote a common Cypriot identity to counter ethnic nationalism (Holland & Markides, 2006). Although both communities protested these reforms, from the 1930s onwards Greek-Cypriot agitation against the British started taking the form of a people's movement (Apeyitou, 2003, p. 76).

The aftermath of the 1931 uprising boosted the more mature Greek-Cypriot nationalism, while it repressed for a while Turkish-Cypriot nationalism (Bozkurt & Trimikliniotis, 2014, p. 256). It is important to underline here that opposition to the British administration, however strongly expressed by the Greek-Cypriot nationalists, had little chance to find Turkish-Cypriot support. Although the Turkish-Cypriot community also suffered under heavy taxation and the dismal socioeconomic conditions on the island, the demand for *Enosis*, coupled with the Greek-Cypriot majority's economic and social dominance, prevented alliances that could lead to a common anticolonial struggle. A large part of the Greek-Cypriot community had gradually come to see the realization of their future objectives for *freedom* and a better life through union with Greece. The demands and ailments of the Turkish-Cypriot community were systematically ignored, as were their anxieties in the prospect of becoming a weak minority within the Greek state (Tzermias, 1991). Under British rule and within Cyprus's insular context, the Turkish-Cypriots were an

¹⁹ Until the 1931 insurgency the *Enosis* movement had largely remained only verbally radical with only few exceptions (Tzermias, 2001).

²⁰ This relates to the collection of the island's annual tribute to the Ottoman Empire by the British, which despite local reactions and despite Cyprus becoming officially a British colony was still being collected until 1928. The tribute was not being attributed to the Ottoman Empire, but channeled to the Treasury in London, a fact that had been causing discomfort to the Muslims and Christians of Cyprus alike. However consistent their resentment for the island's fiscal depletion was, it was predicated on different principles. For the Muslims of Cyprus the tribute had been a proof of the Ottoman Empire's legal rights over Cyprus; consequently they disapproved its confiscation by the British. This was the reason why the Christians disapproved the collection of the tribute altogether, which they rejected both as testimony of what for them was a false Ottoman claim over the island, and a sign of British oppression; thus the demand of *Enosis* had always remained connected to harsh British taxation policies (Holland & Markides, 2006).

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important minority, a status they saw as comparably favourable. As a result, they responded to Greek-Cypriot nationalist agitation by forging alliances with the British, who also relied on Turkish-Cypriot support to counter the Greek-Cypriot majority. It was only after the Second World War, when the demand for *Enosis* resurfaced vociferously to eventually culminate in the 1955-1959 anticolonial fight, that the Turkish-Cypriots articulated their own nationalist demand for *Taksim*.

Before continuing to the examination of the armed conflict of the 1950s, a short digression is necessary to reflect on the predominance of nationalist ideologies within both Cypriot communities. Rather than being inevitable, this predominance was the result of struggle over power and control between different forces in each community, some of which coalesced to form alliances across communal lines in the political space of the Left. The socio-economic transformations in Cyprus during British rule had precipitated the formation of a class movement, which mobilized the working class on the island. The dismal economic conditions, particularly for the rural poor, were aggravated by the agricultural crisis of the 1920s, which left indebted peasants exposed to moneylenders. Thus, the weakest parts of the Cypriot society, losing their property, became impoverished, leading to a profound economic and social crisis (Panayiotou, 2006, pp. 84-85). Labour mobilization acquired institutional form in 1926 with the establishment of the Communist Party of Cyprus [CPC], which supported the mass uprising of miners in 1929. The communist party advocated social change under the rubric of equality, secularism, and progress, demanding civil rights and public participation. Moreover, it opposed *Enosis* in favour of independence. Thus, the Left, by providing the political and ideological space for the advancement of class consciousness, came in conflict with nationalist rhetoric, which promoted identification along ethnic lines (Bozkurt & Trmikliniotis, 2014; Panayiotou, 2006). Within this process, the Left emerged as a political space for the common mobilization of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot working class.

After the events of 1931, the communist party was declared illegal, and resurfaced as the Progressive Party of the Working People [AKEL] ten years later, in 1941. In the meantime, due to the suspension of the constitution, political representation had become compromised and mainly limited to the municipal level, where the Left gained ground reflecting a wide social base. During the 1940s, the Left became a major political force in Cyprus, leading the labour movement in protests and strikes. In the Pancyprian Federation of Labour [PEO], the trade union²¹ of the Left, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot workers battled together against social oppression from the British administration (Ioannou & Sonan, 2014). At the same time, however, the Left competed with the Right and the Church, which already enjoyed the allegiance of the Greek-Cypriot middle and lower middle classes, for the mobilization of the Greek-Cypriot working class, shifting the focus of mobilization away from class consciousness (Bozkurt & Trmikliniotis, 2014, pp. 253-254). Nationalism became particularly appealing to the Greek-Cypriot urban working class. After the mid-1940s, possibly in response to competition from the Right, but also developments in Greece, where the Left had become a major force of resistance during the Second World War, AKEL espoused the demand for *Enosis*, leading as well a mass protest in its pursuit (Panayiotou, 2006, pp. 85-86). Panayiotou (2006) notes that for AKEL, the support of *Enosis* was not an ideological shift; rather, it was a strategic manoeuvring, aimed to create the preconditions of popular unity against the British (p. 100). The

²¹ Turkish-Cypriots started establishing their own trade unions in 1943. The Association of Turkish Cypriot Workers Unions [KTIBK] was by 1945 dominated by nationalists. The majority of the Turkish-Cypriot workers continued to affiliate with PEO until the 1950s (Ioannou & Sonan, 2014, p. 3).

concomitant maturation of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism completed the rupture in the labour movement within the next decade, which saw the predominance of nationalist ideologies in both communities.

The British policy in Cyprus changed after the Second World War, when in light of the post-war instability in the Middle East and the post-war decolonisation wave, Cyprus's strategic position was re-evaluated. Retaining sovereign control over the island was seen as serving British interests, and in an effort to counter the prevailing anticolonial sentiments, the British administration proposed a new constitution, which would guarantee a form of self-government (Panayiotou, 2006, p. 86). The issue of self-government polarized the Cypriot Left, as social unrest intensified. The British proposal was rejected, and at this juncture, the Right regrouped around the demand of *Enosis*, which resurfaced vociferously advocating now for the Greek-Cypriot right to self-determination. In 1950, a referendum was organized illegally by the Church, in which the Greek-Cypriots voted by 96,5 percent in favour of *Enosis* (Holland & Markides p. 223, Mallinson, 2009, p. 19). Its results affirmed the popularization of the demand for union with Greece, as well as the power of the nationalist forces within the Greek-Cypriot community. While the British continued to ignore the *Enosis* demand, agitation was rising on all sides. In the 1950s, massive mobilizations with chants for '*Enosis and only Enosis*' swept the political scenery in Cyprus.

It is so far evident that the Greek-Cypriot *Enosis* demand was not merely anticolonial; it had ethnic, religious, liberal-democratic and social components, of which, however, the ethnic aspect became dominant. On that account, the participatory rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community in self-determination were consistently overlooked, as were their concerns and fears regarding their future as Greek subjects. For Greek-Cypriots, self-determination came to mean only *Enosis*, a demand that was voiced in a way that excluded the Turkish-Cypriots. During the 1940s, the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist (Kemalist) Right had managed to attract the support of the lower middle class, particularly intellectuals, of parts of the workings class, as well as the peasants, disempowering the traditional pro-British Turkish-Cypriot elites (Moudouros, 2014, 66). In response to the demand for *Enosis*, they claimed that in case of a change in status quo, which would end the British rule, Cyprus should be returned to Turkey, which as a successor to the Ottoman Empire was the island's 'rightful' sovereign. Based on this claim, the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist demand, formed as a direct answer to the Greek-Cypriot *Enosis*, was eventually structured around the notion of *Taksim*, i.e. partition of the island.

The juxtaposition of *Enosis* and *Taksim* as nationalist projects underscores a dangerous incipient polarization in all levels of Cypriot society, which had not yet reached its peak when the Cypriot conflict (during this time known as 'Emergency') began in the 1950s. For example, as Ioannou and Sonan (2014) note, the majority of Turkish-Cypriot workers were still organized in PEO until the 1950s. They gradually shifted to the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist trade union KTIBK between 1955 and 1959 (p. 3). In 1955, a Greek-Cypriot guerrilla organization, the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters [*Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston*, EOKA] declared the beginning of armed fight against the British by detonating bombs in Nicosia. Soon the island became a theatre of violence. EOKA assaults, at least at the beginning, were initially targeting British officials and Greek-Cypriot leftists, who as antinationalist were deemed traitors. As the anticolonial struggle escalated and violence intensified, so did British countermeasures, including the mobilization of the British Army, detention camps, curfews, and executions of those found guilty as EOKA agitators. An auxiliary police division was established, dedicated to fight against EOKA. This division was

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staffed with Turkish-Cypriots only, leading to Turkish-Cypriot casualties, thus intensifying friction and hostility between the two communities (Holland, 1998).

At the diplomatic level, Greek-Cypriot intransigence on the demand of *Enosis* was addressed by the British with the involvement of both Greece and Turkey as interlocutors in an international convention in 1955. From this point onwards, the Cyprus Problem was transformed from a local colonial dispute into an international issue, implicating three NATO allies in the Cold War era. Britain's strategy to retain sovereignty over Cyprus was to counter *Enosis*, now also pursued by Greece with petitions in the United Nations [UN], by pitting *Taksim* against it. As Mallinson (2009) and Holland (1998) note, at the time the British did not intend to divide the island between Greece and Turkey; rather, Britain needed Turkey to stake a claim to Cyprus in order to counterbalance *Enosis* with *Taksim*, preventing both. In the Cold War era, however, Turkey, until then having no official strategy concerning Cyprus, had introduced the 'Cyprus question' into its foreign policy agenda in case of a change in the local status quo²² (Özkan, 2015). By British invitation Turkey became in the 1950s actively involved in the Cyprus Problem, not only defending the Turkish-Cypriot demand for *Taksim* (Mallinson, 2009), but also making Cyprus a national cause, enjoying such popularity to match that of *Enosis* (Özkan, 2015).

The shift in international relations was reflected in Cyprus, where agitation was on the rise, with eventually catastrophic results for intercommunal relations. EOKA was soon confronted by a secret Turkish-Cypriot organization, Volkan, later restructured in the guerrilla Turkish Resistance Organization [*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*, TMT], which aimed to achieve partition with aid from Turkey (Bahcheli & Noel, 140). To this end, the TMT promoted a political, but also cultural and economic campaign, which entrenched partition in daily life. Economic relations with the Greek-Cypriots were severed as Turkish-Cypriots were encouraged to conduct business only with each other; similarly, cultural bonds between the two communities were weakened with the 'Citizen Speak Turkish' campaign and the change of village names into Turkish (Kizilyürek, 2010, pp. 108-183). Cultural affinity with mainland Turkey was, thus, promoted and emphasized. The activity of the TMT and the aforementioned practices resonated with large sections of the Turkish-Cypriot community, where nationalist ideology had become dominant. The use or threat of violence intimidated those, who were reluctant to implement or opposed them. The TMT targeted the British, the Greek-Cypriots/EOKA, but also terrorized and attacked those in the Left, who continued to cooperate with the Greek-Cypriots (Ioannou & Sonan, 2014; Kizilyürek, 2010). In this manner, the horizontal class alliance forged within the political space of the Left collapsed. Turkish-Cypriot radicalization, supported by Turkey, led to explosive tension resulting in anti-Greek riots in 1958, thus making armed intercommunal conflict a gruesome reality.

The instrumentalisation of the Turkish-Cypriot demand for *Taksim* was crucial for the transformation of the colonial dispute into an intercommunal conflict, in which fully-fledged competing nationalisms were at play. Once the two communities saw the realization of their future objectives in antagonistic terms, eruption in violence only testified to the collapse of trust between them. Nicosia inevitably became the epicentre of violence; its mixed neighbourhoods gradually homogenized, as people were fleeing areas where they were in the minority, mostly fearful of attacks from their own paramilitaries (Loizos, 1998; Papadakis, 1998). As the situation deteriorated, the British physically separated Greek-

²² For a detailed account of Turkey's foreign policy shifts see Özkan, 2015.

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from Turkish-Cypriots in the capital, which was divided into north/Turkish-Cypriot and south/Greek-Cypriot sectors (see Figures 10 and 11). The same year saw the Turkish-Cypriot members of municipal councils in five cities, including Nicosia, resigning, and the de facto separation of these municipal authorities, an administrative partition which was never reversed (Markides, 1998, pp. 180-181). The year 1958, thus, marked the collapse of trust amongst Cypriots on multiple levels: political, economic, administrative/institutional, and eventually social.



Figure 10: Protests in Nicosia. November 5, 1955, by Illustrated London News (Maragkou & Koutas, 2009, p. 169).



Figure 11: British soldiers install barbed wire fences in Nicosia's historic centre. July-August, 1958, by F. Paiparis (Maragkou & Koutas, 2009, p. 171).

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It is against this background that the viability of the solution to the Cyprus Problem should be evaluated. After a UN motion, talks were initiated between Greece, Turkey and Britain. They produced the Zurich and London agreements that stipulated, both *Enosis* and *Taksim* forsaken and forbidden, Cyprus's independence in 1960. The three treaties²³ signed provided for the establishment of a sovereign Republic of Cyprus, the independence of which was guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. All three were granted military presence on the island, with Britain retaining 99 square miles of sovereign territory in the form of two military bases. According to article four of the Treaty of Guarantee, each of the guaranteeing powers "reserve[d] the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs" created by the treaties (Mallinson, 2009, p. 34). Independence saw the fulfilment of expectations for neither of the island's communities. The cause of *Enosis*, which the Greek-Cypriots so fervently championed, and wherein they saw the consummation of their ethnic ideal for (their) *freedom*, was seemingly abandoned almost overnight, while its opposing force, *Taksim*, articulated to summarize the Turkish-Cypriot demand for equality and respect, had earned an international audience, but saw no merit in practice. Independence was a compromise solution, but it was never the Cypriots' vision for decolonisation.

Cyprus and its people entered their post-colonial period anything but united, as they were already divided on multiple levels into two different communities of interests, laying claim to authority as well as state legitimacy. Moreover, each community's claim was constructed on the 'other's' illegitimacy, yet they ought to cooperate to make a working independent state. Their failure to construct a state guaranteeing democratic rights and safety for all its citizens became evident only three years into independence, leading to another period of intercommunal conflict. The events that followed have prompted historians to assess the new Republic as "the sort of anomalous system of government, capable of arousing no real loyalty amongst its citizens, and even subject to a crippling form of statelessness" (Holland & Markides, 2006, p. 240). Indeed, the events of the 1950s exposed the Cypriot society's profound social breakdown. The Cypriot independence failed to create a polity, which could reconcile the conflicts of interest between the two communities under one state. The temporary physical partition of Nicosia was the harbinger of a more severe partition soon to come; its preconditions already at work and in place. As Mallinson (2009) underlines, "by the time of the 1960 agreements, the socio-nationalistic structures on both sides of the divide were so psychologically entrenched, that it was only a matter of time before a crisis occurred" (p. 109).

4.7 Emergence

This chapter traced the emergence of partition in Cyprus, reviewing historical and anthropological material from secondary sources. It has put into perspective the issues of evolution of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot nationalisms and their trajectory of collision in the transition from Ottoman to British rule, the articulation and pursuit of antagonistic visions for the future, deeply rooted in space/land, and the particular international political conjuncture, which facilitated the transformation of a colonial dispute into an interethnic conflict. This conflict involved international as well as local actors, and resulted in the collapse

²³ These were the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance.

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of social order, which also manifested in Nicosia's first physical partition. The analysis in this chapter aimed to debase the ethnic origin of partition in Cyprus, which many studies take for granted. Rather it examined the emergence of partition in terms of shifting power relations between colonial rule, nationalist ideologies, and class consciousness. Ethnic antagonism was one factor that contributed to conflict and partition in Cyprus, but it became dominant through struggles over power and control.

The establishment of British colonial rule, the competition between class and nationalist mobilizations, and the first eruption of intercommunal violence in the 1950s can all be interpreted as events/episodes in a Foucauldian sense, as they marked shifts in power relations that have resulted in specific states of affairs. For Foucault (1977), 'emergence' is 'the entry of forces; it is their eruption, the leap from the wings to centre stage' (pp. 149-150). However, 'emergence' in Foucault is seen as part of a developmental process, which can be traced in the succession of relations of domination, which in the Cypriot case become observable in the transition from Ottoman to British rule, from British rule to independence, from independence to the collapse of constitutional order, leading to the deepening of partition. These transitions also entailed political, economic, and social transformations, summarized in this chapter as modernization, which triggered *bordering* processes along ethnic lines. These processes culminated in Nicosia's first partition, which is only the physical manifestation of a multifaceted (political, social, economic, cultural) partition.

Following Foucault in that power relations produce knowledge in the form of rationalities, subjectivities, and practices, i.e. what people know about their world, themselves, and how they act based on this knowledge, nationalist ideologies in Cyprus constitute a form of knowledge, which was produced within a complex set of power relations. The Cypriot communities came to understand themselves as Greeks or Turks of Cyprus, and saw the 'other' in antagonistic terms. Consequently, they acted based on this knowledge by pursuing *Enosis* and *Taksim*, coming to conflict with each other. Therefore, the ethnic origin of the Cypriot conflict is itself a form of knowledge, produced within power relations, while obscuring other forms of conflict, such as class struggles. Thus, by studying partition historically and contextually, the rest of this thesis aims to trace the subtle (and sometimes not so subtle) workings of power to see what Cypriots have made, and how they have made themselves in making it. It embarks on a spatial genealogy, an inquiry into forms of power/knowledge, which does not seek to trace teleological continuities between the emergence of partition and its state in the present, but to expose discontinuities and deviations, to trace difference and disparity along the way, and to expose silences and obscurities, by excavating events/episodes that mark shifts in power relations. The rest of this thesis can then be seen as an examination of the partition's 'descent', in which the entanglement of space and power is prominent. The next chapter focuses on Nicosia's Buffer Zone and the ways in which it became implicated in the post-conflict status quo in Cyprus, to examine the deepening of partition after independence, when it became firmly embedded in land/space.

CHAPTER 5

Deepening – *Bordering* and *Re-Bordering* in Official Historical Narratives

5.1 Introduction

The end of British rule in Cyprus marked the beginning of self-rule for Cypriots. Their new bi-communal nation-state, ought to guarantee safety and equal rights for all Cypriots. It failed, however, to reconcile the pre-existing Cypriot divide, which an unalterable constitution intensified through institutionalization in administrative, political, and communal structures. Moreover, although during the 1960s the Cypriot economy grew rapidly¹, the Turkish-Cypriot community gained little benefit from this reputed 'economic miracle'. Following the trends established during the British period, production in almost all economic sectors was dominated by Greek-Cypriots, who were more inclined to entrepreneurial activity (Attalides, 1979, p. 88). In 1961, the average Greek-Cypriot per capita income was 20 percent higher than the average Turkish-Cypriot, as the latter were still mostly employed in public service and agriculture. Hence, as their incidence in low income occupations was higher, the Turkish-Cypriots were economically less prosperous at the onset of independence; their situation did not improve during the next decade. Within three years from independence, political and social tension erupted in violent conflict, resulting in the physical separation of the two communities in Nicosia and other areas, which from 1964 onwards became isolated Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. Thus, partition became firmly embedded in political, social, and economic life in Cyprus, amplifying the divide between the two communities. In 1974, the intercommunal conflict culminated in open warfare following a Greek-instigated coup and a Turkish invasion, resulting in the island's de facto partition.

This chapter addresses the second research question of this thesis, concerned with the ways in which Nicosia's Buffer Zone became implicated in the post-conflict status quo in Cyprus. Following this introduction, the second section of this chapter traces the institutionalization of the Cypriot divide in administrative, political, and communal structures, which led to the collapse of the bi-communal Republic in 1963. The pre-existing political, social, and economic divide between the two communities collapsed onto the physical with the reestablishment of Nicosia's physical partition in 1964, which became permanent in 1974. The third section explores the Cypriot traumas, which served as central cohesive elements of the two official historical narratives established in the aftermath of de facto partition. The fourth section analyses the official historical narratives, which present their own side as victim and blame the 'other' as perpetrator. These narratives have produced ethno-national myths, and rely on them to legitimize claims to statehood and territory that are part and parcel of the Cyprus Problem to date. The fifth section of this chapter examines the dominant conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone, produced by the official historical narratives through processes of *bordering*, which help sustain and legitimize them. The sixth section

¹ Between 1961 and 1973 the average annual growth rate was as high as 7,4 percent, driven by manufacturing, tourism, agriculture and construction (Syrichas, Markidou & Louca, 2012, p. 11).

summarizes the analysis in this chapter, reflecting on the deepening of partition in political, social and economic life in Cyprus, its physical manifestations, and its firm anchoring in land/space.

5.2 Independent Republic of Cyprus: a failed state

The independent Republic of Cyprus was founded as a bi-communal state, which recognized the existence of two ethnic communities² in Cyprus, Greeks and Turks. Its constitution, a product of negotiations among Greek-Cypriot, Turkish-Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish representatives, was a non-amendable document, which precluded the satisfaction of both nationalist demands, *Enosis* and *Taksim*. Rather than reconciling the two communities under a unitary state, however, the Cypriot constitution entrenched and institutionalised their divide, and perpetuated polarization between them. It stipulated a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, elected separately by their respective communities, and possessing equal veto power on matters pertaining to foreign affairs, internal security, and finance (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 46-48, 1960). The executive power was exercised by a Council of Ministers, composed of seven Greek-Cypriots and three Turkish-Cypriots (according to a ratio of 70 to 30), appointed by the President and Vice-President respectively. One of three key ministries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance, was to be headed by a Turkish-Cypriot (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 46, 1960).

The legislative power was exercised by the House of Representatives, composed of 35 Greek-Cypriots and 15 Turkish-Cypriots (again a ratio of 70 to 30); laws were passed by a simple majority, except laws pertaining to the electoral system, the imposition of taxes, and the municipalities, requiring separate majorities (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 62, art. 77-78, 1960). Legislative power was also exercised by separate Communal Chambers, which had the authority to pass laws on cultural, educational and religious matters, as well as matters considered of communal nature, and impose communal taxes to finance separate institutions (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 87, 1960). The 70 to 30 ratio applied to the composition of the public service as well, in all levels of hierarchy (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 123, 1960). In the armed forces, the ratio was modified to 60 to 40 for a total of 2.000, but remained 70 to 30 for the police and the gendarmerie (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 129-130, 1960).

The judicial power was exercised by different courts. The Supreme Court for constitutional matters was composed of one Greek-Cypriot, one Turkish-Cypriot and one non-Cypriot judge, who also presided over the court (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 133, 1960). The High Court of Justice was composed of two Greek-Cypriot judges, one Turkish-Cypriot and one non-Cypriot judge, who again presided over the court (Const. of the Republic of Cyprus art. 153, 1960). It becomes evident that the bi-communal nature of the state was reflected in all its functions. For the Turkish-Cypriots, these constitutional provisions represented safeguards against Greek-Cypriot discrimination or oppression, granting them the status of an equal community. For Greek-Cypriots, however, the same provisions were a cause of great resentment, as they were deemed disproportional power-sharing with the Turkish-Cypriot community, which at that time comprised eighteen percent of the island's population. Greek-Cypriot dissatisfaction was expressed by

² Beside the two communities, the constitution also recognized the existence of three religious groups, the Maronites, the Armenians, and the Latins. They decided in a referendum in 1960 to be included in the Greek-Cypriot community (Akcali, 2007, p. 59).

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their political leadership often enough by publicly reiterating the nationalist cause of *Enosis*, stirring Turkish-Cypriot distrust and feeding nationalist sentiments (Purcell, 1969; Attalides, 1979; Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

The implementation of constitutional provisions and the unobstructed function of the state relied on the nationalist political forces, which dominated the political scene in each community. After independence, EOKA and TMT militants and political advocates became key actors in the Republic's political life. The first President of the Republic was Archbishop Makarios III, a leading advocate of *Enosis*; the first Vice-President was Dr. Fazil Küçük, leader of the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist forces and fervent supporter of *Taksim*. Positions in the administration, the armed forces, and the police were also filled by nationalists. Thus, independence bestowed power on the devotees of the two nationalist projects, who also happened to disagree in key policy issues, such as the Republic's Cold War alignment³ (Attalides, 1979, Sant Cassia, 1983). Moreover, the two communities operated separately in all aspects of political life, such as political parties and trade unions. Soon, antagonism and friction reappeared in many other aspects of life. For example, in the highly-demanded public service employment, Turkish-Cypriot employees had to be hired to achieve the constitutionally designated 70:30 ratio, thus generating competition for opportunities between the two communities (Attalides, 1979). Economic resources became a primary cause of friction. Because the Communal Chambers were financed through communal taxation, the smaller and poorer Turkish-Cypriot community became disadvantaged. Their demands that foreign development aid should not be allocated in proportion to the population of each community but based on needs was not welcomed by the Greek-Cypriots (Attalides, 1979, p. 52). Under these conditions, it is not a surprise that the two communities harboured limited loyalty, and a fair share of suspicion towards their new bi-communal state, and were preparing for its possible failure (Purcell, 1969; Attalides, 1979, Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

Soon two issues became major sources of friction and subjects to veto. The first concerned the composition of the armed forces, which the constitution defined numerically but without specifying ways of implementation. The Greek-Cypriot leadership argued for the establishment of mixed units according to the 60 to 40 ratio on all levels of hierarchy, while the Turkish-Cypriot leadership preferred ethnically separated units (Purcell, 1969, p. 318). These positions reflected the main concern on both sides, which was safety and self-defence in case fighting resumed. Moreover, the presence of Turkish and Greek military units on the island, as provided by the Treaty of Alliance, was placating neither community, as the fear of foreign invasion was unavoidably associated with the other's reputed motherland. Attalides (1979) notes that from a Greek-Cypriot perspective what was considered disproportional Turkish-Cypriot political power was linked with a higher probability of a Turkish invasion (p. 53).

The second and eventually most decisive issue was the ambiguous articles 173-178 of the constitution, providing for the establishment of separate municipalities in the five major cities (Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Markides, 1998). In short, according to the constitution, each municipal authority ought to exercise its jurisdiction and perform relevant functions in areas that were separate from the municipal authority of the other community. This provision implied geographical partition on the municipal level, establishing for each community control over specific areas in the major cities (Markides, 1998, pp. 184-190). The

³ President Makarios promoted a policy of non-alignment, while Vice-President Küçük was pro-NATO. Trade with Socialist countries and close relations to Egypt are also indicative of Makarios's position, which was firmly opposed by Küçük (Attalides, 1979, p. 54-55).

geographical dispersion of the Turkish-Cypriot community within the cities further complicated matters, since such partition would entail the relocation of populations. The Greek-Cypriot proposal for integrated municipalities was met with strong disapproval. The separation of the municipalities developed into a major issue between the two communities, as the Turkish-Cypriots in the House of Representatives blocked taxation legislation, which required separate majorities, as leverage. The Greek-Cypriot leadership responded by delaying the implementation of certain constitutional provisions of bi-communal nature (Markides, 1998, pp. 192). The issue of separate municipalities was unsuccessfully negotiated for over two years, with the involvement of the three guarantor powers, before Archbishop Makarios III, having the support of all Greek-Cypriot political forces, used the deadlock as a pretext to propose constitutional amendments. His thirteen points⁴ plan was presented to Vice-President Küçük, as well as to the three guarantor powers, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, in 1963. It was rejected almost immediately by the latter on grounds of compromising Turkish-Cypriot political power to pave the way towards *Enosis* (Purcell, 1969; Attalides, 1979; Ker-Lindsay, 2011). Agitation rose when Turkish-Cypriots took to Nicosia's streets to protest, and soon the island was engulfed in the violence of intercommunal fighting, which marked the beginning of constitutional collapse in December 1963.

The outbreak of violence resulted in the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriots from all state institutions, and the concentration of Turkish-Cypriot citizens in enclaved areas. A parallel Turkish-Cypriot district administration was established centred on Turkish-Cypriot municipal councils. In the House of Representatives, the Greek-Cypriot legislators applied a 'doctrine of necessity', which allowed the state to continue to function without Turkish-Cypriot participation. Thus, state structures came under full Greek-Cypriot control, and bi-communalism was formally abolished (Bryant & Hatay, 2011, pp. 631-635). To prevent international escalation between NATO members Greece and Turkey, Britain briefly assumed the role of peacekeeper in Cyprus. When a peace conference in London in January 1964 yielded no results however, this task was passed on to the United Nations. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP] was established in 1964 with UN Resolution 186. Nicosia was physically divided anew over the trace of its 1956 partition. The mandate of the UNFICYP extended beyond peacekeeping to negotiating a peace agreement, a task delegated to UN Good Offices presiding over direct dialogue between involved parties.

In due course, while the cause of *Enosis* was strongly resonating among Greek-Cypriots, their political leadership assumed a more moderate stance in the negotiations after 1967, the year marking yet another violent intercommunal outbreak, and Greece's descent to military dictatorship. The latter

⁴ Makarios's 13 points proposal included the following: the abandonment of veto power, the abolition of separate majorities for law enactment in the House of Representatives, unified municipalities, unified administration of justice, the composition of the public service to be adjusted proportionally to the population of each community, the election of both president and vice president of the House of Representatives to be elected by the House as a whole, the Vice-President to serve as deputy to the President in case of absence or inability to perform duties, the vice president of the House of Representatives to serve as deputy to the president of the House in case of absence or inability to perform duties, the abolition of division in the security forces between police and gendarmerie, law enactment pertaining to the size of armed forces, the abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber, the reduction of the members of the Public Service Commission, and simple majority in its decision-making processes (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 33-34). These proposals aimed at creating mixed state structures for decision-making processes, legislation enactment, public service, and armed forces, where Greek-Cypriots as the dominant majority could overpower the Turkish-Cypriots. Thus, power, if abused by the Greek-Cypriots, could lead to Turkish-Cypriot oppression.

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development propelled Makarios' abandonment of *Enosis* in favour of a working independence, causing tension and polarization within the Greek-Cypriot community. *Enosis* hardliners turned against him forming the paramilitary organization EOKA B (the name deliberately echoing the EOKA of the anticolonial struggle) in 1971. In July 1974, following a coup against Makarios, instigated by the Greek military junta, EOKA B briefly took over state administration. Turkey exercised its right to intervene, provided by the Treaty of Guarantee, and reacted with a military operation (Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Tzermias, 1991). Amidst condemning statements from Britain, USA and the UN, and the collapse of dictatorship in Greece, which also resulted in the withdrawal of EOKA B from the Greek-Cypriot administration, peace talks were summoned in Geneva. However, a second Turkish offensive interrupted them, resulting in the island's de facto partition, with Turkey occupying thirty-seven percent of its territory (Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Tzermias, 1991). Nicosia's Buffer Zone was extended east and west, marking the forward defended position of each side. The intercommunal fighting of the period 1963-1967 and the Turkish invasion of 1974 had catastrophic consequences for both communities. The events that transpired afflicted Cypriots with long-lasting traumas that play a key role in the sustenance and perpetuation of the Cypriot partition; it is thus pertinent to look at them closely.

5.3 Exploring the Cypriot traumas

The failure of the independent Republic of Cyprus to become a functional bi-communal state exemplifies the influence and impact of competing nationalisms in state formation. Indeed, as chapter 4 demonstrated, the bi-communal Republic brought together under a rather problematic and rigid constitutional roof fully developed competing nationalisms, without allowing leeway to navigate problems in the bi-communal functions. Within three years from independence, the pre-existing political, social, and economic divide between the two communities collapsed onto the physical. This result was the culmination of nationalist agitation, which continued unabated after independence, deepening mistrust, and violent confrontations between the two communities. Various sources underline a prevailing atmosphere of overt display of nationalist symbols and covert armament of paramilitary organizations (Attalides, 1979; Purcell, 1969; Volkan, 1994). The Greek and Turkish flags were openly displayed instead of that of the Republic, which was flown only in places and occasions dictated by law, illustrating the lack of resonance between Cypriots and their bi-communal state (Volkan, 1994, p. 127). Not less contributory to an explosive ambience was the armament of paramilitaries as part of contingency plans in preparations for a possible failure of the Republic (Purcell, 1969; Volkan, 1994). The Greek-Cypriot irregulars that eventually formed EOKA B were recruited with support from Greece, and comprised mainly former EOKA fighters. By December 1963 they amounted to 5.000 fully, and another 5.000 partially, trained men. Turkish-Cypriots on the other hand had revived the TMT to train their own irregulars, estimated at 2.500 in 1963, with support from Turkey (Purcell, 1969, p. 319). With limited opposition within each community coming only from the Left, which was crushed with attacks from both EOKA B and TMT, intercommunal conflict broke out in December 1963 (Kizilyürek, 2010, p. 184).

The failed attempt at constitutional amendment set the stage for a most violent outbreak, which started in Nicosia, and soon after engulfed the entire island. Purcell (1969) offers, based on a Greek-

Cypriot secret document made public, that the Greek-Cypriot contingency plan (known as the Akritas Plan) to enforce the amendments involved attacks against Turkish-Cypriots to quickly suppress anticipated reactions (p. 323). Hostilities started in Nicosia's historic centre, when Greek-Cypriot police attempted to control a Turkish-Cypriot couple on the street. This incident escalated, when an agitated crowd gathered in protest, resulting in gunfire by the policemen, leaving two Turkish-Cypriots dead (Purcell, 1969, p. 324). The deaths triggered extensive Turkish-Cypriot protests in Nicosia, and tension rose as Greek-Cypriot irregulars started attacking Turkish-Cypriot public buildings and neighbourhoods, leading to more Turkish-Cypriot casualties. Purcell (1969, p. 324-325) writes concerning the escalation of violence in Nicosia:

"[...] in the middle of the night [of December 22nd] the Greeks [meaning the Greek-Cypriot irregulars] began heavy firing into the Turkish quarter with automatic weapons from high buildings, such as the Cornaro and Ledra Palace hotels, the General Hospital, the Cyprus Telecommunications Building, and the Severis Flour Mill, as well as the Cold Storage Building and the Nicosia (English) Club [...]. Of these, the Severis Flour Mill and the Cold Storage Building were to be taken later by Turkish [meaning Turkish-Cypriot] irregulars."

Thus, Nicosia's historic centre was turned into a battleground; irregular forces joined by policemen and gendarmerie occupied strongholds within the city, initiating urban warfare directed against the other community, and targeting civilians as well. The first large-scale atrocities against Turkish-Cypriots, imprinted in their communal memory as Bloody Christmas, took place a few days later on Christmas Eve 1963 in the Omorfita area of Nicosia, leaving many dead. After these events, intercommunal fighting spread all over Cyprus. The next year, 1964, saw a number of atrocities against mainly Turkish-Cypriot civilians. There are at least another two reported cases of massacres, in the village of Ayios Vassilios (in January 1964), and in Famagusta (in May 1964), various large-scale organized assaults, and individual incidents and killings (Purcell, 1969, p. 326-331). The terrorization, attacks, looting of properties, and hostage-taking of Turkish-Cypriots was perpetrated by Greek-Cypriot irregulars cooperating with Greek-Cypriot police (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, pp. 34-35; Purcell, 1969, pp. 326-331). Reprisals against Greek-Cypriot civilians were not uncommon; Turkish-Cypriot losses were, however, significantly higher⁵.

Under these circumstances, Turkish-Cypriots started abandoning their homes and properties in mixed neighbourhoods and villages to find refuge in safer areas, where they were in the majority; Turkish-Cypriot areas in all major towns and in 72 mixed villages were evacuated or partly evacuated, 24 Turkish-Cypriot villages were abandoned (Bryant & Hatay, 2011; Bryant & Papadakis, 2012; Gürel, Hatay & Yakinthou, 2012). Recent research has confirmed UNFICYP estimations that intercommunal fighting between 1963 and 1967 displaced about 25.000 Turkish-Cypriots, and 1.500-2.000 Greek- and Armenian-Cypriots (Bryant, 2012; Gürel, Hatay & Yakinthou, 2012, p. 7). As a result, about 90 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot population was concentrated in 42 enclaves, covering only 3 percent of the land, living in tents, schools, and abandoned properties (Gürel, Hatay & Yakinthou, 2012, p. 7; Volkan, 1994, p. 140). Nicosia received 7.000-8.000 people and, concentrating about one fifth of the Turkish-Cypriot population in Cyprus at the time, became the largest enclave. Between 1964 and 1968, the enclaves became a 'state-within-a-

⁵ A recent study by Gürel, Hatay and Yakinthou (2012) mentions 364 Turkish-Cypriot and 174 Greek-Cypriot fatalities from December 1963 until August 1964 (p. 7).

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state' as the parallel Turkish-Cypriot administration assumed the role, functions and responsibilities of an actual state, while the TMT became the backbone of the Turkish-Cypriot armed forces (Bryant & Hatay, 2011). The de facto Greek-Cypriot government continued functioning in full capacity⁶ without Turkish-Cypriot participation or consent. In response, the Turkish-Cypriot administration declared the government illegal.

Life in the overcrowded enclaves was particularly difficult during the five-year period (until 1968) in which Turkish-Cypriot confinement was near absolute. According to Volkan (1994), to make a case that Turkish-Cypriot survival was conditioned upon collaboration with the Greek-Cypriot majority, telecommunications and postal services were interrupted, and free movement towards Greek-Cypriot-controlled areas was curtailed. Until 1968, the enclaved Turkish-Cypriots had no access to their properties and homes in government-controlled areas (Bryant & Hatay, 2011; Gürel, Hatay & Yakinthou, 2012). Moreover, they were put under severe pressure with a policy of economic siege, according to which imports of all construction materials, car-parts or fuel over a certain quantity were banned, and even food supplies were restricted (Purcell, 1969, p. 350). During this period, Turkish-Cypriots in north Nicosia were living under conditions of privation, relying on support from the Red Crescent providing supplies from Turkey, which were often blocked or detained (Bryant & Hatay, 2011, p. 635). Conditions in this enclave, refuge to some 20.000 people, were particularly difficult due to its isolation from arable land and agricultural goods. After 1968, when negotiations were launched, these restrictions were eased, and free movement in and out of the enclaves was permitted. Only a small number of 2.000 displaced Turkish-Cypriots, however, returned to the places they had fled. The TMT might have prevented such movement, but the majority of Turkish-Cypriots remained in the enclaves until 1974 out of fear or because their properties had been looted, damaged or destroyed. There are also cases, when the Greek-Cypriot leadership actively prevented their return for strategic reasons (Bryant, 2012, pp. 8-9). During and after the Turkish invasion in 1974, about 48.000 Turkish-Cypriots were displaced again, this time from south to north, some becoming refugees for the third time; counting those displaced to northern enclaves earlier, the total number rises to 60.000 (Gürel, Hatay & Yakinthou, 2012, p. 10).

The war of 1974 caused massive casualties and extensive displacement of Greek-Cypriot populations from areas in the north of the island. Those left behind after the second Turkish offensive either became prisoners of war or surrendered, and were consequently enclaved in cities and villages. During this time, mistreatment, rape and murder have been reported (Demetriou, 2012, pp. 5-6; Gürel, Hatay & Yakinthou, 2012, p. 9). A total of 162.000 Greek-Cypriots (including Maronite-, Armenian- and Latin-Cypriots) were displaced from north to south, leaving behind their homes and properties; another 14.000 lost their means of sustenance. About 10.000 chose to stay in the north, but due to discrimination and oppression also moved south within the next five years; about 1.000 remained. The number of dead is estimated at 4.000 Greek-Cypriot and 1.000 Turkish-Cypriot casualties. To this day, 1.619 Greek-Cypriots and 500 Turkish-Cypriots are considered missing (Gürel, Hatay & Yakinthou, 2012, p. 9). In a population of 600.000 at the time, these numbers are significant.

⁶ Purcell (1969) refers to the enactment of new legislation concerning the Electoral Law, the Administration of Justice and Law, the merge of the Constitutional and Higher Courts into a Supreme Court, and amendments of the taxation system (pp. 349-350).

These traumatic events are experienced by each community as collective, intergenerational trauma. Selective remembering has allowed them to ignore the sufferings of the 'other', while providing at the same time a new reference for collective consciousness: victimhood. In the aftermath of de facto partition, two official historical narratives have been established, wherein each community sees their 'own' as victim and the 'other' as perpetrator. These narratives deepened the pre-existing divide between the Cypriot communities, offering partisan and antagonistic interpretations of traumatic events. The Buffer Zone, separating after 1974 two distinct polities, has become their structural element. The remaining two sections of this chapter examine the relation between official historical narratives and conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone.

5.4 Official historical narratives and ethno-national myths

The official historical narratives established in the aftermath of de facto partition are centred on each community's trauma. For the Turkish-Cypriots, the atrocities of 1963-1964, and their enclaved isolation thereafter, came to underpin a narrative, wherein their suffering under Greek-Cypriot oppression is dominant. The losses and bloodshed owed to intercommunal violence designate them as victims, while placing blame on the Greek-Cypriot community as a whole as perpetrators. According to this view, 'living together' is impossible; therefore partition is justified as an imperative for survival. Within this framework the Turkish invasion of 1974 is regarded as a 'Happy Peace Operation' [Mutlu Barış Harekati], which resulted in Turkish-Cypriot liberation from their oppressor (Papadakis, 2006). The official Turkish-Cypriot narrative emphasizes the kinship between Turkish-Cypriots and Turks of Turkey, and sees them as part of the Turkish nation (Kizilyürek, 2003). The ethno-national myth of 'impossible coexistence' legitimizes thus a divisive future, pursued through claims to statehood and territory. The north was to become the permanent Turkish-Cypriot home, where a new sense of belonging was actively fostered through erasure. The Turkish-Cypriots displaced from south to north were resettled in a centrally organized manner in abandoned Greek-Cypriot houses in villages and towns (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1994, p. 334). For these houses they received title deeds, which meant to balance and replace their property left in the south. Communal bonds were kept intact, as people from the same village or neighbourhood were resettled together. The Turkish-Cypriots were displaced as refugees from the south, but relocated into villages and towns in the north with the promise that there was their "real and permanent home" (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1994; Papadakis, 2006, p. 10). Pre-war names of northern villages and towns were changed into Turkish to facilitate this transition, and legitimate a distinctly Turkish identity. People were encouraged to emotionally dissociate from their old homes and places of origin in the south. Thus, in the official Turkish-Cypriot narrative, focus is placed solely on persecution as trauma, while displacement is disregarded and emotionally suppressed (Papadakis, 2006).

According to the Turkish-Cypriot narrative, the events of 1974, and the ensuing Greek-Cypriot sufferings are not denied; they are, however justified as retaliation. The Turkish-Cypriot narrative is summarized in the slogan 'We will not forget' [Unutmayacağız], which refers to the community's traumatic memories of the 1960s (Agathangelou & Killian, 2009; Papadakis, Peristianis & Welz, 2006). The dead are commemorated as martyrs, and the TMT fighters are celebrated as heroes. Within this framework, the

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Cyprus Problem is tackled as an internal affair of the once bi-communal Republic of Cyprus. With regard to a solution, the fulfilment of Turkish-Cypriot self-determination constitutes the initial (ideal) Turkish-Cypriot position, i.e. the recognition of their polity in the north as a legitimate state, adhering to the concept of 'living apart' from the untrustworthy 'other'. Thus, the official Turkish-Cypriot narrative post-conflict reaffirms the original Turkish-Cypriot national demand for *Taksim* as the desired vision for the future, ensuring respect and equality of rights. In 1983, the Turkish-Cypriot administration unilaterally declared its independence, and the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC], which was recognized only by Turkey and declared illegal under UN Security Council Resolution 541.

The official Greek-Cypriot narrative on the other hand revolves around their sufferings in 1974. Loss, displacement and refugeehood dominate the Greek-Cypriot perspective of themselves as victims of the Turkish invasion. According to the Greek-Cypriot narrative, all Cypriot communities were coexisting peacefully until the Turkish invasion in 1974. In this narrative, Turkish-Cypriot grievances are disregarded, and focus is placed on a third party, Turkey, as perpetrator. The ethno-national myth of 'previous peaceful coexistence' legitimizes, thus, the Greek-Cypriot demand for a unified state. The official Greek-Cypriot perspective tackles the Cyprus Problem as an international affair between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. Accordingly, as a matter of foreign invasion and occupation, the Cyprus Problem will cease existing with the island's reunification as one state. In this official narrative, as the memories of their victimization are silenced, Turkish-Cypriots appear as 'brothers' with whom Greek-Cypriots can again live peacefully together (Hadjipavlou, 2007b; Papadakis, 2006). The EOKA *Enosis* campaign of the 1950s, divested of its severe intercommunal ramifications, has been accommodated in the post-conflict narrative as struggle against the British colonial authority, and EOKA fighters are celebrated as national heroes.

The resettlement of Greek-Cypriot refugees was characterized by temporariness, in light of a solution soon to come, which would allow them to return to their homes in the north. Initially, about half of the displaced population sought temporary accommodation with friends or family in the south, while the rest stayed in temporary refugee camps (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1994, p. 335). The majority of the displaced population originated in rural areas, but eventually resettled in or around cities, especially Nicosia, where more employment opportunities were available. The state provided refugee housing by building large estates or by providing land or grants for private development. Abandoned Turkish-Cypriot properties were also utilized (Kliot & Mansfeld, 1994, p. 346). There was no centrally organized effort to retain communal bonds by relocating people from the same village together (Papadakis, 2006). Although Greek-Cypriot refugees have adapted to life in the south, and are certainly integrated in the society, they have also preserved their longing and desire to return to their homes in the north. The myth of 'previous peaceful coexistence' legitimates and supports the desire for repatriation, which, as Zetter (1999) notes, serves the purpose of maintaining continuity with the past. Through family stories and school education, the desire to return north has been preserved, and the experience of loss and refugeehood has been transferred to younger generations as well (Zembylas, 2012).

The Greek-Cypriot narrative is summarized in the slogan 'I do not forget' [Δεν ξεχνώ, Den Xehno], which refers to the community's traumatic memories of 1974. This phrase became a symbol of the 'tragedy of Cyprus', and an integral part of educational policy in school curricula for decades, reproducing the official Greek-Cypriot historical narrative (Papadakis, 1998; Zembylas, 2012). The denial of the Turkish-Cypriot trauma and the erasure of their painful memories from public consciousness facilitate the

dominance of Greek-Cypriot victimhood. The Greek-Cypriot narrative not only delegitimizes any Turkish-Cypriot claim to territory and statehood, much more it renders such demands incomprehensible. For Greek-Cypriots the Turkish-Cypriot polity is an illegal state established on 'occupied lands' [*katechόμενα, κατεχόμενα*]. However, as the Greek-Cypriot demand of *Enosis* had already been abandoned, a new demand was formed to bond Greek-Cypriots together, that of the island's reunification, which would make the repatriation of refugees possible. This demand constitutes the initial (ideal) Greek-Cypriot position in negotiations for the Cyprus Problem as well.

To summarize, in the aftermath of conflict, the two communities constructed official historical narratives that portrayed their 'own' as victims, while either denying or justifying the suffering of the 'other'. These narratives produced ethno-national myths, i.e. constructs that reconfigured the past to conform either to 'impossible coexistence' (Turkish-Cypriot myth), or 'previous peaceful coexistence' (Greek-Cypriot myth). The past was thus reinterpreted, and employed in the reconfiguration of Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot nationalisms. These expressions of nationalism focused on communal traumatic experiences, which were incorporated into the grand schemes of pre-existing nationalist narratives. The Turkish-Cypriot narrative reaffirmed partition, *Taksim*, as the Turkish-Cypriot vision for the future, wherein respect of the community's equality of rights could be achieved. The Greek-Cypriot narrative effectuated a symbolic union with Greece. By designating Turkey as the perpetrator of the 1974 war, it echoed the Greek nationalist eternal 'truth', wherein the Turk is the primordial enemy of the Greek. The war of 1974 was, thus, added to the long catalogue of episodes of animosity between Greeks and Turks, ensuring cultural and ethnic continuity between Greece and Cyprus through victimhood as well. It is important to note here that the distinction between Turkish-Cypriots and Turks in the Greek-Cypriot imaginary is not always clear, and depends on one's political views as well.

Moreover, both official historical narratives reassert the relation of people to land/space. The Turkish-Cypriot demand for a polity of their own that would guarantee the respect of their rights, and where they would not have a minority status, was imagined through sovereignty over the northern part of the island. Without international recognition, however, this Turkish-Cypriot polity remains incomplete. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot demand for reunification lays claim to the entire island; without the northern part of Cyprus a Greek-Cypriot polity is also incomplete. Interestingly, both official historical narratives have also produced conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone space, which help legitimize them. Thus, through processes of *bordering* the official historical narratives become anchored in the space of the Buffer Zone. The next section explores these conceptualizations.

5.5 Dominant conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone in Cypriot imagination

Two dominant conceptualizations of the Cypriot Buffer Zone emerge from the official historical narratives, and anchor them in space through *bordering* processes. The Turkish-Cypriot narrative conceptualizes the Buffer Zone as a 'safety border', while the Greek-Cypriot narrative conceptualizes it as an 'open wound'. The remaining of this section first explores these conceptualizations; it then proceeds to examine some of the ways they have been reproduced in Nicosia, which as the capital of both polities possesses particular gravity. Nicosia's historic centre and its Buffer Zone become, thus, prominent sites, where these narratives compete for legitimacy.

5.5.1 *The Buffer Zone as a 'safety border'*

In the Turkish-Cypriot narrative of 'impossible coexistence', partition is justified as an imperative for the community's survival. Nicosia's Buffer Zone especially is closely linked to the violence of interethnic conflict in 1963-1964, and significantly, with the displacement and enclave confinement of the same period. The separation of the two communities at that time shielded Turkish-Cypriots from attacks, while at the same time exposed them to privations. Hence, during this period, Nicosia's Buffer Zone came to signify protection from Greek-Cypriot aggression. After 1974, the existence of an island-wide Buffer Zone is seen as a guarantee of safety. Treated as a border unequivocally separating two polities, it underpins the impossibility of peaceful coexistence. Emphasizing that Turkish-Cypriot wellbeing relies on the permanence of the Buffer Zone as a border serves a second objective too; it renders the official historical narrative relevant for younger generations without first-hand experience of the conflict and without contact with the Greek-Cypriots. Greek-Cypriot past aggression and the need to live apart (to avoid future aggression) has been reiterated in the north through nationalist discourses of education, perpetuating the culture of conflict by reproducing the 'us vs. them' dichotomy (Zembylas & Karahasan, 2006; Navaro-Yashin, 2003). The dominance of the official historical narrative, underlined by the imperative to 'not forget' the Greek-Cypriot aggression, entails a simultaneous process of erasure of the suffering of the 'other', caused by 'own' aggression. Similarly, memories of past peaceful coexistence, and of violence against those in the political space of the Left working together with the Greek-Cypriots, are silenced as they could undermine the official historical narrative. Through the official narrative, the 'other' is dehumanized to become the enemy in perpetuity. In this process, the Buffer Zone is divested of meanings and emotions relating to life in the south, to become the border that marks the limits of a homogenous community, and an equally homogenous enemy.

In Nicosia's historic centre, the Buffer Zone's materiality is demonstrative of its perception as a firm border. On the northern side of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, the infrastructure of partition exhibits permanence not least by turning its back to south Nicosia. As the streets lining the Buffer Zone's northern edge remain inaccessible to civilians and reserved for military patrolling only, the divide is shifted inwards, where a series of sturdy concrete and metal walls block streets and alleys (see Figures 12, 13 and 14). Rising above the average human height, this divide makes visual contact with the Buffer Zone space and through it with the other side impossible. There, at the interface between the two communities, the existence of Nicosia's Buffer Zone serves as testimony to and constant reminder of Turkish-Cypriot past grievances. In other words, the existence of the Buffer Zone corroborates and substantiates the official narrative, which in

turn legitimates the Turkish-Cypriot demand for self-determination through partition. Thus, the pursuit of permanent partition through recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot polity is also conditioned upon the sustenance and dominance of the narrative, making a status quo where the Buffer Zone as a border endures an imperative.



Figures 12, 13, and 14: Street blockades on the Turkish-Cypriot side, Nicosia. March 17, 2012 by the author.

5.5.2 *The Buffer Zone as an ‘open wound’*

The Greek-Cypriot official historical narrative accommodates a conceptualization of the Buffer Zone as an open wound on the ground, to the Greek-Cypriot society as well as to the body politic. The Buffer Zone represents the Greek-Cypriot trauma, encapsulating in its existence their suffering and loss in 1974. Perhaps no other image is more representative of this than the one accompanying the previously mentioned slogan ‘I do not forget’ [Δεν ξεχνώ, Den Xehno]. Its most popular illustration⁷ depicts Cyprus, usually on blue background, its northern part bloodstained, bisected by a blood-dripping line, which follows

⁷ Interestingly, this illustration was produced by a Greek journalist, Mr. Nicos Dimou, in the wake of the second Turkish invasion in August 1974 as an 8 cm-long sticker. The copyright belongs to him still.

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the trace of the Buffer Zone (see Figure 15). The widespread reproduction of this image in media, posters, pamphlets, and school books speaks volumes about the role of the Buffer Zone in structuring the Greek-Cypriot national imagination. The Buffer Zone becomes indisputable physical evidence, symbol, and omnipresent reminder of the injustices suffered, representing the Greek-Cypriot trauma, which is still experienced in the present. Therefore, the Buffer Zone signifies a disgraceful line of partition, not recognized as a border, embodying from a Greek-Cypriot perspective the Cyprus Problem itself.



Figure 15 (top left): 'I do not forget' (Δεν ξεχνώ, Den Xehno), provided by Nikos Dimou.

Figures 16 (top right), 17 (bottom left), 18 (bottom right): Street blockades on the Greek-Cypriot side, Nicosia. March 7, 2012, by the author.

The official Greek-Cypriot historical narrative sees reunification as the desirable solution to the Cyprus Problem. It follows, that reunification involves the Buffer Zone's removal. Indeed, the materiality of the southern edge of the Buffer Zone in Nicosia's historic centre confirms this (see Figures 16, 17 and 18). There, the divide exhibits temporariness, an intentionally ephemeral nature; roadblocks are made of barrels, sandbags, and barbed wire, while military outposts are simple, impermanent structures, often with just enough space for one guard. The casual wanderer of the streets of southern Nicosia can reach the Buffer Zone's southern edge, and look into the deteriorating urbanity within. Such visual contact can stir strong emotions in sustenance of the trauma of partition. Therefore, the resonance of the official Greek-Cypriot narrative for younger generations without first-hand experience of the conflict and without contact with the Turkish-Cypriots rests upon the Buffer Zone's existence as a wound. The dominance of the

historical narrative, underlined by the imperative to ‘not forget’ the Turkish invasion and aggression, entails here as well a simultaneous process of erasure of the Turkish-Cypriot sufferings caused by Greek-Cypriot aggression. Similarly, memories of violence against those in the political space of the Left engaging in cooperation with Turkish-Cypriots are also silenced as they could undermine the official historical narrative. The sustenance and dominance of the official historical narrative, hinged on the existence of Nicosia’s Buffer Zone, conditions the legitimation of the Greek-Cypriot demand for reunification. The rightfulness of this demand justifies the Greek-Cypriot de facto control over the Republic of Cyprus and its international recognition. A paradox then emerges, wherein the disgraceful line of separation that ought to disappear becomes necessary, not only for the support of the Greek-Cypriot demand for reunification, but for the legitimation of the Greek-Cypriot control over the Republic of Cyprus as well.

5.5.3 *Bordering processes in Nicosia: reproducing the official historical narrative*

The two official historical narratives constructed in the aftermath of the conflict rely on *bordering* processes to support their foundational myths of ‘impossible coexistence’, justifying the demand for partition, and ‘previous peaceful coexistence’, justifying the demand for reunification. They have produced and continue to reproduce conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone as a ‘safety border’ and as an ‘open wound’, crucial for their sustenance. These conceptualizations have over the years become dominant, part and parcel of the status quo of partition. Moreover, they have become diffused in societies, as they are reproduced in social life in practices of *othering*, foregrounding the divide between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. Here, I will offer as a telling example the representations of Nicosia in city maps, readily available at the tourist information offices in Nicosia’s historic centre south and north of the Buffer Zone.

The Greek-Cypriot map of Nicosia’s historic centre depicts in detail the southern part of the city (see Figure 19). It shows few streets in the north; just enough to evoke a sense of incompleteness, omitting other information with the explanation that the other side is under ‘Turkish occupation’. The Buffer Zone is depicted as a thick grey line, superimposed on the map, visually disturbing the continuity of the streetscape and the Venetian walls. It is the lack of information beyond the Buffer Zone, such as street names and monuments, which renders this part of the map unfamiliar for the visitor. The Greek-Cypriot map of Nicosia evokes a sense of incompleteness and interrupted continuity, while at the same time communicating a desire for wholeness. The Turkish-Cypriot map depicts in detail the northern part of the city (see Figure 20), while it entirely leaves out the southern part. The Buffer Zone is depicted as a red dashed line, which marks the city limit. The streetscape and the Venetian walls, however, are interrupted earlier, as they abruptly stop before a grey area, which extends south beyond the Buffer Zone. The Turkish-Cypriot map of Nicosia evokes a sense of detachment and discontinuity, while at the same time communicating a desire for independence. Each representation of Nicosia epitomizes and reproduces each side’s official historical narrative, and alludes to its central demand, i.e. reunification or partition. Conceptualizations of Nicosia’s Buffer Zone as an ‘open wound’, which once healed shall restore the city’s lost continuity, and as a ‘safety border’, which once formally instituted shall establish a new relation between the city’s two parts, are implicit in these representations. Moreover, the two maps epitomize and reproduce perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, thus reproducing the boundary between them.

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Figure 19: Greek-Cypriot touristic map of Nicosia's historic centre, by the Department of Lands and Surveys, Cyprus. (2001). Nicosia: Cyprus Tourism Organisation. Printed copy, scanned.



Figure 20: Turkish-Cypriot touristic map of Nicosia's historic centre, by the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Culture, TRNC. (n.d.). Printed copy, scanned.

In other examples, an ‘us’ imagined in ethnic-nationalist terms, i.e. the national self, is being inscribed on land/space in more conspicuous ways. Various practices of erasure and (re)inscription have taken place in Cyprus, such as changing toponyms⁸, and erecting monuments⁹ and museums¹⁰ to memorialize each community’s sufferings and the armed conflict between them (King & Landbury, 1982; Papadakis, 2006; Navaro-Yashin, 2012). In Nicosia, the inscription and reaffirmation of the national self is often dialectically engaging the ‘other’, and in doing so evokes and reproduces partition in Cypriot imagination. A prominent such example can be found on the slopes of Mount Pentadaktylos/Besparmak overlooking Nicosia, where a gigantic TRNC flag (see Figure 21) was painted on stones in the 1980s, following the north’s declaration of independence. Covering an area of 100.000 square metres, it faces south and is visible from afar. This is a strong statement, asserting the Turkish-Cypriot claim to statehood and land/space. On one hand, it addresses Turkish-Cypriot citizens, legitimizing the northern polity in their eyes; on the other, it addresses the Greek-Cypriots south of the Buffer Zone, announcing the presence of the TRNC, and reiterating the demand for permanent partition and recognition. As the flag is facing south, the latter message becomes more potent, and it is also perceived as a provocation to Greek-Cypriots, stirring emotions of indignation, anger, and sadness (Psaltis, Beydola, Filippou & Vrachimis, 2014). This has been expressed in a written question submitted to the European Parliament by a Greek-Cypriot member in 2009 (Parliamentary question E-5053/09, 2009). The question was prompted by the installation of a second TRNC flag located next to the first in 2003, when the Republic of Cyprus was accepted as a European Union member state. The second flag is brightly illuminated during the night, displaying the Kemalist slogan ‘How happy is he who call himself a Turk’ [*Ne mutlu türk’üm diyene*] at the bottom. The two flags not only embed the Turkish-Cypriot official historical narrative in land/space, they also reiterate the divide between perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, framed in antagonistic nationalist terms. In this manner, they reproduce the boundary between them not at its physical location, but in the minds of people on either side of the Buffer Zone.



Figure 21: The TRNC flag on the slopes of Mount Pentadaktylos / Besparmak, Nicosia. March 5, 2012, by the author.

⁸ For the practice of changing toponyms in northern Cyprus after 1974, see Navaro-Yashin, 2012 pp. 37-50.

⁹ For an analysis of the most emblematic Turkish-Cypriot monument, embodying the slogan “We will not forget”, see Killoran, 1994, pp. 220-242.

¹⁰ For an analysis on the National Struggle Museums in Nicosia, see Papadakis, 1994.

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A similar *bordering* process is taking place at the Greek-Cypriot checkpoint of Ledra Street in Nicosia's historic centre. In a narrow room behind the police station, one finds a small exhibition / memorial displaying photographs of the Greek-Cypriot missing persons of 1974 (see Figures 22 and 23). Although after the opening of the Ledra Street / Lokmaci crossing in 2008 the exhibition became smaller and less visible than in the past, it remains in place¹¹. The visitor's attention is caught by the enlarged photograph of a young child, holding the wedding photograph of his missing parents. A dusty Christmas tree at the corner is decorated with other photographs of women (mothers or wives) and children, holding photographs of their missing beloved ones. The issue of missing persons is certainly sensitive for those who have lost relatives in the war, and who have for decades demanded the right to find out what happened to them. It has, however, also been instrumentalised by the Greek-Cypriot state as propaganda¹², to highlight Turkish aggression and the violation of human rights in 1974, thus promoting its official historical narrative. The photographs of women and children holding photographs of their missing relatives have become a symbol of Greek-Cypriot victimhood, which reproduces the ethnic boundary in public consciousness.




Figure 22 (left), 23 (right): Small exhibition / memorial displaying photographs of the Greek-Cypriot missing persons of 1974, Nicosia. March 22, 2016, by the author.

¹¹ Until 2009, this was a larger exhibition housed in a nearby building, used to educate foreigners and students (Hoak-Doering, 2015, p. 36). Since the opening of the crossings in 2003, and especially after 2007, the Committee on Missing Persons has made significant progress in locating mass burial sites, exhuming and identifying remains, and returning them to their relatives. For the shift this has caused in public discourse around the issue of the missing persons, see Yakinthou, 2008.

¹² For a comprehensive sociological study of the issue of missing persons in Cyprus, and the modes and uses of their pictorial representations, see Sant Cassia, 2005. For a complementary analysis relating to female empowerment and activism, see Hoak-Doering, 2015.

5.6 Deepening

The status quo in Cyprus after independence was determined on one hand by the entrenchment of the pre-existing divide in political, social and economic life in Cyprus, and on the other by the dominance of nationalist political elites. Increased tension resulted in the eruption of violence and the re-emergence of physical partition in Nicosia, which was also underpinned by institutional and administrative partition. The deepening of the divide was clearly demonstrated by the isolation of Turkish-Cypriots in enclaves, and the collapse of constitutional order. De facto partition in 1974 sealed the post-conflict status quo, in which each community's trauma served as a central cohesive element to foster a new sense of belonging. The two official historical narratives produced in the aftermath of conflict were centred on each community's suffering, portraying the 'self' as victim and the 'other' as perpetrator. These narratives legitimize claims to statehood and territory, relying on each side's ethno-national myth, i.e. 'impossible coexistence' or 'previous peaceful coexistence'. The role of the Buffer Zone in sustaining these narratives is crucial. In the Turkish-Cypriot narrative, the conceptualization of the Buffer Zone as a 'safety border' underlines the impossibility of peaceful coexistence, hence the imperative of partition for the Turkish-Cypriot wellbeing. In the Greek-Cypriot narrative, the conceptualization of the Buffer Zone as an 'open wound' justifies the desire for healing through repatriation and reunification, which 'previous peaceful coexistence' presents as unproblematic. Therefore, the Buffer Zone becomes a structural element of these narratives and of each side's ideal solution to the Cyprus Problem. As long as a solution to the Cyprus Problem remains elusive, the Buffer Zone's existence is necessary to support and sustain the relevance of each side's claims. The relevance and impact of each official historical narrative relies, thus, on the existence of the Buffer Zone and the endurance of its conceptualizations as an 'open wound' and as a 'safety border'.

This chapter traced processes of *bordering*, locating the Buffer Zone within the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot official historical narratives. In this analysis, the boundary of the Buffer Zone emerged not only as a product of a complex set of power relations, but also as a space that exemplifies and reproduces power relations. It embodies each community's trauma, representing the intercommunal conflict, the Cyprus Problem itself, as well as its solution either as permanent partition or as reunification. It is, thus, a highly politicized space, serving as a constituent element of the post-conflict status quo. Moreover, the analysis in this chapter demonstrated that this boundary is as much a physical as it is a conceptual entity, placing emphasis on shaping an 'us' vs. 'them' dichotomy understood in ethnic-nationalist terms. The reproduction of this boundary, summarized as *re-bordering*, is diffused in societies. The examples offered in this chapter demonstrated how the boundary is reproduced in everyday practices, as well as everyday experience in Nicosia. Conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone as an 'open wound' and as a 'safety border' acquire particular relevance and significance in Nicosia's historic centre, where the two communities are in close proximity. On the Turkish-Cypriot side, the boundary between the two communities becomes there fortified and overtly militarized to emphasize the presence of the enemy on the other side, from whom protection is necessary. On the Greek-Cypriot side, the boundary between the two communities exhibits temporariness, allowing views into a deteriorating urbanity within, to emphasize the need for healing, for its removal, and for reunification. Therefore, the implication of the Buffer Zone in the post-conflict status quo is in Nicosia more prominent than elsewhere in Cyprus.

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As the two sides embarked on negotiations for the Cyprus Problem, political elites, perpetuating the official historical narrative on each side, came to power with the promise of solution. Until a solution is reached, the status quo of partition serves the interests of these political elites. In Nicosia, the inaccessibility of the urban part of Buffer Zone, coupled with close proximity, and the impression of degradation and abandonment have popularized its perceptions as 'dead' and 'unchanging', inspiring its colloquial characterizations as 'dead zone' or 'no man's land'. As a result, Nicosia's Buffer Zone acquired the status of a symbol in Cypriot imagination. These perceptions are crucial for the continuous relevance and dominance of its conceptualizations as 'open wound' and 'safety border', hence for the dominance of the official historical narratives. In other words, perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone as 'dead' and 'unchanging' became over the years part and parcel of the status quo of partition. It is this status quo that negotiations for the Cyprus Problem sought to change.

The next chapter of this thesis explores pursuits for peace, to which both sides appeared committed. It examines the narratives and practices of peace-making developed in high-level political negotiations and local practices of peace-making on the ground. Nicosia became soon after 1974 the epicentre of bi-communal cooperation, which began with technical projects, extended to urban planning, and eventually expanded to include various bottom-up initiatives. With the examination of peace-making narratives and practices, Chapter 6 reveals a relation between peace-making processes in Cyprus and spatial practices in Nicosia. It opens up the third part of this thesis, concerned with various encounters after partition. These encounters result in the contestation of the official historical narratives, and of the dominant conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone. Their examination affords insights into deviations, discrepancies, contingencies and accidents, which, undermining the status quo of partition, open up opportunities for resistance and subversion.

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CHAPTER 6

Consolidation – Cooperation, Narratives and Practices of Peace-making

6.1 Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of 1974, high-level political negotiations were launched with UN mediation to resolve the Cyprus Problem. Their repeated collapse over the years has made it known as “one of the world’s most intractable conflicts” (Chan, 2016), with Cyprus hosting today one of the longest-running UN Peacekeeping missions. After 1974 the two polities north and south of the Buffer Zone were confronted with the consequences of partition. For the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus [RoC] the 1974 war, besides casualties and displacement of population, was disastrous also in economic terms, as it lost access to the majority of resources (farmlands, tourism and trade infrastructure, industry plants) as well as capital investment (Pashardes & Hajispyrou, 2003). In 1974-1975 gross output, representing revenue from production, dropped by 70 percent, while the gross domestic product (GDP), representing the value of labour and capital, dropped by 17,9 percent (Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Pashardes & Hajispyrou, 2003). There was a 16,9 percent rise in unemployment, as all sectors of the economy were badly hit.

The economy, however, recuperated fast in the south, especially due to a construction boom for refugee housing, and rapid urbanization. Within two years, unemployment had dropped by half. The restart of a free market economy was achieved with labour-intensive policies and international aid, directed towards construction (public infrastructure and housing for refugees), industrial development, agriculture, and manufacturing. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the RoC shifted to a service economy, with ‘sun and sand’ tourism becoming the main economic driver, followed by finance and business services (Orphanides & Syrighas, 2012). The RoC became an EU member state in 2004, and joined the Eurozone in 2008. During this period, the economy continued to grow at a 4 percent rate until 2009 (CIA World Factbook, 2014). Thereafter, it entered a period of economic recession, which peaked during the 2012-2013 fiscal crisis, when the RoC, having lost access to international capital markets, entered an Economic Adjustment Programme. Although after 2016 the RoC has returned to positive growth rate, severe austerity measures were implemented, and the economy has significantly shrunk (Ioannou & Charalampous, 2017).

In the north, the Turkish-Cypriots came to control about one third of the island, but due to economic embargoes and international non-recognition, economic development¹ became dependent on Turkey, not least due to the provided financial aid, the adoption of Turkish Lira as currency, as well as the development of very close monetary and trade ties (Thorp, 2009). Until the mid-1980s, heavy state interventionism and the creation of an oversized public sector across all economic activities characterized the Turkish-Cypriot economy, as a mechanism of providing employment, as well as cultivating state legitimacy (L. Altınay, Bıcak & Altınay, 2002; Bozkurt, 2014). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, following an economic crisis in Turkey, neoliberal economic policies were implemented in northern Cyprus. This resulted in extensive privatization of state-owned enterprises, which for the next decade saw the decline of

¹ Statistical data are not accessible.

agriculture and the accumulation of capital from tourism, education, construction and finance (Hatay, 2008, pp. 155-156). Although it came closer to a free market economy, northern Cyprus remained isolated from international markets and dependent on Turkey. In the early 2000s, a financial crisis in Turkey affected severely the Turkish-Cypriot economy. In response, Turkey sought to implement an IMF-style austerity programme in north Cyprus, which was met with widespread societal dissatisfaction and unrest, creating also favourable conditions for a Cyprus Problem solution (Bozkurt, 2014). The Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan soon after, besides Turkish-Cypriot disappointment, saw between 2006 and 2010 a deepening of the economic crisis and of Turkish interventionism in the north, leading to a neoliberal restructuring of the economy (Bozkurt, 2014). Turkish interventionism, with the support of local political elites, has resulted in the strong presence of Turkish private investment in the economy. This has resulted in positive economic growth since 2010, somewhat reducing the economic disparity between the Turkish-Cypriot north and the Greek-Cypriot south (Apostolides, 2018).

This chapter tackles the third research question of this thesis, unpacking the framework in which the city's bi-communal masterplan operates, by exploring the relation between peace-making processes in Cyprus and spatial practices in Nicosia. Under the changing conditions, described above, this framework is structured by the consolidation of the status quo of partition between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. This chapter addresses consolidation on two levels. First, following this introduction, section 6.2 revisits the most important moments of high-level political negotiations, to trace the consolidation of partition in terms of failed elite peace-making, and the consequences of the intractability of the Cypriot conflict. It places particular emphasis on the latest settlement plan, known as the Annan Plan, exploring the ways in which its acceptance by the Turkish-Cypriots and its rejection by the Greek-Cypriots illustrate deviations from their respective official historical narratives. Section 6.3 then turns to bi-communal cooperation on the ground, to trace the consolidation of partition as a result of peace-making narratives developed within a depoliticized framework of technical projects undertaken in Nicosia since the 1970s. In this analysis, urban planning emerges as a principal field of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation. As supranational actors, especially the European Union, become involved in space- and heritage-making as practices of peace-making on the ground, the opportunity arises to examine shifts in power relations. At the intersection of the European / supranational and the local, peace-making narratives become embedded in Nicosia's historic centre, in due process reclaiming its Buffer Zone as common and shared heritage for all Cypriots. As long as this peace-making narrative does not address the traumatic past, and continues to rely on a depoliticized approach, it reproduces the status quo on the island, hence contributing to the consolidation of partition. Section 6.4 elaborates on the notion of consolidation, and provides the conclusions to this chapter.

6.2 The high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem: failing at elite peace-making

6.2.1 *The unresolved conflict and its role in the deviation from the Turkish-Cypriot official historical narrative*

In 1977, the UN-mediated negotiations produced for the first time an agreement, known as the High Level Agreement, designating four points for the reunification of Cyprus. This agreement stipulated a federal system as the basis for further negotiation, and designated the issues of territory, property, and governance as its constituent elements:

- “1. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.*
- 2. The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability of productivity and land ownership.*
- 3. Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot Community.*
- 4. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.”*

(United Nations Security Council Report, 1977, p. 2)

This initial agreement defined the future solution to the Cyprus Problem along the lines of bi-communalism, thus reiterating the ethnic binary integral to the conflict. In a failed bi-communal state, however, the meaning of bi-communalism was not only contested but also subject to negotiation.

A second ten-point agreement was achieved in May 1979, which determined a resumption of peace negotiations in Nicosia based on the High Level Agreement, and delineated a framework for the talks up to reaching a Cyprus Problem solution. The focus of peace negotiations would be on all territorial and constitutional aspects of a Cyprus Problem settlement, respecting “human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens” (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.50). Both sides agreed to avoid actions that may affect the negotiations negatively, while prioritizing practical measures demonstrating goodwill and promoting mutual confidence. The agreement also touched the issue of the island’s demilitarization, as well as a commitment to “independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment”, which would prohibit “union in whole or in part with any other country” as well as “any form of partition or secession” (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.51). In the following years, peace negotiations repeatedly reached an impasse as the two sides appeared unable to find common ground to implement the agreed federal system, and work out its constituent elements. Relations were further strained by the Turkish-Cypriot administration’s declaration of independence in 1983, which resulted in the collapse of peace negotiations. The unilaterally declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] was recognized only by Turkey and, amidst international condemnation, was declared illegal under UN Security Council Resolution 541.

Intercommunal talks resumed in 1984 to collapse again in 1986; they were followed by UN mediation in 1988, which hit a deadlock in 1989 and was abandoned with the RoC's decision to apply for European Union [EU] membership in 1990. The EU formally accepted its application in 1993, a development welcomed by neither the TRNC nor Turkey. As Greece was already an EU member state, the former alleged a violation of the 1960s constitution, which precluded Cyprus from union with another state, while the latter saw as a possible obstacle in its own pending accession application. Another international player, the EU, became thus actively involved in the Cyprus Problem. The European Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership stated:

*“Cyprus's geographical position, the deep-lying bonds which, for two thousand years, **have located the island at the very fount of European culture and civilization**, the intensity of the European influence apparent in the values shared by the people of Cyprus and in the conduct of the cultural, political, economic and social life of its citizens, the wealth of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer on Cyprus, **beyond all doubt, its European identity and character** and confirm its vocation to belong to the Community.”*

(European Commission, 1993, emphasis added)

The Republic of Cyprus's application for EU membership constituted much more than an obvious further complication of the peace-making process. The European Commission's statement effectively *re-bordered* Cyprus claiming it 'beyond all doubt' as geographically, culturally and morally European. In this manner, it intercepted at the very heart of the Cyprus Problem, where the two communities' constituent 'truths' competed for legitimacy through their official historical narratives. A *re-bordering* of the island as European, with Greece already a member state inevitably seemed to work in favour of the Greek-Cypriots. The European Commission statement, continuing as follows, addressed the Cyprus Problem:

*“A political settlement of the Cyprus question would serve only to reinforce this vocation and strengthen the ties which link Cyprus to Europe. At the same time, a settlement would open the way to the **full restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms** throughout the island and encourage the development of pluralist democracy.”*

(European Commission, 1993, emphasis added)

A settlement of the Cyprus Problem within the frame of the EU is presented here as paving the way to 'pluralist democracy', which would guarantee 'human rights' and 'freedom' island-wide. While acknowledging the Turkish-Cypriot concerns, the European Commission drew attention to possible future benefits that could provide an incentive for the Turkish-Cypriot community:

“Even though they object to the conditions under which the application for membership was made, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community are fully conscious of the economic and social benefits that integration with Europe would bring their community.”

(European Commission, 1993)

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At the same time, the statement stressed not only the importance of reaching a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem, but also the prospective relation between such settlement and the island's integration with the EU:

“This opinion has also shown that Cyprus’s integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question - a settlement which will make it possible for the two communities to be reconciled, for confidence to be re-established and for their respective leaders to work together. While safeguarding the essential balance between the two communities and the right of each to preserve its fundamental interests, the institutional provisions contained in such a settlement should create the appropriate conditions for Cyprus to participate normally in the decision-making process of the European Community and in the correct application of Community law throughout the island.”

(European Commission, 1993)

The 1993 European Commission opinion, thus, asserted that Cyprus's accession process would have a positive impact on the peace-making process by providing a framework of shared European culture, peace, cooperation and dialogue. Thus, not only is the island of Cyprus *re-bordered*, so is the Cyprus Problem too. However, EU accession was eventually decoupled from the success of peace negotiations (Boedeltje, Kramsch, & van Houtum, 2007, p. 132).

When in 1994, amidst an ongoing UN initiative promoting Confidence-Building Measures, the EU member states decided to include Cyprus in the next round of enlargement discussions, the immediate response of the Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriot ruling political elites was the assumption of a harder stance in peace negotiations (Fisher, 2001, p. 316; Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p. 58-61). Meanwhile two incidents threatened the escalation of tension. In 1996, an attempt by Greek-Cypriot nationalist motorcyclists to cross into the Buffer Zone resulted in two fatalities². Soon after, in early 1997, the Cyprus missile crisis broke out, pertaining to the upgrading of Greek-Cypriot defence with the installation of a ground-to-air S-300 missile system bought from Russia. The crisis was diffused with international aid and in 1998 formal accession talks with the EU began. The decision for the commencement of the accession talks prompted a fierce condemnation by the TRNC, and spelled another impasse in UN mediation. With a statement published in December 1997, TRNC decried the alleged violation of the rights of Turkish-Cypriot citizens, concluding:

“The EU, by taking this latest decision despite the above mentioned realities, has only helped destroy the established framework for a settlement in Cyprus which has emerged through the process of intercommunal negotiations. The imbalance that this unjust decision has created in Cyprus has further reinforced the reasons preventing the successful conclusion of the negotiations. For this reason, future contacts can only be held between the two states in Cyprus. Acting within the context of the Joint Declaration of 20 January 1997, the Turkish Republic of

² The Greek-Cypriot motorcyclists/demonstrators entered the Buffer Zone and clashed with Turkish-Cypriot soldiers, police and nationalist counterdemonstrators. One person was killed. His cousin was shot dead several days later, when he entered the Buffer Zone, and attempted to climb a flagpole and remove the Turkish-Cypriot flag as a form of protest.

Northern Cyprus, in cooperation with Turkey, will take whatever steps necessary in all fields.”

(Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Government Statement, 1997)

Immediately after, the TRNC entered an agreement with Turkey securing “partial integration in economics, finance, security, defence, and foreign affairs” (Fisher, 2001, p. 317).

Discussing the intractability of the Cyprus Problem and the repeated failure of peace negotiations, Fisher (2001) and Richmond (1999) emphasize that both sides demonstrated a clear focus on their own interests and initial incompatible positions, rather than seeking compromise. The perpetual disagreement on the form of the federal system offers a pregnant example. The Greek-Cypriot leadership has pursued a solution of federation with a strong central government (as close as possible to their ideal solution of a unitary state), while the Turkish-Cypriot leadership has pursued a confederation between two sovereign states (Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2009). Both positions reflect each side’s objective for sovereignty, and are consistent with each side’s official historical narrative. In a similar vein, Michael (2007) recognizes three sets of parameters impeding the Cyprus Problem solution between 1974 and 1994. First, the changing priorities of the involved parties with regard to key issues, such as the nature and implementation pace of a federal solution, were combined with an all-or-nothing approach, wherein all facets of the Cyprus Problem should be agreed upon simultaneously (governance, territory, property, security). Second, the longevity of the conflict exacerbated pre-existing insecurities and mistrust, prompting each community to pursue its own agenda to strengthen its legitimacy. Third, negotiation breakdowns spelled a return to antagonistic ways of conduct, bolstering nationalist sentiments. Moreover, as the two communities remained separated by the impermeable Buffer Zone, and lived isolated from one another, their official historical narratives became for the younger generations the main source of knowledge about the ‘other’. Thus, each negotiation breakdown on the diplomatic level marked as well a prominent lack of progress in the two communities’ relations, reinforcing old prejudices and fears.

At the same time, the mutual benefits of a solution were not being adequately promoted to become an incentive for rapprochement, which, as Michael (2007, p. 590) stresses, “remains a fundamental precondition for any sustainable unification of the island and its inhabitants”. In this sense, negotiation tactics operated in antagonistic terms as well; one community’s gain was seen as the other community’s loss. As Fisher (2001, p. 322) aptly remarks every time one side conceded to a compromise proposal, the other would retract. The prolongation of the negotiation process, without tangible losses (or gains for that matter), may then be seen as a means to gain advantage over one another. This is argued by Richmond (1999, p. 53) as well, who sees the Greek-Cypriot leadership relying on its international legitimacy, while anticipating increased international pressure on Turkey and the TRNC to further its agenda. As a result, it has been oscillating between cooperation, supported and promoted by international diplomacy, and local support for the status quo, which secured sovereign power over the once bi-communal Republic of Cyprus. The maintenance of the status quo up to this point has served the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as well; the protracted negotiations were seen as a way towards recognition, while at the same time placating the concerns of the international community regarding a renewed violent escalation (Richmond, 1999, p. 53). Thus, while the two adversaries tended to their own objectives, the repeated deadlocks in negotiations until the 1990s have done nothing but strengthen the status quo in Cyprus.

PART III ENCOUNTERS

However, the initiation of EU accession talks significantly modified the terms of the debate, especially with regards to the issue of recognition. Within the sphere of influence of the EU, disputing the legitimacy of the Greek-Cypriot administration would be impossible. The strengthened Greek-Cypriot position came in stark contrast to the protracted lack of international recognition for the TRNC, which has led to political and economic isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community (Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008; Hatay & Bryant, 2008b). While the Greek-Cypriot economy flourished in the 1980s and 1990s, the TRNC remained in decline under international economic embargoes, which increased its political and economic dependency on Turkey (Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008; Hatay, 2008). This dependency was punctuated in the 1970s by repopulation policies in the form of property and citizenship rights, which encouraged migration³ from poor areas of rural Turkey to the TRNC (Akpınar & Olgac, 2008; Faiz, 2008; Hatay, 2008; Jensehaugen, 2014). Following this period, these policies were discontinued, but migration from Turkey continued, though at a slower pace. Increased demand in labour generated by a construction boom in the early 2000s led to a renewed surge in migration of workers from poor areas of Turkey (Hatay, 2007). The political importance of demographics is obvious and already extensively analysed by Hatay (2007, 2008), King & Ladbury (1982), Loizides (2011), and Navaro-Yashin (2006, 2012). Suffice is to say here that, besides Greek-Cypriot indignation, the issue of resettled Turkish migrants has caused internal tensions and friction within TRNC as well. Turkish-Cypriots, regardless of political affiliation, became gradually prejudiced against resettled Turkish migrants, whom they saw as uneducated and 'backward' (Akpınar & Olgac, 2008; Hatay, 2007, 2008; Jensehaugen, 2014; Navaro-Yashin, 2006). The lack of census data until 1996 further fuelled a public discourse of 'demographic danger' posed by the resettled Turkish migrants to the native Turkish-Cypriot population (Hatay, 2007).

By the late 1990s, this discourse fed into a prevalent climate of dissatisfaction in the north, due to TRNC's protracted isolation, and Turkey's intensified interventionist policies corroborated by the ruling elite (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b; Ilter & Alankus, 2010). Within these processes, Turkey transitioned from 'motherland' into the Turkish-Cypriot's new formidable 'other', especially for those on the left of the political spectrum. The economic crisis of the early 2000s, which saw Turkey imposing austerity policies on TRNC, created further frustration amongst TRNC citizens, who took to the streets demanding economic and political autonomy from Turkey (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b; Ilter & Alankus, 2010; Pericleous, 2009). During this period, massive demonstrations and strikes took place, led by trade unions, civil society organizations and political parties, uniting TRNC citizens from across the political spectrum against the ruling elite and Turkish interventionism. Taking into consideration that this ruling elite was traditionally nationalist and in support of the status quo of partition, this was a game-changing shift in the politics of the TRNC, underpinning a growing distance between Turkey and Turkish-Cypriot politics at the beginning of the new millennium.

The Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations continued in 2002-2003, following a renewed deadlock in peace negotiations on the basis of an UN-drafted settlement proposal, which became known as the Annan Plan. With the prospect of EU accession presenting an enticing way out of political and economic isolation,

³ Hadjipavlou & Kanol (2008, p. 11), citing a TRNC census, offer that 46.769 Turkish nationals received Turkish-Cypriot citizenship in the 1970s, while another 70.525 TRNC residents (temporary workers or students) have retained their Turkish citizenship. These numbers are disputed by the Greek-Cypriot administration as inaccurately low. For a comprehensive analysis of the ethnic makeup of the population in the TRNC see Hatay, 2007 and Hatay, 2017.

Turkish-Cypriot public opinion⁴ shifted towards a reconciliatory (pro-solution) agenda within the frame of the EU, as evinced by the vocal demand for ‘solution-accession’ in these demonstrations (Hatay & Bryant, 2008b; Pericleous, 2009). At the same time, the political scenery in Turkey changed as well, with the Justice and Development Party [AKP], assuming, unlike its predecessors, a stance favouring a compromise solution to the Cyprus Problem, in order to promote Turkey’s EU accession prospects (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). As a result of this favourable conjuncture, negotiations were resumed in 2002 on the basis of the Annan Plan. The Turkish-Cypriot support for a solution within the frame of the Annan Plan constitutes a disruption, a deviation from the official Turkish-Cypriot historical narrative, which can be understood against the backdrop of the profound transformation of the Turkish-Cypriot public opinion in the 1990s and early 2000s. The intensified Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations of the time paved the way towards the opening of the checkpoints and the restitution of controlled mobility a year later, opening up numerous opportunities for encounters and synergies, the emergence of other narratives, and new spatial and social practices, which are tackled in the next two chapters of this thesis. The following section of this chapter offers an overview of the Annan Plan, dubbed by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan as the most comprehensive peace plan “in the history of the United Nations”. Its eventual rejection by the Greek-Cypriots constitutes a deviation from the Greek-Cypriot historical narrative, which is addressed in the next section.

6.2.2 Rejecting the Annan Plan: tracing the Greek-Cypriot deviation from their official historical narrative

The failure of the Annan Plan and its aftermath should be deliberated within the framework analysed above. It significantly differs from previous negotiation deadlocks, as it was the first time a plan was put to public vote, hence the closest the Cyprus Problem has ever been to a solution. On April, 24th 2004, significantly after the RoC had secured EU accession a year earlier, two simultaneous referenda took place in the TRNC and the RoC. A bilateral approval of the Plan would have meant that Cyprus would enter the EU unified; this was not the case, however, as the Plan was voted down by the Greek-Cypriots. A closer look at the rhetoric that developed around it, and at the events that took place close to the public vote, expose discrepancies and deviations from the official historical narratives, which are of interest to the present thesis. Detailed political and legal analyses of the Plan have already been offered in relevant literature (Asmussen, 2004; Hoffmeister, 2006; Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Pericleous, 2009; Trimikliniotis, 2009; Varnava & Faustmann, 2009). Nevertheless, before continuing the exploration in this section, it is necessary to summarize the main provisions of the Annan Plan, namely these pertaining to governance, security, territory and property (The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 2004):

⁴ The massive mobilization of Turkish-Cypriots at the time should not be seen as unanimity towards new political objectives or the solution of the Cyprus Problem itself. Turkish-Cypriots are not a homogenous community and the complexity of the Cyprus Problem does not allow for such simplifications. The protests, however, reflect a genuine dissatisfaction with the status quo and the ruling political elites in the north, in power since 1974. Mostly, it demonstrated the Turkish-Cypriot need for change.

PART III ENCOUNTERS

- Governance

The Annan Plan provided for an independent sovereign United Cyprus Republic modelled after Switzerland, with a federal government and two constituent states of equal status. The new bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state would have a single international legal personality defined by its Constitution. All powers not vested in the federal government would be exercised by the governments of the constituent states under their own Constitutions. Cooperation Agreements and Constitutional Laws were to ensure cooperation and coordination between the constituent states, and between them and the federal government. Each Cypriot citizen would hold the Cypriot citizenship and the internal complementary citizenship of a constituent state. The Constitution would guarantee the fundamental freedoms and respect for human rights, as well as the rights of religious minorities (Maronite, Latin, and Armenian). The legislative power would be exercised by a federal Parliament, composed by two houses, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, each with 48 seats. In the Senate, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots would enjoy numerical equality, while in the Chamber of Deputies seats would be allocated proportionally to the population of each constituent state, but never below a quarter of the whole, i.e. 12 seats. Simple majority in both houses and a quarter of Senators voting from each constituent state would be required to pass legislation. The executive power would be exercised by a Presidential Council with six voting and three non-voting members elected by both houses on a single list for a five-year term. The allocation of the seats in the Presidential Council would be proportionate to the population of each constituent state (on the principle of internal citizenship) but never below one third. Decisions would be made either by consensus or by simple majority including at least one member from each constituent state. Two members of the Council from each constituent state would rotate in the offices of President and Vice-President every twenty months. The judicial power would be exercised by the Supreme Court, composed by judges from each constituent state in equal numbers and three non-Cypriot judges. The Central Bank of Cyprus, the Office of the Attorney-General and the Office of the Auditor-General would be independent.

- Security

Regarding security, the three treaties of 1960 (Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance) would remain in place and enhanced by new treaties signed between the United Cyprus Republic and Greece, Turkey and Britain. Partition, secession or union with another state would be prohibited. The territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of the constituent states would be guaranteed. The Annan Plan defined as well provisions for the gradual demilitarization of the island; Greek and Turkish troops would be limited to 6.000 each until 2011, and 3.000 until 2018. Thereafter, a Greek military presence of 950 and a Turkish military presence of 650 would gradually be reduced in three-year revisions. A United Nations Peacekeeping operation and a Monitoring Committee would oversee the implementation of this agreement. Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot forces would also be dissolved.

- Territory

Territorial adjustments, based on agreed maps, in favour of the Greek-Cypriots would be implemented in six phases within 3,5 years. The relocation of current inhabitants of these territories would be overseen by special agreements.

- Property

In the areas that constitute part of territorial adjustments, property would be returned to dispossessed owners. In the other cases, forms of compensation were foreseen, to be managed by an impartial Property Board.

Before the Plan, which enjoyed the support of the international community (including Greece and Turkey), was put to vote, both sides' political elites took firm positions for or against it. In the Cypriot north, the Turkish-Cypriot leader and president of the TRNC since 1983 Rauf Denktash, of the right wing National Unity Party [UBP], strongly opposed the Annan Plan. His sway over the TRNC citizens had, however, been weakened, as the massive mobilizations of the early 2000s against his regime well demonstrated. Mehmet Ali Talat, leader of the leftist Republican Turkish Party [CTP], and head of the government since January 2004, fervently supported a 'yes' vote, as did the majority of political forces in TRNC (Bahcheli & Noel, 2010; Pericleous, 2009). In the Cypriot south, conservative president Tassos Papadopoulos, leader of the centre-right Democratic Party [DIKO], strongly opposed the Annan Plan as well. On April 7th, 2004, in a 50-minutes long speech broadcasted live on all southern television channels, Papadopoulos addressed the Greek-Cypriots and straightforwardly urged them to reject the Annan Plan on the basis that a) it did not serve the interests of the Greek-Cypriots, b) it did not lead to reunification but promoted division, c) it meant the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus, and, d) it was equivalent to recognition of the TRNC. Stressing the alleged dysfunctional nature of the federal solution, he cautioned against a probable future collapse leading to "partition through the international recognition of the constituent states" (PIO Press Release, 2004). And after reassuring the Greek-Cypriots that regardless of the referendum results, the RoC would become a full member of the European Union (which it indeed did), thus achieving "the strategic goal [...] to upgrade and shield politically the Republic of Cyprus" (PIO Press Release, 2004), he concluded appealing in an overtly emotional tone to the morality and national sentiment of the Greek-Cypriots:

"[M]y fellow countrymen,

On April 24 you will vote a YES or a NO to the Annan Plan. You will decide the present and future of Cyprus. You will decide for our generation and the generations that will come after us. I trust your judgement. I am certain you are not affected by false dilemmas and you are not scared by threats about alleged international isolation. [...] I am sure that for you the moral principles and values of our people, their civilization and national historic life still mean a lot to you and you want to continue with security, justice, freedom and peace. Weighing the pros and cons of YES and NO, the consequences of YES are heavier and more onerous.

I call upon you to reject the Annan Plan.

I call upon you to say a resounding NO on 24 April.

I call upon you to defend your dignity, your history and what is right.

With a sense of responsibility towards history, the present and the future of Cyprus and our people, I ask you not to mortgage your future to Turkey's political will. I urge you to defend the Republic of Cyprus, saying NO to its

abolition. To rally together for a new and more hopeful course for the reunification of our country through the European Union”.

(PIO Press Release, 2004)

Papadopoulos spoke of a ‘responsibility towards history’, which for Greek-Cypriots, as the previous chapter demonstrated, is structured around the trauma of 1974. Hence, the Greek-Cypriot official historical narrative served as the unspoken, but already known, linchpin of Papadopoulos’ rhetoric against the Annan Plan. While, however, Papadopoulos called for the rejection of the Plan, which would have brought the long promised solution, he did so promising a better solution at some point in the future. Hence, in his speech, a ‘no’ to the Annan Plan did not foreclose reunification at a later point in time. Political elites in the south, represented by the overwhelming majority⁵ of political parties followed the president’s lead. The left and traditionally pro-solution AKEL⁶ withdrew its support for the Plan right before the referendum (Ker-Lindsay, 2011). The support the Plan received by Papadopoulos’ two predecessors, former RoC Presidents Clerides and Vassiliou, and the European Parliament, was to no avail. Similarly futile proved Kofi Annan’s message to Cypriots, in which, countering Papadopoulos’ emotional declaration, he appealed to reason:

“[I] know you call it ‘the Annan Plan’. Indeed, parts of the plan were put together by the United Nations. But all of its key concepts emerged out of four years of negotiation among your leaders. And most of its 9.000 pages were drafted by hundreds of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Their extraordinary efforts produced one of the most comprehensive peace plans in the history of the United Nations. On Saturday, you will be asked whether you wish to make this plan the basis for your common future. That decision is yours – and yours alone.

[...]

I acknowledge truly that this plan does not meet the full demands of either side. In fact, it is a compromise, as is inevitable in any negotiation. It is also the only foreseeable route to the reunification of Cyprus. There is no other plan out there. There is no magic way of accommodating the maximum demands of one side while at the same time accommodating the maximum demands of the other. This is it”.

(Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s message to the people of Cyprus, 2004)

In the referenda that followed, the Turkish-Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, aligning for the first time in the history of the conflict their interests with those of the Greek-Cypriots in a common EU trajectory. The significant 65 percent voting in favour of the Plan broke with the official Turkish-Cypriot historical narrative, personified by Denktash, and the status quo his politics had sustained and enhanced since 1974. Significantly, this occurred after the restitution of controlled mobility a year earlier, which saw casual interactions between the two communities occurring without hostility. The Greek-Cypriots rejected the Plan by a majority of 75 percent. Although this rejection favoured the status quo of partition they were supposed to resent, the rhetoric that developed around the ‘no’ vote, as exemplified by Papadopoulos’ speech, managed to uphold their official historical narrative by promising a better solution at some point in the

⁵ Only one party, DISY, supported the Annan Plan (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

⁶ AKEL was at the time a coalition partner of the Papadopoulos’ DIKO.

future. Taking into account Ker-Lindsay's (2009) historical analysis of Cyprus Problem negotiations, where he observes that over the years of unresolved conflict proposals for solution have become progressively disadvantageous for the Greek-Cypriots (p. 20), a discrepancy emerges between action (the 'no' vote) and the Greek-Cypriot official historical narrative, which needs to be addressed.

The Annan Plan offered by no means an ideal solution. A comprehensive analysis of its shortcomings, asymmetries, and advantages is provided in Varnava and Faustmann (2009) by scholars that are experts in their fields. The actual provisions of the Plan for a federal system of governance differed substantially, as Trimikliniotis (2009) convincingly argues, from a confederation between two sovereign states, which constituted the initial Turkish-Cypriot negotiating position (pp. 116-118). The solution proposed in the Annan Plan was, hence, closer to the Greek-Cypriot negotiating position. Major points of criticism have been that the Plan did not adequately address the Greek-Cypriot security concerns and the fear for a future Turkish-Cypriot secession (Emilianides, 2009, pp. 95-106; Faustmann, 2009; pp. 224-235; Taki, 2009, p. 188-189). Therein rested the popular in the south arguments against the Annan Plan, which Papadopoulos also employed in his speech, namely that the Plan promoted the abolition of the RoC and the recognition of the TRNC. These arguments have been countered by legal scholars, who underlined the continuity of statehood between the Republic of Cyprus, established in 1960, and the United Cyprus Republic, proposed in the Annan Plan (Trimikliniotis, 2009, pp. 116-118). Hence, from an international legal perspective partition would be, also constitutionally, impossible. Therefore, the basis of argumentation against the Annan Plan, namely the constitutional weakness and non-functionality of the proposed federal solution, which could substantiate the fear of future Turkish-Cypriot secession, are proved invalid. Hence, despite its shortcomings and asymmetries, many scholars agree that the Annan Plan offered a democratic and workable framework for a compromise solution (Asmussen, 2004; Hoffmeister, 2006; Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Pericleous, 2009; Trimikliniotis, 2009; Varnava & Faustmann, 2009). In light of this, its rejection by the Greek-Cypriots cannot be solely attributed to its shortcomings.

Trying to interpret this discrepancy from a Greek-Cypriot perspective, it can be observed that guaranteed international legitimacy and the secured benefits of the EU accession, also exploited by Papadopoulos in his speech, supported a tendency towards inertia. In other words, while the Turkish-Cypriots had foreseeable gains from a solution at this historical juncture, the Greek-Cypriots had a lot to lose moving away from a position of power, deterring them from compromising. This needs to be understood against the backdrop of previous analysis regarding past failed negotiations, and their toll on the two communities' relations in terms of distrust and suspicion. Within this psychological climate of fear, the role of broadcast media is described by Taki (2009, pp. 180-193) as crucial in steering the public debate about the Annan Plan towards a 'no' vote. Reviewing broadcast and print media in the time before and soon after the referendum, Taki (2009) asserts that broadcast media, which served according to polling as the primary source of information for the public, were not only biased against the Plan, but also failed to provide an informed and objective presentation of its provisions, effectively misinforming the public (pp. 182-183). Thus, exploiting the Greek-Cypriot fears, rejectionist political parties and broadcast media misrepresented the Annan Plan as a solution that served the interests of Turkey and disadvantaged the Greek-Cypriot community to the extent that it constituted a threat to the RoC. However, misinformation by the media and the Greek-Cypriot leadership's clout over the electorate alone seem inadequate to explain the massive rejection of a solution, which also satisfied many Greek-Cypriot demands (including territorial

adjustments, repatriation, and property compensations), and which would have realized the national cause of reunification.

An interesting case is made by Lordos (2009), who attributes part of the responsibility for the rejection of the Annan Plan to the process of negotiation itself. In the established tradition of high-level peace negotiations behind closed doors, UN mediators and Cypriot as well as international political elites failed to consult the Cypriot public. Lordos (2009, p. 168) notes that the option to incorporate public opinion polling during the Annan Plan negotiations was deliberated but eventually dismissed early in the process. But as a survey conducted island-wide a year after the referenda showed, the provisions of the Plan reflected primarily the positions of the negotiating political elites, which did not necessarily match public opinion. At that particular historical conjuncture, these provisions resonated with the Turkish-Cypriot public, although with notable exceptions, while they missed the mark with the Greek-Cypriot public altogether (Lordos, 2009, pp. 171-176). Furthermore, the survey polled alternative options to Annan Plan provisions for issues particularly problematic in the negotiations, such as security and property. In each case at least one alternative option was found, which resonated with both communities; agreement was also observed regarding the most favoured option in each case (p. 177). In light of these findings, Lordos (2009) proposes a model to include public opinion during the formulation of a solution plan, rather than only public vote at the end. In a similar vein, Turk (2009) emphasizes the need for civil society representation in the negotiation process. The arguments of these authors have significant merit. A survey conducted in 2012 by the Cyprus 2015 project revealed that Cypriots on both side of the divide believe that their voice is not heard in the negotiation process (see Figure 24). An overwhelming majority on both sides believes that citizens should be consulted in policy-making (see Figure 25). If this is the case, the question is raised as to why public participation has not been demanded.




Figure 24: Extent to which the voice of citizens is heard by the leaders in the negotiation process (UNDP-ACT, 2013, p. 48).




Figure 25: Opinion on whether citizens should be consulted on major policy decisions (UNDP-ACT, 2013, p. 48).

The discrepancy between the Greek-Cypriot ‘no’ vote and their official historical narrative is the result of entanglement of different factors, namely the shortcomings of the plan itself, the agendas of political elites, the role of the media, and the exclusion of the public from the negotiation process. So far the elite, high-level approach to peace negotiations for the Cyprus Problem has remained in place. A positive step towards a quasi-participatory approach was taken in April 2008, when working groups and bi-communal technical committees were established. While the task of the former was to review the negotiation agendas and prepare the ground for the elite talks, the task of the latter was to implement confidence-building measures in different areas⁷ in which cooperation was necessary or possible. However, the working groups were temporary, while there were no provisions as to how the bi-communal technical committees’ work could inform or affect the high-level negotiation process (Kaymak, 2013, p. 5). As a result, even the technical committees that have produced significant work on the ground, such as the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage and the Committee on Missing Persons, are not linked to the process of finding a Cyprus Problem solution; moreover, they have become subordinated to political authorities. As a result, finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem has been diachronically regarded as a prerogative of state authorities, and pursued only in high-level political negotiations. The repeated failures on the elite level have allowed political parties on both sides of the divide to come to power with the promise of finding a (good or better) solution to the Cyprus Problem (Vogel, 2016). Hence, appearing capable to negotiate a solution has diachronically guaranteed access to power.

⁷ Twelve areas were identified: culture, humanitarian affairs, economic and commercial matters, health, crime and crime related matters, crossing points, environment, gender equality, education, crisis management, telecommunications and radio frequency-broadcasting and cultural heritage.

The conviction that finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem is a prerogative of state authorities, and can only be pursued in high-level political negotiations is one reason why public participation has been curtailed. The second reason relates to civil society development in Cyprus, in which the notion of bi-communalism has played a defining role. Bi-communalism first appeared as an essential element of the federal system in the High Level Agreement of 1977, and has been since reiterated in all consequent agreements. Building on Lordos' (2009) and Turk's (2009) observations, I argue that public participation has not only been foreclosed by the political elites and the design of the negotiation process; it has been so severely compromised by the notion of bi-communalism, to the extent that it has in fact never been demanded. The meaning of bi-communalism was moulded within depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation, of which the bi-communal technical committees are but the latest manifestation. To explore bi-communal cooperation, this chapter shifts its focus away from the level of the state and the high-level political negotiations to parallel processes unfolding on Nicosia's ground. While elite peace-making tells the story of conflict intransigence and deadlocks, peace-making on the ground promoted cooperation, triggering larger transformation processes. The remaining sections of this chapter explore how the idea of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation structured narratives of peace-making, as well as the pursuit of peace on the ground, and affected the development of civil society initiatives in Cyprus. This provides another insight into discrepancies and deviations from official historical narratives, grounded on spatial practices in Nicosia.

6.3 Depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation

6.3.1 From pipes to narratives of peace-making

Despite the prevalent separation of the two communities after 1974, bi-communal cooperation on a technical level has been taking place in Nicosia since the 1970s. The narratives of peace-making were shaped within the framework of this initial technical cooperation, and soon after within planning practice for the city's future development. A 1995 booklet published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Cyprus [UNHCR Cyprus] refers to the rise of a peace-making strategy. This publication with the intriguing title 'The Nicosia Sewerage Project: a Plan for Nicosia, a Strategy for the World', serves as a departure point for my analysis in this section of the chapter. The urgency of cooperation between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots after 1974 was dictated by Nicosia's sewerage problems due to the lack of a central sewerage system. The city's new sewerage and storm collection system was planned within the frame of the country's United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], present in Cyprus since 1965⁸ (Hocknell, 2001, p. 157). The UNDP in general offers technical assistance in areas contributing to a state's economic development. Since its establishment in 1965, it has grown "into the world's largest provider of technical assistance on a grant basis" (Hocknell, 2001, p. 160). The Nicosia Sewerage Project was initiated in 1968 as a technical assistance project funded by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, p. 8). Work started in 1972; by 1974 a new treatment plant at the location 'Mia

⁸ For a comprehensive analysis of the work of UN organizations in Cyprus, including UNDP, see Richmond & Ker-Lindsay, 2001.

Milia' north-east of Nicosia had almost been completed (Hocknell, 2001, pp. 165-166). The results of de-facto partition after 1974, however, forced the project to a halt, leaving it inoperable, as its existing infrastructure deteriorated while accumulating debt. The new treatment plant at 'Mia Milia' fell under de-facto Turkish-Cypriot control; a large part of the main outlet fell within Nicosia's Buffer Zone, while already completed infrastructure sustained damage and was in dire need of repair (Hocknell, 2001, p. 166). Moreover, the already saturated sewerage system was further strained by the influx of displaced Greek-Cypriots from the north, who initially relocated mainly in Nicosia. This unanticipated increase of population led to city expansion outside the anticipated reach of the planned sewerage system, making expansions urgent. Moreover, while the incomplete system was inoperable, interaction between the two communities became impossible, while the loan for a project, which political realities impeded, had to be repaid. Within this context, necessity dictated that a way be found for the Sewerage Project to resume, a task that required bi-communal cooperation.

Under the auspices of UNDP, negotiations were launched to produce an agreement, and specify the process and methods of operation for the completion of the project. During these four-year-long negotiations, the two mayors of Nicosia, Lellos Demetriades and Mustafa Akinci, emerged as leading figures in a process that eventually set the basis for cooperation between Nicosia's (and Cyprus's) two communities for years to come. The ensuing framework for cooperation was based on what was called 'a non-political approach' wherein all participants were divested of their official capacity, and formalities were forsaken. A bi-communal technical team was established, which was, however, explicitly of "no legal standing" and "outside the political process", only to focus on solving the pressing practical issues of the incomplete sewerage system (UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, p. 8). This framework was, however, revolving around two ground-breaking premises. First, Nicosia was to be tackled as a whole, and second, trust was to be fostered "by trusting" (UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, p. 8). In essence interlinked, these premises constitute in retrospect, seen within the dismal political circumstances of that period, a rather bold decision. While partition and the trauma of the armed conflict were recent, a technical project was developing in tandem with the vision of Nicosia's reunification, and underpinned by trust-building. These attributes, enhanced and consolidated later in the inception of Nicosia Master Plan [NMP], have a political footing to the extent that they implicitly endorsed reconciliation in praxis. This approach is what makes the Sewerage Project revolutionary for its time and, despite assurances to be outside the political process, political in its essence.

The reader might inquire then why the political aspect was so explicitly abnegated. On one hand, the UNDP, as all UN operations, had to remain impartial, and respect the sovereignty of the recipient country. Therefore, explicit political neutrality⁹ was a precondition for its continuous operation in Cyprus, which by the early 1970s constituted the most concentrated field of UNDP aid in the world (Hocknell, 2001, p. 162). On the other hand, local politics too favoured the de-politicization of bi-communal cooperation. In an article published in 1998 Demetriades subtly touches this issue:

⁹ Hocknell (2001, pp. 157-250) offers a comprehensive critique of UNDP's involvement in Cyprus, both with regards to its strategic goals as well as its chosen state-centric approach, which the author finds asymmetrically favouring the Greek-Cypriot community.

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“While there is certainly a political side to these kinds of projects, they are also about humanitarian issues and basic human needs and somehow we managed to keep them out of the usual political discussions, partly through the decision to try and do our work in silence without attracting constant media attention. For it was always my feeling that were these to become staple issues for political discussion, then the projects would have been put in jeopardy.”

(Demetriades, 1998, pp. 172-173)

What is implied here is that embedding the technical projects in local politics would have resulted in their subordination to the volatility of high-level political negotiations as well, and could effectively prevent their realization altogether. Thus, it becomes clear that a common understanding was fostered very early in bi-communal cooperation that in order to move forward, the Sewerage Project, and for that matter any following project, had to be disentangled from the complexity of the contested political realities. Furthermore, as the following passage underlines, this also served the common good:

“We tried to find common ground away from politics. We managed to reach agreement without interfering with the principles of politics... we had in mind during the negotiation the interest of all people in the Nicosia area, whether they are Greeks or Turks.”

(Lellos Demetriades quoted in UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, p. 8)

Outside the influence and control of local politics, bi-communal projects would assumingly be able to continue unhindered, fostering a culture of cooperation without involvement or stakes in politics. In this manner, the Sewerage Project inaugurated both a practice of de-politicization of bi-communal relations, and a narrative of peace-making on the ground. The term ‘de-politicization’ here operates on two levels. On a first level, it is used to denote the alleged removal of bi-communal relations from political influence and control, which is how those involved perceived the disentanglement of the bi-communal projects from the high-level political negotiations. On a second level, it summarizes the inability of bi-communal relations to exert influence over political discourses. Keeping bi-communalism and formal politics separated structures the framework within which bi-communal relations operate. Hence, it is not the nature of bi-communal relations that becomes apolitical, but their defined a priori perceived impact.

Disentangling the Sewerage Project from contested local political realities developed in tandem with procuring funds from outside the local communities. This process (of both funding the project as well as depoliticizing it) would not have been possible without UN mediation. In 1986 the Nicosia Sewerage Project was redefined as humanitarian aid under the auspices of UNHCR, a shift that made available funds from the government of the United States of America [USA]¹⁰. Furthermore, UNHCR soon came to see bi-communal cooperation as a means towards trust- and confidence-building between the two communities, thus serving its mandate, and qualifying as humanitarian aim per se. Bi-communal cooperation was consequently declared a prerequisite for project funding:

¹⁰ Annual humanitarian assistance for Cyprus from the United States of America was by 1995 amounting to 10 million dollars. From 1992 onwards the entirety of funds was dedicated to bi-communal projects (UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, p.11).

“[...] to qualify for humanitarian assistance, projects had to provide opportunities for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to work together in a non-political manner on specific areas of concern for the overall well-being of all Cypriots.”

(UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, p. 10, emphasis added)

Having grown “out of necessity” as D. B. Lasan, Ex Chief of Mission UNHCR Cyprus underlines, this first bi-communal project was seen as encapsulating a unique “problem solving approach”, to be expanded and contemplated in a global context as “a new bold strategy for other nations in conflict” (UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, pp. 3-4). Thus, tackling a practical issue within the Cypriot context developed into a peace strategy; known today as ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’. Cooperation between parties in conflict stands at its heart, while regaining trust and goodwill, and recruiting people committed to and laying the foundation for peace are its merits. However, this “grand experiment”, as the UNHCR booklet calls it, was primarily grounded on the apolitical nature of the various projects to be implemented (UNHCR Cyprus, 1995, p. 10). Thus, de-politicization turned from an unavoidable repercussion to an essential strategic component. As a result, it can be consistently traced in all following bi-communal projects, from the Nicosia Master Plan to current local initiatives.

6.3.2 Peace-making as space-making: the Nicosia Master Plan

After the successful completion of the Sewerage Project, which started operating in May 1980, the same two mayors of Nicosia, Demetriades and Akinci, both re-elected in office, initiated the Nicosia Master Plan [NMP]. The NMP is the most durable and consistent form of cooperation between the two communities in Nicosia, and generally in Cyprus, to date. Its importance lies notably on one hand in the tangible and very visible effects its years of operation have brought about in Nicosia’s historic centre, while on the other, in the precedent it has set regarding collaborative planning practices. In the following sections, I analyse NMP’s initial planning strategy, and elaborate on these two aspects.

6.3.2.1 A planning strategy

The establishment of the NMP was necessitated by the prevailing conditions in Nicosia in the aftermath of conflict and partition. Gradually after 1960, the city grew outside its historic centre in an unsystematic and unplanned manner, not least due to the lack of a comprehensive regulatory framework (Zetter, 1985, p. 25). As the process of urbanization intensified, a trend stronger in the south due to the influx of refugees¹¹ from the north, land speculation resulted in urban sprawl (see Figure 26) and unconsolidated urban development, which was accentuated by the gradual abandonment of the historic centre in favour of areas outside the Venetian walls (Oktay, 2007). Due to the proximity to the ‘other’, urban areas adjacent to Nicosia’s Buffer Zone became unattractive, and consequently abandoned, and left

¹¹ According to Hocknell (2001), by 1976 about 50 percent of residents in Nicosia’s historic centre were refugees (p. 168).

to decay. Low demand and high rates of vacancy led to reduced property and rent prices. By the beginning of the 1990s, Nicosia's historic centre on both sides of the divide had become a neglected area attracting the lower social and economic strata, mainly immigrant workers, as well as light manufacturing uses, such as warehouses and workshops (Hocknell, 2001, p. 168; Oktay, 2007, p. 235). At a time when neither the RoC nor the TRNC had the necessary legal frameworks to effectively regulate urban development, the NMP provided an instrument after which the planning system on both sides was consequently patterned.



Figure 26: Growth pattern of the Nicosia Urban Area (Demetriou, 2004, p. 260)

According to the 1984 Nicosia Master Plan Final Report, the NMP was conceived as a planning strategy, which aspired to tackle the challenges ensuing from unregulated urban development, in a manner that would ensure the coordinated growth of the city's two parts in preparation of its potential reunification (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984). Therefore, it reflected best the vision of the two Nicosia mayors, Demetriades and Akinci, and put the narrative of peace-making, developed within the frame of the Sewerage Project, into actual practice. At its very outset then, the NMP anticipated a solution to the Cyprus Problem, which would bring about the city's reunification. During its first phase (1981-1984) a framework was outlined, which served one main objective for development: "the improvement of the existing and future habitat and human settlement conditions of all the inhabitants of Nicosia" (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 1). Within this

frame, however, the need for a pragmatic approach was underlined, which would take into account Nicosia's realities on the ground to create a "realistic and implementable plan" avoiding "lengthy academic analyses" (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 3). Hence, a clear-cut technocratic approach was formulated already at these early stages to facilitate the "orderly development of an integrated city" (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 3). For this purpose, a bi-communal technical team (the NMP Project Team) was established, comprised of Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot architects, planners, sociologists, engineers and economists, and monitored by an International Consultative Panel of professionals. At times, these foreign advisors supported the bi-communal technical team with reviews and recommendations. An operational horizon of twenty years (1981-2001) would allow the NMP to plan for the long-term, implementing various proposals at different phases.

To determine the prevailing conditions in divided Nicosia at the time, a diagnostic survey was carried out during the first phase of the NMP (1981-1984), identifying and categorizing the city's problems. A diagnostic report produced in November 1981 identified the city's sprawl, coupled with scattered residential development and overprovision of empty building plots, as the main characteristics of Nicosia's development problems. Based on this report, proposed policies concentrated on consolidating the city's existing area, and negating sprawl tendencies. Within this frame, a strategy was developed identifying residential priority areas able to accommodate projected future growth, and assisted by a package of incentives. This process resulted in the May 1983 NMP Draft Report, which was consequently submitted to the representatives of the two communities (the mayors) for discussion and assessment. Throughout the process, exchange between the two community representatives, local professionals and institutions, as well as recommendations from the International Consultative Panel, played an important role in the preparation of a Final Report, which was produced in July 1984.

Incorporating those ideas which enjoyed wide consensus, and which were compatible "with the cultural and socio-economic aspects of Nicosia as a whole", the Nicosia Master Plan Final Report outlined for the first time a planning strategy for Greater Nicosia, based on five general principles (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p.6):

1. *Flexibility, expressed in the development of two parallel scenarios; one for Nicosia as a whole, and one for Nicosia under conditions of partition.*
2. *The initiation of a continuous planning process, with the production of a document that would be updated over time.*
3. *A future-oriented approach prioritizing private activities for the city's development, while attributing a supporting and incentives-providing role to public activities.*
4. *The delineation of a "strategy of containment and limited consolidation"¹² within Nicosia's limits, by focusing on identified Priority Development Areas and making rational use of available resources.*
5. *Directing future residential development within Priority Development Areas to prohibit further urban sprawl.*

Within this framework, a number of specific aims were determined, including the prioritization of low cost housing, coupled with a close relationship between home and work, the development of an

¹² The NMP defines as degree of consolidation the ratio between population and land area. The smaller the area of settlement for a given population, the higher is the degree of consolidation (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 16)

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efficient transportation system, the incorporation of green areas and parks, the provision of incentives for the relocation of existing manufacturing uses, and last but not least, the revitalization of the historic centre. The Plan also provided objectives for the facilitation of its implementation, with special emphasis on the creation of the necessary legislative and administrative frameworks, the acquisition of financial and other resources, public acceptance and cost-effectiveness (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 9-10).

Major constraints of physical, economic, social, legal and administrative nature were also identified. The physical constraints were primarily related to urban sprawl, such as empty building plots and existing land stock within the NMP area that would raise the city's capacity far beyond the projected population increase for 2001. Moreover, existing infrastructure, serving the already expanded city, created obstacles for a functional reorganization. The identified economic and social constraints pertained to urban sprawl, land allocation, and acceptance of planning procedures by the public. For example, high land values, coupled with a preference for individual detached or semi-detached houses was leading to further expansion of the city towards the less expensive periphery. As property was, and still is, a highly revered constitutional right in Cyprus, any restrictions or devaluations deriving from planned developments could lead to compensation payments. This condition, in tandem with limited financial resources, and deficiencies due to the absence of planning legislation and an appropriate planning authority, as well as a significant lack of trained or experienced professionals constituted the legal and administrative constraints. Listed last amongst the constraints, and constituting a category itself, was Nicosia's Buffer Zone, and the ensuing difficulties of planning for a divided city within the frame of the Cyprus Problem (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 11-14). The city's partition was highlighted, thus, by the NMP as a separate challenge.

Within the frame of the general planning strategy, Priority Development Areas [PDAs] and Future Development Areas [FDAs] were identified. The latter category incorporated areas, where disincentives would lead to a slower-pace development, hence allowing for the earlier development of the PDAs. In the PDAs, primary drive remained the residential development and the achievement of "a good relationship between homes and jobs" (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 17). To this end, the NMP proposed incentives aimed to make residential land affordable, to wider parts of the population, with fiscal and credit measures, such as long-term housing loans, as well as directing public sector projects to use land situated in the PDAs. The general planning strategy incorporated a diagrammatic representation of the conceptual planning framework in terms of spatial and functional organization, the Structure Plan, and provided a Physical Development Plan, illustrating the proposed planning policies. The Structure Plan integrated eight (8) major components: a) it specified the city's future development limits, the Development Boundary, b) it proposed population distribution relating to both planned land uses and the road network, c) it reiterated the priority of residential development in PDAs, d) it proposed a road network following a ring-radial system, e) it designated new industrial areas near existing ones, f) it emphasized the lack of, and planning for, interconnected open green spaces, g) it envisaged a Central Business District, incorporating part of the historic centre and its adjacent areas in south and north into an island-wide service centre, and finally, h) it outlined a vision for the historic centre itself to guide all future projects (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 18-20). Here, the emphasis the NMP placed on the historic centre's architectural heritage should be highlighted:

"The historic centre of Nicosia is an outstanding example of international architectural heritage. It is the heart of the city and it is irreplaceable; in short, it

constitutes the most precious part of the NMP Area. Without it, Nicosia would lose its identity and become an ordinary city. It is therefore of immense importance, not only to Nicosia but also to the international community, that the Walled City is protected, enhanced and revitalized in order to assume its proper role as an integral part of the city. It is the intention of the NMP to adopt appropriate policies and take all necessary measures to achieve this objective.”

(Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 20)

The central position of the Buffer Zone and of the historic centre in the NMP is further stressed in the Physical Development Plan (see Figure 27), which established a link between the planning strategy and urban realities on Nicosia’s ground at that time. With its twenty years horizon (1981-2001), this Plan would initiate “a continuous planning process” (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 21). It described interventions concerning the restructuring of the road network (traffic and transportation), the development of residential and industrial areas, the provision of open spaces, the designation of a Central Business District, as well as the distribution of major functions (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 21-41). All interventions that stumbled upon the existence of the Buffer Zone, or were entirely prevented because of it, were included in a ‘Plan B’, which on one hand allowed each side to function separately, and on the other, made provisions for full implementation in the future. Hence, the NMP produced simultaneously two planning scenarios, one without the Buffer Zone, and one with it.




Figure 27: Nicosia Master Plan 1st Phase, Physical Development Plan, 1984 (Petridou, 1998, p. 360).

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A separate section in the Physical Development Plan is allotted to the historic centre (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 35-37), the importance of which is aptly emphasized in the following excerpt:

*“The historic, cultural and architectural value of the Walled City of Nicosia justifies the claim that this area, with its surrounding ensemble of the Venetian walls, the moat and the bastions, should be considered as a rare **specimen of international heritage**. Within the circular city, there are some exceptional and several important, well-preserved religious buildings and old houses. The irregular, narrow streets are defined by characteristic domestic architecture, mainly late 19th and early 20th century.”*

(Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 35, emphasis in the original)

The NMP proposed integrated conservation as a planning approach that meant to incorporate the revitalization of the historic centre into its larger planning strategy. Integral parts of this approach were alongside land use and traffic / transportation planning, the development of schemes for the protection, restoration, rehabilitation and revitalization of its architectural heritage, accompanied by various implementation tools (legal, administrative, technical and socio-economic). To this end, the Plan prioritized residential use over others, expecting that revitalization schemes would attract residents of certain, quite specific, profile: young to medium age, economically active families (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 36). With concern to other land uses within the historic centre, the Plan proposed the concentration of commercial and light manufacturing activities (primarily traditional artisan and handicraft workshops) in specific designated areas, and the promotion of mixed-use zones. Provisions also concerned green areas, new open spaces, cultural areas, and the introduction of entertainment and leisure uses, which should not, it stated, overshadow the residential character of the historic centre (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 134-136). Within the walls, pedestrian movement was to be prioritized at the expense of vehicular movement under pedestrianization schemes (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 137). Strict guidelines, such as restrictions in building height and plot coverage, were to contribute to the “visual quality of streetscapes”, coupled with “face-lifting schemes” (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 138-139). Within this framework, special attention was called to Nicosia’s Buffer Zone, which the Plan characterized as “the most important glueing area in the functional integration of the city” (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 136). The Plan envisaged its reinstatement as a hub of activity, with the reconnection of the north-south shopping axis (Kyrenia Gate to Ledra Street), and the establishment of squares and open spaces along the west-east historical axis (Paphos to Famagusta Gate).

The first phase of the NMP included specific suggestions regarding funding and implementation procedures (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 157-192). Unlike the larger NMP area, where private investment was expected to drive development, the historic centre’s revitalization relied primarily on public expenditure. Efforts would also be concentrated towards attracting private investment for specific projects through public-private partnerships (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, p. 160). Implementation provisions pertained to the inadequate at the time legislative, administrative and institutional frameworks. Therefore, the 1984 Nicosia Master Plan Final Report in its last chapter proposed a Town and Country Planning Legislation, through which all essential for the implementation of the NMP elements would be regulated: designation of one planning authority, introduction of Local Plans and Area Schemes, public participation in the form of consultation and the right to object, enforcement of planning and development control, and


various financial provisions. With the assumption that such legislation would soon be enacted, the Plan then proceeded to outline the specifics of an administrative framework for implementing its proposals, as well as the development control procedures, such as application procedures for building permits or design regulations (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 163-164).

Regarding an administrative framework, which would secure planning control, the NMP aspired to assume the role of the overseer and coordinator of the overall planning process in Nicosia, and be quickly accommodated within existing planning departments as a special branch. It also provided for the establishment of a Joint NMP Planning Committee with representatives from both communities, which would ensure the implementation of the NMP throughout its operation. Gradually, this planning administration would transition from mere coordination and mediation between separate planning authorities and the bi-communal NMP Project Team, to constituting a new planning authority. Under conditions of continued partition, this new planning authority would replace the NMP Project Team; however, existing planning authorities would be retained and coordinated by the Joint NMP Planning Committee. The latter would be dismissed in case of a Cyprus Problem solution, and be replaced by a new unified planning administration (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 165-172). The NMP Final acknowledged that the area covered by the NMP was not under the control of one branch of administration. Moreover, no existing agency would be able to undertake the multiplicity of its foreseen functions. This situation was not, however, identified as a hindrance, as long as the NMP Project Team was concerned with only technical rather than executive responsibilities (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp.176-179).

The first phase of the NMP was concluded with suggestions pertaining to public participation, acknowledging the citizens' right to shape their environment. It envisioned a gradual but eventually firm establishment of public consultations as integral part of the Plan's implementation at every future stage, leading to the routine incorporation of public participation in the planning process (Nicosia Master Plan, 1984, pp. 189-192).

6.3.2.2 Tangible effects, intangible repercussions

The second phase of the NMP (1984-1985) focused on the historic centre and its adjacent areas, for which a detailed Operational Plan was proposed. Within its frame, an Area Scheme was prepared to tackle the main identified development problems, i.e. urban decay, depopulation, traffic congestion, migration of shops and offices, lack of open green spaces and infrastructure for pedestrian movement. The proposed plan emphasized the uniqueness of Nicosia's historic centre, promoted development and tourism, maintaining a viable residential population, promoted intercommunal relations, and involved the public in the planning process (Nicosia Master Plan, 1985, pp. 5-7). Specifically for the historic centre, short- and medium-term rehabilitation and conservation projects were outlined, which prioritized housing and community facilities. Hence, the NMP placed emphasis on Nicosia's residents and the improvement of their living conditions. The proposed projects were conceived as twin interventions, i.e. each project in the south had an equivalent project in the north (see Figure 28). These projects aimed to stimulate physical, social, economic and cultural revitalization of the historic centre. Moreover, they were expected to attract new residents without displacing the existing ones, by increasing the available housing units, while proposing tools to safeguard their affordability (Nicosia Master Plan, 1985, pp. 19-20).



**Figure 28: Nicosia Master Plan
2nd Phase,
bi-communal priority
investment projects
(Ozturk, 2018).**

- | | |
|--|---|
| ● Chrysaliniotissa and Arab Ahmed housing rehabilitation projects | ● Restoration of monuments Old aqueduct, Beyouk chan |
| ■ Pedestrianisation scheme of the commercial area | ● Omerye and Selimye projects |
| ■ Survey of the buffer zone | ● Phaneromeni and Samanbahce project areas |
| | ■ Phaneromeni phase II project |

These proposals were to be implemented during the third phase of the NMP (1986-2001). To this end, the bi-communal technical team proposed certain measures pertaining to the enactment of relevant legislation and policy-making on the part of the separate planning authorities on each side of the divide. As the NMP possessed no executive authority, the implementation of its proposals remained at the discretion of the separate planning authorities, each of which prepared a separate Local Plan. Moreover, the entire endeavour required funds “unprecedented for urban development in Cyprus” (Hocknell, 2001, p. 170). In the north, the economy was stagnant, impeding the financing of NMP projects, while in the south private funding was inadequate and government funds static (Hocknell, 2001, p. 170). As a result, acquiring external funds became the only way towards realizing the NMP projects.

The implementation of twin projects started under the aegis of UNHCR as refugee relief in 1987. In the Chrysaliniotissa and Arabahmet traditional quarters rehabilitation projects were initiated first within the frame of the Bi-communal Humanitarian Programme. But their progress was very slow, especially due to legal and administrative obstacles. In the RoC the Town and Country Planning Law, although approved in 1972, came into effect only in 1990 (Petridou, 1998). Equivalent legislation in the TRNC was also enacted late, in 1989 (Hocknell, 1998). During the realization of the Chrysaliniotissa and Arabahmet projects it became clear that the rehabilitation of large portions of residential areas was a very costly, complicated and slow operation. Moreover, the proposed by the NMP administrative changes regarding a common planning authority for Nicosia were never performed. Therefore, project implementation remained fragmented, leading to discrepancies in the quality of rehabilitation achieved on each side of the Buffer Zone. In 1998, UNOPS succeeded UNHCR as overseer of the rehabilitation projects in Nicosia’s historic

centre. Projects were accommodated within the UNDP Bi-communal Development Programme [UNDP-BDP] with funds channelled through the United States Agency for International Development [USAID] (Cyprus BDP Evaluation Final Report, 2004, p. V).

With regards to tangible effects, the realized projects have been successful in physical terms. Although the Arabahmet project in the north (see Figures 29 and 30) was less successful than Chrysaliniotissa in the south (see Figures 31 and 32), both created pockets of high quality residential development in the historic centre. Following expropriation processes, vacant traditional houses were rehabilitated, while new structures filled empty plots. Improved public spaces and community amenities made these areas more attractive. In the Chrysaliniotissa quarter in the south, families with children were incentivized by long-term tenancy to live there at lower than free market rents. This residential quarter attracted population of higher income, while state subsidies and tax allowances have encouraged owners to invest in housing rehabilitation in the area (Petridou, 1998). The majority of the population in the rehabilitated Arabahmet quarter in the north, however, was comprised by low-income immigrant workers, unable to invest in housing rehabilitation and maintenance (Oktay, 2007). As a result, the building stock of Chrysaliniotissa quarter is better maintained today than its northern counterpart. In both areas various buildings were listed as fine examples of local architecture or monuments, and gradually rehabilitated, such as the Arabahmet Culture and Arts Centre, the Arabahmet Mosque, the Chrysaliniotissa Church and the Chrysaliniotissa Crafts Centre (Oktay, 2007). The pedestrianization of Ledras / Onasagorou streets in the south, and the improvement of the Kyrenia Avenue in the north (part of the Selimiye Area Improvement project) were completed with funds from the European Economic Community [EEC], attracting small scale economic development along these commercial corridors. Some of the face-lifting schemes were also initiated during this period, and continue until today, resulting in problematic outcomes as these depicted in Figure 33. Entire neighbourhoods in southern Nicosia have received such treatment, turning into scenery, aiming to simulate the experience of rehabilitated traditional cityscape in the hope that the image will attract private investment for the complete works. Towards the end of its twenty year horizon, these NMP projects were still not finalized, while the remaining ones were discontinued in view of an upcoming evaluation.

The evaluation took place in 2004 with the aim to assess the NMP's successes and shortcomings, and provide directions for an updated plan. The main focus of diagnostic analysis was the plan's core area, i.e. the historic centre and its adjacent business districts outside the Venetian walls. According to the 2004 Diagnostic Report, the NMP overall failed to contribute to this area's economic and social revitalization, as urban sprawl and the outflows of employment away from the city centre have not been halted (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004a). In Nicosia's historic centre deterioration of the urban environment continued. In the north, population decrease (by 4 percent) was accompanied by a rise in unemployment (by 12 percent), and a decline in residential uses. In the south, while there was an increase in population in some parts of the historic centre (by 8 percent), unemployment increased sharply (by 24 percent), as did vacant housing (by 21 percent) (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004a, pp. 5-6). The report attributes the continuous degradation of the historic centre to the continuous partition of the city, which is considered a disincentive for private investment in the area. Despite legislated financial incentives only 124 of the 1.253 listed buildings in the historic centre were restored, while many landmarks in the area were observed to be in poor condition. An overall lack of awareness pertaining to the cultural value of these buildings and sites was observed

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(Nicosia Master Plan, 2004a, pp. 8-9). Institutional fragmentation and the lack of sustainable financing were also underlined. Based on this evaluation, a new planning strategy was devised, which is analysed in the next section of this chapter. Considering the limited tangible effects of the NMP, peace-making as and through space-making aspired to produce in Nicosia spaces where peace could take place. Based on the analysis above, this did not come true. The NMP produced some high quality spaces, which were expected to entice the return of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot families to the historic centre, order to constitute a reunified society after a Cyprus Problem solution at some point in the future.



**Figure 29 (top left), Figure 30 (top right):
Aspects of the Arabahmet neighbourhood. March, 2012,
by the author.**

**Figure 31 (middle left), Figure 32 (middle right):
Aspects of the Chrysaliniotissa neighbourhood. March,
2012, by the author**

**Figure 33 (bottom right):
Restored façade, crumbling interior in Nicosia's historic
centre. December, 2015, by Old Nicosia Revealed.**



Besides tangible effects, however, the NMP had prominent intangible repercussions. First, it placed planning practices at the epicentre of peace-making on the ground, inaugurating a practice of peace-making as space-making. In this manner, the peace-making narrative developed within the frame of the Sewage Project was translated into a depoliticized planning practice. Within the NMP this practice became institutionalised, delineating a framework within which bi-communal cooperation was understood and allowed to operate. Space-making was removed from the political process, and precluded from having any effects towards the high-level negotiations for the Cyprus Problem. Second, in this process, the meaning of bi-communalism as cooperation along ethnic lines, hence along the lines of partition, was consolidated. The ethnic lens is well reflected in the proposed twin interventions. While there is merit in the argument of the NMP team, which considered these projects anchors and reference points for future reunification of the city, they were also meant to distribute the expected benefits of NMP projects between the two communities equally. Interventions that did not lend themselves to such bi-communal approach were not considered. Within the NMP, a culture of cooperation developed, albeit only amongst the involved professionals and experts, which reproduced the ethnic binary at the epicentre of the Cypriot conflict. Third, this cooperation was kept intentionally quiet throughout the twenty years of NMP operations (Loizos, 2006). As a result, the envisaged participatory planning processes were never fully implemented. Extensive consultations with existing residents in the Chrysaliniotissa and Arabahmet quarters were carried out in 1986, but afterwards local community involvement was precluded. In this respect, planning processes in Nicosia mirrored elite peace-making in that they both negotiated a future without consulting those whom this future concerned. Bi-communal cooperation, as shaped in the processes analysed in this chapter so far, has excluded the people from shaping both the future Cyprus Problem solution, and their urban surroundings based on their needs and aspirations. Taking into account that other cities in Cyprus modelled their planning approaches after Nicosia's, non-participation in planning processes became a rule. The new planning strategy that followed the NMP continued in this path.

6.3.3 From space-making to heritage-making: the New Vision for Nicosia

The results of the NMP evaluation were crucial in shaping a new planning strategy for Nicosia. The NMP Diagnostic Report maintained that a solution to the Cyprus Problem would be the main catalyst for the city's regeneration (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004a, p. 11). In anticipation of this solution, it stressed, however, the need to develop a comprehensive 'common vision' to drive development and coordinate future interventions. This vision, the report emphasized, should provide opportunities to link the heritage of the historic centre to activities that could attract population and investment, leading to economic and social regeneration (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004a). Hence from the outset, the new strategy was envisaged to change Nicosia's urban realities in physical as well as socio-economic terms. It should be noted here that the urban realities the new strategy planned to tackle differed significantly from those encountered at the inception of the NMP. The degrading urban environment of Nicosia's historic centre had driven down rent prices, which attracted economic migrants and other low income groups, now inhabiting Nicosia's historic centre. These groups, lacking the means to invest in housing restoration and businesses, and unable to instigate the desired regeneration processes, would be most affected by the new strategy. The vision, on

which the new strategy was based, was only 'common' with reference to the Cypriot conflict, hence envisaged to bring Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots together after a Cyprus Problem solution, but failing to include and plan for Nicosia's current residents, and tackle their needs and aspirations. This understanding must inform the reading of the following sections of this chapter, which analyses the new cultural heritage-based strategy for Nicosia. This strategy placed Nicosia's Buffer Zone at its epicentre, reclaiming it as cultural heritage and an essential part of its vision. Finally, this section elaborates on the ways in which this 'cultural heritage turn' in planning strategy for Nicosia was facilitated within European / supranational frameworks and institutions, and the ensuing implications of these processes as Nicosia's heritage was made anew.

6.3.3.1 The cultural heritage turn of the new planning strategy

In the tradition established by the NMP, a bi-communal technical team was tasked with the preparation of a new planning strategy, dubbed the New Vision for the Core of Nicosia Project (hereafter New Vision). Although the New Vision maintained its predecessor's bi-communal approach and cooperative modus operandi, it opted for a narrower spatial focus. The New Vision concentrated on Nicosia's core area, comprised of the historic centre, and extending only slightly beyond it to include the business / commercial districts in its north and south. It aimed to provide an updated framework for an integrated planning approach in this central area, as well as proposing actions and projects for its implementation.

Based on the results of the diagnostic analysis, the New Vision for the Core of Nicosia Final Report identified the impending risk factors for the future development of the core area, and outlined strategic alternatives to address them (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b). The four major risk factors identified ensue from Nicosia's continuous partition:

1. The continuing degradation of the built environment, with special emphasis on landmarks and buildings "of cultural and historic value symbolizing the common heritage of the population of Nicosia", which are seen as assets in future regeneration schemes (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b, p. 8).
2. The loss of centrality, understood in spatial (geographical) and economic terms.
3. The loss of opportunities for social regeneration and housing reuse.
4. The Buffer Zone, which at present impacts negatively on its adjacent areas, but its role is seen as pivotal in the city's future reunification.

In light of the above, the New Vision's key objective was to provide a strategy to reverse current trends in Nicosia's core area, and trigger a process of transformation. To this end, the New Vision proposed a new strategy, which was deemed the most effective to foster the conditions for coordinated regeneration and development of Nicosia's two parts, and which would play an important role towards integration after a Cyprus Problem solution.

Under this guiding principal, four strategic alternatives were evaluated using SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis. Each of them reflected a different vision for Nicosia's future, based on a different prime mover for regeneration. The premise behind all four was that continuing in a 'business as usual' manner would further endanger Nicosia's historic centre in social, economic and physical / spatial terms. The four strategic alternatives adhered to the initial principles behind the

establishment of the NMP, while introducing measures to entice private capital, and establishing public sector policies with strong socio-economic components, in order to channel investment towards Nicosia's regeneration through public-private partnerships (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b, pp. 9-10). In other words, the New Vision aspired to harness market forces to serve planning objectives. The contemplated strategic alternatives were social regeneration, business regeneration, integrated regeneration, and cultural heritage-based regeneration. In the next paragraphs, I provide a short comparative analysis, which elicits interesting information about the criteria employed in assessing and eliminating each alternative, and consequently the kind of development that was envisaged by the New Vision.

The *vision for social regeneration* focused on human resources and residential uses, having as its main objective to strengthen the social structure of the historic centre, and increase its population. In this alternative, which resembled the original NMP strategy, economy remained a secondary objective, while emphasis was placed on rehabilitation and reuse of existing housing infrastructure. According to the New Vision Final Report, such process of regeneration would benefit bi-communal contact in the traditionally residential environment of the historic centre (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b). On the other hand, it would be impeded by the high cost of housing restoration, the conflict of housing with other noisy uses, and the limited demand for family housing in the core area. In assessing this strategic alternative, the perceived negative impact of external factors weighed heavier against the aforementioned expected benefits. Uncertainty regarding channelling private investment towards housing restoration, and housing demand from young families were seen as major disadvantages. Decisive factors, leading to the eventual rejection of this vision, were also the unavailability of public funding, and the prolonged implementation process of public improvement works in residential areas, which had already been proven problematic in previous NMP projects. The existence of the Buffer Zone was seen as an additional threat for this vision's implementation (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b, pp. 10-11). Three observations are of importance here. First, private investment was highly prioritized as a means to finance New Vision projects. Second, this vision's assessment reflected a high level of uncertainty regarding the availability and sustainability of public funding for project implementation in the long term. Third, this vision outlined a specific desired socio-economic profile for the historic centre's residents, represented by young families with the means to afford restoration works. This profile differed substantially from the socio-economic realities of the historic centre, which had become home to poor immigrant workers and alternative youths.

The *vision for business regeneration* focused on commercial and office development, having as its main objective to strengthen the economy in the core area. In this alternative, human resources and residential uses remained secondary objectives, while emphasis was placed on boosting existing commercial and office uses. According to the New Vision Final Report, such process of regeneration would benefit from the historic centre's compactness and pedestrian accessibility, while taking advantage of large vacant business floor space (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b). On the other hand, it would be impeded by already intense vehicular traffic and parking problems, and the competition from existing business hubs in the suburbs, and along activity spines. Similarly to social regeneration, this vision too was deemed vulnerable to perceived negative impact of external factors. Decisive factors, leading to the eventual rejection of this vision, were the uncertainty regarding channelling private investment, the unavailability of public funding, and the slow implementation process of accessibility and mobility improvement works. Here too, the existence of the Buffer Zone was seen as a threat for this vision's implementation (Nicosia Master

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Plan, 2004b, p. 11). The SWOT analysis of this strategic alternative reaffirmed the importance the New Vision attributed to private investment. Furthermore, although the focus was on the business and commercial sector, there was a prominent lack of consideration regarding the impact this vision would have on existing social structures. It can be retrospectively observe that the evaluation of strategic alternatives by the New Vision was one-dimensional, and primarily focused on the economic viability of the proposed strategies.

The *vision for integrated regeneration* focused on multiple coexisting activities, having as its main objective to promote synergies between uses, and their integration in the historic centre. This alternative would rely on existing social, economic and physical structures. It provided, hence, a holistic approach, which combined the strengths and opportunities of the previous two visions, and was seen as strongly resembling Nicosia's pre-partition urban conditions (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b, p. 12). Although the SWOT analysis stressed the immediate appeal it was expected to have, it was eventually rejected on the basis of economic non-viability. The necessity to attract private investment in the historic centre was once again stressed. In this respect, the New Vision Final Report underlined the lack of a leading activity to drive development (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b). With the bulk of responsibility falling on the public rather than the private sector, in tandem with the difficulties to implement integrated development, and the possibly high risk of land use conflicts, this vision was considered economically volatile.

The *vision for cultural heritage-based regeneration* focused on tangible cultural assets geared to tourism and education. In this alternative, human resources, residential and commercial uses remained secondary objectives, while emphasis was placed on strengthening the cultural and heritage uses, and improving the quality of urban environment in the core area. Based on the provided SWOT analysis, this strategic alternative presented similar disadvantages to the previous three and comparatively fewer advantages (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b, pp. 11-12). Here too, existing intense parking and traffic problems, and the poor overall conditions in the historic centre were seen as impediments. The lack of legal and financial instruments and the slow public sector decision-making were deemed equally problematic. As additional weakness, unique to this vision, the SWOT analysis identified the lack of public awareness regarding culture-related development. Furthermore, it stressed the expected negative impact of such development on existing residential areas. It can be observed that the perceived advantages, which the SWOT analysis identified, do not seem to balance the aforementioned disadvantages, and they are not unique to this vision. The compactness of the historic centre and its pedestrian accessibility, identified as assets, also applied also to the business regeneration vision. The unique urban environment of the historic centre was mentioned as an advantage in the vision for social regeneration as well. The vision for cultural heritage-based regeneration relied heavily on the presence of urban heritage landmarks, in which it saw the opportunity to create a market for restoration through educational and touristic uses. This advantage satisfied the concern regarding private investment, which was highlighted in the other three strategic alternatives. Last but not least, this strategic alternative envisaged the reclaiming of the Buffer Zone space, to serve as a gluing area between Nicosia's two parts. This idea of the Buffer Zone as a gluing area was central to the previous NMP strategy. The New Vision planned to accommodate it within cultural heritage-based regeneration, claiming it as heritage for all Cypriots.

The *cultural heritage-based regeneration* was selected as the most promising strategy to serve as a common vision for Nicosia's future, and to provide a platform for bi-communal cooperation. The New

Vision Final Report emphasized the historic centre's high symbolic value for both communities, and the potential of its unique built cultural heritage to reinforce its centrality (Nicosia Master Plan, 2004b, pp. 12-13). Moreover, cultural heritage-based regeneration was seen as providing the opportunity to translate cultural assets into marketable resources, in order to attract tourism and other income-creating activities, which would mobilize coveted private investment. It was also anticipated that the foreseen growth in the historic centre would eventually create demand for housing and commercial uses, a process, which was also expected to evoke similar growth in the area outside the Venetian walls. Thus, in the selected strategy, culture became the prime mover for the historic centre's economic development, which was also expected to trigger social regeneration by bringing new residents and business ventures.

While the New Vision remained faithful to the NMP vision for Nicosia's reunification, its cultural heritage turn constituted a clear departure from previous planning strategy, which was founded on a prevailing interest in the historic centre's social vitality, and improved living conditions for residents. In the years separating the NMP from the New Vision, the historic centre's resident population on both sides of the divide had changed substantially. In the south, in 2004 more than fifty percent of the inhabitants were low-income immigrant workers, mainly from India, Philippines, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, and China. This population gave back to the historic centre some of its lost vitality, frequenting public spaces on Sundays and days off, and strengthening student bodies in the local schools (Migrant Cities Research Nicosia South, 2008, pp. 5-6). In the north, immigrants from Turkey started replacing the Turkish-Cypriot residents of the historic centre in the 1980s and early 1990s. By the late 1990s, however, they were joined by low-income immigrant workers of Kurdish and Arab origin from south-eastern Turkey, turning the historic centre into an immigrant ghetto¹³ (Hatay, 2008; Hatay & Bryant, 2008a, pp. 8-9). The cultural heritage-based regeneration as conceptualized in the New Vision Final Report tackled the changed socio-economic realities in the historic centre as liability, and set out to transform them radically. As a result, instead of planning for its current residents, and tending to their actual needs, the New Vision planned for a future imaginary Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot population mix. The unquestioned reiteration of the ethnic lens in planning practice offers a telling example for the extent to which the Cyprus Problem has eroded manifold aspects of public life in Cyprus. The ethnic binary, which the notion of bi-communalism reiterates, has been rendered redundant and irrelevant to urban development in Nicosia's now multicultural and highly diverse historic centre. As a result, in its efforts to produce a common Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot vision for Nicosia's future, the New Vision became exclusionary to Nicosia's real residents in the present.

6.3.3.2 Proposals for implementation

Following the formulation of a regeneration strategy, the New Vision proceeded in its second phase with concrete proposals pertaining to its implementation. Taking into account the shortcomings, identified in the diagnostic analysis of the NMP, an Outline Plan was developed with key proposals pertaining to institutional and administrative frameworks, the legal establishment of public-private partnerships and financing mechanisms, the involvement of the public, and the designation of a portfolio of

¹³ Exact census data specifically for the historic centre are not available.

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projects for priority implementation (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, pp. 4-7). The next paragraphs briefly review these key proposals.

To tackle the problem of a dual planning and decision-making system, which resulted in the past in fragmented implementation of projects, the New Vision proposed a unified institutional framework (the Core Area Development Authority) to assume the powers and responsibilities for the entire New Vision planning area. In other words, the New Vision proposed institutional reunification for all planning and decision-making matters concerning the core area, or at least the historic centre (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, pp. 21-24).

The legal establishment of two public-private partnerships, the Nicosia Municipality Enterprises Ltd. in the south, and the Arabahmet Development Company Ltd. in the north, was proposed as an instrument to mobilize private investment. To kick-start the implementation of projects, the New Vision proposed the establishment of a Revolving Fund as a sustainable financing mechanism. Initially equipped with public and international funds, this mechanism would exert revenues from finished projects, which, coupled with enticed private funds, would be used to finance consequent projects (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, pp. 25-29).

The involvement of the public was outlined in terms of consultation sessions and raising awareness, aimed to generate social support for the New Vision. Generally, public participation in the planning process has been neither encouraged nor cultivated in Cyprus. As already mentioned previously, the NMP took some steps in this direction, but overall participation remained limited amongst professionals. The New Vision targeted a broader audience, and designated public participation as an important condition for successful implementation of projects. However, it placed emphasis on gaining acceptance for its cultural heritage-based regeneration strategy from the public. Furthermore, it conceived of this public as an aggregate of stakeholders, represented in some organized form, such as municipal councils, chambers of commerce, associations of shopkeepers or property owners, community groups or civil society organizations (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, pp. 29-32). While this was an ever-expandable list of participants, it effectively excluded individuals and groups of people that do not or cannot pursue their interests in organized forms, as is often the case with legal and illegal immigrant workers, and other vulnerable population groups now residing in the historic centre.

To highlight the proposed implementation policies, and attract private investment, the New Vision designated Special Development Areas [SDAs], where specific priority projects were to be carried out. The selected SDAs were considered of strategic importance for the overall revitalization of the city. They involved buildings and sites considered to display cultural or architectural value, they provided opportunities for private investment, and they involved expensive interventions, which the public sector alone would be unable to finance (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, p. 25). Half of the planned SDA interventions were concentrated in the historic centre, which the New Vision designated as the centrepiece of its cultural heritage-based regeneration strategy. The New Vision Outline Plan Final Report went as far as proposing that the entire area within the Venetian walls “should be designated as an area of International Heritage and/or European Capital of Culture” (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, p. 15), a proposal which was indeed pursued in the next years.

On the whole, the historic centre was designated as a mixed use area, with residential, commercial, office and recreation / leisure uses promoted. Two areas that were designated as primarily

residential were concentrated on the east and west, around the previously successful Arabahmet and Chrysaliniotissa projects. The New Vision proposed an increase in the historic centre's residential capacity by almost 75 percent. For the remaining area, promoted activities included small and medium scale retail shops, infrastructure for education (kindergartens, schools, universities, student accommodations) and cultural uses (handicrafts, exhibition spaces, galleries, bookshops). Recreational, entertainment and leisure uses (cafes, restaurants, cinemas, music halls, small theatres) and other tourism-related uses (accommodation) were particularly encouraged as commercially viable; they were also expected to displace undesirable low rent residential uses. Workshops and warehouses, found at the time in abundance in the historic centre, as well as manufacturing uses, and any large scale establishments were banned (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, pp. 33-36). Finally, all interventions had to adhere to certain principles, such as the improvement of the built environment with effective conservation measures, and the provision of services and facilities. Development density, plot coverage and building heights were kept similar to the existing. Traffic and mobility proposals were oriented towards public transport and pedestrian movement, but the commission of separate traffic study was considered necessary.

To date, the New Vision's proposals regarding institutional and administrative changes have not been implemented. The continuous partition of the city and the lack of a Cyprus Problem solution have prevented such undertakings. The two proposed public-private partnerships were indeed established, but the Arabahmet Development Company has gone bankrupt and information is not available on the Nicosia Municipality Enterprises. The involvement of the public in the planning process has been limited to public presentation of finished plans, and only in the south. Hence, the New Vision's impact can only be observed through the realization of projects in the SDAs. These have been closely connected to Nicosia's Buffer Zone, to which the next section turns.

6.3.4 The controversy with reclaiming Nicosia's Buffer Zone as cultural heritage

The cultural heritage turn of the New Vision, as analysed in the previous sections, was not the only substantial departure from previous planning strategy and practice in Nicosia. Even more significant was the new plan's preoccupation with Nicosia's Buffer Zone. The NMP had already designated it as the city's 'gluing area', but in its twenty years of operation it had refrained from making any concrete proposals for projects within it, primarily because of the lack of progress in the Cyprus Problem negotiations. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the New Vision sought to accommodate the Buffer Zone in its cultural heritage-based regeneration strategy. The favourable conditions for such endeavour were created only a few years earlier, when between 2001 and 2003 the NMP team surveyed Nicosia's Buffer Zone for the first time. The 238 buildings within were evaluated in terms of their architectural quality and structural condition. The survey produced detailed architectural drawings, sketches, records of previous uses and construction materials, as well as proposals for emergency interventions for structural support. The survey team concluded that the majority of the buildings inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone were of exceptional or high architectural and environmental value, including some characterized as monuments. As many buildings were found to be in ruinous condition, however, the pressing need for preservation and revitalization interventions was stressed. In light of the results of this survey, the Buffer Zone's inclusion in the new cultural heritage-based strategy is not surprising. However, the New Vision elevated the Buffer Zone to a cornerstone position in

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its regeneration strategy for the historic centre.

The New Vision Outline Plan Final Report clearly stated that the desired revitalization of the historic centre could not be achieved, if the Buffer Zone continued to function as a border (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, p. 40). Hence, it was argued in the report, reintegrating the Buffer Zone into the urban fabric of the historic centre owed to become a priority for the new plan. Thus, the idea of reunifying Nicosia, which underlined in theory all previous NMP interventions, became strikingly prominent in the New Vision. Furthermore, it was for the first time translated into concrete proposals. Restoration of buildings and preservation of architectural heritage became major objectives. From a total of five SDAs planned in the historic centre, four concerned the Buffer Zone, and these were given high priority (see Figure 34). They were seen as 'gluing' projects, able to achieve functional integration. Moreover, the plan stated that development inside the Buffer Zone had to achieve social and economic revitalization, and an overall improvement of the deteriorated urban environment, with particular focus on restoring buildings of high cultural value and architectural heritage. Similarly to the rest of the historic centre, the Buffer Zone was designated in the New Vision as a mixed use area, with the exception of its parts that fell within the areas designated as predominantly residential in the east and west, close to the Venetian walls. The mixed uses foreseen by the New Vision related to commerce and education. These uses were deemed appropriate for the Buffer Zone's reemphasized centrality and symbolic role for Nicosia as a whole, while bringing people there to work and mingle (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, pp. 40-43). The more specific development proposals in the SDAs in the historic centre follow these principles (Nicosia Master Plan, 2005, pp. 44-53, pp. 64-67).




Figure 34: Intervention priorities in the Buffer Zone (Bond, 2013, p. 14).

In light of the above, the new plan not only produced a vision for Nicosia's future, it also embedded this vision in the space of the Buffer Zone. Through the proposed strategy and priority projects, a series of transformations were promoted. The framework of the New Vision attempted to transform the relation between cultural heritage and the economy of urban development processes, the relation between public and private sector in the same process, the relation between people and cultural heritage, and the relation between people and space in Nicosia. All these relations are essentially power relations, which the New Vision sought to disjoin and reconstitute. The anchor and exemplary field of implementation for this endeavour was the Buffer Zone. As a result, the New Vision did not only seek to regenerate Nicosia's Buffer Zone, but also reclaimed it as the means and the place to reunite Nicosia. With its proposals for institutional and functional / physical reunification of the historic centre, the New Vision anticipated and planned for a unified city. As long as a solution to the Cyprus Problem remains elusive, however, the New Vision's implementation remains as constrained as its predecessor's. This is why, I argue, that the New Vision's proposal for a cultural heritage-based regeneration constitutes much more than a solution to the historic centre's economic and physical decline; it is a deviation from the old script, the beginning of a new narrative that reclaims and re-borders Nicosia's Buffer Zone in the guise of heritage. Buildings and sites in Nicosia's historic centre, and the Buffer Zone as a whole, are being reimagined by the architects and planners of the New Vision as common and shared heritage for all Cypriots. But this reimagining is not unproblematic.

Cultural heritage has been a contested matter in Cyprus, as is often the case with societies in conflict. Already during the British colonial period, British and other foreign heritage experts placed emphasis on structures representing pasts that resonated with the West, i.e. Hellenic, Venetian or Lusignan, which helped legitimize British control over the island. As a result, structures that were considered oriental (Ottoman and Islamic) were disregarded as non-monumental, hence as lacking heritage value, thus falling in the category of the vernacular (Scott, 2002). The Hellenic structures preserved by the British and their perceived value were appropriated by Greek-Cypriot nationalism as evidence of the island's primordial Greekness, to which the Ottoman period was seen as only an interruption. The lack of officially recognized Ottoman or Islamic monuments meant the effective exclusion of the Turkish-Cypriots from ownership of cultural heritage in Cyprus (Scott, 2002). After Cyprus's independence in 1960, the heritage-related professions (such as archaeology) became dominated by Greek-Cypriots, who continued working in the already established ethnicized tradition on the island (S. Hardy, 2010). As a result, heritage in Cyprus became part and parcel of the continuous contest for legitimacy between the two major ethnic groups. Ethnic and religious differences served as the main identifiers of buildings and sites, to which each community claimed cultural ownership. As a result, Greek-Cypriots are considered the inheritors of Christian, as well as Hellenic and Byzantine structures, while Turkish-Cypriots the inheritors of Islamic, as well as Ottoman structures (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010).

Post-conflict, the dominant discourse on both sides of the divide has been concerned with heritage destruction by the ethnic and religious 'other', experienced as loss. Greek-Cypriots have for years bemoaned the destruction of churches and monasteries, or their conversion into other uses, the desecration of cemeteries, and the neglect of archaeological sites in the north (Miltiadou, 2012). Similarly, the Turkish-Cypriots have lamented the destruction of mosques, hamams, tekkes, and cemeteries, and the neglect and dereliction of their villages in the south. The deplorable condition of these heritage sites in both

sides of the divide serves as a reminder and reiteration of victimhood, hence intricately linked with conflict and partition (Constantinou, Demetriou & Hatay, 2012). Cultural heritage has become, as a result, a highly politicized field, also implicated in the dominant historical narratives. The need to care for what is perceived as Greek-Cypriot cultural heritage in the north is used as an argument to legitimize the Greek-Cypriot return, which can be achieved through the island's reunification. The loss of what is perceived as Turkish-Cypriot heritage in the south is used as a proof of impossible peaceful coexistence, legitimizing partition (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010).

Heritage preservation and conservation have followed similar patterns. In the south, legislation pertaining to the management and protection of Turkish-Cypriot properties has only been enacted in 1991, leaving structures that have not been used for the relief of Greek-Cypriot refugees unattended. Conservation of heritage sites, such as mosques, was put in practice¹⁴ even later, and it was employed as propaganda to underscore the absence of this practice on the other side of the divide (Balderstone, 2007; Constantinou & Hatay, 2010). Indeed in the north, few selected archaeological sites and churches have been preserved, on one hand, as assets in cultural tourism, and on the other, as tokens of tolerance and a multicultural Ottoman past (Constantinou, Demetriou & Hatay, 2012). However, neglect for the other's heritage did not necessarily serve the ethno-nationalist rhetoric of the TRNC. As S. Hardy (2010, 2013) underlines, the inadequate care for Greek-Cypriot heritage in the north was also the result of TRNC's isolation, and its prominent lack in financial resources, as well as expertise and experience in conservation, a fact which is rarely acknowledged in Greek-Cypriot heritage discourses. After the opening of the crossings in 2003, heritage sites, especially sites of religious importance, became popular visiting destinations, for both spiritual, as well as personal pilgrimage (Constantinou, Demetriou & Hatay, 2012). When after 2003 Cypriots came for the first time face to face with the destruction and neglect of the structures associated with their community on the other side, these cultural heritage discourses emerged with renewed rigour.

Against the background of these ethnicized traditions in cultural heritage conservation and preservation discourses, the vision for cultural heritage-based regeneration in Nicosia appears to be anything but the platform for cooperation the New Vision envisaged. The 'colonization' of these discourses by the Cyprus Problem and their consequent politicization, further complicates the reclaiming of Nicosia's Buffer Zone as common and shared heritage for all Cypriots. Not only is its public perception and understanding firmly embedded in the dominant historical narratives, but it is also a remnant of conflict itself. Allusions to other now distant pasts, when the Buffer Zone was a place of intercommunal exchange, and the location of a boisterous, multicultural market, become tainted by more recent memories of violence. As a result, the Buffer Zone's cultural ownership, meanings, and representations remain contested. In light of the above, if cultural heritage were to serve as a platform for cooperation, it needed to be reconceptualised away from divisive ethno-nationalist connotations, and address the recent traumatic past in the present. Based on my empirical material, I argue that the former unfolds under the aegis of the UNDP, and the institutional framework of the European Union, while the latter is merely bypassed. These

¹⁴ Even in this case, as S. Hardy (2010) notes, conservation was not unproblematic, as it was often performed in inappropriate ways that concealed destruction or neglect.

supranational frameworks enable as well the reimagining of Nicosia's Buffer Zone as common and shared heritage for all Cypriots. The next section of this chapter delves in this idea.

6.3.5 The United Nations Development Programme, the European Union and remaking heritage in Nicosia

The relation between the EU and urban planning in Cyprus predates the island's EU accession. For example, European funds were channelled into the NMP already in the 1980s, when the EU (then European Economic Community) financed the pedestrianization of Ledras / Onasagorou streets in the south, and the improvement of the Kyrenia Avenue in the north. As EU involvement in the RoC intensified through the 1990s, especially after the beginning of accession negotiations in 1998, multiple processes of Europeanization¹⁵ took place, i.e. the adoption of EU rules, standards and directives as national policies in various fields. With regards to heritage-making, and its relation to EU regulatory mechanisms, a recent ethnographic study by Gisela Welz (2015) provides ample material, spanning a wide spectrum of policy areas that touch on various facets of tangible and intangible heritage; from certifying food and food-producing processes, to tourism planning, to standardizing protection and conservation mechanisms, pertaining to natural or built environments. In her analysis, heritage-making emerges as a highly complex field, where supranational institutions intersect with local governance structures, producing new discourses, practices and actors. Within these processes, Europe becomes localized, while at the same time local cultural assets are being inscribed in a European symbolic framework. These processes are, however, not merely normative. Welz (2015) makes a strong case that standardization of heritage and heritage-making processes has resulted in commodification of culture. Hence, local cultural assets are not only appropriated as European, but also marketed, sold and consumed under a European brand.

As direct relations between the EU and the TRNC did not exist, the continuous absence of a Cyprus Problem solution has left the Turkish-Cypriots on the margin of Europeanization processes. This also excluded them from pre- and post-accession EU funds. Things started changing during the period leading up to the vote for the Annan Plan, when the Turkish-Cypriots turned to the EU as a way out of their political and economic isolation. In the aftermath of the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek-Cypriots, the European Commission implemented an Aid Programme for the Turkish-Cypriot community under Council Regulation (EC) No 389/2006. This programme aims to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic and social development of the Turkish-Cypriot community, by fostering reconciliation between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots and their cooperation with the EU, and by preparing the extension of the *acquis communautaire* following a future Cyprus Problem solution. Cultural heritage conservation and preservation have been consistently supported by the Aid Programme¹⁶ as a measure towards reconciliation and confidence building (European Commission Report, 2018). To meet the EU

¹⁵ For a comprehensive analysis regarding Europeanization processes in Cyprus see Ker-Lindsay, Faustmann and Mullen, 2011.

¹⁶ Between 2006 and 2017 the EU allocated EUR 485 million to the Aid Programme, distributed through application-based grant schemes to projects that serve the Programme's objectives (European Commission Report, 2018, p. 1). Between 2011 and 2017 the Aid Programme allocated EUR 14,7 million for interventions in 71 cultural heritage sites across the island (European Commission Report, 2018, p. 6).

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objective of fostering reconciliation between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, UNDP's already existing structures of bi-communal cooperation offered a solid base. Through an UNDP / EU partnership, EU funds¹⁷ flowed into various fields of UNDP operation, making the EU one of the two major donors of UNDP activities in Cyprus; the other being the USAID. Prominent amongst UNDP's fields of operation was the NMP, which at that time was re-evaluating its strategy and transitioning into the New Vision. NMP and New Vision projects, now geared to cultural-heritage regeneration, have been continuously funded by both the EU and the USAID. Heritage-making processes in Nicosia's historic centre can, hence, provide an insight into the synergies between the UNDP, the EU, the USAID, and local actors, through which to observe the intersection of the European / supranational and the local.

Two UNDP programmes have been established in the early 2000s, the EU-funded Partnership for the Future Programme [UNDP-PFF], and the USAID-funded Action for Cooperation and Trust [UNDP-ACT]. Cultural heritage-related activities in Nicosia have been funded by both. The UNDP-PFF, established in 2001 and still ongoing, supports the implementation of confidence-building measures between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, with the aim to facilitate rapprochement, and social and economic development. Although it operates at various levels to serve these objectives, financing large infrastructure projects (such as the new wastewater treatment plant in Nicosia), supporting the Committee on Missing Persons, and community and private sector development, significant portion of its resources is allocated to cultural heritage restoration and preservation. Initially, between 2001 and 2005, the programme took over the implementation of discontinued NMP projects, financing the revitalization of Selimiye, Omeriye, Phaneromeni and Samanbahce areas in Nicosia. These interventions included, apart from infrastructure and public space improvement works, façade restorations and the consolidation and upgrading of historic buildings, such as the Omeriye Mosque and the Omeriye Baths. Therefore, EU funding has not only been instrumental in the eventual, albeit delayed, implementation of various NMP projects, but also financially supported the cultural heritage turn in planning practices. As the NMP transitioned into the New Vision, EU funds were channelled into the rehabilitation of monuments and other buildings of high cultural value within the proposed SDAs in the historic centre. New Vision projects, such as the opening of the Ledra Street / Lomkmaci crossing, the rehabilitations of the Bedestan (as cultural centre) and the Old Municipal Market Bandabuliya in the north, and the restoration of the Taht-el-Kale mosque and Famagusta Gate in the south, all landmarks of the historic centre today, have been realized with EU financial support. Through the mobilization of European resources and funding schemes for local interventions, heritage restoration and preservation became a prominent field in which the EU is being localized in Cyprus.

Four years after the establishment of the UNDP-PFF, the UNDP-ACT was launched to succeed the UNDP-BDP (1998-2004). The UNDP-ACT (2005-2015) aimed to foster reconciliation through strengthening civil society, and promoting its engagement in the peace process. Structured in four phases, it gradually shifted emphasis from small projects, which offered opportunities for bi-communal cooperation in producing new spaces for citizen peacebuilding, to actions and activities that promoted citizen advocacy in the peacebuilding process (UNDP-ACT, 2015). The UNDP-ACT, although operating independently from

¹⁷ The UNDP documents rarely differentiate between different EU funding sources used to finance its projects. By cross-checking various European Commission documents, I have determined that in the sector of cultural heritage conservation and preservation these 'EU funds' come from the European Structural and Investment Funds, mainly the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the Aid Programme for the Turkish-Cypriot community.

the UNDP-PFF, situated bi-communal cooperation and its efforts towards reconciliation within a European cultural framework (UNDP-ACT, 2015, p. 8). Hence, while not directly cooperating with each other, the two programmes adhered to similar principles, and catered to complementary fields of operation within the UNDP. The field, in which they have overlapped, is cultural heritage restoration and preservation. While for UNDP-ACT protecting cultural heritage per se was never a main objective, the programme, drawing inspiration from the NMP projects realized with the support of its predecessor, the BDP, acknowledged it as a rich field for bi-communal cooperation and confidence-building (UNDP-ACT, 2015, p. 34). As a result, during its first phase (2005-2008), the UNDP-ACT funded the drafting of the New Vision Outline Plan. Hence, the UNDP-ACT did not only financially support heritage-related projects, to great extent it enabled the cultural-heritage turn of the planning strategy in Nicosia. The New Vision emerges here as an intersection of local needs and aspirations, and supranational strategic objectives. It constitutes at the same time a regeneration strategy targeting Nicosia's local problems, and a new practice of peace-making. This practice is based on bi-communal cooperation in heritage conservation, and funded through supranational institutions.

During its second phase (2008-2011), the UNDP-ACT prominently funded the restoration and rehabilitation of the Armenian Church and Monastery complex inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, a New Vision priority project, as well as two other restoration projects, the Grand Turkish Bath (Büyük Hamam) in north Nicosia, and a historic building rehabilitated as a bi-communal Day Care Centre for people with disabilities in south Nicosia. The dependence of NMP and New Vision projects on external funding has been prominent. Without the proposed administrative and institutional changes, the sustainable financing mechanism, the Revolving Fund, envisaged by the New Vision, has not been established. As a result, the New Vision, much like its predecessor, relies on application-based grants for the realization of projects. In recent years, due to international donors' differentiated priorities, bi-communal funding for projects has been scarce (Athina P., personal communication, 2013 January 30). The Greek-Cypriot Nicosia Municipality has independently realized conservation projects on its side with a combination of state funds and EU Structural Funds. In a similar manner, the Turkish-Cypriot Nicosia Municipality has utilized funds from the Aid Programme for the Turkish-Cypriot community. As a result, cooperation between the two NMP offices has become less vigorous, although communication has not stopped (Athina P., personal communication, 2013 January 30).

Both the UNDP-PFF and the UNDP-ACT programmes have also expanded their cultural heritage-related work outside Nicosia. Between 2007 and 2014, the UNDP-PFF funded various heritage conservation interventions through the 'Community Development, Rehabilitation and Infrastructure' project¹⁸ (Phase 1 and 2). In its second phase (2008-2011), the UNDP-ACT funded four prestigious restoration projects outside Nicosia¹⁹. Crucial to the systematization of this island-wide expansion was the establishment of the bi-communal Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in 2008, which has been tasked with designating immovable cultural heritage sites of historical significance and social importance in

¹⁸ For more information on this project, see

<http://www.cy.undp.org/content/cyprus/en/home/operations/projects/partnershipforthefuture/upgrading-of-local-and-urban-infrastructure---phase-ii.html>

¹⁹ These were the Church of Agios Neophytos, the Peristerona House, the Holy Maronite/Catholic Church of the Prophet Elias and the Cultural Heritage Circle Preservation project in the village of Kontea (UNDP-ACT, 2015, pp. 100-102).

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need of conservation (Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, 2015, p. 4). At the time, an initial list of forty sites for emergency interventions was drafted, and approved by the then leaders of the two communities. Furthermore, an island-wide study of cultural heritage was conducted in 2010, coordinated and funded by the UNDP-PFF, which produced an extensive catalogue of more than 2.300 sites for future interventions. Since then, the UNDP-PFF has launched five iterations of the project 'Support to Monuments of Great Importance for Cyprus', which having completed the conservation of thirty sites island-wide makes the EU the biggest donor²⁰ to the work of Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage.

In the synergies between the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, and the UNDP-PFF and UNDP-ACT programmes, a new narrative takes shape, in which cultural heritage conservation and preservation are seen as objectives shared by all Cypriots. Thus, this field is appreciated for its potential to foster trust and confidence between the Cypriot communities through bi-communal work (Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, 2015; UNDP-ACT, 2013). In agreement with the peace-making narrative shaped in previous bi-communal technical cooperation, however, this practice becomes depoliticized as well. The UNDP-PFF stresses in its project descriptions that within its frame practical aspects of preservation are considered in a non-political manner. Assessing its cultural heritage interventions, the UNDP-ACT makes a clear distinction between the Cyprus Problem solution as the milieu of high politics, and cooperation on the ground, which is fostered "in order to begin solving shared day-to-day problems regardless of, though not at odds with, the political process" (UNDP-ACT, 2015, p. 34).

At the same time, this depoliticized practice, instead of tackling the contestations intrinsic to local cultural heritage, which derive from its implication in the dominant historical narratives, it merely bypasses them. Restoring cultural heritage is presented as a higher purpose in itself, hence as an uncontested convergence point, as the following statement highlights:

"The Cultural Heritage Technical Committee believes that it is the primary responsibility of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to protect the endangered cultural heritage of the island, and that it is important for these monuments to be preserved not only because they are important symbols for the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, and for humanity, but also because they have intrinsic values in themselves."

(Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, 2015, p. 3)

Joint work for the protection of these valuable heritage sites is then construed as generating joint, if not ecumenical, ownership. But this joint ownership is assumed only on the basis of bi-communal cooperation in the present, without engaging with the difficult past that brought about violence and yearlong neglect to these sites, generating in the first place the need for their conservation. Indeed, the majority of the above mentioned conservation projects concerns churches and mosques, echoing the established ethnicized heritage traditions. The ethnic and religious difference emphasized in these traditions, and their instrumental role in the Cypriot conflict are neither re-evaluated nor confronted. They are merely reinterpreted within a European / supranational framework, and repackaged as diversity. Echoing the ideas

²⁰ Other smaller donors include the Honor Frost Foundation, the Evkaf Administration and the Church of Cyprus, funding two specific projects (Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, 2015, p. 5).

of the New Vision for Nicosia, restored sites all over Cyprus are being reimagined as spaces originating in a shared past, and utilized to build a common future.

The reconceptualization of cultural heritage conservation in Cyprus away from divisive ethno-nationalist connotations is also facilitated by international campaigns and awards. A case in point is the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, which endows architectural concepts attending to the challenges faced by societies with significant Muslim presence. The award was granted to the 'New Vision Plan for the Rehabilitation of the Walled City' in 2007, asserting its sensibility towards Turkish-Cypriot needs and aspirations, while emphasizing its capacity to bring together opposing sides "to build a shared space for all people and all faiths" (Aga Khan Award for Architecture 10th Cycle, 2007, p.132). Within a European framework, this reconceptualization has taken place through the mobilization of two prominent European actions, the 'European Heritage Awards / Europa Nostra' and the 'European Heritage Days'.

Europa Nostra is an organization founded in 1963 as an association of various heritage CSOs to protect and promote Europe's cultural and natural heritage. It is supported by public bodies, private companies and individuals, and contributes to the formulation of heritage-related European policy, aiming to place cultural and natural heritage at the core of the European project (Europa Nostra, n.d.). Within this frame, the organization awards since 2002 prizes for European cultural heritage under the label 'European Heritage Awards / Europa Nostra', to celebrate and promote best practice and excellence in four categories: 1) conservation, 2) research, 3) education, training and awareness-raising, and 4) dedicated service by individuals and organizations. The Awards are funded for the period 2014-2020 through the EU programme 'Creative Europe' with a budget of EUR 1,46 billion. It is not, however, the prospect of a monetary reward that has attracted more than 2.500 applicants from 39 European countries to compete for the Awards. Over the last 16 years, 109 Grand Prix laureates in total have received EUR 10.000 each. The about 30 other winners selected every year by a jury of specialists receive only a certificate and a bronze plaque, meant to adorn the awarded heritage site. The allure of a 'European Heritage Award / Europa Nostra' is on one hand, the prestige of 'exceptional heritage' labelling on a European level, while on the other, the international exposure and positive impact on tourism this labelling is expected to bring along. Thus, the Awards become an instrument, with which local cultural assets are being inscribed in a European symbolic framework.

Over the years, various NMP and New Vision projects have received a 'European Heritage Award / Europa Nostra'. In 2005, the Omeriye Baths project received an award in the category of conservation. In 2009, the 'Study, Assessment and Design for the Structural and Architectural Restoration of the Bedestan' received an award in the category of research. In 2011, the previously mentioned NMP survey of Nicosia's Buffer Zone also received an award (Gran Prix) in the category of research. In 2015, the Armenian Church and Monastery project inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone received an award in the category of conservation (European Heritage Awards, n.d.). The Awards not only add to these sites' symbolic value, but to their valorisation as well, significantly contributing to the commodification of these cultural assets. The bi-communal nature of the selected projects has been emphasized in all cases. Echoing the European Commission Opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership (1993), which, as mentioned in section 6.2.1 of the present chapter, situated Cyprus "at the very fount of European culture and civilization", these awards symbolically re-border Nicosia's heritage sites within European territory.

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The other prominent European institution, the 'European Heritage Days', was launched in 1991 by the Council of Europe²¹ as a participatory cultural event. It aimed to raise awareness about "the richness and cultural diversity of Europe", countering xenophobia and encouraging tolerance, as well as to emphasize the need to protect the common European cultural heritage (European Heritage Days [EHD], n.d.). In September each year, the fifty countries that have signed the European Cultural Convention organize events and festivities, as well as free visits for citizens to various heritage sites.

In 2008, the 'European Heritage Days' in the RoC were focused specifically on Nicosia's Buffer Zone to emphasize "the right of every man to free access to the cultural heritage of his land" (Petropoulou & Hadjisavva-Adam, 2008, p. 5). For the organization of exhibitions and events, the Greek-Cypriot Nicosia Municipality collaborated with the Greek-Cypriot office of the Nicosia Master Plan. Although actual access to the Buffer Zone was not provided, they published a booklet with the title 'Nicosia: The Unknown Heritage along the Buffer Zone' (Petropoulou & Hadjisavva-Adam, 2008), which for the first time brought to the wider public the results of the NMP survey in Nicosia's Buffer Zone. This booklet echoed the urban heritage-based strategy of the New Vision, at the time already afoot, in identifying Nicosia's Buffer Zone as a "lifeless area between the two living parts of the city" (Petropoulou & Hadjisavva-Adam, 2008, p. 21), which had the inherent potential to become an integrative element. It not only praised the exceptionality of the built environment inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, but also stressed its endangered state and the "utmost importance" of its protection and revitalization under a "common vision" (Petropoulou & Hadjisavva-Adam, 2008, p. 91).

The 2008 'European Heritage Days' reclaimed Nicosia's Buffer Zone as European cultural heritage in danger. When Europa Nostra launched its awareness-raising 'Seven Most Endangered Heritage Sites' programme in 2013, Nicosia's Buffer Zone was placed on its list of monuments and sites in Europe considered being in the greatest peril. This programme maintains that restoration and protection of these sites is an imperative for Europe. To this end, it produces technical reports with proposals for the endangered site's rescue and rehabilitation, as well as cost assessment. Although it does not provide funds for this purpose, it explores available financing options. In the case of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, its proposals are a summary of the priority projects of the New Vision, as described in the available Europa Nostra / EIB Institute Technical Report (Bond, 2013).

The processes explored in this section of chapter 6 trace a shift in power relations in Cyprus, wherein the EU is introduced as a major actor. The appropriation of local cultural assets as European, re-borders Nicosia and Cyprus within a European symbolic framework. Nicosia's Buffer Zone stands at the epicentre of this process, reclaimed as common and shared Cypriot-cum-European heritage. Through this reclaiming and re-bordering, the deadlock of high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem, which necessarily keeps the northern part of the island separated from the territory of the EU, is effectively overcome. By utilizing the already depoliticized structures of bi-communal cooperation under the aegis of the UNDP, the EU extends its influence north of the Buffer Zone, while keeping appearances of neutrality in terms of the Cypriot conflict. In this sense, processes in Nicosia's historic centre and Buffer Zone exemplify unfolding parallel border dynamics. While the status quo between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots remains unaffected, however, above the level of the state power relations shift, constructing new

²¹ Since 1999, the 'European Heritage Days' is a joint action of the Council of Europe and the European Commission.

narratives, practices and actors. Narratives of peace-making as depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation have been produced within the supranational frameworks of the UN, the UNDP, and European institutions. As a result, heritage-making has become a practice of peace-making by reinterpreting the past to serve a European future. This process has resulted in the production of space in Nicosia's historic centre, where peace is supposed to take place. The highly engaged local actors, however, see their role as only preparatory as none of these processes can impact on the negotiations for the solution to the Cyprus Problem. Thus, this shift in power relations produces modes of thinking, acting and being in the present, which are nominally depoliticized, but in effect disempower local people by curtailing their agency, both in shaping their Cyprus Problem solution, and their spaces of peace in Nicosia and elsewhere. Moreover, in keeping with the status quo on the island, these supranational / European institutions are inadvertently reproducing asymmetrical power relations on the local level. The next section of this chapter elaborates on this aspect.

6.3.6 Bi-communal cooperation and asymmetrical power relations

The synergy between the European institutions, namely the 'European Heritage Awards / Europa Nostra', the 'European Heritage Days', and the more recent 'Seven Most Endangered Heritage Sites', analysed above, traces a consistent reciprocity between local and European actors. Nicosia's historic centre and its Buffer Zone become prominent fields, where this reciprocity plays out. The divisive connotations and difficult pasts of these sites within the Cypriot context, however, remain unaddressed. As these various actions contribute to the appropriation of Nicosia's sites to construct the European locally, however, they also reproduce asymmetrical local power relations. For example, the 'European Heritage Days', for which the responsible body in Cyprus is the Department of Town Planning and Housing (Ministry of Interior, RoC), have over the years prominently lacked Turkish-Cypriot participation or even consultation for the organization of events. The 2008 Buffer Zone-themed year was no exception, despite the fact that it was co-organized by the Nicosia Master Plan, which had for years established channels of communication and cooperation between Greek-and Turkish-Cypriots on the municipal level. This sort of established communication and cooperation, already declared and treated as depoliticized, has actually been avoided altogether outside the activities of the Nicosia Master Plan.

In the recent past, there have been two prominently missed opportunities for bi-communal cooperation on the municipal level with international gravity. The first is the case of Manifesta 6, the nomadic European Biennial of Contemporary Arts²², which in 2006 was planned to take place in Nicosia. The three foreign curators of Manifesta 6 decided to organize an 'art school', aiming to open "dialogue between West Europe's artists and audiences and their Eastern European peers" (El Dahab, Vidokle & Waldvogel, 2006). Although the local partner of the Manifesta was the Greek-Cypriot Nicosia Municipality and the Ministry of Culture and Education of the RoC, the Biennial was contractually defined as a bi-communal project (El Dahab, Vidokle & Waldvogel, 2006). In line with the objectives of the 'art school', two out of the three curators decided to organize their projects in north Nicosia, a decision which created

²² Manifesta is the second most important contemporary arts exhibition in Europe after Documenta in Kassel.

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friction with the Greek-Cypriot authorities. The situation soon escalated, resulting in the unilateral cancelation of the Biennial on the part of the Greek-Cypriot authorities during the preparation stage, and legal action being taken against the International Foundation Manifesta and the three curators, to prevent the project from ever being staged elsewhere (International Foundation Manifesta, 2007). In this case, bi-communal cooperation remained nominal, as the international event was seen as a politically contested scene.

The second missed opportunity is Nicosia's bid to become the 2017 European Capital of Culture²³ [ECOC], which is perhaps the most recognizable European cultural action. The campaign, organized by the Greek-Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture in 2011, was initially based on the idea of culture as common denominator, able to unite communities and foster peaceful coexistence (European Capital of Culture, 2011). Capitalizing on bi-communal projects, such as the Nicosia Sewerage Project and the Nicosia Master Plan, the bid claimed that Nicosia is a unique and exemplary case, where this principle worked in practice. This campaign was endorsed by nine municipalities in the larger Nicosia and Larnaca regions of the RoC, but despite its premise, it prominently failed to engage the Turkish-Cypriot community. This was noted by the ECOC selection panel, which criticized the bid for failing to communicate ways in which Turkish-Cypriots, as well as Nicosia's immigrant inhabitants would be involved (European Capital of Culture, 2011). Following this assessment, the bid was relaunched and reoriented towards Nicosia's Buffer Zone. With its new motto 'get in the zone', the second campaign sought to bridge real and imagined 'Buffer Zones', and reshape people's perception of Nicosia. Acknowledging the difficulties posed by the unresolved Cyprus Problem, it proposed an artist-led bi-communal approach to projects, through which to "explore, bridge and transcend buffers", and create a cultural space of coexistence (Nicosia 2017, n.d., p. 18). According to the bid, its proposed programme of activities aimed to boost the process of cultural heritage-based regeneration by creating opportunities for connections between the communities in Nicosia, and strengthening the city's ties with Europe (Nicosia 2017, n.d., pp. 24-31). Core element of the campaign was citizen participation in transforming Nicosia's Buffer Zone with a multiplicity of actions and events, many of which relied on proposals from local entrepreneurs, citizen groups, and bi-communal CSOs, while others engaged international actors (Nicosia 2017, n.d., pp. 51-77). The immigrant inhabitants of Nicosia remained invisible in the bid, while Turkish-Cypriot engagement was only understood along the lines of encouraging the participation of creators, and the attendance of events, rather than inclusion in the organizational team. The latter was also noted by the ECOC selection panel, which in its final assessment in 2012 rejected Nicosia's bid (European Capital of Culture, 2012).

The supranational and European institutions and actions analysed in this chapter have afforded the Turkish-Cypriot community opportunities to access and partake in ownership of Cypriot heritage, which had been foreclosed in the past. In compliance with the status quo on the island, however, their local official interlocutors and partners have diachronically been the Greek-Cypriot authorities. This holds true for all UN operations in Cyprus, including the UNDP, as well as EU institutions. Firstly, this meant, as already mentioned earlier, that Turkish-Cypriot access to funds has been limited. The establishment of the Aid Programme for the Turkish-Cypriot community, in operation since 2006, illustrates this asymmetry.

²³ The European Capital of Culture was established in 1985, to "highlight the richness and diversity of European culture and the features they share, as well as to promote greater mutual acquaintance between European citizens" (Patel, 2013, p. 2).

Post- EU accession, its establishment was necessitated by the lack of Turkish-Cypriot access to funding opportunities, otherwise granted by EU membership. Secondly, it also allowed other forms of exclusion and disenfranchisement, as the two examples above well illustrate. The established channels of cooperation and communication on the municipal level have not spilled over beyond the frame of the NMP. Depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation remains technical, and is otherwise foreclosed when it threatens to confer legitimacy on the Turkish-Cypriot community. It is, thus, embedded within the local system of power, and conditioned by the status quo of partition on the island.

6.4 Consolidation

This chapter explored the relation between peace-making processes in Cyprus and spatial practices in Nicosia, to understand the framework in which the city's bi-communal masterplan operates. To this end, this chapter first revisited the high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem, and their most critical turning points. During repeated failures in elite peace-making, the status quo in Cyprus became consolidated. On either side of the divide, the ruling political elites pursued their interests, instead of seeking compromise. The ensuing longevity of the conflict exacerbated insecurities and mistrust between the two communities firmly separated by the Buffer Zone. During this prolonged period, the official historical narratives provided for the younger generations the main source of knowledge about the 'other'. Moreover, the maintenance of the status quo of partition served the political elites on either side of the divide. In the south, it provided sovereign power over the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, which post-1974 witnessed an 'economic miracle'. In the north, protracted negotiations were seen as a way towards achieving the permanence of partition, i.e. the recognition of the TRNC.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU accession talks in tandem with the negotiations for the Annan Plan disrupted this pattern. In the analysis of this chapter, the results of the two parallel referenda for the Annan Plan served as entry points to unpack deviations from the official historical narratives. The Turkish-Cypriots voted in favour of the plan, although it did not grant the recognition of their *de facto* state in the north, thus deviating from their official historical narrative of 'impossible coexistence'. Their yearlong political and economic isolation, their weak economy, and their deepening dependence on Turkey, coupled with a recent economic crisis, created an explosive climate, which in the early 2000s saw massive Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations in favour of solution and EU accession. These massive mobilizations resulted in the opening of checkpoints in 2003, marking in tandem with the acceptance of the Annan Plan a profound transformation of the Turkish-Cypriot public opinion.

The Greek-Cypriots voted against the Annan Plan, although it offered a workable framework for a compromise solution, and it would have realized their national cause of reunification. Trying to interpret this deviation from the Greek-Cypriot official historical narrative of 'previous peaceful coexistence', different factors were considered. The RoC enjoyed international legitimacy, and it had secured the benefits of EU accession, which meant that in case of a compromise solution its political elites would be moving away from a position of power. Hence, these political elites, utilizing the media, urged the Greek-Cypriot people to reject the Annan Plan. At this historical juncture, the Greek-Cypriot community appeared to be comfortable without a solution in the here-and-now, as long as a solution at some point in the future was

promised. I have argued in this chapter that this result is also owed to the fact that over the many years of failed elite-peace-making the wider public has been excluded from co-shaping a solution to the Cyprus Problem. As a result, this solution has been diachronically regarded as a prerogative of state authorities, only to be pursued in high-level political negotiations, and not to be pursued by the public. Following this, it can be argued that the capacity of Cypriots to act in relation to the Cyprus Problem, i.e. their agency in affecting high-level negotiations, has been curtailed by the design of peace negotiations.

This chapter proceeded to contemplate the lack of demand for public participation within a culture of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation. Bi-communal cooperation began in Nicosia in the 1970s, necessitated by the city's incomplete and highly saturated sewerage system. Within the dismal political circumstances of that time, cooperation was established on the municipal level with UN mediation, under the condition that it would remain outside the political process. Thus, a top-down narrative of peace-making on the ground emerged, in which de-politicization of bi-communal cooperation removed the Sewerage Project from political influence, and simultaneously rendered it apolitical itself. In due process, under the umbrella of the UNHCR, depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation came to be seen as a trust- and confidence-building measure between communities in conflict, becoming a prerequisite for funding future projects. Nicosia's case inspired, thus, a peace strategy, known as 'post-conflict peacebuilding', turning depoliticization into an essential strategic component, which can be traced in all following projects.

Within this first bi-communal cooperation developed as well the idea of preparing Nicosia for reunification in anticipation of a Cyprus Problem solution. This idea led to the establishment of the Nicosia Master Plan, which is the most durable and consistent form of cooperation between the two communities in Cyprus. The NMP produced a planning strategy, which on one hand aimed to address Nicosia's pressing urban problems, while on the other to provide for the coordinated development of its two parts. The NMP became the blueprint, upon which the planning systems in Cyprus were established. However, it possessed no executive authority. As a result, its proposals for institutional and administrative changes were never implemented. Moreover, the implementation of its priority interventions in Nicosia was slow and fragmented, resulting in success only in physical terms. Following this, it can be argued that the capacity of Cypriots in Nicosia to act in relation to their urban space, i.e. their agency in affecting the planning processes, has been curtailed by the design of official planning practices.

Although the NMP's tangible effects were limited, its intangible repercussions have been more prominent. First, it put the peace-making narrative, developed within the frame of the Sewerage Project, into practice as space-making, institutionalizing a depoliticized planning practice in Nicosia. Second, it consolidated the meaning of bi-communal cooperation along ethnic lines, reifying the ethnic binary found at the epicentre of the Cypriot conflict. Last, it precluded public participation from peace-making on the ground, mirroring elite peace-making. In much the same way as elite peace-making was the prerogative of state authority, peace-making on the ground was the prerogative of a bi-communal team of experts and professionals. As a result bi-communal cooperation became for over twenty years not only depoliticized, but also exclusionary to the wider Cypriot publics.

In the early 2000s, following an evaluation of the NMP, a new planning strategy was formulated, to serve as a 'common vision' for the regeneration of Nicosia's historic centre. Continuing in the path of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation, this New Vision aimed to exploit the historic centre's cultural heritage to entice private investment, generate economic growth, and bring about social regeneration. The

linchpin of the new strategy was Nicosia's Buffer Zone, which the new plan reclaimed as common and shared heritage for all Cypriots. Within this new planning strategy, a new, again top-down, narrative started taking shape, wherein the cultural heritage of Nicosia's Buffer Zone was reimagined as the means and the place to reconcile the Cypriot communities. This, however, required a reconceptualization of heritage away from divisive ethno-nationalist connotations, marking another deviation from the official historical narratives. With the New Vision, the peace-making narrative, shaped within the Sewerage Project and the NMP, was translated into a practice of heritage-making. The exploration of this process of heritage-making as a practice of peace-making on the ground provided the opportunity to a) trace a shift in power relations, wherein the EU was introduced as a major actor, and b) to unpack power asymmetries that reproduced the status quo of partition.

The reimagining of Nicosia's historic centre and Buffer Zone as common and shared heritage was facilitated within supranational and particularly European institutional frameworks. The EU has financed NMP and New Vision cultural heritage conservation projects, utilizing the already established structures of bi-communal cooperation under the aegis of the UNDP. In this process, heritage conservation became a prominent field in which the EU was localized in Nicosia. Within UNDP programmes, this practice was expanded island-wide, considered a field in which bi-communal work can foster trust and confidence between the Cypriot communities. Hence, a new peace-making narrative was established, wherein cultural heritage conservation was seen as a uniting higher purpose. The contestations intrinsic to local cultural heritage, and its implication in the dominant historical narratives were bypassed with the inscription of Cypriot heritage sites in a European symbolic framework. This was achieved through the mobilization of prominent European actions, such as the 'European Heritage Awards / Europa Nostra', the 'European Heritage Days' and the 'Europa Nostra Seven Most Endangered Heritage Sites'. These European actions effectively *re-bordered* Cyprus within European territory, reclaiming as well Nicosia's Buffer Zone and many heritage sites in the historic centre as common and shared Cypriot-cum-European heritage. Bi-communal cooperation remained in this case too depoliticized, and unable to influence the politics of the Cyprus Problem. At the same time, while remaining neutral in terms of the Cyprus Problem negotiations, the EU extended its influence north of the Buffer Zone.

This shift in power relations is not understood here to involve only state and supranational actors. The processes discussed in this chapter offer insights into the ways power becomes networked, manifesting in human actions, constructs and interactions (or lack thereof). The shift in power relations produced modes of thinking (peace-making narratives), acting (space- and heritage-making practices), and being (how local actors engaged in these practices and understand their effects). Hence, following Foucault, it produced certain knowledge about cooperation across the divide in Cyprus, and the way it is understood and acted upon. Although it established practices of cooperation with tangible positive effects, and certain success in terms of cultivating trust and confidence amongst professionals, it simultaneously curtailed public participation, contributing to the disempowerment of the Cypriot people by foreclosing their agency.

In the processes of locally constructing the European and Europeanizing the local in Nicosia, power asymmetries were also observed. In compliance with the status quo on the island, all involved supranational and European institutions established official partnerships with the internationally recognized Greek-Cypriot authorities. This has not only limited Turkish-Cypriot access to funding, especially in the

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past, it has also allowed their exclusion from other European culture- and heritage-related actions. Hence, the established bi-communal cooperation on the municipal level, although depoliticized, has remained rather limited. Beyond the frames of the Nicosia Master Plan and the UNDP projects, bi-communal cooperation entails a threat to confer legitimacy on the Turkish-Cypriot community; it is, hence, foreclosed. Therefore, despite the shift in power relations and EU involvement, peace-making on the ground remains embedded within the local system of power, and conditioned by the status quo on the island, which it also reproduces.

Another retrospective observation can be made here by means of conclusion. Space-making and heritage-making as practices of peace-making on the ground *re-border* Nicosia and Cyprus as European, bringing together Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots under a supranational framework. At the same time, however, these planning practices in Nicosia produce yet another boundary, which cuts across the ethnic lines of the Cypriot conflict. By promoting a cultural heritage-based regeneration strategy for the historic centre, the New Vision gradually transforms this area into a rebranded (European) product for cultural consumption, precipitating gentrification processes. As heritage sites are rehabilitated and streetscapes receive façade restorations to create a beautiful scenery that can attract private investment, Nicosia's current low-income inhabitants, immigrant workers and alternative youths, are already struggling and being forced out of the historic centre, which has turned, especially in the south, into a boisterous hub of cafés, bars, restaurants, galleries and other leisure- and tourism-related business establishments (Christodoulides, 2014; Ioannidou, 2018). Perceived as bridging the ethnic divide by creating spaces where peace should take place, these practices etch simultaneously another boundary in Nicosia, that of class difference. The ethnic binary that guides these practices under the shadow of the Cyprus Problem becomes in this case irrelevant. Urban planning in Nicosia provides spaces for an imagined Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot community, while contributing to the marginalization of weak parts of the society on both sides of the Buffer Zone.

This chapter examined the framework in which the city's bi-communal masterplan operates. This framework is defined by the consolidation of the status quo of partition between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, as much with regards to repeated failures in elite peace-making, as with regards to peace-making on the ground. Depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation emerged as a key notion, which on one hand created channels of contact, and a scheme of working together across the divide on technical matters, but on the other precluded the political impact and effects of this cooperation. Within this framework, Nicosia's Buffer Zone has been reclaimed and reimagined as common Cypriot / European heritage, a common and shared space of peace and reconciliation. This is, however, a top-down reimagining, which excludes the people of Nicosia, Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and marginalizes the immigrant 'others'.

The following two chapters of this thesis turn their attention to people, and their bottom-up initiatives in Nicosia. Chapter 7 focuses on what is locally known as the bi-communal movement, a form of rapprochement and citizen peacebuilding, instigated in the 1990s as a confidence-building measure. During this period, with the support of international donors and under the auspices of the UN, various conflict resolution workshops and other regular bi-communal actions were organized in Nicosia's Buffer Zone. Main aim for the participants of these actions was simply to meet, interact with the 'other', and understand their hopes and fears, laying the foundations for societal reconciliation after a Cyprus Problem

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solution. However, these events were situated within the broader framework of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation as well. Thus, citizen interaction and socialization was also depoliticized ab initio. Chapter 7 explores how the de-politicization of bi-communal relations at large rather than countering partition, helped sustain a norm of conduct to navigate life with it. It then proceeds to explore how the opening of the crossings in 2003 impacted on power relations and on the socialization of individuals across the Buffer Zone under conditions of controlled mobility.

CHAPTER 7

Crossing – Controlled Mobility and the Normalization of Partition

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored the establishment of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation in Nicosia within the frame of the Sewerage project, the Nicosia Master Plan, and the New Vision Plan. These technical projects became embedded in peace-making narratives, wherein depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation came to be seen as a trust- and confidence-building measure between communities in conflict, inspiring a peace strategy, known as 'post-conflict peacebuilding'. Within the frame of this strategy, bi-communal activities were organized in Nicosia in the 1990s to encourage the gradual rapprochement of the two communities. Between 1991 and 1997, with the support of international donors and under the auspices of the UN, various conflict resolution workshops, and other bi-communal activities were organized in Nicosia's Buffer Zone. Main aim for the participants of these activities was simply to meet, interact with the 'other', and understand their hopes and fears, laying the foundations of societal reconciliation, considered necessary for the implementation of any Cyprus Problem solution. Thus, in the 1990s, Nicosia's Buffer Zone became the locus of bi-communal cooperation and rapprochement. However, these workshops and activities remained embedded in the broader framework of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation. Thus, citizen interaction was also depoliticized ab initio. The bi-communal activities of the 1990s gave rise to what is locally known as the bi-communal movement, which comprised individuals and groups interested in and pursuing rapprochement and reconciliation. Between 1997 and 2003, the bi-communal movement operated under arduous conditions due to the impermeability of the Buffer Zone, a deadlock in high-level peace negotiations, and an imposed ban on bi-communal activities. After the opening of the crossings in 2003, which opened up opportunities for casual, effortless interaction, the movement provided the basis for the development of a 'civil society of reconciliation', i.e. the part of civil society¹ concerned with peace-making on the ground.

This chapter tackles the fourth research question of this thesis, which examines the impact of the 2003 opening of the crossings on the socialization of individuals across the Buffer Zone. Following this introduction, the second section of this chapter explores the initiation and development of the bi-communal movement in the 1990s, which marked the beginnings of mediated socialization of individuals in Cyprus. The third section examines the ways in which interaction, initially within the bi-communal movement, and later within the civil society of reconciliation, became depoliticized. Here the notion of 'recognition' plays a

¹ CIVICUS, an international organization dedicated to strengthening citizen action, offers a working definition of 'civil society' as "the arena - outside of the family, the state, and the market - which is created by individual and collective actions, organizations and institutions to advance shared interests" (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 24). This arena is largely shaped by the legal and political framework within which it operates, provided by the state, and the way citizens understand their role within the state, and their relation to it. Therefore, the mechanisms through which citizens are shaped as political subjects play an important role in how they understand and utilize their civil rights to express their concerns, and pursue their interests.

crucial role in structuring an acceptable 'norm of conduct', by which bi-communal relations also abided. The fourth section of this chapter examines the opening of the crossings in 2003, and the way it shifted power relations by opening up opportunities for encounters and synergies impossible in the past, challenging at the same time the established 'norm of conduct'. The sixth section then proceeds to explore how the de-politicization of bi-communal relations at large, rather than countering partition, which was the aim of rapprochement and reconciliation, contributed to the normalization of partition in public life after the failure of the Annan Plan. Normalization in this chapter is conceptualized through both empirical material from interviews conducted in Nicosia with participants in the civil society of reconciliation, as well as theoretical considerations. The last section summarizes the findings of this chapter, and traces the shift in power relations brought about by the opening of the crossings.

7.2 From bi-communal activities to the bi-communal movement

Until the 1990s, casual contact between the two communities had been precluded for a generation². A communication embargo was effectively in place, as the Buffer Zone was impermeable, and postal and telephone services disconnected (Efthymiou, 2014; Hadjipavlou, 2012). During periods when high-level peace negotiations were progressing, political elites showed goodwill by allowing bi-communal meetings (Broome, 2005; Hadjipavlou, 2012; Loizos, 2006; Vogel & Richmond, 2013). As a result, sporadic meetings were held in the 1970s and 1980s between specialist groups, such as teachers and business people (Broome, 2005; Hadjipavlou, 2012; Loizos, 2006). A surge in regular and structured activity occurred during the period 1991-1997, when political contacts, business and professional meetings, citizen gatherings, and conflict resolution workshops were organized under the auspices of the UN (Broome, 2005; Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008; Wolleh, 2001). These various activities were facilitated and financed by external agencies, such as foreign diplomatic missions, the UNDP, and the Fulbright Commission, and were held at the Ledra Palace Hotel inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, which was serving as the UN headquarters, therefore deemed neutral ground. Hence, in the 1990s, Nicosia's Buffer Zone became central to intercommunal contact in Cyprus, playing a key role in the formation and development of the bi-communal movement. Participation in these activities was conditioned by permissions to enter the Buffer Zone, granted by the UNFICYP, and by the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Main goal for their participants was simply to meet, interact with the 'other' in order to understand their hopes and fears, and construct relationships of trust (Hadjipavlou, 2012; Loizos, 2006; Lönnqvist, 2008). This functioned primarily on a personal level, through informal networking of interested individuals, who were expected to become the foundation of societal reconciliation after a political solution to the Cyprus Problem had been reached.

The bi-communal activities of the 1990s opened up channels of communication, and created opportunities for synergies and productive debates beyond the official historical narratives. Besides the high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem, political contacts in the 1990s occurred through

² This refers to bi-communal contacts in Cyprus. The contact between Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot expatriates or students in foreign universities constitutes a form of bi-communal relations beyond the scope of the present research project.

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visits of political leaders to the other community, interviews broadcasted on television, and though meetings and workshops between youth wings of political parties. Business and professional meetings established contacts between trade unions from the two communities, while meetings amongst young business leaders provided the opportunity to explore business collaborations. Other bi-communal meetings and activities involved exchanges amongst groups of professionals, such as lawyers, educators, journalists, environmentalists, medical professionals, and others, on issues pertaining to their fields. Citizen gatherings brought people from the two communities together in informal casual settings, such as receptions, concerts, and exhibitions (Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008, pp. 15-18; Broome, 2005, pp. 15-22). But the most impactful bi-communal activities of the 1990s were the conflict resolution workshops and trainings, which instigated deeper and productive debates, and led to the formation of lasting relationships. These activities, attracting hundreds of people, provided their participants with new sets of skills to address sensitive issues, develop relational empathy to the other community, and go through healing processes that relieved some of the sufferings and psychological burdens brought about by war and partition (Anastasiou, 2002; Hadjipavlou, 2012). A crucial aspect of these activities was that they touched core issues of the Cyprus Problem, such as identity, property, federalism, and Cyprus in the context of the European Union. Moreover, they assisted participants in developing methods to further peace-building efforts in the future (Broome, 2005, pp. 22-28). Within these activities, participants started initiating and developing their own bi-communal projects, which marked their transition from trainees / recipients to activists / instigators.

Within the bi-communal activities of the 1990s, various bi-communal groups with specific professional foci, target groups, or mandates were formed, and met regularly. Their work advanced bi-communal communication, cooperation, and peace-building in a multiplicity of ways, not least through the development of special projects³ that have served as predecessors to local initiatives today. In due process, many of these bi-communal groups received funding from the UNDP-BDP, at the time also financing NMP projects, and they became more institutionalized, for example by acquiring the form of a civil society organization [CSO]. Through institutionalization and international funding of their activities, these organizations and groups were gradually conferred legitimacy. Thus, through the socialization of individuals in the bi-communal activities of the 1990s, what is known as the bi-communal movement came into being, laying as well the foundations for a civil society of reconciliation. The bi-communal movement reflected the combined efforts of international and local actors, which brought Cypriots together to work on issues of mutual concern, and eventually through these encounters towards societal rapprochement and reconciliation (Hadjipavlou, 2012). Although it primarily engaged individuals favouring or being open to the island's reunification, however, it was not formed as a political movement to pursue a particular kind of solution to the Cyprus Problem. Bi-communal contacts in the 1990s focused on 'neutral' issues (UNDP-ACT, 2013, p. 11). They placed emphasis on cultural or educational activities, cultivating skills to be applied in citizen peace-making in the future, or pursuing exchange on specific issues (for example, health care, environment, education), or amongst specific groups (for example, politicians, business people). Main objective was to establish citizen contact and cooperation, where there was none before, in order to

³ For example, 'Youth Encounters for Peace' was a project developed to bring together young people. Another project, the bi-communal magazine 'Hade', hosted stories about experiences with bi-communalism and events in Greek, Turkish and English (Anastasiou, 2006; Broome, 2005).

create the preconditions for societal reconciliation after a solution to the Cyprus Problem. These activities were inherently political, as they defied the official historical narratives in practice, but at the time they were not necessarily seen as political action by their participants (Anastasiou, 2006, p. 260; Loizos, 2006, p. 186). They were perceived as having socio-cultural impact, operating outside formal (party) politics.

In December 1997, the TRNC administration, following a renewed collapse of negotiations for the Cyprus Problem, and reacting to the commencement of the EU accession talks for the RoC, discussed in the previous chapter, prohibited Turkish-Cypriots from accessing Nicosia's Buffer Zone to participate in bi-communal activities. Bi-communal activities became, thus, leverage to improve the negotiating position of the TRNC, confirming the fear expressed by the NMP initiators that implication in local politics might negatively affect bi-communal cooperation. Indeed, as a result, regular bi-communal meetings ceased. Few persistent groups continued to meet in the mixed village of Pyla / Pile, which, located inside the Buffer Zone about 60 km away from south Nicosia, and 80 km away from north Nicosia, was not easily accessible. In the next six years, larger meetings were not prohibited altogether, but they were only occasionally organized. Meetings and interaction were also taking place abroad with external facilitation and funding (Wolleh, 2001). The persistence of some bi-communal groups to meet despite the ban on crossing speaks to the increasing strength and relevance the bi-communal movement acquired for its participants, and its transition from external facilitation to local embracing and ownership (Hadjipavlou, 2012). Moreover, the ban on Buffer Zone access exemplifies the close link that had been forged between bi-communalism and the Buffer Zone. At that time, bi-communal relations were also necessarily spatially fixed. The more the bi-communal movement gained momentum, the more politically contested the access to Nicosia's Buffer Zone became.

When, in April 2003, the TRNC partially lifted the restrictions on movement between north and south in Nicosia, opening the Ledra Palace checkpoint, a new era began for the bi-communal movement. As thousands of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots hurried to visit the other side, and opportunities for casual encounters opened up, groups and individuals involved in the bi-communal movement rejoiced. With mobility reinstated, they were at last at liberty to meet, which also meant that they had to reconsider their course of action. In the next years, an aggregation of bi-communal groups, institutions and organizations emerged, giving rise to a civil society of reconciliation. With external funding, locally initiated, bi-communal actions and activities gradually legitimized cooperation in the public eye. Not unlike the technical projects examined in the previous chapter, however, bi-communal actions and activities after 2003 also involved the de-politicization of bi-communal relations. In the next section of this chapter, I explore how this contributed to shaping a 'norm of conduct', which supports the status quo of partition.

7.3 The fear of recognition and the de-politicization of bi-communal relations

Bi-communal cooperation was nothing new in Cyprus in the 1990s. At that time, the Nicosia Master Plan had already been in operation for more than ten years. This cooperation was, however, kept quiet; it was not publicized as an achievement. Rapprochement and reconciliation between the two communities were not popular causes. On both sides of the divide, there were people directly affected by the conflict. Moreover, traumatic memories of displacement and persecution in the past were experienced in an

intergenerational and collective manner. Stereotypes about the 'other' and distrust were perpetuated through reiteration in family stories and schooling, making the official historical narratives relevant for younger generations without first-hand experience of the conflict (Leonard, 2014). As a result, the bi-communal activities of the 1990s were taking place under rather unfavourable conditions. Participants were negatively portrayed in the media, accused of being unpatriotic, traitors to the national cause, or enemy collaborators (Anastasiou, 2006, p. 256; Broome, 2005, pp. 39-40; Loizos, 2006, p. 183; Lönnqvist, 2008, p. 8). They also faced criticism on a personal level by their family or their social circles. Furthermore, since they essentially opposed the status quo on the island, political elites on both sides of the divide developed responses to bi-communal activities that reinforced the official historical narratives. The Greek-Cypriot authorities at times capitalized on the success of bi-communal activities to promote the validity of the Greek-Cypriot historical narrative, i.e. that the two communities coexisted peacefully until the 1974 Turkish invasion. Following this, rapprochement and reconciliation activities were not necessary, as they only confirmed that the two communities were getting along (Broome, 2005). Such rhetoric aggravated the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to claim that Greek-Cypriots were taking advantage of bi-communal activities to promote the 'previous peaceful coexistence' narrative, and deceive the Turkish-Cypriot participants (Hadjipavlou, 2012). In all the commotion that accompanied the surge of bi-communal activities in the 1990s, the will and voice of people participating in them was by and large ignored, or dismissed as unreliable. As a result, the experience of participants in bi-communal activities occurred separately from public life in both spatial and social terms. The strongest incentive (and excuse) to sustain this separation of bi-communalism from public life was the issue of 'recognition', which concerned the political elites on both sides of the divide, albeit from different perspectives.

The issue of 'recognition' is primarily relevant to the high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem. For the internationally recognized RoC⁴, it is an imperative that the so-called illegal TRNC remains an internationally unrecognized entity, as recognition would mean the legitimization of partition. For the TRNC, recognition as a state is a supreme objective; until it is achieved, however, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership strives to avoid recognition of the RoC as the only legitimate state that represents the whole of Cyprus, i.e. the Turkish-Cypriots in the north as well (Broome, 2005). It is not possible to exhaust the discourse on 'recognition' here, and it is not within the scope of this thesis to explore the legal aspect of the issue. Suffice is to say that state recognition is, on one hand, an internal matter concerning the relation between the state and its people, defining obligations and rights, while on the other, an external matter, concerning the relation of a state with other states, and the rules pertaining to their interactions. Constantinou and Papadakis (2001) refer to the former as the "construction of legal subjectivity" and to the latter as "international legitimacy" (p. 127). Hence, 'recognition', especially as 'international legitimacy', inevitably plays an important role in what constitutes the Cyprus Problem and its future solution. Conduct between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in high politics has been largely determined by it. For example the presidents of the RoC and the TRNC only take part in the negotiations as the leaders of their respective communities; the omission of their formal titles serves the purpose of avoiding the other's 'recognition'. The

⁴ The recognition of the RoC government has been granted de jure to some extent because "the consent of a legally constituted government was in essence required for the UN peacekeeping operation to take place in early 1964" (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001, p. 128).

issue of 'recognition' has also played a crucial role in the way local authorities exercised control over intercommunal contact beyond high politics, and eventually bi-communal relations at large.

The discourse on 'recognition' pervades all official and unofficial conduct between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. This is for example reflected in terminology used to designate the 'other'. The Greek-Cypriots refer to the TRNC with the term 'pseudo-state' or 'occupied lands' [katechόμενα, *κατεχόμενα*]; the Turkish Cypriots largely use the terms 'Greek-Cypriot' or 'South Cyprus administration'. Furthermore, any imaginable international activity, also non-political (for example business exchanges, sport events or academic conferences) is treated as an arena of rival political claims. The Turkish-Cypriots are encouraged to participate in order to gain international standing, while the Greek-Cypriots try to exclude them, and, if fail to do so, withdraw participation (Broome, 2005). As these interactions do not entail state actors, however, Greek-Cypriot participants are burdened with the responsibility of 'implied recognition', which means unintentionally legitimizing the 'other' state through interaction (Broome, 2005; Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001; Wolleh, 2001). This became especially problematic for bi-communal relations in the 1990s, as the fear of 'implied recognition' in combination with the inhibitory factors mentioned earlier discouraged Greek-Cypriot participation in bi-communal activities. A 'norm of conduct' was developed to navigate the issue; only unofficial meetings between the two communities were acceptable, and individuals and organizations participated in them outside any official capacity. However, what constituted an unofficial meeting was often not clear. In the example of the Sewerage Project and the Nicosia Master Plan, the two mayors of Nicosia were meeting as representatives of the two communities. Although the omission of their titles divested them of their official capacity, these meetings can hardly be considered unofficial. In this case, however, an effect on 'recognition' was claimed by neither side. Constantinou and Papadakis (2001) stress that the international legal perspective concerning 'recognition' is clear in stating that a) only states and their representing governments can grant or withdraw state recognition, not individuals, and b) there is room for conduct without the danger of 'implied recognition', if the official state formally withdraws it (p. 132). Hence, the issue of 'implied recognition' presents Cypriots with a false dilemma. If there can be no legal repercussions in the interaction of non-state actors, the significance of 'recognition' lies in its function as an instrument used by political elites to exercise control over the kind and intensity of intercommunal relations.

The fear of 'implied recognition' weighed heavily especially with Greek-Cypriots. It impregnated bi-communal activities to the extent that recognition of any level of the Turkish-Cypriot society was denied in order to uphold the Greek-Cypriot state. This had consequences pertaining to the kind of interaction sought and projects implemented within the frame of bi-communal activities as well. Broome (2005) confirms that these projects were "limited in scope and focused primarily on cultural and educational activities" (p. 45). This was a way to bypass political contestation, as well as to attract more participants by downplaying the political aspect of bi-communalism. After the opening of the crossings, the USAID and the UNDP launched the UNDP-ACT programme, which made available new funding opportunities targeting specifically the advancement of civil society in Cyprus. This objective was later undertaken by the EU-funded UNDP-PFF as well. The depoliticized framework, within which the UNDP already operated, explored in the previous chapter, was extended to citizen peace-making. As the engaged participants of the 1990s turned into instigators of local initiatives, their projects and activities retained their former limited scope, still mainly educational and cultural. Not only have local actors internalized the 'norm of conduct'

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that keeps activities away from politics, as B. Kanol and Kanol (2013) offer, this norm has also been reproduced by international actors, who have denied funding to potentially politically controversial projects proposed by local actors. Vogel (2013, p. 44) also notes that the less political the proposed projects are, the more likely it is for them to acquire funding. This speaks to the level of control the Cypriot authorities, especially in the south, have exercised in delineating the framework within which bi-communalism was allowed to operate, as well as the complexity of power relations involving actors above and below the level of the state.

Since the opening of the crossings, the evolution of the bi-communal movement into a distinct part of the Cypriot civil society, concerned with reconciliation and peace-building, has had positive effects (Gillespie, Georgiou & Insay, 2011; Jarraud, Louise & Filippou, 2013). It was only through bi-communal activities and organizations that people across the divide were able to cooperate on issues of common concern (CIVICUS, 2011). Thus, the civil society of reconciliation has fostered increased understanding regarding the interdependence of the two communities, and inspired increased engagement with the 'other' (Gillespie, Georgiou & Insay, 2011, pp. 12-13). Nevertheless, the 'norm of conduct' outlined above has continued to permeate bi-communal interactions and relations. During my empirical work in Nicosia, members of bi-communally active CSOs, when asked about their organization's effectiveness in relation to the Cyprus Problem solution or reunification, i.e. the bigger picture, constructed a line of argumentation that supported a supplementary subtle role of their activities. They portrayed their work as preparatory of a Cyprus Problem solution: their role was to help bridge the gap in understanding between the two communities, to help people towards mutual recognition and celebration of their differences, and to bring people from all Cypriot communities in dialogue towards societal rapprochement that would create a basis for future cohabitation, when high-level political negotiations reach an agreement. In other words, they were not there to solve the political problem, but serve the society within their capacity. The opinion was also expressed that interaction of people in various (perceived as) non-political activities would make them more perceptive and sensitized towards the 'other' community. Through getting to know each other and working together, bonds would be created that are expected to set in motion reconciliation processes on a larger scale.

Based on the above, it becomes clear that today as well bi-communal action, at least in its institutionalised form, is not necessarily perceived by its instigators as political action, i.e. as a way to pursue their interests, and achieve change through participation in decision-making processes. It has been noted by several authors (Gillespie, Georgiou & Insay, 2011; Jarraud, Louise & Filippou, 2013; Lönnqvist, 2008; Vasilara & Piaton, 2007; Vogel, 2013) that on both sides of the divide, politics is considered a top-down affair resulting in a weak civil society. Political parties dominate the public sphere as legitimate channels of communication between the public and the governing elites. According to my analysis in the previous chapter, the Cyprus Problem does not constitute an exception. Finding a solution is considered a prerogative of the state, with public participation precluded from the high-level negotiation process. Although peace-oriented civil society could provide an arena for political involvement, its activities have been depoliticized beforehand, not only content-wise (educational or cultural activities), but also by disconnecting them from impacting decision-making. Simply put, where public participation could have had impact on the Cyprus Problem solution, it is foreclosed; where public participation is possible, it is presented and perceived as politically non-impactful. It can be argued here that the issue of 'recognition'

has imposed restrictions on the agency of bi-communal activists by limiting their understanding of their capacity to achieve change.

A notable exception of civil society engaging in political action was the pro-solution movement for the Annan Plan in the early 2000s. During this time, the massive mobilizations of the Turkish-Cypriot community not only exemplified the radical transformation of public opinion in the north, but also marked people’s efforts to act politically in relation to the Cyprus Problem, by demanding from their government to return to the negotiating table, and to find a solution on the basis of the Annan Plan. Civil society saw this mobilization bearing results, when the Annan Plan was put to vote. In the south, however, the pro-solution civil society, lacking legitimacy vis-à-vis political elites, failed to mobilize the public. The rejection of the Annan Plan resulted in the general disappointment of the civil society of reconciliation on both sides of the divide. Since then, bi-communal cooperation has to certain extent evolved and intensified. Based on the latest available assessment of the Cypriot civil society, between 2006 and 2011 the percentage of CSOs participating in bi-communal activities rose, in the Greek-Cypriot community from 14 to 36 per cent, and in the Turkish-Cypriot community from 40 to 70 percent (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 110). In the Greek-Cypriot community, the participation of the public also increased (from 8 percent of the population survey to 10 per cent), but remained significantly low. In the Turkish-Cypriot community, public participation slightly dropped (from 16 percent of the population survey to 14,7 per cent). Hence, while CSOs became significantly more inclined to cooperate across the divide, incentivized as well by new available funding opportunities, this did not trigger substantially increased participation from the wider public, suggesting a continuous lack of legitimacy. Regarding the type of bi-communal activities attracting public participation, in both communities cultural activities were the most popular. Moreover, according to the same survey, more than half of the population on both sides of the divide remained either negative or sceptical regarding the positive contribution of bi-communal activities to the reconciliation process, as Figure 35 below illustrates.




Figure 35: Population’s perceptions of the value of bi-communal activities to reconciliation (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 111).

The findings of the CIVICUS survey echoed views expressed by my interviewees, who spoke about consistent participation in bi-communal activities by a small circle of 'usual suspects'. Hence, the opening of the crossings did not bring about radical changes in intercommunal interaction, as it was initially believed it would. It effectuated, however, a shift in power relations, which, while challenging the established 'norm of conduct' and the status quo on the island, eventually came to exemplify perhaps the most crucial moment of de-politicization of intercommunal interactions. The next section examines this shift in power relations.

7.4 The opening of the crossings: a catalyst of reconciliation?

The impermeability of the Buffer Zone has been the most decisive factor contributing to its status as a symbol in Cypriot imagination. Chapter 5 elaborated on its role in structuring and sustaining the official historical narratives on both sides of the divide. In this analysis, the Buffer Zone emerged as the encapsulation of partition, and of the Cyprus Problem. In the Turkish-Cypriot official historical narrative of 'impossible peaceful coexistence', it represented safety from the untrustworthy 'other'. The ideal solution to the Cyprus Problem was summarized in the demand for its legitimation and endurance as a border. In the Greek-Cypriot official historical narrative of 'previous peaceful coexistence', it signified a disgraceful line of separation, marking a wound on the ground, to Greek-Cypriot society, as well as to the body politic. The ideal solution to the Cyprus Problem was summarized in the demand for its removal. Consequently, its impermeability was seen as the result of the intransigence of the TRNC administration and Turkish occupation. These perceptions of the Buffer Zone, as a 'safety border' and as an 'open wound', have over the years of unresolved conflict become dominant, part and parcel of the status quo of partition. Moreover, as chapter 5 concluded, they also became necessary for the sustenance and continuous relevance of the official historical narratives on both sides of the divide. Hence, the opening of the crossings in 2003, making the Buffer Zone porous, challenged simultaneously both narratives, and the status quo of partition they underpinned. Opening up possibilities for casual interaction, encounters, and synergies between the Cypriot communities, it marked a milestone for intercommunal relations. The newfound, albeit controlled, mobility presented, thus, a challenge to the established 'norm of conduct' as well. In other words, if people were finally at liberty to move across the Buffer Zone and meet without the authorities' permission, bi-communalism and public life would eventually intersect, catalysing as well political action towards reconciliation, and towards a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Indeed, the opening of the crossings brought about a shift in power relations, but not the radical changes activists in the bi-communal movement expected.

On 23 April 2003, after 29 years of firm partition, the Ledra Palace crossing in Nicosia opened, allowing Cypriots to cross to the 'other' side. Approximately 5.000 Greek-Cypriots and 2.000 Turkish-Cypriots crossed on that day only, after waiting for hours in long queues, and showing their passports (Webster & Dallen, 2006, p. 170). By the end of 2004, four million crossings had been counted. In the Greek-Cypriot community the idea that the opening of the crossings was an unexpected and surprise move of the TRNC regime is prevalent. However, realities on the ground and the tension building up in the north played a key role leading up to this development. Although presented by the Turkish-Cypriot

authorities as a gesture of goodwill to promote reconciliation, it was the massive Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations of the early 2000s that exercised significant pressure on their administration. The climate of dissatisfaction due to the TRNC's political and economic isolation, and Turkish interventionist policies in the north, elaborated in the previous chapter, erupted in massive demonstrations, which united ordinary citizens, political opposition leaders, and civil society organizations (Anastasiou, 2006; Pericleous, 2009). A grand demonstration on 18 July 2000 resulted in violent clashes with the police and, a few days later, thirty-nine trade unions and other organizations, and two political parties formed the platform 'This Country Is Ours' (Pericleous, 2009, p. 161). The protests were initially geared against the TRNC regime and Turkey, but soon the coherent demand for a federal solution "on the basis of political equality of the two communities", as opposed to confederation (diachronically the Turkish-Cypriot position in the Cyprus Problem negotiations), became central (Pericleous, 2009, p. 161). As the focus shifted from demonstrating dissatisfaction to demanding a solution in the form of federation and EU accession, the numbers of protesters soared. On 26 December 2002 more than 30.000 people demonstrated in north Nicosia with the slogan 'solution, accession, peace'; on 14 January 2003, an unprecedented crowd of 60.000 demonstrated their indignation, demanding solution or the resignation of the Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş; on 27 February 2003, it was followed by a larger rally of 70.000⁵ (Anastasiou, 2006, pp. 281-282; Pericleous, 2009, pp. 165-166). In many of these demonstrations, amidst cries for peace, demands to open the Buffer Zone were regularly expressed (Navaro-Yashin, 2012). In the face of such vociferous dissatisfaction, and in an attempt to appease the crowds, the regime in the north declared the lifting of mobility restrictions. Through their massive mobilizations, the people in the north expressed their opinion and actively pursued their interests, achieving a milestone policy change. In other words, they acted politically, exerting agency. Greek-Cypriot groups engaged in bi-communal activities attempted to demonstrate their solidarity with the Turkish-Cypriot public with the 'Civil Initiative for Solution and Reunification', and eventually with the platform 'Solution Now', which became bi-communal after the opening of the crossings. However, in the south, public opinion and the larger civil society did not undergo a transformation similar to their counterpart in the north, as they did not face similar challenges, and they had different priorities and needs (Hadjipavlou, 2012, p. 110). The pro-solution forces in the south did not manage to mobilize people in favour of the Annan Plan, leading to its rejection. However, the Buffer Zone remained porous, allowing crossings; manifold encounters continued to take place.

On the first day of reinstated mobility, representatives of both administrations made statements pertaining to the issue of 'recognition'. The Turkish-Cypriot administration announced that Greek-Cypriots showing their passports to cross north did not, through this action, recognize the TRNC. At the same time, the Greek-Cypriot administration made the same proclamation, stating that individuals cannot recognize states (Demetriou, 2007, p. 997). Hence, with a single announcement, the Greek-Cypriot state reversed the discourse of 'recognition' and 'implied recognition' it had promoted, and which helped vilify bi-communal activities and cooperation in the past. In relation to this, Demetriou (2007) argues that, while both statements effectively depoliticized crossing, the Greek-Cypriot state simultaneously reasserted its authority over its citizens beyond the territory it controlled, by retaining its power to enable or prohibit, in

⁵ Navaro-Yashin (2012, p. xviii) emphasizes that this is an extraordinary number considering that the population in the north is around 250.000.

this case, mobility. The decision to uphold the (Greek-Cypriot) state, which had defined the citizens' political action in the past, was removed from the individual. Crossing or not crossing would not have political implications for the state. Hence crossing was not allowed to become a political action for Greek-Cypriots.

Besides depoliticizing crossings, the Greek-Cypriot state exerted a level of control over the encounters that were occurring in the north by assigning crossing a morality factor. Soon after the restitution of mobility, certain reasons for crossing were deemed morally acceptable, dictated by official government statements, while others were not (Demetriou, 2007, p. 998). Crossing to visit one's home or village was an acceptable practice, while crossing to enjoy oneself, for example to go to the beach, gamble or visit brothels, was not. In due process, certain practices developed. Dikomitis (2005) identifies three general categories: 1) pilgrimage, when people cross regularly to visit specific places (home, village, sacred sites), and develop own rituals that comply with internalized morality standards, 2) regular crossing, when people engage in daily activities, which are normally not interrupted by the Buffer Zone, such as grocery shopping, or going for a haircut, 3) not crossing, for political, nationalist or personal reasons that include the issue of 'implied recognition', which is seen as transpiring through showing one's passport or spending money in the north. Webster and Dallen (2006) corroborate these findings with data collected in autumn 2004. According to their study, 57 percent of the Greek-Cypriot population at that time considered visiting the other side of the island inappropriate (p. 173). The three most often cited reasons for not crossing were refusal to show passport, nationalistic reasons, and lack of interest on the part of non-refugees (Webster & Dallen, 2006, p. 174). Indeed, according to the same study, Greek-Cypriot refugees were two times more likely to cross than non-refugees. However, regardless of having crossed or not, almost all respondents considered spending money in the north inappropriate, because it supported the TRNC economy (Webster and Dallen, 2006, p. 175). The CIVICUS survey, mentioned earlier in this chapter, confirms that these statistics had changed only slightly by 2011. Half the Greek-Cypriot population had still not crossed to the other side; 26 percent had only crossed between one and four times since 2004; 13 percent crossed once a year; and significantly less people crossed more often. Regular crossers (once or twice a month) constituted only 0,3 percent of the population survey (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 113).

Reflecting on the de-politicization and moralization of crossings, the following observation is elucidating. While crossing was largely depoliticized for Greek-Cypriots (by their own state), not crossing came to constitute a political statement / action. 'Implied recognition', although precluded (by the state), still largely structured this behaviour. 'Implied recognition' and the individual citizen's behaviour relating to it can be seen as a form of knowledge, understood following Foucault (1977) as certain ways of thinking (rationalities), acting (practices), and being (subjectivities). This knowledge was not imposed on Greek-Cypriots by their state; it was produced within a complex set of power relations; hence, while the state rhetoric changed, this knowledge endured. Already internalized by people, it is part of a system of subjection, in which state authority is an important but not the only parameter. The opening of the crossings can then be seen as an 'event / episode', which, according to Foucault (1977), is not a singular moment in time, but a struggle of forces, which provides the opportunity to observe the subtle workings of power that may lead to shifts in power relations. Shifts in power relations may, according to Foucault, produce other kinds of knowledge, opening up opportunities for resistance and subversion. Indeed, local

initiatives in Nicosia, which developed after and because of the opening of crossings, offer such transformative opportunities, which I unpack in the next chapter of this thesis.

In the Turkish-Cypriot community, crossing became a very different affair. The radical transformation of public opinion, and of the larger civil society in the north, which became palpable with their massive protests and demonstrations, constituted a deviation from their official historical narrative. By that point, however, this historical narrative had lost its relevance for large parts of the population. As one of my Turkish-Cypriot interviewees, Mete H.⁶ (personal communication, 2013 February 5), affiliated researcher with PRIO Cyprus Centre, remarked, the conceptualization of the Buffer Zone that structured and underpinned it had been transformed from a 'safety border' to an obstacle for Turkish-Cypriot aspirations. Thus, the deviation had less to do with peace and reconciliation per se; rather, it was through peace and reconciliation that at that particular conjuncture many Turkish-Cypriots came to see the fulfilment of their aspirations for a better life. This was translated into a positive vote for the Annan Plan, and, when this failed, into a change in the Turkish-Cypriot leadership in the 2005 presidential election, which brought to power for the first time after 32 years a pro-solution, centre-left social democratic party⁷. Although the opening of the crossings did not end the political and economic isolation of the TRNC, it improved the situation in the north, by boosting tourism and making available employment opportunities in the south⁸ (Thorp, 2009, p. 11). After 2004, economic support came from the EU in the form of trade arrangements, and the Aid Programme for the Turkish-Cypriot community, mentioned in chapter 6. Moreover, the opening of the crossings provided Turkish-Cypriots the opportunity to obtain passports from the RoC, and access its healthcare system, since according to the constitution of the RoC they are its citizens. As Navaro-Yashin (2012) notes, a significant reshuffling of sociality occurred, as Turkish-Cypriots⁹ developed various activities depending on border mobility, ranging from refugees visiting their place of origin, to working, sending their children to private school, shopping, and enjoying leisure activities in the south. Although a moralization of crossings did not occur in the north, the rejection of the Annan Plan was a source of major disappointment with feelings of betrayal prevailing in the Turkish-Cypriot community, which did not see the momentum it created for solution bearing results. The aftermath of the referenda saw the reinforcement of conflict culture and mistrust between the two communities, with Turkish-Cypriots mentioning fear, insecurity, and feeling rejected (Hadjipavlou, 2007a; Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008). Although many more Turkish-Cypriots crossed regularly in relation to Greek-Cypriots, a significant part of the population (more than 40 percent) had until 2011 never crossed south (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 110). This is reflected in the comparative crossing data of the CIVICUS survey as well, as shown in Figure 36 below.

⁶ Mete H. is a researcher affiliated with Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO] Cyprus Centre, and active in the civil society of reconciliation.

⁷ Mehmet Ali Talat, then leader of the centre-left CTP (Republican Turkish Party) became the second president of the TRNC following the 2005 presidential elections, after his party had headed a coalition government in the parliamentary elections a year earlier.

⁸ A study conducted in 2008 estimated the number of workers crossing from north to south daily to 2.300-2.500 (Hatay, Mullen & Kalimeri, 2008).

⁹ On the contrary, mainland Turks who live in the TRNC, are not permitted entry into the RoC through the Buffer Zone crossings.




Figure 36: Frequency of crossings to the 'other' other between 2004 and 2011 (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 110).

It becomes clear that the opening of the crossings did not catalyse broad-spectrum reconciliation processes. However, significant portions of the population on both sides crossed the Buffer Zone at least once, engaging in meaningful encounters with people on the other side. Considering the levels of mistrust in both communities, and the adversarial historical narratives prevalent in each side, perpetuated by media and education, the absence of violence was remarkable. Over the years, encounters continued to take place in a peaceful manner, but during the initial period they were also reportedly overtly emotional and compassionate (Demetriou, 2007; Hadjipavlou, 2007a). Greek-Cypriot refugees¹⁰ and their families were largely welcomed by the Turkish-Cypriots residing in their pre-1974 homes. Stories started surfacing of objects, such as wedding dresses, photographs, embroideries, heirlooms, and valuables, which had been kept safe and returned to their original owners after almost thirty years. These personal encounters re-humanized the 'other', and as Hadjipavlou (2007a, 2012) notes, helped counter long-established stereotypes. They were also painful, as people from both sides re-experienced loss in manifold ways. These were genuine interactions, wherein people became aware of each other's trauma, and to certain extent developed empathy, in some cases leading to the formation of lasting friendships. Hadjipavlou (2007a, 2012) notes that these encounters, although impactful for individuals, could lead to societal reconciliation, unless they were legitimated through synergies between political elites, institutions, and civil society, to produce another narrative to counter that of partition. This, however, did not happen, and as

¹⁰ There were also similar stories told by Turkish-Cypriot displaced people. They were, however, fewer because there were fewer people displaced from the south, and in many cases Turkish-Cypriot villages and properties were left to decay. On the contrary, Greek-Cypriot properties in the north were used by new tenants, hence preserved.

Hadjipavlou and Kanol (2008) note in their thorough study regarding peacebuilding work in Cyprus, it was also a missed opportunity on the part of the bi-communal movement.

The bi-communal movement failed to respond to the opening of the crossings in a coherent, coordinated, and collaborative manner, as pro-solution activists acted unilaterally on each side in promoting the Annan Plan (Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008, p. 54). While in the north, solution had become a popular cause, uniting opposition political forces, CSOs, trade unions, bi-communalists, and ordinary people, in the south, bi-communal activists' efforts came too late and remained marginal. The Greek-Cypriot leadership, political elites¹¹, and the church largely campaigned against the Annan Plan, and even the Greek-Cypriot left (AKEL), traditionally supporting reconciliation, did not back it. Hadjipavlou and Kanol (2008) attribute the late and weak response of the Greek-Cypriot bi-communalists to their hesitation to act politically (p. 53). As I have argued in this and the previous chapter, bi-communal work operated in a depoliticized framework. For Turkish-Cypriot bi-communalists, political action towards solution and EU accession was catalysed by their pressing circumstances, rather than their will for reconciliation and peace. This enabled them to question the status quo, and act to change it. Although such pressing necessity for solution was absent for Greek-Cypriots at that particular historical and political conjuncture, solution and reunification were central in their official historical narrative. If the bi-communal movement had not missed the opportunity to translate the meaningful encounters and experiences from the opening of the crossings into political action, perhaps things would have developed differently.

The failure of the Annan Plan caused disappointment and frustration for bi-communalists, and weakened the participation in bi-communal work. With the opportunity provided by the Annan Plan missed, the activists involved in the bi-communal movement were forced to re-evaluate their action and reconsider their agenda. With the crossings open, bi-communal meetings today are not anymore castigated in either community, and are often praised or embraced by political parties. Bi-communalism and cooperation have produced a civil society of reconciliation, but, as the examples of Nicosia 2017 and Manifesta 6 in the previous chapter well demonstrated, they have not been popularized. I want to argue that this is so, because bi-communal cooperation, by remaining depoliticized, became part of the Cypriot 'normality', which the open crossings came to underpin, especially after the failure of the Annan Plan.

7.5 The opening of the crossings: a factor of normalization?

'Normality' was a recurring notion in the interviews I conducted with people engaged in the civil society of reconciliation. For example, when asked about the opening of the crossings and the reasons why it did not bring about the radical changes the bi-communal movement expected, a Greek-Cypriot interviewee, Olga D.¹², responded:

¹¹ Only one of the major political parties supported the Annan Plan, the centre-right and largely conservative Democratic Rally (DISY). For a comprehensive analysis of political elites' composition in the RoC since the late 1980s, see Katsourides, 2012.

¹² Olga D. is a researcher affiliated with Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO] Cyprus Centre, and active in the civil society of reconciliation.

*“We did not see the wall falling like in Berlin. We did not see it falling as we expected, having lived with this orientation that the green line should not exist, that the wall of division should fall, all this discourse. [...] And maybe we can say that the Greek-Cypriots are more comfortable, that they had less incentive to change something. [...] But as long as I can remember, things were like this... there are negotiations, we are waiting for the solution, we are waiting for the signing of the agreement, and round after round, and it changes from one election to another. This makes me think that since we lived all this time with this expectation or uncertainty or instability, maybe on some level we have stabilized the instability. [...] We have learned to function in terms of emergency, from legal matters to everyday matters... the emergency as if it were **normal**. And maybe we have made peace with that. But this does not mean that it is comfortable peace.”*

(Olga, personal communication, 2013 February 1, emphasis added)

What in Cyprus constitutes ‘normality’ is considered exceptional¹³ in reference to western (primarily European) paradigms of governance and sovereignty. In the local context, however, the Cyprus Problem and the expectation of its solution have conditioned political attitudes and social life to the extent that various exceptional situations, such as life with a Buffer Zone, have been rendered familiar. Semblances of peace within the conflict allowed life to continue despite it, in a process of conflict ‘normalization’. This can be defined as a process, which allows ‘ways of doing things’ developed to cope with and deriving from the prolonged conflict to appear as ‘normal’. For example, when asked about the European Capital of Culture (Nicosia 2017) campaign, examined in the previous chapter, and its failure to engage the Turkish-Cypriot community despite the established channels of cooperation on the municipal level, a Greek-Cypriot interviewee responded:

*“[Bi-communal] cooperation is not a good thing politically. If you want to insult a Greek-Cypriot politician, tell them that they agreed with the Turks. This is a great insult. Of course, to achieve anything with the other side, you have to agree with the Turks. There is a level of schizophrenia in this. [...] This is our **normality**. They never thought differently.”*

(Marios¹⁴, personal communication, 2013 January 30, emphasis added)

Hence, it is ‘normal’ in a society, which expects and hopes for the island’s reunification, to mistrust by default the ‘other’, with whom peace is expected to be made. Moreover, while bi-communal cooperation has been taking place since the 1970s, and politicians regularly engaged in it (as in the case of the NMP), it is ‘normal’ to consider it politically hurtful. Seen through the lens of ‘normalization’, bi-communal activities in the 1990s were allowed, or even at times promoted, as part of the pursuit for peace, but they were depoliticized to preserve the familiar status quo. The Annan Plan would have radically transformed the status quo, which secured for Greek-Cypriots sovereignty over a recognized state, prosperity, and a semblance of peace. The solution, which it would make reality, however, was not the ideal Greek-Cypriot solution. In this context, the uncertainty of reunification under the Annan Plan appeared less comfortable and of higher risk, than the maintenance of the familiar status quo. Thus, the Greek-Cypriots deviated from

¹³ For an analysis about the state of exception in the Cypriot context, see Constantinou, 2008.

¹⁴ Marios E. is active in the civil society of reconciliation in the CSO Association for Historical Dialogue and Research.

their official historical narrative, voting against reunification, to preserve the keystone of their 'normality', the promise of solution at some point in the future. As long as this solution is expected, things can continue in a 'business as usual' fashion.

The normalization of partition prior to the opening of the crossings was prominent in the north. In a recent study, Navaro-Yashin (2012) explores northern Cyprus as a 'make-believe space', a term she coined to describe processes of imagining and materializing the TRNC as a political and social space. She examines modes of governance, administration, as well as practices that have constructed the TRNC as a de facto state. Since this state is not recognised internationally, it relies on semblances of normality, or, 'mimicry', as Mete aptly described the process, directed inwards. There is a constitution, a president, ministries and a prime minister, a legal system, judiciary, police, etc. that function in ways they do in recognized states (Navaro-Yashin. 2012, pp. 27-31). The TRNC became the guarantor of Turkish-Cypriot wellbeing, allocating land, property, and jobs in state institutions and state-operated enterprises (banks, factories, hotels, farms) (Bozkurt, 2014). However, these semblances of normality have always been conditioned by the existence of the Buffer Zone. Hence, although the Turkish-Cypriot polity evoked a sense of familiarity for its citizens, it also constrained them in manifold ways. The inability to move across the Buffer Zone, or travel abroad (except to Turkey) with TRNC documents, was a prominent constraint, upon which Turkish-Cypriot normality faltered. The opening of the crossings signalled the beginning of change for Turkish-Cypriots, which the failure of the Annan Plan soon after foreclosed. Afterwards, with the crossings open, the Buffer Zone started resembling a state border in its function to control and regulate the movement of people and goods. When asked about his perception of the Buffer Zone after the failure of the Annan Plan, Mete responded:

"Interestingly after the opening of the checkpoints and encounters, and also with the 'no' vote of the Greek-Cypriots, the Buffer Zone became a border. It has become a border with checkpoints. It wasn't anymore a wall of safety, it wasn't an obstacle for hopes; it has become a border of two entities, which failed to unite. So it became more institutionalized with border checkpoints, passport controls, with regulations. It was the border of the EU in a way, de facto border of the EU. If you want to bring some goods to the other side, regulations start appearing. So it is becoming a functional border in that sense."

(Mete, personal communication, 2013 February 5)

Disappointment after the failure of the Annan Plan prompted the Turkish-Cypriot community to turn inwards, to their made-up state. Without a Cyprus Problem solution, the EU was proving unable to provide a viable way out of their economic isolation. For example, the EU instituted the Green Line Regulation to facilitate trade across the Buffer Zone, and, through Greek-Cypriot ports, the export of Turkish-Cypriot goods to EU countries. However, various regulatory obstacles and strong psychological barriers have resulted in limited real transactions (Hatay, Mullen & Kalimeri, 2008). This is only one indication of how things changed after the opening of the crossings, without bringing about radical transformation. Asked how this affected the bi-communal movement, the same interviewee observed:

"[External] intervention pulled out. Now the borders are open. You meet. Whatever you want to do, do. But this time... first the Turkish-Cypriots were upset with the Greek-Cypriots because of the 'no' vote. For a while it was very tense after the referendum, people were not talking to each other. There was

disappointment. On the other hand, daily life started taking over. People realized that this opening is not the end of the conflict; it is actually a new period. As I said, in a way it is legitimizing the border, with the checkpoints, with the institutional. Some of the Greek-Cypriots resented this because it was not changing the game; it was actually adding new dimensions to the game. It was a game-changer but it wasn't what they expected. Nothing changed. In that sense the bi-communal movement lost their meaning. So they had to come up with new ideas to bring people to be there."

(Mete, personal communication, 2013 February 5)

As daily life started taking over, the open crossings became part of the Cypriot 'normality' on both sides of the divide. Reinstated mobility was accommodated in everyday practices; some cross to the other side, some do not. In either case, the Buffer Zone is legitimated as a border. Life continues for many as 'normal', but not for all. The exasperation conveyed by another Turkish-Cypriot interviewee, who has chosen to live on the Greek-Cypriot side, is elucidating:

"It [the opening of the crossings] shifted the balance, it didn't tilt it. It shifted it to another dimension, another stability. It is like a dog. You have a leash. Your dog has two-three metres. You press the button, and your dog has another one metre. This is it. But the dog is still not free. [...] They opened up the border, so we do not have the discourse of saying "Look, there is this stupid division here. They cannot even pass". So everybody accepted it now. This makes us feel that everything is ok. It is not ok."

(Murat¹⁵, personal communication, 2013 January 31)

In the aftermath of the opening of the crossings and the failure of the Annan Plan, the de-politicization of bi-communal cooperation and relations hindered coordinated political action on the part of the bi-communal movement. The civil society of reconciliation, in which it transitioned in the following years, did not face the challenge of establishing and maintaining contact across an impermeable Buffer Zone. It needed, however, to overcome disappointment and re-emergent mistrust in both communities, and the normalization of partition. While the opening of the crossings provided opportunities for political action bottom-up, the de-politicization of bi-communalism, and the normalization of partition have allowed state authority on both sides of the divide to reassert control over all matters pertaining to the Cypriot conflict. The renewed circles of failed high-level negotiations reaffirmed the conflict's notorious intransigence, reinvigorating the official historical narratives. The role of media was again crucial in perpetuating these narratives, and fomenting antagonism between the two communities, when providing information about events on the other side or about the Cyprus Problem negotiations (Hadjipavlou & Kanol, 2008). Conflict-oriented (rather than peace-oriented) media representations also constitute part of the Cypriot normality.

'Normality' and 'normalization' as traced here through empirical material resemble the notion of 'normalization' as it appears in Foucault (1979), relating to disciplinary power. I want to argue that the disciplining mechanism in Cyprus has been the Cyprus Problem itself, and the ways the traumatic memories of the past appear to threaten the wellbeing of Cypriots in the present (and in the future). The

¹⁵ Murat is an academic, active in the civil society of reconciliation.

Cyprus Problem summarizes a complex, albeit not static, set of power relations, which, as mentioned earlier, has been producing knowledge. It is this knowledge that manifests as each side's official historical narrative, and appears in the form of subjectivities (for example, the self as victim, the 'other' as perpetrator), rationalities (for example, ability or inability to coexist peacefully, certain conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone, prejudices and stereotypes about the 'other'), and practices (for example, pursuit of partition or reunification). This knowledge has been internalized by people, resulting in the production of practices governed by it, such as the vilification of bi-communal cooperation, or cooperating but doing it quietly. Through the years of unresolved conflict, these practices have functioned as norms, which serve as tools to exert social control through punishment or reward for respectively deviating from or adhering to the norms. The castigation of bi-communalists as traitors in the 1990s, which places them on the margins of their societies, can be seen as a form of punishment. In the north, opposing the regime has had at times much more severe consequences¹⁶. These norms have also become dominant. They have produced systems of rules that impose obligations, such as avoiding actions that may result in 'implied recognition', adhering to the moral standards of crossing, reproducing antagonistic stereotypes, or not acting politically, as well as rights, such as safety, security, jobs, or the promise of rights, such as the return of refugees, or international recognition. These obligations and rights become the means of domination, which function through systems of subjection. In this sense, the norms are not imposed on people top-down by some power-holding authority; they are internalized, producing knowledge about the world, manifesting in the ways people see and understand themselves, think and act. It is through these means that power operates on people. Foucault, however, notes that the rules have no value themselves; they can be appropriated and redirected, opening up opportunities for subversion and resistance. In this sense, the dominant norms can be contested and challenged, if people find other ways to pursue their interests and secure their rights.

The opening of the crossings in 2003 disrupted the Cypriot normality, by providing Cypriots with a unique opportunity to deviate from their established norms. Crossing to the 'other' side was a way of acting, a practice, incompatible with existing knowledge. Hence, the decision to cross opened up possibilities for Cypriots to no longer do, think or be what they did, thought or were, when such choice was absent. On the 'other' side, they were encountering the 'other' anew (most for the first time). Moreover, they were encountering as well people from their 'own' side. In other words, they did not only construct new social relations, but they also reconstructed existing social relations under different, not 'normal', conditions. It was through these new, old, as well as new-but-also-old social relations that they were rediscovering old-but-new spaces. Therefore, in these encounters, time, space and sociality became intricately entangled. This is neither to say that the act of crossing was in itself subversive, nor that those who crossed did so with the intention to subvert the norm. Rather, the encounters that were made possible through crossing confronted Cypriots with discrepancies between their experienced reality and their official historical narratives. This face-off resulted either in the reinforcement of the official narrative, or in its challenge, and in some cases, in its collapse. Therein lays the shift in power relations, which threatens to subvert the status quo of partition. The opening of the crossings opened up a process of erosion of the

¹⁶ For example, the left-wing daily newspaper *Avrupa*, which started circulation in the late 1990s, has been sued and fined numerous times, forcing it to shut down in 2001. It was relaunched under the name *Afrika*, but continued to criticize the TRNC regime. It received regular threats, and was also the victim of several violent attacks. Its editor and a journalist were jailed in 2002 for insulting the TRNC president (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2002; Reporters without Borders, 2001).

official historical narratives, and of the Cypriot normality, by offering the possibility to imagine a future without the Buffer Zone.

7.6 Crossing

This chapter examined the impact of the 2003 opening of the crossings on the socialization of individuals across the Buffer Zone. It explored the transition from complete alienation, to the bi-communal movement of the 1990s, to the civil society of reconciliation after 2003. It traced the ways in which, bi-communal interaction and relations amongst individuals were depoliticized, and the ways in which this de-politicization helped shape a 'norm of conduct' that sustained the status quo of partition. It then examined the opening of the crossings in 2003 as a catalyst for bi-communal interaction. Reinstated mobility, albeit controlled, opened up opportunities for encounters impossible in the past, challenging the established 'norm of conduct'. In this chapter, the opening of the crossings was tackled, following Foucault (1977), as an 'event / episode', which uncovered the struggle of different forces, and provided the opportunity to observe the subtle workings of power, and to trace shifts in power relations. From this perspective, this chapter explored how power operates on Cypriots through the normalization of partition in public life, which has produced certain knowledge in the form of rationalities, subjectivities and practices. This knowledge, internalized, operates through a system of subjection, making the norms this chapter explored dominant. By adhering to the rules governing the norms, people pursue their interests and secure their rights. The opening of the crossings has caused a shift in power relations by offering opportunities to uncover discrepancies between what people know and their new experienced reality. This shift in power relations provided opportunities for new different practices to emerge, for the production of different knowledge, which can challenge the status quo of partition. Thus, the opening of the crossings opened up opportunities for resistance and subversion.

After the opening of the crossings, political elites remained idle, demonstrating their unwillingness to lead reconciliation processes. As a result, reconciliation took place on a personal level, through encounters between individuals, who crossed to the other side of the Buffer Zone. Despite the peaceful manner in which these encounters took place, societal reconciliation required coordinated action, which the bi-communal movement at that particular juncture failed to promote. It also failed to capitalize on the experiences and encounters of the opening of the crossings, in order to engage in coherent, coordinated and collaborative political action to promote the Annan Plan. The rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek-Cypriots, and the missed opportunity for reunification, caused disappointment amongst pro-resolution forces on both sides, and especially in the Turkish-Cypriot civil society, which had fervently fought for it against its leadership. In the aftermath of the referenda, the reinforcement of conflict culture, the renewed deadlock in high-level negotiations, and the antagonistic discourse that remerged in high politics and the media, weakened the engagement in bi-communal activities. In due time, and as the reinstated controlled mobility became part of the Cypriot normality, the civil society of reconciliation reconsidered its agenda and found new ways to engage people in rapprochement and reconciliation.

Cooperation and contact eventually took new organized and institutionalized forms, with the support and financing of the UNDP, through the UNDP-ACT and the UNDP-PFF programmes. Both

targeted specifically the advancement of civil society in Cyprus, and encouraged bi-communal cooperation by making it a prerequisite for funding. A number of CSOs with a broad spectrum of interests emerged, which in the tradition of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation largely still emphasize on cultural and educational actions and activities. Despite increased participation of CSOs in bi-communal activities, a new norm for the interrelation of the Cypriot communities has not yet been popularized. In Nicosia, which remains the centre of bi-communalism and cooperation, the small but vibrant civil society of reconciliation has made Nicosia's Buffer Zone its headquarters. There, a number of local initiatives struggle to come forth and bring about the changes they aspire to. The new practices they have developed produce new imaginaries for Nicosia and for Cyprus; some inadvertently comply with established norms, while others challenge them. The next chapter turns to these practices to examine the ways different actors articulate their visions for the future, offering opportunities for transformation, resistance and subversion. These practices materialize through reclaiming and appropriating space in Nicosia's Buffer Zone, and producing new places for cooperation, civic engagement and revolutionary praxis. In these processes, new perceptions of the Buffer Zone emerge that deviate from those underpinning the official historical narratives. As spatial practices translate into political action, Nicosia's Buffer Zone becomes a public domain of political contestation of norms, as well as articulation of new ideas, visions and demands, exposing the ceaseless struggle over power and control.

CHAPTER 8

Transcendence – Spatial Practices of Compliance and Resistance

8.1 Introduction

Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots had been living apart for longer than a generation, when controlled mobility was reinstated on the island in April 2003. Since then, nine crossing points along the Cypriot Buffer Zone have allowed controlled mobility between the island's two parts. Only two of these crossings are located in urbanised areas, both of them in Nicosia. Following the rejection of the Annan Plan, and as political elites remained idle, various civil society actors came forth aspiring to bring about bottom-up change. During my empirical work, I found that their actions and activities are centred around these two open crossing points, the Ledra Palace crossing at the periphery of the historic centre, and the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing at its heart (see Figure 37).




Figure 37: The locations of the Ledra Palace and the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossings in Nicosia's historic centre, by 'Conflict in Cities and the Contested State' (RES-060-25-0015) (Kyriacou, 2014).

In order to facilitate the examination of the practices of these civil society actors, the analysis in this chapter has been organized in two categories: 'institutionalized activism' and 'grassroots activism'. Both descriptions refer to civil society initiatives that have taken place in Nicosia after the opening of the crossings in 2003, but they are by no means mutually exclusive. The activism scene in Nicosia presents high level of complexity. Individuals and groups have been engaged, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, in various events and activities in the 1990s, and some eventually became part of the so-called bi-communal movement. Actions and activities pertaining to cooperation between the Cypriot communities have been very diverse. As people engage in multiple activities, and certain practices intersect, or are embraced by many, it is difficult to draw a line separating institutional from grassroots activists. Therefore, the categorization used here reflects the framework within which these initiatives developed, rather than grouping together their participants. The term 'institutionalized activism' is used to describe initiatives developed by civil society organizations [CSOs], and which were established under the auspices of the UNFICYP, with the financial support of external donors (such as the USAID and the EU), and with the tolerance or support of the state authorities on both sides of the divide. The term 'grassroots activism' is used to describe initiatives developed by radicalized individuals and groups in the left of the political spectrum, that have no access to institutional resources, are self-organized, and do not favour the support of the authorities.

This chapter tackles the fifth research question of this thesis, concerned with the role of current, bottom-up initiatives, taking place in Nicosia, in critically looking at established social norms, and the processes in which they were produced. Relying on the assumption that space can reproduce social norms, it examines the socio-spatial practices local initiatives have developed, and the spaces and places they have produced as they acted politically, and exerted agency. The analysis in this chapter focuses on two prominent local initiatives. Following this introduction, section 8.2 examines the Home for Cooperation, an activity centre inside Nicosia's Ledra Palace Buffer Zone crossing, which has developed into the headquarters of institutionalized activism in Nicosia. Section 8.3 examines the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement, an initiative, which claimed Nicosia's Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing between 2011 and 2012. Both initiatives have reclaimed actual Buffer Zone space, appropriated it and vested it with new meaning, marking a prominent shift in local spatial practices. Through these processes, the space of the Buffer Zone becomes transformed, reflecting the involved actors' diverse intentions and associated imaginaries for Nicosia and for Cyprus. As Nicosia's Buffer Zone is *de-bordered* and *re-bordered*, power relations are renegotiated and reconstituted, posing challenges for the 'norm of conduct', perpetuated by official historical narratives, and the status quo of partition. The Buffer Zone emerges as the locus for civic engagement and revolutionary praxis, the public domain of political contestation of norms as well as articulation of new ideas, visions and demands. The final section of this chapter elaborates on the changed socio-spatial practices of local initiatives as ruptures in the dominant historical narratives, highlighting their potential to 'transcend' partition. In this analysis, the Buffer Zone emerges as a real-and-imagined space, where domination, subjection and resistance are emplaced.

8.2 Institutionalised activism and the *re-bordering* of Nicosia's Buffer Zone

8.2.1 *The Home for Cooperation: physical access to the space in-between*

Inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, within the Ledra Palace crossing, on the periphery of the historic centre, overlooking the moat between Mula and Rokkas bastions stands the Home for Cooperation (see Figures 38, 39 and 40). Since its inauguration in May 2011, the Home, as it is called by its habitués, functions as a community centre oriented towards intercommunal dialogue and cooperation. It has developed into a sort of operational headquarters for institutionalized activism in Nicosia, offering office and work space to civil society organizations cooperating across the divide in diverse areas of interest. It houses a small library and a critical history archive, while its rooms are available for renting to organizations, groups and individuals for innovative projects and events. Additionally, it hosts on a regular basis Turkish and Greek language courses, dance and sports classes, cultural and artistic programs and occasionally film screenings, workshops, conferences and exhibitions. A cosy café, operating on the ground floor, is welcoming casual get-togethers and chance encounters amongst friends and strangers.




Figure 38: (left) The location of the Home for Cooperation inside the Ledra Palace crossing, processed (Epaminondas, 2011, p. 7).

Figure 39: (top right) The building before rehabilitation. November 13, 2007, by AHDR.

Figure 40: (bottom right) The building rehabilitated as the Home for Cooperation. November 21, 2012, by AHDR.

The building housing the Home for Cooperation today was built at the beginning of the 1950s by the Armenian Mangoian family in one of Nicosia's affluent mixed neighbourhoods at the periphery of the historic centre, amongst manor houses and shops, across the street from the leading hotel of that time, the Ledra Palace. Not long after, its surrounding area became the epicentre of violence, first during the EOKA campaign, and later during the 1963-1968 hostilities (Demetriou, 2012b; Epaminondas, 2011). Salient marks of contestation and conflict, the sandbag barriers separating Nicosia into Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot sectors in the 1960s almost touched its walls; a checkpoint controlling south-north movement was right at its doorstep (see Figure 41). Its first floor was rented to UNFICYP, while the area became increasingly militarized. It was only after the events of 1974, however, that the building, caught in crossfire, was abandoned, when the entire area fell into the Buffer Zone. The hotel Ledra Palace became the headquarters of UNFICYP, while its neighbouring buildings, as the rest of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, were left to yearlong decay and dereliction.



Figure 41: Barricade between the Ledra Palace Hotel (left) and the building, which today houses of the Home for Cooperation (right). 1964, by S.Boye Poulsen, processed in black and white (Epaminondas, 2011, p. 18).

The building remained in a dilapidated state until the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research [AHDR], a bi-communal civil society organisation working on reconceptualising history education in Cyprus since 2003, initiated the process of its acquisition. Marios E., an AHDR member, recalls how the opening of the first checkpoint in 2003, the Ledra Palace crossing, enabled this process:

“Together with other bi-communal groups we wanted to meet at some place convenient. Some of us were living in the south, some others in the north. For this reason we were holding our meetings in Ledra Palace. On our way there, we could see the Buffer Zone buildings along the now open road. These are the only Buffer Zone buildings that are accessible. Elsewhere in the city, Buffer Zone buildings are not. We thought then that it would be a good idea to get one of these buildings and turn it into an educational centre. Back then, even we were saying such thing as a joke, as something unachievable. And everyone, even those supporting our work, agreed that it would be impossible, for the simple

reason that it had never been done before. Previously of course the conditions were not favourable; there was no opening in the Buffer Zone. However, even after that, due to a habit of many years that it is [considered] impossible to do something inside the Buffer Zone, it was still thought of as impossible.”

(Marios, personal communication, 2013 January 30)

This ‘impossible’ vision, however, became a strong initiative when the AHDR secured funds from the European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein) and Norway Grants in 2009, responding to a call for application, interestingly enough, not for the creation of an educational centre but for the preservation of cultural heritage (Marios, personal communication, 2013 January 30). With the securing of financial aid, along came support from the UNFICYP, which mediated between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot authorities, and obtained their approval for the operation of the Home for Cooperation within Nicosia’s Buffer Zone. The building was purchased from the Mangoian family, and restoration works began in 2010.

The Home for Cooperation was inaugurated in May 2011 in a ceremony which was attended by many prominent international personalities, and covered by local and international media. Amongst others, present were the ambassadors of the USA, Sweden and Switzerland, representatives of the Council of Europe, of EEA and Norway Grants, and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Cyprus (Epaminondas, 2011, p. 35). This was also the first time a Greek-Cypriot and a Turkish-Cypriot leader were meeting for a reason other than negotiating for the Cyprus Problem (Kyriakos, personal communication, 2014 June 19). Demetris Christofias and Dervis Eroglu cut the ceremonial ribbon together, opening four-day-long festivities (Epaminondas, 2011, p. 35). With the inauguration of the Home for Cooperation, civil society organizations moved their meetings across the street from Ledra Palace into a space specifically dedicated to bi-communal cooperation, and aiming to become a bridge-builder between Nicosia’s communities. Five organizations have established their offices there, while many more use its premises to organize activities and events.

8.2.2 From physical to symbolic access

As highlighted in the previous chapter, the Ledra Palace was already associated, especially since the 1990s, with intercommunal interaction within the frame of the bi-communal movement. This location in-between, equally accessible to both communities, certainly lends this site spatial convenience, evident also in the presence of the Fulbright Centre and Goethe Institute, of the US and German governments respectively, in the same area. Marios emphasizes, however, that the Home became attractive to bi-communal CSOs not only because of its convenient location but also due to its symbolism:

“Nicosia is the archetype of partition. You have to choose a side even when you do not want to, where to live, where to pay your electricity bill, what police to call when you lose your wallet, etc. There is a strong symbolism. On the other side you are a guest, politically. In the Buffer Zone nobody is the other’s guest. Symbolically, it belongs to both, even when there is one Greek-Cypriot and ten Turkish-Cypriots. The Buffer Zone is closer to a sense of belonging to all. Symbolically we are co-owners.”

(Marios, personal communication, 2013 January 30)

This sense of symbolic co-ownership of the Buffer Zone space, often substituted in conversations with the term neutrality, highlighted by interviewees, comes in stark contrast to the immediate surroundings of the Home for Cooperation. The Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot checkpoints, shown in Figures 42 and 43 below, embody and represent simultaneously the dominant historical narrative on each side. Crossing into the Buffer Zone from the south, one is greeted by a blue and white¹ painted concrete roadblock. Another roadblock displays large-format photographs of the last occurrence of violence in 1996, when two Greek-Cypriot demonstrators were killed inside the Buffer Zone in Derynia. Disturbing images² from the actual scenes of the killings, reported live by the media at the time, figure prominently amongst them, accompanied by descriptions of the events in overtly nationalist language. The Greek-Cypriot checkpoint, thus, addresses those crossing towards the north, launching a warning that aims to cause fear and insecurity on interacting with the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot military.



Figure 42: The Greek-Cypriot checkpoint at the Ledra Palace crossing. 2013, by E. Berg.



Figure 43: The Turkish-Cypriot checkpoint at the Ledra Palace crossing. 2013, by E. Berg.

¹ Blue and white are the colours of the Greek flag not that of the Republic of Cyprus. Their symbolism is well- known to locals.

² In older photographs depicting the Greek-Cypriot checkpoint during its opening in 2003, one sees a different layout of this photographic material appearing under the description 'Turkish law and order' written in capital letters. One can infer that the imagery has been updated at least once since its first installation and significantly after the 2003 opening of the crossings.

The Turkish-Cypriot checkpoint also addresses those crossing from south to north. A large signpost bearing the TRNC flag and the words ‘*Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti*’ (Welcome to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) greets those who enter. Behind it, the red and white colours, which the TRNC and Turkish flags share, adorn robust checkpoint buildings, that come in stark contrast to the temporary light prefabricated structures encountered in the south. Atop them another large signpost, this time in English, reads ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Forever’ in capital letters, declaring the permanent presence of the TRNC, and with it the permanence of partition. A smaller signpost on its right reads again in capital letters ‘Welcome to T.R.N.C. You are now entering the sovereign republic’.

These two checkpoints embody and reproduce in the most coherent manner the two dominant historical narratives in Cyprus. At the same time, they are their physical manifestation, expressed not only in the materials of their construction, but also in their abundant symbolic verbal and non-verbal signs. Thus, even entering the Buffer Zone without crossing to the other side, one has to overcome the psychological and mental barriers each dominant narrative imposes, as well as criticism from their respective communities. Therefore, while the Ledra Palace crossing has rendered the Buffer Zone physically accessible, what Marios describes as symbolic access is severely curtailed for those not ‘converted’³ to bi-communalism.

This parameter, although not specifically mentioned by interviewees, seems to be ever present and well-reflected in the actions and activities of civil society groups, which focus particularly on bringing people from the wider public into the Buffer Zone. For example, one aspect emphasized in this respect is safety. The Home for Cooperation is not only conveniently located in-between, and symbolically accessible to both communities, it also offers a safe space for bi-communal activities. As Marios (personal communication, 2013 January 30) stresses, aggressive protests and demonstrations never enter the Buffer Zone, hence the space between the checkpoints is protected, not least due to the policing presence of the UNFICYP. Bi-communal activists, voluntarily displaced inside Nicosia’s Buffer Zone, choose the political and social margin of their respective community to advocate from there a different norm for the interrelation of the Cypriot communities. This chosen margin overlaps with the spatial margin between Nicosia’s two parts. The spatial, the political and the social become, thus, entwined. Simply entering the physical space of the Buffer Zone, however, is not in itself a revolutionary act; it is purposeful political action that holds transformative power, as Marios underlines:

“It has to be combined with practices... in communication... in decision-making and in the political action of the group which comes in the Buffer Zone. The Buffer Zone will not transform me. In order to capitalize on its neutrality or co-ownership, a certain relationship between the groups and the Buffer Zone has to be formed.”

(Marios, personal communication, 2013 January 30)

The practices of civil society groups choosing the marginal space of the Buffer Zone and their relation to space itself emerge, thus, as an important point in understanding transformative processes unfolding on Nicosia’s ground. In order to probe further the relationship between CSOs and the Buffer Zone space, I

³ The term ‘converted’ has been used by two interviewees, Olga (personal communication, 2013 February 1) and Mete (personal communication, 2013 February 5), to designate those involved in bi-communal activities.

focus here on the activity of the AHDR, which is aptly illustrative.

8.2.3 The vision of the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research

The Association, supported by teachers on both sides of the divide, is concerned with issues of pedagogic practice in history education in Cyprus. The organization's work aims to promote critical thinking in history teaching and learning, and through this approach to impugn the dominant ethnocentric historical narrative on each side of the divide. AHDR member Kyriakos P. notes:

"We do not impose any one historical narrative; we do not say people should believe this or that. We say that history should be read critically, through looking for sources and different viewpoints. It is a constant search for what happened. We want to question the authority of whoever says they hold the absolute truth about history."

(Kyriakos, personal communication, 2013 February 7)

In this sense, the work of the AHDR is oriented towards promoting the kind of history education that can foster cooperation and peace in divided societies. The AHDR activity is organized around four main areas of interest: a) providing training for educators through seminars, conferences, symposia and workshops, in order to promote multiperspectivity and dialogue in history education, b) developing supplementary educational materials available in Turkish, Greek and English to support primary and secondary school students, and educators, and enrich learning and teaching history with innovative booklet series, introducing investigative approaches, interactive methods, oral testimonies, gender and cultural diversity, c) conducting research on local recent history and historiography, on history didactics (also in comparison to other contexts where conflict or segregation is prevalent), and on the social, cultural and political context of history education, and d) advocating for a reform in history education in Cyprus through developing policy papers, and cooperating with the Council of Europe. Speaking to the organization's increasing credibility in Cyprus and abroad, the AHDR became the national coordinator representing Cyprus in the European Association of History Educators [EUROCLIO]. In this capacity, it participates for example in the project 'Decisions and Dilemmas III: Making Learning about the EU Motivating and Meaningful', which focuses on training educators in making learning about the EU interesting and attractive to students.

Within the frame outlined above, the AHDR has undertaken various innovative projects, such as the Cyprus Critical History Archive, which is an online database of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot newspaper articles pertaining to intercommunal relations, and often violence, in the period between 1955 and 1964. The collected raw material, which exceeds 25.000 articles, is gradually being organized in categories, digitized, and uploaded in collections, which are searchable through keywords. All uploaded articles are accompanied by a summary of the original in English, which makes them somewhat but not fully accessible to all Cypriots and foreigners. The entire database of raw material is available for research purposes in a personal computer at the Home for Cooperation. The envisaged aim of this archive was to bring to light different perceptions of and political viewpoints on the same events, as presented in two Greek-Cypriot and two Turkish-Cypriot newspapers, one of leftist and one of ethnocentric political

orientation in each community, thus exposing readers to primary sources. This initiative was developed as part of the larger 'Multiperspectivity and Intercultural Dialogue in Education' (MIDE) project⁴, which was funded by UNDP-ACT. Within the frame of the MIDE project, the AHDR engaged in research initiatives, conducted teacher training workshops, and developed its supplementary educational material. The Cyprus Critical History Archive, working together with video blogs, regular radio programmes, and television announcements, aimed to raise public awareness regarding the erroneous universality and uniformity dominant historical narratives appear to have. Moreover, by becoming a lasting and expandable tool facilitating public engagement with primary sources, it aspired to sensitize the wider public in forming their own perspective about past events. However, as Kyriakos (personal communication, 2013 February 7) informed me, the project relied on acquiring new funding to further process material, and expand its database. While it was launched towards the end of MIDE Phase II in 2013, at the moment of writing only 1.336 items from one Greek-Cypriot and one Turkish-Cypriot newspaper of ethnocentric political orientation have been uploaded; since then, having run out of resources, the project seems to have remained stagnant.

In the same direction, another AHDR initiative, the 2009 - 2014 research project 'Nicosia: The Story of a Shared and Contested City'⁵, addresses the wider public by providing access to otherwise disparate information about Nicosia's multicultural pasts. Funded by Norway Grants, this project illustrates the city's transformation in terms of population mix from 1881 until 1973 using online maps. To make these maps and time periods more relatable to people, the project also marks landmark sites for each period, providing an insight into the diverse past of familiar places and monuments. However, separate population data for the ethnic makeup of each of Nicosia's quarters after 1960 are unavailable. As a result, this online tool becomes inadequate in illustrating the city's gradual partition in ethnically homogenous sectors.

Other AHDR initiatives include the one-year project 'Meeting Point' (January 2013- January 2014), which promoted cooperation amongst the Cypriot communities through disseminating information about EU policy and regulations. Stationed at the Home for Cooperation, this project also organized activities to reach the wider public, such as storytelling clubs and other creative activities for children up to seven years old, a seniors' evening, during which oral stories about intercommunal relations were recorded, an international photo contest with 'cooperation' as its theme, and a political discussion amongst Cypriot youth about the potential contribution of education in finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem. The 'Europe Direct Information Centre, Nicosia', funded by the European Commission, was established between 2015 and 2017 in the Home for Cooperation as well, with the aim to provide information on EU legislation, EU programmes and funding opportunities, but also foster dialogue across the divide. It organized various public events, such as the 'Study in Europe Educational Fair' and an open-air summer Film Festival, as well as learning activities for children. Within the frame of the 2017 project 'Astronomy for Peace', the AHDR collaborated with the non-profit organization Galileo Mobile to organize astronomy activities for students from schools from both sides of the divide. The activities, funded directly by the International

⁴ MIDE Phase I (2009-2011) received 1.124.900 Euros. MIDE Phase II (2011-2013) received 397.555 Euros. For more information on the MIDE project visit:

http://www.cy.undp.org/content/cyprus/en/home/operations/projects/action_for_cooperation_and_trust/multiperspectivity-and-intercultural-dialogue-in-education--mide.html

⁵ For an exploration of this online tool, visit: <https://www.nicosiaproject.eu/>

Astronomical Union, Office of Astronomy for Development⁶, took place at schools and at the Home for Cooperation, and aimed to foster an interest in science, while promoting interaction amongst students. In the same spirit of cooperation, the 'Intercommunal Children's Choir', funded by the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, holds its weekly rehearsals at the Home for Cooperation since the beginning of the school year 2017-2018. Also launched in 2017 and funded by the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, the educational programme 'Imagine' focuses on anti-racism education, and engages students from both sides of the divide first in their classroom, and at a later stage in mixed activities taking place at the Home for Cooperation.

The embeddedness of all these activities in Nicosia's space is prominent. Most of them bring their participants in the Home for Cooperation inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, while those operating online bring make aspects of Nicosia's past accessible to all. In this sense, all these activities foster meaningful encounters: between participants in the Buffer Zone, between participants and space in the Buffer Zone, and between participants and the city. However, they all highlight their cultural or educational character, and remain within the spectrum of expected, socially acceptable activities, behaviours and relations to space, following the 'norm of conduct' established through depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation. Within the frame of these activities, entering the Buffer Zone is not conceived as a political act per se. The AHDR's vision, as described by my interviewees however, seems rather deviously political, as the next paragraphs illustrate.

8.2.4 A rupture in the Buffer Zone, a rupture in the dominant historical narratives

The AHDR has firmly established itself within civil society in Cyprus, forging partnerships with international organizations and donors. Through its projects and activities it has linked its approach to history education to fostering a culture of peace. Reflecting on the organization's achievements, Kyriakos (personal communication, 2013 February 7) mentions the outreach AHDR has to teachers on both sides of the divide. According to him, 90 percent of secondary school history teachers in the Turkish-Cypriot community possess AHDR educational material. In the Greek-Cypriot community outreach is less extensive, but the AHDR has reached more than 1.000 educators, and at least 500 of them have attended its seminars and workshops. Reflecting on the general impact of the AHDR's efforts, Kyriakos stresses the necessity for continued efforts:

*"People often ask us what the impact of our efforts is since 2004. And I respond that we have not achieved what we wanted in neither community, which is to impugn the dominant narrative on history issues. On the other hand, though, we have succeeded in broadening the scope of the discussion. While at the beginning the discussion was about history issues between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, now I think we can talk about history issues within each community. In other words, and I believe we have contributed to this, we have managed to cast doubt on and **create a rupture** in the perception that history is one, our history, it is objective, and the other's history is propaganda. By introducing this rupture in*

⁶ The European Southern Observatory, Education and Public Outreach Department, the Universe Awareness astronomy programme and Meade Instruments donated materials. For more information about this project visit: <https://www.columbahypatia-project.org/>

the narrative we create the space, the opportunity, to develop different historical narratives.”

(Kyriakos, personal communication, 2013 February 7, emphasis added)

The ‘rupture’ in each community’s dominant historical narrative, which Kyriakos mentions above, takes in the case of the AHDR spatial form as the Home for Cooperation. Not only do the Association’s activities take place there, but this space inside Nicosia’s Buffer Zone is the materialization of its initiators’ vision for the future. By being established firmly on the ground, with walls, doors and an address, the Home enplaces cooperation with the aspiration that it will become a new norm for interrelation amongst the people of Cyprus. Moreover, it embodies the Association’s and the other resident organizations’ practices, and takes the debate in which they engage to the public sphere, as Kyriakos underlines:

“The organization’s biggest project is this space here, the Home for Cooperation. This is a step towards overcoming the limits the Association sets for us. That means to go beyond the subject of history and dealing with history. Of course, I would say that we can never really escape history, but mostly issues of policy and production of educational material, and enter the space of public history, and how it is being negotiated in the public space of Cyprus.”

(Kyriakos, personal communication, 2013 February 7)

The AHDR projects described above can be seen as efforts to open the debate about history and its negotiation to the wider public. For the AHDR, this opening of the debate is specifically imagined in spatial terms. Future plans, as described by Kyriakos during our interview, involve increasing the accessibility of the Buffer Zone to people. Following an invitation by the UNFICYP, guided tours for the wider public inside Nicosia’s Buffer Zone were shortly contemplated. The AHDR was asked to provide suggestions on how to make use of the existing UNFICYP tour, the one I also took, as well as alternative ideas to engage the wider public with the Buffer Zone space. Nevertheless, during its initial stages this initiative was paused indefinitely, when a participant in one of the preparatory guided tours removed a bottle from the spot in which it rested since 1968. According to Kyriakos (personal communication, 2013 February 7) the UNFICYP has a zero-tolerance policy regarding fiddling with Buffer Zone artefacts. This incident spoiled the AHDR’s previously good relationship with the UNFICYP; since then, the issue of opening the Buffer Zone to the public has not been revisited. For Kyriakos, however, this endeavour is still worth pursuing in the future, as he believes that increased outreach to the wider public can be achieved through physical access to the Buffer Zone space. He sees the Buffer Zone as a tool, which can be utilized to raise public awareness about the conflict and the consequences of continued partition, thus forcing people to look critically at the past that produced both. To this end, the Home for Cooperation is a good effort, he says, which “offers the possibility to create a **rupture** in the Buffer Zone” (personal communication, 2013 February 7, emphasis added). Reclaiming and appropriating space in the Buffer Zone, and vesting it with new meaning, challenges its perceptions dead, unapproachable and unchanging, thus breaking the continuity of partition on the ground. Suggesting new ways to use the Buffer Zone in the future, Kyriakos claims, will affect how people think about the city’s and the island’s partition (personal communication, 2014 June 19). It is when people stop thinking about partition as inevitable and irreversible, he argues, that they will be interested in actively working towards a solution. Thus, for

Kyriakos, a rupture in the dominant narratives hinges on a rupture in the space of the Buffer Zone. By breaking the continuity of partition on the ground, the Home of Cooperation challenges the continuity of the narratives that support the Cypriot status quo. It becomes clear to me that for Kyriakos, the Buffer Zone's inaccessibility represents the status quo of partition, against which the AHDR's work is directed. This is why he considers the Home for Cooperation an important contribution, as it offers a concrete example of how cooperation can work, thus inspire the belief that there are benefits in participation. A wider reclaiming of the Buffer Zone by the public for their own interests and purposes remains, however, even for Kyriakos, wishful thinking:

"We do not solve the problem. We are trying to highlight the problem. The space [of the Buffer Zone] cannot really be opened to the public, for safety reasons. If only it could! We want to push things in this direction. Imagine the following: that there would be pressure from both communities, from the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot owners of property, who would want to return and use the Buffer Zone. [...] This would mean that after forty years, the status of the Buffer Zone is challenged!"

(Kyriakos, personal communication, 2013 February 7)

Here, in only few words, Kyriakos articulates the perceived limitations of the impact the Home for Cooperation and the work of CSOs, such as the AHDR, appear to have; their purpose is not to solve the Cyprus Problem, but to contribute to the extent of their abilities, towards creating favourable conditions in society for a solution that will come from above at some point in the future. This idea has been echoed in all my interviews with members of CSOs in Nicosia (personal communications, January 2013; February 2013; June 2014). Without exception, they all distanced the work of their organization from the political process of official negotiations and local politics at large, and emphasized their preparatory role and societal outlook. Thus, while working for cooperation, these actors curb their own political impact, inadvertently reproducing partition. Following the rules by which bi-communal cooperation was allowed to take place since the 1970s, they strive to remain away from the political process and the high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem. They perceive their role as preparatory, and like the bi-communal activities in the 1990s, they retain a focus on educational and cultural activities. Although they have had some success in bringing more people into the Buffer Zone, the present situation is still far from the realization of their vision for the future.

8.2.5 Criticism from within: of ticking boxes, containment, and dependencies

In light of the above observations, it did not come as a surprise that some interviewees from the civil society of reconciliation, reflecting on the situation before and after the opening of the crossings, express criticism regarding present activities and actions, including those developing around the Home for Cooperation. Olga (personal communication, 2013 February 1), an academic and researcher affiliated with Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO Cyprus Centre] speaks of the naiveté, idealism and romanticism of the bi-communal movement before 2003, when the driving argument was inherently political, i.e. to reunify. In the post-2003 era, she sees the section of reconciliation in which she is active becoming more professional, specializing not only in the type of issues with which they engage, but also in their methods

and their ways of work. The PRIO Cyprus Center for example started as a dialogue group, facilitating before 2003 bi-communal meetings in the Buffer Zone. It gradually developed into a research-oriented CSO, moved its offices from the Ledra Palace to a location close to the historic centre in the south, and has since developed a more academic outlook. Today, it focuses enriching the literature and supplying healthy debate on the Cyprus Problem, and its related issues of property and displacement, settlers, hydrocarbons and more (Olga, personal communication, 2013 February 1; Mete, personal communication, 2013 February 5). According to Olga, many bi-communal groups experienced a similar period of reorientation, and needed time to find their way after the opening of the crossings. Now they set specific goals, they “get down to business” and rely on external funding. In other words, the bi-communal movement of the 1990s has turned into the institutionalized activism the Home for Cooperation so well illustrates. This is of course an improvement in terms of goals, objectives, and level of organization, but Olga identifies a crucial downside:

*“It often seems to me a bit **self-congratulatory**. I hear about programmes about public awareness... to talk to people and convince them, empower them, and such like... or organize workshops and focus groups etc. And at the end, the focus groups are amongst us, or the empowerment is a simple discussion we have with them. And I think these things happen while we know that we have not reached the ideal, what we should have done, if we wanted to have a good focus group and if we wanted really to empower people. But there is this understanding that the project has to be done, and empowerment is maybe a box that needs to be ticked. Therefore, if we can say that we gathered twenty people and we talked to them about certain issues, and they listened, this does not mean that they will be on the streets the next day. We have ticked the box nevertheless.”*

(Olga, personal communication, 2013 February 1, emphasis added)

In consideration of this criticism, Olga expresses uncertainty regarding the impact of initiatives developing around the Home for Cooperation. She notes that there is a close circle of “the converted”, as she describes people already interested in cooperation with the ‘other’, who show up at bi-communal events. She doubts, however, that there is a significant multiplier effect in the wider societies on either side of the Buffer Zone. The lack of significant societal impact appears also prominently in an evaluation of the Cypriot civil society, which was conducted within the frame of the ‘Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution in Europe and India’ (CORE) project⁷.

In a similar vein, another interviewee, Mete H. (personal communication, 2013 February 5), affiliated researcher with PRIO Cyprus Centre as well, also expresses criticism regarding the societal impact of bi-communal activities. He describes some aspects of the bi-communal movement before 2003 as more meaningful than certain rapprochement activities following the opening of the crossings. Speaking specifically about bi-communal activities sponsored by political parties in the direct aftermath of the opening of the crossings in 2003, and the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, such as youth and women gatherings organized by AKEL and CTP, he emphasizes a prominent evasion of discussing in-depth difficult political problems, turning instead into “kebab meetings”, more about “folklore, food and drinks”

⁷ See for example, Vogel, 2013; Vogel and Richmond, 2013.

than politics. In contrast to such meetings mentioned above, according to Mete, rapprochement is indeed happening at the Home for Cooperation. Although he also comments on seeing the same people turning up at events, he also emphasizes as an especially positive aspect of the Home's position in-between, the fact that it is accessible to people who either cannot cross to the other side, such as settlers and immigrants, or do not want to cross. In the latter case, people who would otherwise have stayed away from bi-communal events become exposed to meaningful encounters. Mete, however, expresses the concern that rapprochement and the genuine interactions that result from it might remain contained in the Buffer Zone:

"It [the Home for Cooperation] is a good idea. It is a nice place and space. But sometimes I have this worry... Are we containing the rapprochement in the Buffer Zone, having no impact on the other sides [meaning outside the Buffer Zone]? [...] Because I believe that the more people cross to the other side on their individual choice, the more beneficial it is for rapprochement... to get to know the other side's story. By containing the movement in the Buffer Zone are we blocking or stopping this motivation? Because now if I want to meet my Greek-Cypriot friend, I just go to the Home for Cooperation and meet him there. I do not go to Strovolo [neighborhood in south Nicosia]."

(Mete, personal communication, 2013 February 5)

Still, he underlines that, although the societal impact is not as much as he and others in the civil society of reconciliation would want, the situation is improved in comparison to 2003. The key, Mete opines, much in line with Kyriakos and Marios earlier, is in changing people's perceptions, and the way they see the problem, to look beyond their own victimization and traumas, and hear the voices on the other side as well. Since PRIO Cyprus Centre moved its offices to the south, a conscious decision as Mete assures me, he has to cross the Buffer Zone every day to go to work. Although this may cause certain inconvenience, it also gives him the opportunity to meet people around his place of work, such as the local grocery shop owners and others working around, having casual but genuine interactions outside the Buffer Zone. He, thus, juxtaposes rapprochement in the Buffer Zone with meaningful interactions outside the Buffer Zone, making a crucial remark:

"What the establishments realized is that keeping the Buffer Zone as it is, serves their purpose. Instead of people having an event in the north, now they will have it in the Buffer Zone. It will not have a direct impact on the society. It is a place for confinement as well. So the [Turkish-Cypriot] officials love it. As long as the people meet there, and you don't have Greek-Cypriots going around and having an event here and there in the north. They are happy that they have it there [in the Buffer Zone]. Same thing with the Greek-Cypriot [officials] supporting bi-communal initiatives, so the people don't cross to the north."

(Mete, personal communication, 2013 February 5)

For other CSOs yet, the primary purpose of their work is other than cooperation between the Cypriot communities, as they are preoccupied with contemporary societal issues for which there is little to none state activity. For example, the rupture in the dominant narratives through a rupture in the Buffer Zone, which underpins the activity of the AHDR, and the establishment of the Home for Cooperation, appears to be less relevant for Katerina A. (II), associate project manager of Youth Power Cyprus

(personal communication, 2013 February 1). Youth Power Cyprus is a network of twelve Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot organizations, concerned with youth activism towards shaping “a peaceful and sustainable future, for a multicultural Cyprus”⁸. Funded through UNDP-ACT, as many of the initiatives I encountered during the period of my research, this organization is housed in the Home for Cooperation as well. According to their official statement, they provide a platform for young Cypriots aged between 15 and 35, to voice their interests, and become empowered to claim their own vision for the future through campaigning, networking, and lobbying. Empowerment, Katerina offers, is achieved through creating meaningful connections and synergies, regarding issues that concern young people on either side of the divide. In this case, rapprochement between the two communities appears to be a by-product of another primary focus. According to Katerina, young Cypriot participants are troubled, for example, by high youth unemployment and limited opportunities for youth entrepreneurship, by the financial crisis peaking at the time, by environmental issues, for example relating to energy or sustainability, by persisting stereotypes, and by the marginalization of the LGBTQ community. None of these concerns is a bi-communal issue by definition, but according to Katerina, the bi-communal aspect is a prerequisite for acquiring funding.

Therefore, youth groups who want to be affiliated with Youth Power Cyprus must factor in bi-communalism when preparing their project proposals. This means that concerns not adaptable to a bi-communal approach, although highly relevant, remain unaddressed. The apparent benefit of the prerequisite of bi-communalism, which Mete notes as well, is that working together with members of the ‘other’ community on issues of mutual concern fosters familiarity, which can lead to the collapse of stereotypes. The idea that it is through cooperation with the ‘other’ that an outcome mutually beneficial may be achieved, cultivates a culture of cooperation amongst the younger generation, which is necessary to imagine a common future. This is why, according to Katerina, the Home for Cooperation is the appropriate place for Youth Power Cyprus. Although, she also speaks of the convenience of its location in-between, and its accessibility to both communities, she highlights yet another aspect, the sense of togetherness, and the possibility of empowerment it engenders through synergies:

“Because there is a larger network of organizations here, and because this is the space where a family of civil society is gathered, here the action of the various organizations can be more powerful and coordinated. There is more contact, and many of these programmes complement one another. There are educational programmes, activities for the youth, research, funding opportunities... all these can create synergies, and this has revived the Buffer Zone of Nicosia.”

(Katerina, personal communication, 2013 February 1)

However, as Olga argues, the condition of bi-communalism requires in advance at least a certain liberal attitude towards cooperation (personal communication, 2013 February 1). This means that groups applying for funding, although not primarily interested in bi-communalism, must at least be open to the possibility of working together with the ‘other’. Although this empowering sense of togetherness in the Buffer Zone, which Katerina mentions, makes the Home for Cooperation potentially impactful for civil society at large, members of the involved CSOs are to a certain extent already “converted”, hence eventually part of the close circle of organizers and attendees of bi-communal events. This observation

⁸ For more information, visit: <http://youthpowercyprus.org/about-us/who-we-are>

feeds back to Mete's concern about containment in the Buffer Zone. Quite relevant here is his remark that CSOs in Nicosia have become as well a sort of employment sector for young university graduates, who find interest in working in the open-minded environment cultivated by the aggregate of CSOs around the Home for Cooperation (Mete, personal communication, 2013 February 5). With their wide spectrum of interests and concerns, of which Youth Power Cyprus is exemplary, bi-communal CSOs belong indeed to the most open-minded parts of the Cypriot societies. However, the dependence of these organizations on external funding places them in a precarious position, when their donors withdraw to move on to other projects.

The above-mentioned concerns are echoed in the words of another interviewee, Michalis S. (personal communication, 2013 February 5) of the bi-communal CSO Cyprus Community Media Centre [CCMC], which is also located inside the Buffer Zone, in the front yard of Ledra Palace hotel, opposite the Home for Cooperation. Although he also admits that the Home for Cooperation has brought into the Buffer Zone people who would not be reached otherwise, he also speaks about two important disadvantages of operating within the Buffer Zone. First, in line with Mete's concern on "containment" and Olga's "close circle of the converted", he describes as a "microclimate" how it is always the same people participating in events, and engaging in or organizing activities. Second, he speaks of a certain spatial distancing from Nicosia's regular urban life, as the Ledra Palace crossing lies at the periphery of the historic centre, away from areas with busy pedestrian or vehicular movement. Moreover, neither the Ledra Palace nor the Home for Cooperation is visible from outside the Buffer Zone to the occasional passer-by. As a result, it becomes even more difficult for CSOs to attract participants, creating a rather pressing need to publicize their activities. The CCMC, Michalis (personal communication, 2013 February 5) tells me, as the only community media organization in Cyprus, has largely undertaken this task.

In general, community media are distinct from mass media as they are not for profit, and aim to offer a voice to marginalized groups without access to mass media. They operate through television or radio frequencies or through the internet and social media. The CCMC caters to the communication needs of CSOs through four areas of activity: a) providing trainings, for example regarding writing press releases, or producing and editing videos, radio shows and podcasts, b) doing productions, for example promotional spots, short documentaries, or coverage of events, c) forging collaborations with mass media on both sides of the divide, and often acting as an intermediate between CSOs and mass media, or between media across the divide, and d) advocating a change of legislation regarding media in Cyprus, to include community media as an official media sector, next to licensed private commercial media and the state-funded Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation [*Ραδιοφωνικό Ίδρυμα Κύπρου*, Radiofonikó Ídryma Kýprou]. Established in 2009 and funded through UNDP-ACT, the CCMC has supported CSOs in communicating their work, and empowered them with relevant skills and tools including non-traditional areas, such as social media and blogs. It has also contributed to the coverage of bi-communal activities and relations on both sides of the divide, thus contributing as well to the rapprochement of the Cypriot communities. But as UNDP-ACT came to an end in July 2013, the CCMC faced the same problem as many other CSOs funded through it: a prominent lack of resources to continue its work, and the challenge of either finding a new donor or devising a sustainable business plan. At the time of writing, the CCMC has found a new source of financing through the Erasmus+ programme of the European Commission to continue its work in the area of communication. Part of its operational costs is covered by renting out room and equipment. According to

Michalis (personal communication, 2013 February 5), this seems to be a good prospect for the CCMC, compared with other organizations, which faced with scarcity of resources often readjust the scope of their activities in order to take advantage of available funding opportunities.

Wider societal concerns and interests bring open-minded individuals in the Buffer Zone, thus potentially recruiting them for rapprochement through the precondition of bi-communalism. Available funding opportunities, such as external, project-based funding for CSOs provided by the UNDP-ACT and the UNDP-PFF, generate two distinct disadvantages. Firstly, with the end of funding period, these newly-formed, bi-communal groups are faced with existential angst. Looking for a new source of funding is challenging. Although some might turn to other employment opportunities, Olga (personal communication, 2013 February 1) notes that because of the work already done, and of the achieved shift of perspective, these groups do indeed look for alternatives, especially when actual physical infrastructure, rather than networking or internet presence, has been produced. This holds true for initiatives without previous rapprochement background, but especially for those, like AHDR, CCMC, and the Home for Cooperation itself, which have a long and bumpy road behind them. Looking for new funding opportunities may, as Michalis notes, result in a readjustment of activity scope, which then impacts on consistency and continuity of actions. A second disadvantage is the ensuing, real or perceived, dependence between CSOs and their financiers, not only in terms of activity areas that receive funding, but also in terms of their political outspokenness. For example, when asked about the CCMC's position towards the Occupy Buffer Zone movement, which received negative commentary in most mainstream commercial media, Michalis openly admitted that this particular community-based initiative was neither supported nor covered. He attributed this stance to a conflict of interest, as UNFICYP was against the occupation of the Buffer Zone and the CCMC was operating in the Buffer Zone with UNFICYP permission, and at the time receiving funding from UNDP. Had they had another economic relationship, Michalis says, the position of the CCMC towards the Occupy movement might have been different. If there is such a potentially exclusionary filter as to which marginalized groups get a voice through the CCMC, then, despite appearances and statements that the organization remains away from political issues, its action, or in this case inaction, is deeply political.

8.2.6 The Buffer Zone challenged; the Buffer Zone re-bordered

The field of CSOs in Nicosia provides ample and extremely diverse material for consideration. For the purposes of this research project, I chose to focus on the Home for Cooperation and the organizations associated with it, as they constitute the majority of organized rapprochement-related actions and activities. This narrower focus alleviates little of the complexity, which the diverse Cypriot civil society of reconciliation demonstrates. In post-2003 Nicosia of controlled mobility, the Home for Cooperation stands at the heart of rapprochement- and reconciliation-related activism. The CSOs associated with it organize manifold events and actions, promoting cooperation and dialogue between the Cypriot communities, while tackling issues that affect vulnerable or marginalized parts of the society on either side of the divide. Conveniently located in-between, the Home for Cooperation is physically accessible to all Cypriot communities. Under the condition that the crossings remain open, it will keep providing regular access to Nicosia's Buffer Zone, under current circumstances otherwise illegal. By bringing people in the Buffer Zone, it has developed into a safe space for socialization as well, a space for meaningful encounters and

synergies, which also evokes a potentially empowering sense of togetherness. Perceived as neutral or co-owned, it fosters a sense of belonging to all, thus promoting intercommunal relations between equals. Hence, through the practices of civil society engaged in the Home for Cooperation, the Buffer Zone becomes transformed from a boundary that divides into a bridge that connects. In other words, the Home for Cooperation represents a spatialized vision of the civil society of reconciliation for the future; it becomes an exemplary niche from where to advocate a new norm for interrelation between Cypriot communities.

Moreover, physical access to the Buffer Zone holds the potential of symbolic access, as first-hand, lived experience of the Buffer Zone space holds the potential to transform the popular perception of this space as dead and unchanging. As people forge interpersonal relations, engage in genuine encounters, and appropriate space for their own purposes and uses, they challenge the set of rules, i.e. 'the norm of conduct', that the dominant historical narratives have imposed. Therein lies the potential the rupture in the Buffer Zone, embodied in the Home for Cooperation, to trigger a rupture in the dominant historical narratives. It can be argued, that the part of civil society of reconciliation engaged in institutionalized activism in Nicosia exerted agency by reclaiming real, physical space inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, and transforming it into their place for peace, the Home for Cooperation. By engaging in purposeful action, seeking change through appropriating space in the Buffer Zone, and vesting it with new meaning, actors embarked on *de-bordering*, thus turning into agentive subjects. In this process, a new peace-making narrative started taking shape in tandem with the shift in socio-spatial practices, which seeks to impugn the nationalist official historical narratives by opening the debate about history and its negotiation to the wider public. However, counter-nationalist narrative and practice is not necessarily revolutionary and subversive.

Critique coming from within the civil society of reconciliation highlights the disadvantages of initiatives around the Home for Cooperation. Containment of meaningful encounters within the real and imagined contours of the Buffer Zone serves the established status quo of partition by hindering their outreach to the wider public, the anticipated spillover effect. As a result, a 'converted' milieu of activists serves as organizers and attendees of events, becoming the usual suspects of rapprochement, while life continues in a 'business as usual' fashion in post-2003 Nicosia of normalized partition. Moreover, functioning through official procedures with a permit by the UNFICYP, and sanctioned by both the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot administrations, these initiatives necessarily abide by the rules the present status quo determines. This set of rules defines what behaviours and activities are legal⁹, acceptable and expected. As a result, the Home for Cooperation and its associated organizations have retained the apolitical profile propagated by bi-communal activities under the auspices of UN in the past, and a focus on cultural and educational activities. They fail, thus, to impact with their action and activity from the bottom up the wider political debate pertaining to the Cyprus Problem. They perceive their work as preparatory, pertaining to societal rapprochement and reconciliation of cultural differences, towards creating a basis for future cohabitation when a political solution of the Cyprus Problem is reached. Thus, the practices related to the Home for Cooperation have also become subjugated to the Cyprus Problem and its – always imminent but still elusive – solution; in other words, subjugated to the status quo of partition.

Furthermore, while after 2003 the civil society of rapprochement grew significantly, especially around the Home for Cooperation, it became more diversified in terms of interests, goals, and to certain

⁹ For example, staying overnight in the Buffer Zone is not allowed per UNFICYP regulation.

extent participants, more organized, and more visible than before, it also became highly institutionalized, project-based, and relying on international agencies for funding, as well as legitimation in the public eye. As a result, bi-communal CSOs are often seen as an employment opportunity, bending their profiles and scope of activity to respond to available funding opportunities, a situation which results in inconsistency and volatility. In this sense, initiatives such as the Home for Cooperation, when relying on external funding for their operation, and on the endorsement from international donors and local authorities for their legitimation, become vulnerable to hijacking by parallel agendas that serve the status quo of partition against which they are supposed to work. Case in point, the Home for Cooperation itself, envisaged as an educational centre, became possible only through funding intended for preservation of cultural heritage. The Europa Nostra Conservation Award, which the Home for Cooperation received in 2014, serves as an endorsement of its activity, adding to its legitimacy in the public eye. At the same time, however, it entangles the Home of Cooperation, and with it institutionalized activism at large, in the cultural heritage turn performed by the New Vision with its heritage-driven strategy for the development of Nicosia's historic centre.

To conclude, practices centred around the Home for Cooperation become embedded in the space of the Buffer Zone, challenging the dominant historical narratives, and countering partition through producing transformative knowledge. The Home for Cooperation provides a safe shared space for its supporters and members, allowing their ideas to grow and mature, but obstructing their communalization by remaining restricted by the rules, which the present status quo on the island determines. Not visible to casual passers-by and away from the buzzing life of Nicosia's historic centre, initiatives remain limited in the Buffer Zone, which despite the restored mobility, still functions as a boundary in spatial, political, and social terms. Thus, despite being challenged, the boundary is being redrawn and eventually reproduced in the practices of CSOs active in the Home for Cooperation, *re-bordering* the Buffer Zone. Institutionalized activism in the Buffer Zone after the opening of the crossings is but one way to encounter the 'other' in meaningful ways. As Mete (personal communication, 2013 February 5) remarks "of course there should be someone doing this grassroots thing". Indeed, as if to tease the institutionalised activism scene in Nicosia, another bottom-up initiative did the grassroots thing. The next section of this chapter reflects on practices taking place in Nicosia's historic centre, which engage the Buffer Zone space in protest, and which entail other meaningful encounters.

8.3 Grassroots activism: *de-bordering*, resistance, and subversion from below

8.3.1 *Opening the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing to 'normal civilian and pedestrians' activities'*

In October 2011, a few months after the Home for Cooperation opened its doors in the Buffer Zone, another initiative reclaimed Nicosia's other crossing point, the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi¹⁰ crossing at the

¹⁰ The crossing site is known to Turkish-Cypriots as Lokmaçi, named after a shop that used to sell a local cruller-like confectionary, known as lokma. Before it was cut off, Ledra Street extended northwards to meet Girne / Kyrenia Street, leading up to Girne / Kyrenia gate.

heart of the historic centre. This was the sixth crossing point to open along the Cypriot Buffer Zone in April 2008, five years after the first. The contentious process of its opening speaks to its symbolism and importance for the authorities on both sides of the divide. Today's commercial hotspots, Ledra Street in the south, and its extension in the north, were in the past one long shopping street running in a north-south axis. At the heart of Nicosia's historic centre, it intersected the west-east commercial axis, comprised of Ermou Street and Kykkos Avenue; great part of the former and all of the latter now falling within Nicosia's Buffer Zone. Ledra Street / Lokmaçi was the site where the first barricade was re-erected and manned in late 1963, and has since served as a symbol of Nicosia's partition. As elaborated in chapter 5, it has been for years a memory site for the Greek-Cypriot missing persons, charged symbolically and emotionally.

The Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing was the first, and so far the only, to connect densely populated urban areas in Cyprus. Its opening had already been agreed in 2005, when both sides concurred on UNFICYP facilitation of the opening process. On November of that year, the Turkish-Cypriot authorities decided to construct a footbridge on their side, which would elevate pedestrian crossing over the patrol track of the Turkish forces / Turkish-Cypriot security forces on the northern edge of Nicosia's Buffer Zone (United Nations Security Council Report, 2006, pp. 2-3). In this manner, military patrolling would continue under the footbridge unobstructed by the movement of civilians above. The Greek-Cypriot authorities in disagreement with the footbridge, and the reassertion of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot military presence at the crossing, withdrew consent, and as a result froze the repair and demining works on the street. The Turkish-Cypriot authorities demolished the footbridge in late December 2006, but no progress had been made in the discussions on opening Ledra Street / Lokmaçi until March 2007. Until then, on the Greek-Cypriot side, an elevated wooden platform blocked their side of the prospective crossing, providing a vantage point from where visitors could look at the decaying urbanity within Nicosia's Buffer Zone, kindling its symbolism as an 'open wound'. In March 2007, the Greek-Cypriot authorities removed the platform and replaced it with a wall made of fibreglass screens (United Nations Security Council Report, 2007, p. 3). The crossing remained closed, however, as the Greek-Cypriot authorities demanded the fulfilment of additional conditions, such as the removal of Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot military personnel from the site. According to United Nations Security Council Report S/2007/699 (2007), tensions remained heightened in 2007 as the Turkish forces / Turkish-Cypriot security forces attempted incursions into the Buffer Zone near Ledra Street / Lokmaçi, and installed video surveillance overlooking it (p. 3). Hence, the opening of Ledra Street / Lokmaçi, proposed as a confidence-building measure towards societal reconciliation on the ground, became another bone of contention between the authorities and political elites on both sides. Their efforts to control the opening process highlight their competition over power, and their attempt to exert control over the physical space of the Buffer Zone. Hence, prior to releasing the crossing to the public, political elites sought to *re-border* the Buffer Zone by disjoining and reconstituting power relations on site for public display.

In March 2008, following presidential elections in the south, which were won by Demetris Christofias, the General Secretary of AKEL, agreement was finally reached. With a left-wing government on both sides of the divide for the first time, the crossing opened in April 2008, in celebratory ambience. Demining of the area and the securing of the buildings' facades were implemented as part of the EU-financed UNDP-PFF project 'Community Development, Rehabilitation and Infrastructure' in collaboration with the NMP and local authorities. With the reinstatement of mobility in the centre of Nicosia, the NMP

envisaged the restoration of Ledra Street / Lokmaçi' s former continuity in movement as well as use, and aimed to encourage “a return to normal civilian and pedestrians’ activities” (UNDP Cyprus, n.d.). Two years after the opening of the pedestrian crossing, in February 2010, conservation works with a two-year horizon began in some of the buildings lining the street. Around the same time, and as the narrow fifty-meters-long section of street had already become busy with pedestrians moving back and forth between the two checkpoints (see Figure 44), a group of civilians entered that part of the Buffer Zone, and eventually set camp. This was the beginning of Nicosia’s own Occupy movement, known as Occupy Buffer Zone [OBZ], which lasted from November 2011 until April 2012. The violent eviction of the protesters after six months of occupation begs the question of what is understood as ‘normal civilian and pedestrians’ activities’. The following part examines the practices of the OBZ and its development up to eviction.



Figure 44: The open Ledra Street crossing, Greek-Cypriot side. March 17, 2012, by the author.

8.3.2 Greetings from the Buffer Zone: practices of resistance and subversion

The occupation of the Buffer Zone in October 2011 was not a premeditated act of transgression to provoke the authorities. It was a spontaneous form of protest, which developed organically from the involved protesters' previous activity in Nicosia's historic centre. It was, therefore, a real grassroots movement. The group of protesters included activists, students, academics, artists, and others with views situated in the political space of the left, ranging from critical liberal to radical leftist, antiauthoritarian, and anarchist persuasion (Murat¹¹, personal communication, 2013 January 31). The occupiers were part of a larger alternative scene¹², often referred to as the 'Phaneromeni crowd', which was visibly active in the historic centre, frequenting the square surrounding the church of Panagia Phaneromeni in the south, at a location very close to Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing. Some of them were inhabitants of the historic centre for years, others were newcomers, and others yet simply enjoyed the scale, proximity, ambience, and free pedestrian movement only Nicosia's historic centre offered. They found themselves increasingly suffocating by the recent expansion of consumerist spaces the advancing gentrification, mentioned in chapter 6, was bringing along. As the tables and chairs of new cafes, bars, and restaurants started taking over the pedestrianized area around Phaneromeni Square, and the nearby Onasagorou Street, free public space started disappearing. The 'Phaneromeni crowd', marginalized as it became in the process, sought to reclaim central Nicosia's public spaces through performative practice, by parading and partying on the streets (Iliopoulou & Karathanasis, 2014). Murat (personal communication, 2013 January 31) describes how one such parading event entered the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing for the first time in 2010, and held a carnival party there, gathering a crowd of more than a hundred people. Between then and the beginning of the OBZ, the 'Phaneromeni crowd' repeatedly entered the Buffer Zone at Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing in similar fashion. By October 2011, negotiations for the Cyprus Problem were once again failing to produce results, the global economic crisis had started affecting Cyprus, and the Occupy Wall Street movement in New York was receiving international attention. In this historical and political conjuncture, marrying local concerns and international solidarity, part of the 'Phaneromeni crowd' started meeting every week at the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing to discuss and protest. Soon after, these weekly meetings developed into overnight stays, and an actual encampment was set inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, as shown in Figures 45-47 (Erdal Ilican, 2013).

The protesters set their camp on the part of Kykkos Avenue falling within the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing. They were, therefore, within the Buffer Zone but clearly, at least at the beginning, not infringing on Buffer Zone space outside the limits of the area opened and designated for 'normal civilian and pedestrians' activities'. From November 2011 onwards the protesters were living in tents on the asphalted street of the crossing. Erdal Ilican (2013) describes in detail how the members of the movement organized themselves in spatial and social terms. In the limited space of the crossing available to them, they organized separate areas for sleeping, cooking, and socializing, while never blocking the movement of people crossing between the checkpoints. As the members of the movement grew in numbers, rules for cohabitation and decision-making were set collectively in a manner akin to other Occupy movements

¹¹ Murat is an academic, active in the civil society of reconciliation, and participant in the OBZ.

¹² For an informed examination of the early forms and actions of grassroots activism in Nicosia's historic centre prior to the OBZ, see Iliopoulou and Karathanasis, 2014.

PART III ENCOUNTERS

worldwide. Practical problems and ideological concerns were tackled in the General Assembly; decisions were made unanimously on the basis of inclusivity. Daily activities included discussions, demonstrations, presentations, workshops, film screenings, banner- and placard-making, art, music-playing and singing, grilling, and more; activities were happening at the spur of the moment, because “people were enjoying them” (Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31). To publicize their actions and activities, and call for participation, the protesters were printing pamphlets and stickers, but they were mostly communicating through the internet, utilizing successfully social media, especially YouTube and Facebook, and blogs.



Figure 45, 46 and 47: (top right, bottom left, bottom right) The occupation at Ledra Street crossing, March 17, 2012, by the author.

When the particularly cold and rainy for Cypriot standards winter came, some members of the OBZ entered a vacant commercial building, which stood between their camp and the Greek-Cypriot police station and checkpoint. The Kykkos building, as it is known for being property of the Kykkos Monastery, hence of the Church of Cyprus, had been abandoned by its original users in the 1960s, and was later commandeered by the Greek-Cypriot National Guard until 2008. Although it was deteriorating, it did not present structural stability problems, and it was not receiving conservation interventions as other buildings in the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing. After heated debate within the movement, the protesters eventually decided to occupy it to protect themselves from the cold and the rain. Hence, this expansion of occupation was not a political act per se, but an example of needs-based development. The ground floor became 'the people's coffee shop', while space in the two upper floors was allocated on a 'first come, first served' basis for private or public use. The members of the OBZ entered a space marked by conflict, and proceeded to inhabit it and transform it; debris, sandbags and barbed wire – remnants of continuous militarization – were removed; spaces were laboriously cleaned and repaired; bullet hole-ridden walls were painted. Some rooms were claimed for private use, while others became a common kitchen, a radio station, an art room, another coffee shop for smokers, an activity centre, and a cultural centre. As the protesters worked their way through the building, gradually recovering and cleaning rooms, new uses were gradually accommodated (Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31). Hence, as the movement moved from the street to the building, daily life in the OBZ became organized differently, but also richer and more diversified.

Throughout the six months of its lifespan, on the street and inside the building, the OBZ remained a protesting movement. Its most prominent, defining characteristic was its members' refusal to comply with the fixed categories that structured the societies they abandoned when they entered the Buffer Zone. According to Murat (personal communication, 2013 January 31), the OBZ defied hierarchies by remaining leaderless. Disillusionment with party politics was expressed through a refusal to be affiliated with political parties, including the left-wing parties, AKEL (at the time leading a coalition government in the south) and CTP in the north. Significantly, participants also rejected bi-communalism, therefore denying their categorization as Turkish- or Greek-Cypriot, which they understood as a product and reproduction of the status quo of partition. They insisted on the movement's inclusivity of all, regardless of ethnicity, disavowing discriminations on the basis of class, gender, sexual orientation, religion or race. By rejecting such processes of *othering*, prevalent in societies on both sides of the divide, they rejected the way these societies were ordered, and the conceptual boundaries, and inequalities produced by such ordering. The OBZ participants' rejection of rigid binary categories ensuing from these *bordering* processes, such as male / female, heterosexual / homosexual, haves / have-nots, Christian / Muslim, white / black, situated them on the margin of their societies. Hence, by choosing the Buffer Zone as a site of protest, the boundary produced by the most rigid process of *othering* on the island, they also appropriated its symbolism, and redefined its meaning. Nicosia's Buffer Zone became the chosen margin, offering not only an escape from societal norms, but also the opportunity for resistance and subversion.

This tenacity to resist and subvert societal norms became the cohesive substance of the movement, bringing together in agreement a rather heterogeneous crowd. This is clearly articulated in the only text the OBZ participants collectively publicized two months into the occupation, shown in Figure 48.




Figure 48: The Occupy the Buffer Zone movement announcement (OBZ, n.d.).

This statement of protest illustrates just how openly critical their demands were, not only towards the existing systems of governance in Cyprus, but also towards liberal capitalism. The OBZ demanded free education and healthcare for all, the protection of the environment, the right to housing for all, the demilitarization of Cyprus, the abolition of armies, and a solution to the Cyprus Problem founded on these principles. Hence, the OBZ was in the words of my interviewee “surrounded by the logic and the up-to-date terminology of the global economic and social politics of the road [...], speaking the language of the world as well as the language of the locals” (Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31). In this sense, the OBZ was a people’s movement, drawing attention to the pressing local and global problems, which were seen as interlinked. Hence, entering the Buffer Zone, a space of disputed legal status, where neither Cypriot establishment’s authority applied, the members of the OBZ created the opportunity to articulate

their vision for the future. This vision was radically inclusive, based on equality and fair access to resources, in tandem with a solution of the Cyprus Problem:

“If someone tells you this is a space where no authority applies, this is a space with no rules, and this is a space to dream, do you limit your dreams? So we wanted to have free education, free healthcare, we wanted to have environmentally-friendly technologies to be developed. We were saying that these things cannot be taken seriously, unless there is a solution [to the Cyprus Problem] now! NOW! Because unless there is a solution, these things cannot be addressed. It is the mother of all problems! And then we were saying we are here! See! We are here! And we are going to use humour, mimicry, we are going to talk, do art, video screenings to pass the message that a) there are alternative people who do not want to live in these structured systems, b) there are alternative and enough number of people who desire to create a third space, where all these things can be rethought of from economics and politics.”

(Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31)

The OBZ was reprimanded for the idealism and impracticality of its demands, for the lack of a political agenda, and of a proposal for ‘the day after’. To this criticism, Murat responded with a question relevant to all Cypriots:

“Some people were saying, where is your manifesto? I am not a political party! This is a movement that has these aspirations. Its form of protest is occupation of this particular space. If you like it, join! If not, then not. But do you like what these people are saying? Don’t you want your environment to be protected? Don’t you want this island to be one? Don’t you want this island to be demilitarized, human rights to be respected? To cut this nationalism, racism, xenophobia, homophobia... every shit that fucks your life? What are you doing about it? [...] The main message for me was: is there something wrong with your lives? With Cyprus? With the system? If you think there is, what is it, and what do you do about it? We think it’s these and we are here. We are not just talking about it, we are also here.”

(Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31)

Murat’s insistence on ‘being there’ seemed to be very crucial for the OBZ in a manner that significantly differentiated the movement from the instances of ‘being there’ occurring at the Home for Cooperation. Starting to unpack this dissimilarity, I realized that the OBZ achieved much more than redefining the social and spatial margin as a space for protest, resistance, and subversion of societal norms. Rather than merely making a statement and raising awareness, the OBZ participants actually practiced resistance and subversion. The OBZ was the first and only instance in the many decades of partition, when civilians attained unmediated, also unauthorized, access to Nicosia’s Buffer Zone, for the sole purpose of ‘being there’, to inhabit the space in-between. By performing everyday mundane tasks, such as cooking, sleeping, cleaning, repairing, drinking, and eating, they realized the much-discussed and anticipated ‘return to normal civilian and pedestrians’ activities’. Through this process, they broke the limitations under which institutionalized activism operated, thus transforming as well the essence and meaning of cooperation in Cyprus.

As the boundaries of binary categories collapsed in the movement's all-encompassing inclusivity, the space of the Buffer Zone became a space for meaningful encounters with multiple overlapping 'others'. In this manner, the practices in which the protesters engaged effectuated multiple simultaneous processes of *de-bordering*. Through these processes, the OBZ participants collectively negotiated the rules of engagement with each other, and with their spatial surroundings; living side by side became fruitful coexistence. In this manner, protesters did not only use or occupy space in Nicosia's Buffer Zone; they vested it with new meanings and inhabited it, creating in-between the polities they renounced, their own ideal polity. In this polity, the solution to the Cyprus Problem was not only possible but already lived. In this sense, the OBZ performed sovereignty outside and beyond state formations. Through these processes of space appropriation, imagining, and vesting space with new meaning, creating social relations, and new rules of conduct, Nicosia's Buffer Zone became transformed. Its dominant perceptions as 'dead' and 'unchanging', as well as its conceptualizations in dominant historical narratives, as a 'safety border' and as an 'open wound', collapsed, and other understandings emerged and became embedded in the actual physical space in-between. The OBZ's reclaiming of space for people's own interests calls to mind the rupture in the Buffer Zone, mentioned by Kyriakos previously. In the case of the OBZ, the rupture in the Buffer Zone straightforwardly challenged the continuity of dominant historical narratives that produced the aforementioned perceptions of the Buffer Zone. It, thus, challenged the established norm and the status quo of partition in a very real and tangible way, by providing a lived alternative in the here-and-now.

8.3.3 Denigration, othering and violent eviction

In consideration of the above, it is unsurprising that such nonconformist movement did not find supporters in the representatives of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot political elites. The same elites that inaugurated the Home of Cooperation a few months earlier, to celebrate bi-communal cooperation, did not publicly engage with the OBZ (Edal Ilıcan, 2013). Thus, in the Cypriot political life on either side of the divide, the movement remained marginal, as any engagement in discussion or negotiation would also spell its legitimization as interlocutor. This was not the case with militias and law enforcement representatives, who often payed visits to the movement to monitor its activities (Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31). The greatest asset of the OBZ, which in retrospect also contributed to its longevity, was the lack of precedent, which effectively meant the absence of a legal framework to evict the protesters. The only regulatory framework pertaining to activities inside the Buffer Zone is the mandate of the UNFICYP; as mentioned elsewhere, its Civil Affairs Section provides limited duration permits for specific civilian activities, in order to oversee them and to prevent violent confrontations. However, it does not include provisions to remove from the Buffer Zone protesting civilians who want to live peacefully together. Moreover, as Murat (personal communication, 2013 January 31) noted, a violent confrontation with peaceful Cypriots in their own land would show the UNFICYP in an unflattering light. The protesters were, thus, calmly approached by UNFICYP personnel informing them about the need of a permit to hold activities in the Buffer Zone, and received this information also in writing, presented along with a request to vacate the area.

It is important to underline that the movement's demands were never addressed by either the political elites or the UNFICYP. Attention was only drawn to the lack of permission to enter the Buffer

Zone, and the alleged conditions of occupation, deemed to constitute a public health hazard. A document, shown in Figure 49, of which multiple copies were distributed among the OBZ participants in January 2012, after they moved into the Kykkos building, listed the reasons why the occupiers' presence in the Buffer Zone was a source of discomfort: lack of authorization, health and safety risk to self and others, impeding the NMP conservation works, littering, making noise, lighting fires, and attracting feral dogs. The document, bearing the UN insignia but neither a name nor a signature, adopted a lofty didactic tone; the occupiers needed to be admonished for their own and their neighbours' good. The OBZ responded by publicizing a letter, in which they debunked each of these complaints, refocusing the discussion on the essence of the protest, i.e. the OBZ was a peaceful citizen movement, reclaiming the Buffer Zone to pursue a different vision for the future, and had no intention to leave. And stay they did, well into the spring.




Figure 49: The UNFICYP letter to the OBZ activists. January 12, 2012 (OBZ, n.d.).

The movement's contact with the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot law enforcement bodies remained unofficial throughout the occupation; exchanges with the occupiers were based on attempts to intimidate or sabotage, but an official procedure of eviction was never initiated due to the previously mentioned lack of legal framework (Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31). Eventually, on the night of the 6th of April 2012, the Greek-Cypriot police, headed by the antiterrorist squad, raided the Kykkos building, and forcefully removed the OBZ protesters from the Buffer Zone at gun point (Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31). The profoundly violent eviction of peaceful, unarmed civilians resulted, according to a Cyprus Mail article, in twenty-eight arrests, of which eleven minors, and "numerous claims of police brutality and human rights violations" (Evripidou, 2012). The violation of protesters' basic rights is corroborated by other interviewees, and also reported in the newspaper 'Gnomi' by Trimikliniotis (2012). Suspicions of drug use and drug trafficking, on which the Greek-Cypriot police claimed it acted, were proved unfounded as a total of one gram of cannabis was confiscated during the raid. What this brutal attack against the OBZ best demonstrated, however, was a rare occasion of unanimity amongst the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot authorities, and the UNFICYP in an exercise in repression and enforcement of state authority. As it would not have been possible without coordination and consent amongst all three, the raid reasserted the control of all authorities over the physical space of the Buffer Zone, and over the bodies of the protesters, which were violently brought back into the politics they abandoned during the occupation. The Buffer Zone was effectively *re-bordered*, conceptually but also materially. Metal barriers were installed to block access to the street where the OBZ encampment was initially located, and wooden panels resealed the Kykkos building. Over the next month, attempts to reoccupy the crossing were met with threats from the police (Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31). With a precedent of eviction and unnecessary use of violence against it, the OBZ dissipated by June 2012.

8.3.4 Back to 'normal': the reassertion of power and control over space

For all the trouble and irritation the OBZ caused to the UNFICYP, the absence of references to it in official documents, published following the police raid, is remarkable. The United Nations Security Council Report S/2012/507 in June 2012 made only a brief mention without naming the movement, and completely omitting the police raid:

*"Beginning in late 2011, a group of protesters had occupied the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing in downtown Nicosia. While the protest waxed and waned during the reporting period, the encampment posed a security risk and a safety and public health hazard. UNFICYP closely monitored the situation and liaised with the sides to ensure that the presence of protesters did not undermine the security situation or the smooth functioning of the crossing point. In June, the departure of the last protesters allowed the area to be restored to **normality**."*

(United Nations Security Council Report, 2012, p. 6, emphasis added)

It appears that the mundane, ordinary, and most of all peaceful, activities of the OBZ protesters did not fall within the definition of 'normal civilian and pedestrians' activities', which the opening of the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing was supposed to encourage. This seems to contradict the UNFICYP practice to facilitate activities that promote cooperation in the Buffer Zone. Page 7 of the same document reads:

“Civilian activities in the buffer zone are a natural consequence of an increased sense of overall security. Such activities, however, will only contribute to the reconciliation process if they are managed in a manner that fosters trust and cooperation.”

(United Nations Security Council Report, 2012, p. 7)

The most prominent such example is of course the Home for Cooperation, the inauguration of which was reported by the Secretary-General as a “landmark event” and “a space for inter-communal education, dialogue and research” (United Nations Security Council Report, 2011, p. 4). Unlike the practices of CSOs around the Home for Cooperation, the practices of the OBZ protesters were not seen by UNFICYP as managed properly to foster trust and cooperation, hence as not contributing to the reconciliation process. The analysis in the previous part of this chapter demonstrated, however, that reconciliation and a solution to the Cyprus Problem were actually lived in the OBZ. To unpack the perceived difference between the practices in the Home for Cooperation and those of the Occupy movement, attention must be paid to the use of the term ‘normality’ by the UNFICYP.

Chapter 7 examined the normalization of partition, and its relation to power and knowledge in the Cypriot context. In this analysis, ways of thinking, acting and being under conditions of conflict (rationalities, practices and subjectivities) were tackled as products of complex sets of power relations. Through the years of unresolved conflict, this knowledge became internalized by people, resulting in the production of a ‘norm of conduct’. This norm came to determine a depoliticized framework, within which peace-making, rapprochement, and bi-communal cooperation were allowed to operate. The Home for Cooperation, by adhering to the rules of depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation, and collaborating with the UNFICYP, was seen as operating within this framework. On the other hand, the OBZ challenged all authorities, including the UNFICYP, and acted politically. It was then seen as deviating from the Cypriot ‘normality’. The UNFICYP has for years coordinated the high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem, and liaised with both sides for various issues, ranging from the establishment of the NMP to the opening of new crossings. In its course of action, it saw the state authorities on both sides of the divide as sole arbiters over all matters pertaining to the Cypriot conflict. As a result, it continued to support depoliticized, bi-communal cooperation on the ground as a way to promote reconciliation in a neutral manner. I want to argue here that this course of action followed by the UNFICYP has rendered it part and parcel of the status quo of partition.

The differentiated treatment the Home for Cooperation and the OBZ received by the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot authorities, and by the UNFICYP, demonstrates in the most coherent manner how the struggle over power and control is emplaced on the space of Nicosia’s Buffer Zone. The practices developing around the Home for Cooperation have been sanctioned by all three authorities, and, operating by their rules, they are not considered to pose a challenge to the status quo. The practices of the OBZ on the other hand are seen as a direct challenge to the status quo, hence worthy of violent eviction. The OBZ’s challenge to the authority of the UNFICYP is emphasized by interviewees involved in the Home for Cooperation as well. Marios (personal communication, 2013 January 30) notes that all authorities, including the UNFICYP, worked together to crush the OBZ as a way to reassert their power. For Kyriakos (personal communication, 2013 February 7), the OBZ represented exactly this rupture in the Buffer Zone, which could potentially redefine it beyond the dominant historical narratives, hence a threat to the status

quo. In this sense, the status quo of partition does not only involve power relations between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot state authorities, but also power relations between these authorities and the UNFICYP, between these authorities and the people of Cyprus as their political subjects, and ultimately between the UNFICYP and the people of Cyprus. In other words, the *modus operandi* of the UNFICYP has been rendered part and parcel of the status quo, against which it is supposed to work. From this perspective, the opening of the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing can be seen as a product of negotiation amongst three authorities, the two state authorities and the UNFICYP. Within the framework of conflict normalization, without UNFICYP permission 'crossing through' appears as the only acceptable practice. This is also the 'normality' that the eviction of the OBZ restored in the area, to which the Report of the Secretary-General refers.

The notion of 'normalization' can also shed light on the resounding lack of outrage from the wider public for the violence and the reported violation of rights, which the unarmed and peaceful OBZ participants suffered. The occupation of the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing was a radical action, which deviated from the established social norm, resulting in a prominent lack of genuine and organized solidarity with the protesters. The OBZ attracted early on the interest of international media, with news reports in Reuters and *Hürriyet Daily News*, and coverage in Al Jazeera's popular social media TV show 'The Stream'. Locally, however, the occupation enjoyed limited media coverage, and limited support in the public sphere. For those who did not care to see the occupation up-close, the OBZ was at best, in the words of the Cypriot acquaintance who first mentioned it to me in casual conversation, an act of childish folly. Although individuals who were not core members of the occupation participated in some of its activities, lending the movement support, all in all the OBZ, especially outside Nicosia, did not resonate with the wider public (Olga, personal communication, 2013 February 1).

Public opinion was largely biased by allegations regarding unlawful activities in the movement, such as the use of drugs, and sexual relations between minors and adults (Iliopoulou & Karathanasis, 2014), although there were no reported cases of sexual harassment, rape or theft. These unsubstantiated *ad hominem* attacks, together with the previously mentioned complaints about noise and littering, turned the OBZ's chosen marginality against it, to further delegitimize it in the public eye. Trimikliniotis (2012) described this process as fabrication of 'moral panic' by the authorities and the mass media, which portrayed the OBZ essentially as a threat to the social order. Through this process of *othering* the OBZ was presented as an immoral, dangerous societal outsider. This distorted image shaped the majority consent to legitimize its eviction. As a result, the violence against the OBZ appeared to the wider public not only legitimate, but necessary for a return to 'normality'.

Returning to my analysis on the normalization of partition in chapter 7, the process described here can be understood along the lines of a disciplining mechanism. Following Foucault (1977), I argue that by choosing the Buffer Zone as its space of protest, the OBZ claimed, appropriated, and vested new meaning in the space that represents and reproduces the dominant order, and underpins the status quo of partition. Through this radical action, the protesters engaged in socio-spatial practices, which provided the opportunity to re-imagine the Buffer Zone, and eventually transform it, thus producing other ways of thinking, acting and being. As I have argued in this chapter, such rupture in the Buffer poses a threat to the status quo by seeking to renegotiate power relations. To this threat, the authorities responded by reasserting their control with the use of violence. The occupation of the Ledra Street / Lokmaçi crossing

can then be understood in Foucauldian terms as an ‘event / episode’, the study of which provides the opportunity to observe the workings of power, and uncovers the struggle over power and control. Its culmination in violent eviction offers an insight into the relations of ‘domination’, aptly described by Murat with indignation:

“If you are part of such group, living there for six months, you have proved that you are not violent. If you get rid of such group of people in such way, with such force, then none of you guys is safe in your homes. That means that at any point in time, when the system decides you are the ‘other’ they will fuck you up. You are not safe anywhere, if the state can enter into spaces in that fashion. If you do not conform, that means you have no life here. And that is shown to us, proved!”

(Murat, personal communication, 2013 January 31)

As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, it is not only state power that defines power relations. ‘Domination’ in Foucault (1977) produces ‘systems of subjection’ through which people internalize and adhere to the set of rules governing the established ‘norm of conduct’. It is through a process of subjection that power runs through the social body, and manifests itself in the absence of reaction and public outrage during the eviction of the OBZ protesters.

Besides the wider public, there was a prominent absence of vocal and organized solidarity for the OBZ on the part of the civil society of reconciliation¹³ as well, which must be addressed here. Murat notes, for example, that women and youth associations remained silent, despite the unwarranted violent treatment, and some injuries, suffered by women and youth during the police raid. Furthermore, although most of my civil society interviewees expressed sympathy towards the OBZ, they all spoke about its eviction as an expected, unavoidable event. However, they did not premise their perception of the unavoidability of the event on the effectiveness of the movement or the potential traction of the protest. In fact, although most of the interviewees assessed the premises of the OBZ positively, i.e. they agreed with its message and intentions, they appeared sceptical towards its effectiveness, and noted that they were for this reason either a little or not at all involved. Criticism varied. For Marios (personal communication, 2013 January 30), the lack of a political programme and a proposal for the day after was critical; for Katerina (personal communication, 2013 February 1), the OBZ did not forge synergies, or cooperate with the civil society of reconciliation, a fact that, in her opinion, curtailed its impact; Michalis (personal communication, 2013 February 5) criticized the lack of solid foundations; NMP head Athina P. (personal communication, 2013 January 30) emphasized the lack of rapport with the wider public, and characterized the OBZ non-productive and static; for Mete (personal communication, 2013 February 5), the OBZ lacked clarity and specific goals. None of these interviewees expressed criticism pertaining to the mode of protest, and chosen location of occupation, i.e. the Buffer Zone. On the contrary, it was the reclaiming and appropriation of Buffer Zone space that greatly contributed to their positive assessment.

The lack of reaction for violent eviction of the OBZ on the part of the civil society of reconciliation illustrates the function of the system of subjection, as described by Foucault (1977). The knowledge that

¹³ A bright exception is the platform of Greek and Turkish-Cypriot teachers ‘United Cyprus’, which a few days after the police raid expressed their support to the OBZ, and condemned the use of police violence against it, and the way the issue was covered by some of the press.

the Buffer Zone is considered out of limits for political action, in which the protesters engaged by protesting against the authorities and the status quo, seems to have been internalized by the other civil society interviewees. In their practices, as the example of the Home for Cooperation illustrates, they invariably reproduce social and spatial relations in forms that are known to be acceptable by the authorities, i.e. they conform to the 'norm of conduct'. When asked about the eviction, Kyriakos (personal communication, 2013 February 7) and Marios (personal communication, 2013 January 30), without hesitation, attributed the violent eviction of the OBZ to the subversive nature of the practices of the occupiers in the Buffer Zone. Hence, the extraordinary congruence of space and practice that made the OBZ threatening to the status quo, also made its eviction to appear unavoidable in the eyes of these civil society actors. The presumption of the unavoidability of the eviction, and its ensuing anticipation, rendered their reaction to it redundant.

8.4 Transcendence

This chapter analysed the socio-spatial practices of institutionalised and grassroots activism in Nicosia in the aftermath of the opening of the crossings. It focused on the two most prominent local initiatives: the Home for Cooperation and the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement. The practices of both initiatives revolved around reclaiming and appropriating space in Nicosia's Buffer Zone, and vesting it with new meanings, thus necessarily involving the renegotiation of power relations. Acting purposefully politically, the activists who were involved in these initiatives pursued change. Thus, following Björkdahl and Kappler's (2017) definition of agency, they turned from actors into agentive subjects. They effectuated change through new socio-spatial practices that challenged established power relations. However, the two examples analysed in this chapter demonstrated that agency is not only reactionary to power; it is simultaneously enabling and disabling. The next paragraphs conclude this chapter by further examining this transformative process.

The Home for Cooperation with its wide range of bi-communal actions and activities provides regular access to the Buffer Zone, under current circumstances otherwise illegal. It functions as a safe, shared space for the civil society of reconciliation, accommodating a niche, from where to advocate a new norm for interrelation amongst the Cypriot communities. In this sense, although the conflict in Cyprus is considered unresolved, it produces a place for peace in the here-and-now. In this process, the Buffer Zone becomes transformed into a bridge of connection. Furthermore, the physical access to the Buffer Zone affords those engaged in the Home for Cooperation symbolic access, holding the potential to challenge and rupture the dominant historical narratives that produced the status quo of partition. However, the apolitical profile of the cultural and educational actions and activities taking place there, and their containment in the Buffer Zone, has subjugated the Home for Cooperation to the status quo. Restricted by the 'norm of conduct', shaped within power relations between state authorities, the UNFICYP, international financiers, and the Cypriot publics, activities remain bounded by the material and ideational contours of the Buffer Zone. As a result, although working against it, the Home for Cooperation eventually reproduces the status quo. Hence, despite being challenged, the Buffer Zone becomes *re-bordered* in the practices of activists engaged in the Home for Cooperation.

On the contrary, the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement was inherently and radically political. The protesters did not only use or occupy space; they performed sovereignty in the Buffer Zone, by realizing and inhabiting in-between the polities they renounced their own vision for Nicosia and Cyprus. Through mundane everyday practices, they imagined and vested new meanings in the Buffer Zone, appropriating its symbolism, thus transforming it into their ideal polity, where a solution to the Cyprus Problem was not only possible, but already lived. Despite the lack of resonance with the wider public, this movement challenged the established norm, *de-bordering*, albeit briefly, the Buffer Zone. Through this process, Nicosia's Buffer Zone was reconceptualised as a space for resistance and subversion. This new conceptualization became emplaced in the materiality of the crossings, in-between. The movement's violent eviction *re-bordered* the Buffer Zone, reconstituting power relations and reasserting control over space. Its importance lies neither in the numbers of its participants nor in its reception by the public. The parting words of the OBZ participants, and, in a sense their legacy, written on a placard they left behind, when their attempts to reoccupy the Buffer Zone failed, were "You cannot evict an idea". The practice of Buffer Zone occupation planted this idea as a seed, setting the example for other future protests. Showing in practice how an-other way of thinking, acting, and being becomes possible, created the opportunity for new beginnings. In this sense, it did not only transform the Buffer Zone for the period of the occupation; it also transformed intercommunal interaction and cooperation beyond bi-communalism, and introduced radical, spatial practice as subversive.

These two initiatives exemplify the simultaneity of processes of *de-bordering* and *re-bordering*, and their entanglement in systems of domination and subjection within the Cypriot context. Within this frame, their socio-spatial practices provide pregnant analytical moments to understand the Buffer Zone as a dynamic social construct, constantly shaped and reshaped in the renegotiation of power relations. Rather than merely a product of state power, the Buffer Zone becomes an intersection of various imaginaries, while offering the space for their physical expression. It is there, that the dominant historical narratives are reproduced. Simultaneously, it is also there, that diverse actors claim and appropriate space for their own interests and purposes, to vest with new meanings, and emplace their vision for the future. It is, hence, there that the status quo of partition is being reproduced, but also challenged. As various practices converge or collide, the struggle over power and control is continuously taking place. As a result, the Buffer Zone becomes as much the locus for compliance with established norms, as for revolutionary praxis, articulation of new ideas, visions and demands.

The contextual and historical study of Nicosia's Buffer Zone affirmed Foucault's (1997) remark that power is productive. The socio-spatial practices of diverse agentive subjects in the Buffer Zone transformed both the material and the ideational dimensions of Buffer Zone space, producing a diversity of places. The Home for Cooperation embodies the AHDR's and other CSOs' vision for the future. It becomes simultaneously a place to meet, discuss, encounter, party, learn, work, and build peace; a place to be empowered, and a place to conform. The Occupy movement embodied its participants' vision for the future. It was simultaneously a place to inhabit, encounter, protest, resist, enjoy, demand change, party; a place to perform sovereignty, and a place to suffer violence, and be dominated. These places can be located geographically, and at a specific point in time, and they display sets of social relations. Thus, in the analysis of this chapter, space emerges as an all-encompassing spatiality. In Soja's (1996) terms, it is as much real, as it is imagined; it is simultaneously real-and-imagined.

In chapter 2, I introduced the term *transcendence* to describe the transformation of the material and ideational dimensions of the Buffer Zone through spatial practice. In this thesis, *transcendence* denotes a radical transformation in the conceptualization of the boundary with the potential to challenge power relations beyond its limits. According to the analysis in this chapter, it can be argued that local initiatives in Nicosia provide opportunities for the partition's *transcendence*. The analysis in this chapter highlighted how space, place and agency intersect in Nicosia's Buffer Zone to challenge power relations. As people's lived experience of and in space becomes transformed, perceptions of the Buffer Zone space as 'dead' and 'unchanging' are questioned. By producing new ways of thinking, acting, and being beyond the established social norms, activists in Nicosia perform a critique of the past, and of the politically laden and socially conditioned processes wherein these social norms emerged. Their critique of past experience impacts on how future experience is imagined, and on the ways people articulate and pursue the realization of these future imageries in the present. In Foucault's terms then, local initiatives in Nicosia offer opportunities to transform rationalities, practices and subjectivities: to no longer think, act and be as Cypriots have done in the past.

The observations and analysis in this chapter highlight complex and interweaving sets of relations between places (real, imagined, real-and-imagined) and between people and places. Space emerges here as more than an object to research, but as a tool for analysis intimately linked with power and knowledge. The next and last part of this thesis, serving as a conclusion, discusses the material of this and previous chapters in the broader frame of a spatial genealogy.

CHAPTER 9

The Space In-Between

9.1 Towards a Spatial Genealogy

This thesis posed five research questions to organize and guide the analysis of collected material, and correlate them with theoretical explorations undertaken in Part I. In Parts II and III, chapters 4 to 8 tackled each of them, tracing transformative processes in post-conflict Nicosia, by excavating events / episodes in the Buffer Zone's timeline that uncover the workings of power, and the knowledge it has produced, as it is traced in ways of thinking (rationalities), being (subjectivities), and acting (practices). Together, these chapters compose a spatial genealogy of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, which provides an-other way of thinking about space, power, knowledge in Nicosia, and an-other way of studying urban partition. Below I provide an overview of this process.

Part II of this thesis explored Nicosia's and Cyprus's partition. Chapter 4, **Emergence**, responded to the first research question of this thesis:

1. *If borders and boundaries are of processual nature, when, where and how was Nicosia's Buffer Zone established as a dividing boundary, in public discourse, in society, and on Nicosia's ground?*

This chapter reviewed historical and anthropological material from secondary sources, and traced the emergence of partition in Nicosia and Cyprus as a socially, politically, economically, and culturally embedded phenomenon, which eventually found spatial expression in Nicosia's first physical partition in 1956. Hence, the analysis in this chapter contests the ethnic origin of partition in Cyprus, which underpins analyses of Nicosia as a 'divided city' that tackle the Buffer Zone as a remedy for interethnic violence. Partition in Nicosia emerged as a result of shifting power relations as Cyprus transitioned from Ottoman to British rule, and from British rule to independence, within a particular historical conjuncture. These transitions entailed political, economic, and social transformations, summarized in chapter 4 as modernization. These processes of transformation brought about disruptions in the social, political, and economic life of Cypriots, as the traditional economy, social hierarchies, and authority structures collapsed, and new economic and social realities and political forces emerged. These disruptions made a new sense of community, beyond family, religion and kinship, necessary, which due to concomitant assimilation of nationalist doctrines through education, was sought and eventually articulated along ethnic lines, as Greek and Turkish. *Bordering* processes were, thus, triggered, resulting in antagonism over power and resources between the Cypriot communities, which eventually culminated in interethnic violence.

Chapter 4 revealed, however, that ethnic antagonism and conflict were not inevitable. Rather than being inherent in the Cypriot society, they were the result of struggles over power and control. Nationalist forces within each community competed for the mobilization of the working class against the British administration with forces in the political space of the Left, where alliances transcended ethnic lines.

Eventually nationalist ideologies prevailed, stifling opposition from the Left. The oppositional nationalist demands for *Enosis* / Union with Greece and *Taksim* / Partition were, thus, popularized, and pitted one Cypriot community against the other with increasing intensity.

Moreover, chapter 4 explored the premises of competing nationalisms in Cyprus, and the adversarial 'constituent truths' underpinning them. These 'truths' provided for each community a cohesive element, which came to underpin their antagonistic visions for the future. The nationalist demands for *Enosis* and *Taksim* articulated these visions in spatial terms as well, embedding the competing nationalist projects in Cyprus in space / land. Thus, space became a constituent element of the nationalist projects in Cyprus. This approach to the relation between space and conflict in Cyprus differentiates the present thesis from analyses that see territorial demands as a consequence of conflict. I posit here that claims to space / land became entangled with the two communities' visions for the future.

In chapter 4, I reflected on these findings following Foucault (1977), to trace the forms of power / knowledge in the emergence of partition in Cyprus. The transition from Ottoman to British rule, the competition between class and nationalist mobilizations, and the first eruption of intercommunal violence in the 1950s can be construed as events / episodes that marked shifts in power relations, and resulted in specific states of affairs. According to Foucault, power relations produce knowledge in the form of rationalities, subjectivities, and practices, i.e. what people know about their world, themselves, and how they act based on this knowledge. Nationalist ideologies can then be seen as a form of knowledge, a way of thinking about the world, according to which the two communities imagined the realization of their visions for the future in antagonistic terms. Based on this way of thinking, the two communities came to understand themselves as Greeks or Turks of Cyprus, and saw the 'other' in antagonistic terms. Consequently, they acted based on this knowledge by pursuing *Enosis* and *Taksim*, coming to conflict with each other. Therefore, the ethnic origin of the Cypriot conflict is itself a form of knowledge, produced within power relations, while obscuring other forms of conflict, such as class struggles.

Chapter 5, *Deepening*, responded to the second research question of this thesis:

2. *If boundaries exemplify power relations, in what ways is Nicosia's Buffer Zone implicated in the post-conflict status quo in Cyprus?*

This chapter explored the role of Nicosia's Buffer Zone in the post-conflict status quo in Cyprus. To this end, it excavated events / episodes in the period between Cypriot independence in 1960 and de facto partition in 1974. It found that during this time, the Cypriot divide was deepened, as it became entrenched in political, social and economic life in Cyprus. Nationalist political forces, which had played key roles in the conflict in the 1950s, dominated politics in both communities after independence. The antagonism between them destabilized the new bi-communal state, which was also bound by an unalterable constitution. The constitution institutionalized the divide in administrative, political and communal structures, exacerbating distrust between the Cypriot communities, leading to nationalist agitation. As pre-existing grievances were not reconciled under a unitary state, the deepened political, social, and economic divide between the two communities manifested spatially, when interethnic violence erupted in Nicosia in 1963. Nicosia was again divided on the trace of its 1956 partition, separating Greek- from Turkish-Cypriots in the capital. Soon after, as violence escalated against them, the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot community were displaced in

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enclaved areas, and the constitutional order collapsed. In both communities, nationalist forces continued to pursue the nationalist demands for *Enosis* and *Taksim* through paramilitary activity, turning not only against the 'other', but also against those in their 'own' community cooperating across ethnic lines. The involvement of the reputed 'motherlands' of the two communities, i.e. Greece and Turkey, resulted in the war of 1974, which plagued the Greek-Cypriot community disproportionately. It led to the extension of Nicosia's Buffer Zone island-wide, sealing the post-conflict status quo of deepened partition.

In the aftermath of conflict, each community produced an official historical narrative, which is centred on their 'own' suffering and victimhood, and disregards the suffering of the 'other' who is seen as perpetrator. These narratives provided for the two communities a new sense of belonging, relying on processes of *othering*, understood as *bordering* based on the theoretical exploration in this thesis. Each narrative produced a dominant conceptualization of the Buffer Zone, which helped sustain and legitimize it, while anchoring it in space. In the Turkish-Cypriot narrative, the Buffer Zone is conceptualized as a 'safety border', underlining the impossibility of peaceful coexistence, hence the imperative of partition for the Turkish-Cypriot wellbeing. In the Greek-Cypriot narrative, the Buffer Zone is conceptualized as an 'open wound', justifying claims for repatriation and reunification, which 'previous peaceful coexistence' presents as unproblematic. Thus, with the Buffer Zone as their structural element, the official historical narratives legitimized claims to statehood and territory as well. Moreover, they translated these claims into their ideal solution to the Cyprus Problem, as either permanent partition or reunification. It is, thus, a highly politicized space, serving as a constituent element of the post-conflict status quo. Within this process the Buffer Zone emerged not only as a product of a complex set of power relations, but also as a space that exemplifies and reproduces power relations.

Through the years of unresolved conflict, the Buffer Zone as a boundary between the two communities became diffused in societies, and reproduced in everyday practices, as well as everyday experience in Nicosia. As negotiations for the Cyprus Problem resulted in one deadlock after the other, the promise of solution provided political elites on both sides of the divide access to power. The continuous relevance and dominance of the official historical narratives were crucial in sustaining the demands for partition and reunification. These narratives made the interethnic conflict appear inherent, and partition inevitable, by marginalizing and silencing past and present narratives that deviated from them. The events / episodes excavated in this chapter (enclave period 1963-1968, war of 1974) unveiled how complex sets of power relations, involving local and international actors, resulted in the dominance of nationalist official historical narratives. Their dominance relied on the sustenance of conceptualizations of the Buffer Zone as a 'safety border' and an 'open wound'. These conceptualizations become most relevant in Nicosia due to the close proximity of the two communities. There, the inaccessibility of the urban part of Buffer Zone and the impression of degradation and abandonment has elevated it to a symbol in Cypriot imagination. Perceptions of the Buffer Zone as 'dead' and 'unchanging' have been popularized, becoming crucial for the continuous relevance and dominance of its conceptualizations as 'open wound' and 'safety border', hence for the dominance of the official historical narratives. In other words, perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone as 'dead' and 'unchanging' became over the years part and parcel of the status quo of partition.

Power relations are, however, not fixed, and they should not be taken for granted. According to Foucault, they should be re-examined case by case, in order to uncover the subtle workings of power in shaping rationalities, subjectivities, and practices that appear natural and timeless. This is performed in

this thesis with the analysis carried out in Part III. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 are concerned with encounters between political elites, individuals, and groups from the two communities that took place since 1974. These encounters help expose silences, irregularities, and deviations from the official historical narratives that challenge their dominance, hence the assumed continuum between conflict and peace, partition and integration.

Chapter 6, **Consolidation**, responded to the third research question of this thesis:

3. *If peace-making can be seen as a spatial project, what is the relation between peace-making processes in Cyprus and spatial practices in Nicosia that provides the framework for the operation of the Nicosia Master Plan?*

This chapter explored the relation between peace-making processes in Cyprus and spatial practices in Nicosia. This exploration, initially aiming to understand under what conditions and limitations a common planning strategy can operate in a divided city, unveiled multiple encounters at various scales. Above the level of the state, encounters occurred since the 1970s between the leaders of the two communities and the ruling political elites around them, and between them and international teams of mediators in high-level political negotiations for the Cyprus Problem. This process, known as elite peace-making, has resulted in Cyprus in repeated failures. The ensuing longevity of the conflict exacerbated insecurities and mistrust between the two communities, which remained rigidly separated by the Buffer Zone. Thus, although efforts have been made to find a solution to the Cyprus Problem, the status quo of partition became consolidated, perpetuating as well the dominance of the official historical narratives.

The initiation of the process of EU accession for the RoC in the late 1990s, which coincided with negotiations on the Annan Plan for the solution to the Cyprus Problem, shaped a particular historical and political conjuncture, which attended to a prominent shift in power relations. A new actor, the EU, became actively involved in the Cyprus Problem, seeking to *re-border* Cyprus as geographically, culturally and morally European. As a solution to the Cyprus Problem did not become a prerequisite for EU accession, the position of the RoC was strengthened at the expense of the TRNC, leading to another deadlock in peace negotiations. However, the prospect of EU accession increasingly resonated with the Turkish-Cypriot public, which had for years suffered the repercussions of political and economic isolation. The massive Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations in the early 2000s in favour of solution and EU accession constitute a deviation from their official historical narrative, which was confirmed in their vote in favour of the Annan Plan in 2004. The rejection of the Plan by the Greek-Cypriots constitutes a deviation from their official historical narrative as well.

The deviation from the Turkish-Cypriot official historical narrative could be adequately explained by the growing gap between the pursuits of formal politics and the interests of the public in TRNC, which was brought about by the challenges Turkish-Cypriots faced due to their isolation, and the continuous non-recognition of their state in the north. The Greek-Cypriot deviation from their official historical narrative, however, necessitated further consideration, providing the opportunity to examine the curtailment of public participation in peace-making processes. This held true as much in elite peace-making, which has excluded the wider public from co-shaping a solution to the Cyprus Problem, as in peace-making on the

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ground. As a result, finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem came to be seen as a prerogative of the state.

The narratives of peace-making on the ground were shaped as depoliticized bi-communal cooperation, which was necessitated by Nicosia's incomplete sewerage infrastructure. To tackle this technical problem, encounters and exchanges took place between municipal leaders, planning professionals and the UN in Nicosia. During this process, depoliticized bi-communal cooperation came to be seen as a trust- and confidence-building measure between communities in conflict, inspiring a peace strategy, known as 'post-conflict peacebuilding'. De-politicization, understood as the alleged removal of bi-communal relations from political influence, and their inability to exert influence over political discourses, became an essential strategic component of peace-making on the ground, which can be traced in all following bi-communal projects.

At the epicentre of peace-making on the ground was Nicosia Master Plan, which inaugurated a practice of peace-making as space-making. The Nicosia Master Plan became the most durable and consistent form of cooperation between the two communities in Cyprus. Although it had some positive effects in physical terms, it also institutionalized depoliticized planning practice in Nicosia. In its twenty years of operation, the Nicosia Master Plan facilitated numerous encounters between planning professionals from both communities in Nicosia. In this process, it consolidated the meaning of bi-communal cooperation along ethnic lines, reifying the ethnic binary found at the epicentre of the Cypriot conflict. Moreover, it precluded public participation from peace-making on the ground, mirroring elite peace-making. Thus, it can be argued that the design of peace-making processes, both on the elite level and on the ground, has curtailed the capacity of Cypriots to act in relation to the solution of the Cyprus Problem, as well as act in relation to shaping their urban space. In other words, the agency of Cypriot people in affecting peace-making processes has been foreclosed in tandem with their agency in affecting planning processes.

The successor of the Nicosia Master Plan, the New Vision Plan, continued in the path of depoliticized bi-communal cooperation. It formulated a new strategy for Nicosia's historic centre, which was based on cultural heritage regeneration. Within this strategy, heritage-making developed as another practice of peace-making on the ground. This strategy claimed Nicosia's Buffer Zone as cultural heritage, reimagining it as the means and the place to reconcile the Cypriot communities. As this process required a reconceptualization of heritage away from divisive ethno-nationalist connotations, it marked another deviation from the official historical narratives for both communities. This deviation became possible within the shift in power relations precipitated by EU accession. Heritage-making processes in Nicosia's historic centre provided insights into encounters and synergies between international (the UNDP, the EU, the USAID) and local actors (municipal authorities, planning and heritage professionals). Through these encounters and synergies, intersections of the European / supranational and the local were observed.

Within supranational and particularly European institutional frameworks, various sites first in Nicosia and then island-wide were reimagined as common and shared heritage of the Cypriot communities. This was supported by prominent European actions, such as the 'European Heritage Awards / Europa Nostra', the 'European Heritage Days' and the 'Europa Nostra Seven Most Endangered Heritage Sites'. These European actions inscribed heritage sites all over Cyprus in a European symbolic framework, *re-bordering* the island within European territory, while simultaneously constructing the European locally. In

this process, however, power asymmetries between the two Cypriot communities were reproduced, as European institutions officially partnered with the internationally recognized Greek-Cypriot authorities. Hence, peace-making on the ground remained embedded within the local system of power, and conditioned by the status quo on the island, which it also reproduced.

Moreover, space-making and heritage-making practices in Nicosia, aiming to bridge the ethnic divide by creating spaces where peace should take place, have produced another boundary by instigating gentrification processes in the historic centre. These processes affect Nicosia's current residents, immigrant workers and alternative youths, who comprise the weakest parts of the societies on both sides of the divide. The ethnic aspect of the Cypriot conflict has become the primary concern of peace-making on the ground. This demonstrates the extent to which the Cyprus Problem has eroded many aspects of public life in Cyprus, including planning practice. It also highlights the inadequacy of planning approaches, which focus on one aspect of urban conflict, to address the challenges residents in 'divided cities' face in a holistic manner. Although Nicosia is emphasized in relevant literature as a positive example of action taken by planners and architects before a conflict settlement (Bollens, 1999, 2001, 2009; Calame & Charlesworth, 2009; Charlesworth, 2006; Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011), these studies assume the ethnic lens of the conflict in planning for spaces of peace. In other words, they end up reproducing the very binary against which they are supposed to work.

The examination in this chapter elucidated complex and interweaving sets of power relations operating at different scales, yet impacting on one another. It excavated events / episodes (EU accession, the NMP, the New Vision) that involve supranational, state, and non-state actors, and offer insights into the ways power becomes networked, manifesting in encounters, synergies, and interactions between them (or lack thereof). The shift in power relations explored in this chapter produced modes of thinking (peace-making narratives), acting (space- and heritage-making as practices of peace-making), and being (how various actors engage in these practices and understand their effects). Hence, following Foucault, it produced certain knowledge about peace-making and cooperation across the divide in Cyprus as depoliticized. Within this process, Nicosia's Buffer Zone was claimed as common and shared heritage, exemplifying how shifts in power relations manifest in the production of space as well. Depoliticized bi-communal cooperation on technical and urban planning matters created channels of contact, and provided a scheme of working together across the divide. It precluded, however, the political impact and effects of this cooperation, contributing to the consolidation of partition on the ground. Thus, although it was successful in cultivating trust and confidence amongst professionals, it contributed to the disempowerment of the Cypriot people by foreclosing their agency in peace-making and space-making.

Chapter 7, **Crossing**, responded to the fourth research question of this thesis:

4. *If social relations are constructed within power relations, how did the opening of the crossings in 2003 impact on the socialization of individuals across the Buffer Zone?*

This chapter examined the opening of the crossings in 2003 as another 'event / episode' in the timeline of partition in Nicosia, and in Cyprus. It traced developments in the social interrelation of the two communities on the grassroots level, from complete alienation, to the formation of the bi-communal movement, to the civil society of reconciliation. Based on the analysis in this chapter, as people started

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engaging in bi-communal interaction and relations, their encounters were portrayed and perceived as depoliticized, in a manner similar to professional interactions in planning practices. This de-politicization of bi-communal relations helped shape a 'norm of conduct' that sustained the status quo of partition. This 'norm of conduct' was the result of a process of normalization of partition in public life, wherein ways of thinking, acting, and being (Foucault's rationalities, practices, and subjectivities) developed, in order to cope with the continuous elusiveness of a Cyprus Problem solution. Following this, the official historical narratives on both sides of the divide, the myths of 'previous peaceful coexistence' and 'impossible coexistence', the demands for reunification and partition, understanding of the ethnic self as victim and the 'other' as perpetrator, can all be seen as manifestations of knowledge. These ways of thinking, acting, and being became a part of what Foucault (1977) describes as a system of subjection; they have been internalized by people, resulting in the production of practices governed by their logic. Through the years of unresolved conflict, these practices have functioned as norms, and served as instruments of social control, by producing a system of rules and rights. It is through these means that power operates on people. By adhering to the rules governing the norms, people pursue their interests and secure their rights.

The opening of the crossings in 2003 disrupted the Cypriot 'normality'. Crossing to the 'other' side, and encountering the 'other' was a way of acting, a practice, incompatible with existing knowledge. The decision to cross opened up possibilities for Cypriots to no longer do, think or be what they did, thought or were, when such choice was absent. It provided, thus, the opportunity to deviate from established norms. The encounters that were made possible through crossing confronted Cypriots with discrepancies between the reality they experienced after crossing and their official historical narratives. Therefore, the opening of the crossings caused a shift in power relations, which provided opportunities for new different practices to emerge, for the production of different knowledge, which could challenge the status quo of partition. Thus, the opening of the crossings opened up opportunities for resistance and subversion.

In the following year, a significant reshuffling of sociality occurred, however broad-spectrum reconciliation processes were not catalysed, as those involved in the bi-communal movement had hoped. The meaningful encounters that occurred as people crossed to the 'other' side did not find institutional support and political legitimation, which could have contributed to new narratives and practices of peace-making. Instead, state authority reasserted itself by depoliticizing crossings, while the bi-communal movement failed to engage in coherent and coordinated political action to promote reunification through the Annan Plan. The failure of the Plan in 2004 saw the re-emergence of mistrust and conflict culture in both communities. In its aftermath, a renewed deadlock in the new round of high-level negotiations reaffirmed the conflict's notorious intransigence, reinvigorating the official historical narratives. As daily life started taking over, the open crossings became part of the Cypriot 'normality' on both sides of the divide. However, in due time, the activists involved in the bi-communal movement overcame their disappointment, and developed new actions and activities in order to promote rapprochement and reconciliation. Today a small but vibrant civil society of reconciliation is active inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone.

Chapter 8, ***Transcendence***, responded to the fifth research question of this thesis:

5. *If space can reproduce social norms, what is the role of the socio-spatial practices of bottom-up initiatives in Nicosia today in critically looking at these norms, and the processes in which they were produced?*

This chapter concluded the spatial genealogy undertaken in this thesis, by inquiring into the socio-spatial practices of institutionalised and grassroots activism in Nicosia, which developed after the opening of the crossings in 2003. It examined two prominent bottom-up initiatives, which have taken place inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, the Home for Cooperation and the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement. These initiatives concentrate the majority of actions and activities developed by the civil society of reconciliation today. Relying on the assumption that space can reproduce social norms, this chapter examined the spaces and places these activists have produced as they acted politically, and exerted agency.

In both cases, activists developed practices, which reclaimed and appropriated space inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone, and vested it with new meanings. The Home for Cooperation became the headquarters of institutionalised activism, providing space for bi-communal activities, which advocate a new norm for interrelation amongst the Cypriot communities. By producing a geographically and temporally specific place, where peace takes place despite the ongoing conflict, it came to contest the binary perception, which sees peace and conflict as antipodes. Moreover, providing physical and symbolic access to Nicosia's Buffer Zone, it transformed it into a bridge of connection, thus challenging power relations. Therein lays its potential to challenge and rupture the dominant historical narratives that underpin the status quo of partition. Nevertheless, the Home for Cooperation, abiding by the rules of the 'norm of conduct', continued to emphasize cultural and educational actions and activities. As a result, although working against it, it eventually reproduced the status quo.

The Occupy movement defied all authorities, and performed sovereignty inside Nicosia's Buffer Zone. Although only for a short period of time, the activists involved in it, inhabited their ideal polity, where a solution to the Cyprus Problem was not only possible, but already lived. They challenged the established social norms not only by producing a place for peace, but also by producing ways of thinking, acting, and being in the present, which were different than those perpetuated by the official historical narratives. The activists of the Occupy movement challenged the status quo of partition, by reconceptualising Nicosia's Buffer Zone as a place for resistance, and subversion of norms.

Through these initiatives, activists in Nicosia exerted agency by emplacing their political action, as well as new social relations. As they claimed and appropriated space for their own interests and purposes, the Buffer Zone became their chosen margin. It became perceived, conceived and lived space, thus simultaneously real and imagined, and real-and-imagined. Through these new socio-spatial practices, they transformed both the material and the ideational dimensions of space, providing opportunities for the partition's *transcendence*.

The establishment of the Home for Cooperation and the occupation of the Buffer Zone can be seen as excavated 'events / episodes' in the timeline of the Buffer Zone, which highlight complex and interweaving sets of relations between places (real, imagined, real-and-imagined), and between people and places. Moreover, they exemplify the parallel border dynamics at play in the construction of Nicosia's Buffer Zone as a boundary. The simultaneity of processes of *de-bordering* and *re-bordering*, as analysed in this chapter, and their entanglement in systems of domination and subjection within the Cypriot context, provide the opportunity to understand the Buffer Zone as a dynamic social construct, constantly shaped and reshaped in the renegotiation of power relations.

The next and final section of this chapter discusses the findings of this thesis, and contemplates their contribution to our understanding of urban partition. Moreover, it explores the contribution of spatial

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genealogy as a mode of analysis to the study of divided cities, borders and boundaries, and peace and conflict studies.

9.2 Conceptualizing the space in-between

9.2.1 *Rethinking Nicosia's Buffer Zone as a Dynamic Social Construct*

This thesis has conducted a spatial genealogy of Nicosia's Buffer Zone to see what it is that Cypriots have made and how they have made themselves in making it. To this end, it studied Nicosia's and Cyprus's partition contextually and historically from a predominantly spatial perspective. This mode of analysis has shed light on dominant narratives and practices, which have produced dominant conceptualizations and perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone. By excavating 'events / episodes' in the timeline of the Buffer Zone, it also revealed discrepancies, discontinuities, deviations, and silences in these dominant narratives, which revealed struggles over power and control, and the mechanisms of domination and subjection. In other words, this spatial genealogy has uncovered the workings of power, and the knowledge they have produced in the form of rationalities, subjectivities and practices. From this analysis, Nicosia's Buffer Zone emerged, contrary to popular perception, as neither 'dead' nor 'unchanging' dividing boundary, stuck in time, and awaiting a solution to the Cyprus Problem. The 'events / episodes' analysed in this thesis provide pregnant analytical moments to understand the Buffer Zone as a dynamic social construct with multiple spatial, social and political functions.

Over the years of unresolved conflict, Nicosia's Buffer Zone has become a symbol in Cypriot imagination, charged with emotions and vested with a diversity of meanings for Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots alike. It represents the city's partition; it is the embodiment of the Cypriot conflict and the locus of collective memory of past traumas. It is a 'safety border' and an 'open wound'. Its continuous existence underpins and makes relevant for younger generations the official historical narrative on each side of the divide. Thus, it sustains the status quo of partition, becoming an instrument of domination. It is a militarized space, made in and by conflict. It is a barrier to both communities' aspirations. It is a functional border, with crossings, with regulations and trade policies. Simultaneously, however, it is the space, which is expected to reunify Nicosia at some point in the future. It is the NMP architects' and planners' gluing area. It is Cypriot common and shared, as well as European heritage. At the same time, the Buffer Zone is the space where peace is made in the here-and-now. It has been a bridge of connection between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot activists, first for the bi-communal movement, and later for the civil society of reconciliation. It is a space of safety for their activities, a space for socialization, a space of empowered togetherness, and a space to pursue current interests beyond peace in the present. It is the space, which has the potential to cause ruptures in the official historical narratives, but also the space of compliance with established norms. It is a space of protest as well, a space of resistance, a space for subversion of societal norms. It is a space, where bodies suffer violence in the present. It is a space for multiple encounters, and a space for mundane practices. It is the space to imagine and realize an-other future. It is reclaimed and appropriated constantly by different actors, becoming an intersection of different imaginaries, while offering the space for their physical expression, resulting in the production of different places. It is there, that the

struggle over power and control is taking place, where power relations are reproduced, but also challenged. It is the space, where new ideas, visions and demands are articulated. Through these processes, the material and ideational dimensions of the Buffer Zone are being transformed, transforming along the peoples' lived experience in space, the ways they relate to past experience, as well as the ways they imagine future urban experience, and how they articulate and pursue the realization of these imageries today. The hypothesis formulated at the beginning of this thesis is, thus, confirmed.

9.2.2 Expanding spatial thinking

Through the analysis in this thesis, Nicosia's Buffer Zone emerged as a dynamic social construct, a real, as well as imagined space, and simultaneously real-and-imagined, entangled in complex and shifting sets of power relations. Moreover, this thesis illustrated the ways in which the social, the historical, and the spatial are intricately interwoven, and the need to study them simultaneously in specific contexts. Therefore, Nicosia's urban partition epitomizes Soja's (1996) *Thirdspace*. Allow me to elaborate on this.

Nicosia's Buffer Zone exemplifies the congruence of Lefebvre's (1974/2007) *perceived, conceived and lived* space, as well as the congruence of Soja's (1996) *Firstspace, Secondspace, and Thirdspace*. It is *perceived space / Firstspace* to the extent it is experienced through the senses; it can be measured and described; it is the outcome of human activity (for example, the conflict, or the processes of peace-making on the ground), and experience (for example, the trauma of 1963-1968 and 1974, or encounters in the bi-communal movement). It is *conceived space / Secondspace* to the extent that it is planned by planners and architects, conceptualized in official historical narratives, and understood through various representations (for example, in the Nicosia Master Plan and the New Vision Plan, in maps, in the materiality of checkpoints, in the materiality of its infrastructure, in symbols, texts and images). It is *lived space / Thirdspace* to the extent that it is experienced by people unconsciously, becoming a means for subjection and domination. It is also appropriated by the imagination, vested with new meanings and inhabited (for example, in the cases of the Home for Cooperation and the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement).

The spatial genealogy conducted in this thesis discovered in Nicosia's Buffer Zone other qualities of *Thirdspace* as well, which Soja (1996) explored through his approximations. Nicosia's Buffer Zone has been a space made by ethnic difference and inequality in the 1950s, and through the years of unresolved conflict continued to reproduce this difference by producing knowledge (ways of thinking, acting, and being), which relied and reproduced an 'us' vs. 'them' dichotomy, i.e. Turkish-Cypriots vs. Greek-Cypriots. This binary logic became dominant by downplaying and silencing horizontal alliances that were forged across ethnic lines, such as those in the political space of the Left and the labour movement. This process of *othering* has been ceaselessly taking place, reproducing the boundary between the Cypriot communities until today. After the opening of the crossings, the Buffer Zone was chosen by the activists of the Home for Cooperation and the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement as a space of resistance to the dominant order, providing the basis for an-other space, from where to think differently, not only about the politics of conflict, but also about history and society at large. The Buffer Zone became, thus, the chosen margin, where the binary of ethnicity collapsed, providing the space for the formation of non-exclusionary communities, and new modes of thinking, acting and being in the present. Claiming and appropriating space became in this

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process a meaningful political act, which resulted in the production of new, temporally and geographically specific places to inhabit. In this sense, producing space became an act of resistance and subversion.

Specifically in the case of the Occupy movement, the process of choosing and reclaiming the margin as a site of resistance provided the opportunity to challenge established power relations, and, through them, the status quo of partition. In this case, the Buffer Zone as the chosen margin did not only become a bridge between ethnic binary categories, but it was also transformed into a space where the binary logic collapsed. Thus, the Buffer Zone became a space for both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, and other 'others', and a space from where to contest binary distinctions, which order society at large, such as those structured around class, gender, sexual orientation, religion or race. Through their practices and lived experience in the Buffer Zone, the activists of the Occupy movement questioned the very definition of binary categories, modelling a way of thinking and being in the world, which is heterogeneous, yet inclusive, incomplete, flexible, and changing. This new way of thinking and being entailed more than hybridization between binary categories; it entailed self-transformation through purposeful political acts, resulting in a new, radical way of being, enunciated in and from the Buffer Zone, with the potential to transform a sense of community outside its contours. The activists involved in the Home for Cooperation, although not in such radical ways, pursued similar processes of self- and community-transformation through their socio-spatial practices in the Buffer Zone. Following the analysis in this thesis, it can be argued that the Buffer Zone became for them all a space of empowerment.

Through the analysis in this thesis, the space of the Buffer Zone emerged as a dynamic social construct, which facilitates encounters between various actors across time, and accommodates a variety of meanings, socio-spatial practices, and spatial, social, and political imaginaries. Therefore, following Foucault (1986), it can be argued that the Buffer Zone displays the qualities of *heterotopias* as well. It can be seen as a counter-site, which simultaneously reproduces and challenges sets of power relations. In a single real place in-between Nicosia's two sectors, it juxtaposes several spaces, "several sites that are in themselves incompatible" (Foucault, 1986, p. 25). It is simultaneously a dividing boundary, representing the status quo of partition, and a site of resistance and subversion, contesting the status quo of partition. It is the space where peace is made, inverting conflict, and the site where various imaginaries beyond peace and conflict are embedded. The Buffer Zone can only be fully understood, if considered in relation to Nicosia's and Cyprus's realities, the space outside its contours. This thesis has explored some of the ways in which the Buffer Zone reflects or contradicts these realities, by providing an insight into the workings of power in making them. As Foucault's *heterotopic sites*, the Buffer Zone too involves a system of opening and closing (the open crossings), which makes it isolated and porous at the same time. Through this system, the Buffer Zone becomes accessible, physically and mentally, hence open to transformation.

Nicosia's Buffer Zone offers a concrete, empirical example, which enriches and expands the spatial paradigm Soja initiated in *Thirdspace* with evidence from the field. In this manner, the spatial genealogy undertaken in this thesis realizes his urging to think 'from space', and provides an-other way of thinking about power, knowledge and space in Nicosia, and an-other way of studying urban partition. Rather than merely functioning as another approximation to *Thirdspace*, however, this study of Nicosia's Buffer Zone introduces the mode of spatial thinking presented above to the study of divided cities, borders and boundaries, and peace and conflict.

9.2.3 Thinking from space: imbuing the study of divided cities, borders and boundaries, and peace and conflict with spatial awareness

Spatial genealogy as a mode of analysis prioritizes the study of space as a category of inquiry. In this sense, it does not only seek to understand space as an object of study, but to explore as well how the production of space intersects with the production of knowledge (rationalities, practices and subjectivities), social relations, and power relations over time in specific contexts. This mode of analysis can inform the scope of inquiry offered in literature about divided cities, borders and boundaries, and peace and conflict.

Conflict and the divided city

The present thesis challenged the ethnic origin of partition in Nicosia, moving away from approaches in 'divided cities' literature, which assume a narrow scope, dominated by the prevalence of ethno-nationalist conflict as the cause of urban partition. These approaches disregard the fact that cities host multiple, overlapping, and often interrelated contestations and conflicts, unfolding simultaneously. The study of Nicosia's Buffer Zone in this thesis examined how space and conflict are mutually constituted in power relations. It showed that partition is a socially, politically and economically embedded phenomenon, which also manifests physically. Hence, urban partition cannot only be addressed as a discord in the urban fabric in need of remediation. Analyses must shift focus from urban partition as the product of conflict, to the multiple and intersecting processes that produced it. In order to achieve this, spatial interventions, which aim to address urban partition, need to be founded on an understanding of space as more than the material surface against which things unfold. Moreover, studies on 'divided cities' must shift attention away from top-down, state-oriented approaches, which primarily focus on urban policy-making, and explore bottom-up processes unfolding on the ground as well. This thesis has shed light on the simultaneity of top-down and bottom-up processes of transformation, both of which produce spaces and places of peace and conflict. A shift of focus away from the state can provide insights into the contemporary interests and concerns of urban dwellers in divided cities, beyond the prevailing mode of conflict. Furthermore, the study of Nicosia's Buffer Zone challenged the assumption, on which the works on 'divided cities' explored in chapter 2 are predicated, that a linear transition exists between conflict and stability, between partition and spatial integration. This thesis showed that conflict and stability, partition and spatial integration, coexist, and are constantly negotiated in urban space by different actors simultaneously, hence implicated in the struggle over power and control. It also showed that urban partition is not only a condition to be remediated; it can be productive as well, giving rise to opportunities for social and political transformation.

The study of borders and boundaries

In order to move away from the narrow scope of ethnic polarization encountered in the 'divided cities' literature, the present thesis situated the study of Nicosia's partition within border and boundary studies. By doing so, it focused on power relations and their constant renegotiation, placing emphasis on *bordering* processes. It has tackled Nicosia's Buffer Zone as a simultaneously spatial and conceptual entity, which is both a social product and an ongoing process. Moreover, this thesis studied *bordering* in Nicosia as a historically contingent process. The spatial genealogy approach it offered has uncovered and

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examined various boundary-producing practices and discourses, through which the Buffer Zone has been reproduced in social life in Cyprus. Through this analysis, Nicosia's Buffer Zone emerged as a highly complex boundary, where territorial and conceptual constructs become entangled. Furthermore, this thesis demonstrated that *bordering* processes take place at various scales simultaneously, and involve a variety of actors beyond the level of the state, which has dominated the border studies literature. It traced state-produced perceptions of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, and gradually shifted focus to people-produced perceptions, which emerge bottom-up, through people's everyday experiences and practices. In this process, it uncovered the parallel border dynamics at play, entangled with shifts in power relations, and the simultaneity of *bordering*, *de-bordering* and *re-bordering* in Nicosia's historic centre.

The refocusing of scale away from the state provided the opportunity to explore and problematize border openness, which is a recurrent subject in the contemporary study of borders and boundaries, in relation to urban partition. While openness relates to border crossing and transgression, urban partition is addressed in relevant literature according to a binary logic of permanence or removal of the boundary. In Nicosia, the opening of the crossings in 2003 catalysed encounters between people, and between people and places inside and across the Buffer Zone. In these various encounters, although the physical boundary was still in place, some people overcame various mental and imaginative boundaries, and engaged in practices, which challenged the status quo of partition. In these instances, the boundary was there, yet simultaneously it was not. I introduced the term *transcendence* to describe this process. *Transcendence* is conceptualized as more than mere crossing of the boundary; it is understood as the transformation of its ideational dimensions with the potential to challenge power relations. *Transcendence* in the present thesis does not imply the dissolution or removal of physical borders and boundaries, rather a radical transformation in their conceptualization. In these encounters, binary distinctions, which have structured analyses in border studies, such as 'us' and 'them', 'here' and 'there', 'inside' and 'outside' collapsed. For example, in the cases of the Home for Cooperation and the Occupy the Buffer Zone Movement, the Buffer Zone became simultaneously here-and-there, inside-and-outside; distinctions between 'us' and 'them' were denounced. These are not hybrid categories, bringing the two ends of the binaries together; they entail transformation of their constituent parts into something radically inclusive. In Nicosia's case, urban partition was transformed into an inclusive space 'in-between', where new rationalities, practices, and subjectivities found expression. This example provided the opportunity to enrich contemporary research in border and boundary studies with the more encompassing understanding of spatiality traced in this thesis, by contemplating the 'in-between', in terms of its spatiality, temporality, and sociality, as well as its critical function and efficacy.

Peace and Conflict Studies

The analysis in this thesis contributes to recent literature in the field of Peace and Conflict Studies, which interrogates established definitions of conflict-war, peace and peace-making. Traditional approaches to peace and conflict are structured around a binary distinction between war-conflict and peace, and the assumption that the transition from one to the other is linear. In recent literature, peace and war-conflict are tackled as phenomena that coexist, involving various interrelated actors at different scales. The present thesis has specifically drawn from Björkdahl and Kappler (2017), who tackle peace-making as a spatial project, in order to conceptualize peacebuilding agency through spatial practices. They see conflict-war

and peace as always emplaced, and choose space and place as vehicles to explore peacebuilding agency. However, they conceptualize 'space' and 'place' too schematically; 'space' is framed as an immaterial, imaginary phenomenon, occupying the ideational dimension, while 'place' as its material counterpart, i.e. space appropriated, inhabited, given meaning and interpreted.

This thesis has borrowed their conceptualization of agency as linked to transformative processes. It has traced how peace-making from above (high-level negotiations for the Cyprus Problem), and peace-making on the ground (peace-making as space-making and heritage-making in Nicosia) have curtailed public participation, hence the agency of Cypriots to shape both their solution to the Cyprus Problem (peace), and their urban space (where peace is supposed to take place). Turning to local, bottom-up initiatives, it explored how agency was exerted through everyday (spatial and social) practices that challenged established power relations. Through reclaiming and appropriation of space, emplacement of new meaning, and lived experience, various actors in Nicosia exerted agency, not only producing spaces and places for peace, but also producing spaces and places as a way to pursue their interests and act politically. Nicosia's case exemplifies Björkdahl and Kappler's (2017) thesis that peace and conflict coexist, and that peacebuilding agency is manifested in processes of spatial transformation. It furthers their endeavour by predicating this analysis on an expanded, all-encompassing understanding of 'space' as simultaneously real, and imagined, and real-and-imagined. Neither 'space' nor 'place' can be divorced from material and ideational dimensions, leading to a collapse of binary distinctions. Spaces of conflict, such as Nicosia's Buffer Zone, can simultaneously be spaces of peace, as well as spaces of subjection, resistance and subversion, exclusion and inclusion. Following this, through spatial transformations, various forms of agency, besides peacebuilding agency, are exercised, which need to be acknowledged and examined. This becomes possible by prioritizing the study of space in analyses, in tandem with attention to agency of actors inhabiting spaces, and their actual lived experience.

9.2.4 The space 'in-between'

Thinking from space in the study of divided cities, borders and boundaries, and peace and conflict means to move away from binary distinctions, such as 'peace/conflict', 'inside/outside', 'here/there', 'us/them', 'partition/reunification', and examine the grey matter in-between, in order to explore what happens at the interstices. This means to depart from the perceived exceptionality of urban partition, which guides these analyses. Nicosia's Buffer Zone is an exemplary case to study ethno-nationalist conflict, urban partition, and ethnic boundaries, but these exceptional situations are not all there is to it. The focus of this thesis on the entanglement of space, power, and knowledge, has uncovered processes, which take place simultaneously.

My analysis traced some of the ways in which the exceptionality of the Cyprus Problem, understood as an ethno-nationalist conflict, has acquired a prime position in social and political life in Cyprus, overshadowing issues beyond the ethnic conflict, which have become more acute, hence more relevant for people in Nicosia today. Local initiatives have increasingly become preoccupied with the pursuit of interests beyond the Cypriot conflict, focusing on issues such as inequalities, discrimination, racism, LGBTQ rights, environmental protection, and opportunities for the youth, which transcend ethnic

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lines. All these issues remain unaddressed by municipal and state authorities on both sides of the divide, using the primacy of the Cyprus Problem as a pretext. In Nicosia in particular problem-solving approaches, such as those provided by integrated urban planning, are geared towards the perceived effects of the ethnic conflict. As a result, they exacerbate or even generate inequalities as they strive to counter partition. In their efforts to create shared spaces for an imagined Greek-and-Turkish-Cypriot future community, they disregard the real and acute concerns of residents, such as advancing gentrification, in the here and now.

The spatial genealogy conducted in this thesis excavated 'events / episodes' in the Buffer Zone's timeline that highlight complex and interweaving sets of relations between places (real, imagined, real-and-imagined) and between people and places. In this analysis, the Buffer Zone emerged as a position of enunciation *in-between*, challenging power relations, and facilitating the production of new forms of meaning, and the exercise of agency. Following this, the 'in-between', as explored in the example of Nicosia's Buffer Zone, concentrates the qualities of Soja's (1996) *Thirdspace*, while rectifying its shortcomings; it, thus, expands spatial thinking beyond *Thirdspace*. The 'in-between' is simultaneously space as real, imagined, and real-and-imagined, without the sense of hierarchy, to which *Thirdspace* alludes. It can be geographically and temporally specific, but also simultaneously the host of various imaginaries. It does not only bring together the distinct ends of binary positions; it fuses them into something extraordinarily inclusive. This is, however, not a static hybridization, but entangled in power relations, hence constantly made and remade. Explorations of the 'in-between' must take into account time, as it is through the relation of space and time that transformative processes can be understood. Finally, the 'in-between' facilitates the exercise of agency; it is there that power relations are negotiated. It should not, however, be seen as liminal, merely in the process of becoming, but as already being at any given moment, simultaneously, the space where various imaginaries find expression. Therefore, the 'in-between' elucidates as well the entanglement of the spatial, the historical, and the social.

9.3 Suggestions for further research

Although the exploration of Nicosia's Buffer Zone and of the space in-between in this thesis ends here, the genealogical inquiry is by no means concluded. By thinking from space about the entanglement of space, power, and knowledge, this thesis went beyond the exceptionality of its case study, and uncovered processes that would have otherwise remained obscure. Nicosia's partition has been diachronically employed as an instrument of social control, inclusion and exclusion, beyond the ethno-nationalist conflict. The recent claims to Nicosia's Buffer Zone constitute no exception. In this respect, in Nicosia and in Cyprus more relevant than the discussion on the Cyprus Problem is the contemplation of the terms and conditions under which this discussion has been taking place, and the debates it has overshadowed along the way. Future research can address the curtailment of public participation, and the marginalization and silencing of people's voices and political action. Moreover, attention must be paid to contemporary issues, such as gentrification, which are in Nicosia as present as in any city.

The present thesis provided a perspective for spatial analysis as critique, which considers the simultaneity of phenomena at multiple scales. It expanded spatial thinking through the conceptualization of the 'in-between', and it demonstrated how this expanded spatial thinking can inform the study of divided cities,

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borders and boundaries, and peace and conflict. This thesis serves as an invitation for researchers in urban studies to use its method of analysis to study other kinds of spaces historically and contextually, and through these explorations to enrich and expand spatial thinking, and expose discontinuities and deviations, uncover silences, probe irregularities, contingencies, and errors that have shaped conceptions of things we consider given and immutable.

APPENDIX I – A chronology of events in Cyprus

1878	Britain assumes administration in Cyprus, which remains under Ottoman sovereignty
1914	Britain annexes Cyprus
1925	Cyprus becomes officially a British colony
1955	EOKA begins guerrilla war against British rule in pursuit of Enosis with Greece
1956	Nicosia's first partition
1959	End of EOKA campaign
1960	Cyprus becomes an independent, bi-communal state
1963	Proposal of constitutional amendments. Eruption of intercommunal violence
1964	UNFICYP is established Turkish-Cypriots become isolated in enclaves Nicosia's second partition
1968	Easement of Turkish-Cypriot isolation.
1974	Coup, backed by the Greek junta, against the Greek-Cypriot government of Cyprus Turkish invasion Nicosia's Buffer Zone extends island-wide - de facto partition
1977	High Level Agreement on an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic
1980	The Nicosia Master Plan is initiated
1983	The declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
1998	Initiation of the EU accession process for Cyprus
2002	Negotiations begin on the basis of the Annan Plan
2003	Crossings open between south and north for the first time since 1974
2004	The Annan Plan is put to vote. It is accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots by 65 percent, but rejected by the Greek-Cypriots by 76 percent. Cyprus becomes an EU member state
2006	Contacts for a new round of negotiations Agreement on confidence-building measures
2008	Opening of Ledra Street / Lokmaci crossing in Nicosia Fully-fledged negotiations commence
2010	Limnitis/Yesilirmak crossing opens
2011	Home for Cooperation is established Occupy the Buffer Zone Movement begins
2012	Occupy the Buffer Zone movement is evicted from the Buffer Zone
2015	Formerly stalled negotiations resume
2017	Negotiations are stalled again
2018	Two new crossing points open in Dherynia and Lefka / Aplici

APPENDIX II – Expert interviews

Expert interviews were conducted with the following individuals:

Katerina A. – Employee in the Greek-Cypriot Municipality of Nicosia / Nicosia 2017 Project

Katerina served as second coordinator in the Nicosia 2017 project, working on the city's campaign to become European Capital of Culture. Nicosia's bid was based on the notion of promoting peace in a divided capital, by rebranding and redefining the city through changing the Buffer Zone in Cypriot imagination. She organized and supervised numerous events, and after the bid's dismissal, she continued working on its successor 'Project Nicosia'. Her perspective offered on one hand insights into the participants' aspirations, while on the other revealed its controversies.

Eleonora – Nicosia resident, architect

Eleonora is a Nicosia resident and architect, who works in the city's historic centre. In the early stages of research she offered insights about regarding living and working in Nicosia. Her positive experience comes in stark contrast to popular perception about the historic centre's safety.

Katerina A. (II) – Associate Project Manager for Youth Power

Katerina An. is an associate project manager for Youth Power, a civil society network of 12 NGOs funded by Action for Cooperation and Trust in Cyprus (UNDP-ACT), promoting bi-communal work and youth activism. The platform's activities incorporate research on youth opinions and attitudes, media outreach and communication tools, towards the aim of developing an island-wide action plan on the role of youth in peacebuilding.

Dinos C. – Consulting Engineer (previously City Engineer)

Dinos has been working in the Municipality of Nicosia as a city engineer since 1972. After 1974, he was the head of the Greek-Cypriot team of Nicosia Master Plan until 2001. He possesses unique knowledge of the changes urban environment underwent during and after partition, as well as most valuable experience concerning bi-communal planning and cooperation, since he has been the leader of numerous projects. He conveyed unique first-hand knowledge regarding the ambience of collaboration between the two communities over time.

Olga D. – Senior Research Consultant at PRIO Cyprus Centre

Olga, a social anthropologist, has carried out fieldwork in western Thrace and Cyprus, and has been working on issues of human rights, minority-state relations, refugeehood, gender, and migration. Amongst other issues, she has written on processes of reunification, and the dynamics of EU accession of Cyprus. She is currently co-editor and book reviews editor at the journal *The Cyprus Review*. Her current research

focuses on the process of political subjectivization in conditions of conflict and inequality, and particularly on the shaping of subjectivity through concepts of 'loss' and 'abandonment'.

Marios E. – Member of Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR)

Marios is a teacher and board member of the AHDR, involved in the founding of the Home for Cooperation (H4C) in 2011, which today accommodates seven CSOs, and serves as a meeting and activity centre for intercommunal cooperation and dialogue. Located in the Buffer Zone, H4C aims to contribute to its transformation by breaking established perceptions.

Murat – Nicosia resident, academic, activist

Murat is a Turkish-Cypriot academic who lives in the Grek-Cypriot side of Nicosia. His research interest includes the making of sovereignty, the changing property / land rights and the contestation of authority in Cyprus. A highly critical mind, aware of his marginal position in both societies, he participated in the Occupy the Buffer Zone movement. His insight into the movement's short life, motives, goals and impact is precious. Our discussion opened up ways of understanding the civil society and shed new light into the current situation in Nicosia and Cyprus.

Ayla G. – Senior Research Consultant at PRIO Cyprus Centre

Ayla is working at the PRIO Cyprus Centre since 2002, after her early retirement from the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) in Famagusta. She is actively involved in bi-communal cooperation. Between February 2003 and April 2004, she worked as the Turkish-Cypriot coordinator of the PRIO administered 'Public Information Project'. This project's goal was to disseminate objective and easily understood information on the 'Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem', known as the Annan Plan.

Mete H. – Senior Research Consultant at PRIO Cyprus Centre

Mete has been a political analyst and freelance writer since 1985, primarily researching and writing on the Cyprus conflict, Cypriot cultural history, immigration, and ethnic and religious minorities in Cyprus. He has taught at Near East University and Cyprus International University, and served as a board member of the Turkish-Cypriot Education Foundation. He is currently serving as a board member of the Turkish-Cypriot Human Rights Foundation, and a member of the editorial board of *The Cyprus Review*. His contribution to my understanding of the Turkish-Cypriot society's transitions during the last decade was crucial.

Gregoris – Nicosia resident, academic, activist (refused to be recorded)

Gregoris is an academic and activist, describing himself as an independent, progressive leftist scholar. He is politically active in antiauthoritarian circles in Nicosia. His research interests revolve around understanding industrial relations and class structure in Cyprus. During our talk, he was able to summarize the development of the bi-communal movement and activism in Nicosia.

Maria M. – Planning Officer A', Head of European Affairs Office (Greek-Cypriot Municipality of Nicosia)

Mavrou is a sociologist currently working as the Head of European Affairs Office. She started her career as one of the two sociologists working with Nicosia Master Plan between 1983 and 2003. Her work as part of the Greek-Cypriot team was to conduct field research, with the goal of identifying the socio-economic profile of different areas in the historic centre, and their changing patterns. The data her team collected were evaluated and implemented in policymaking and regeneration projects.

Fevzi O. – Nicosia resident, architect

Fevzi is a Turkish-Cypriot architect, and refugee from the south, who has been involved in bi-communal activities for years. He is currently assisting the Kontea Project regarding the restoration and preservation of heritage in a former Greek-Cypriot village (Kontea / Turkmenkoy) in Northern Cyprus. This project, a result of collaboration between the former Greek-Cypriot refugees and the current Turkish-Cypriot residents, is exemplary for its bottom-up character.

Kyriakos P. – Member of Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR)

The Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR) was founded in 2003 by Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot teachers, researchers and scholars from various fields of the humanities, with the aim to facilitate a continuous, open dialogue about enhanced pedagogic practices and historical research in Cyprus. Kyriakos presented to me various projects and activities, taking place at the Home for Cooperation.

Panikos P. – Engineer in the Greek-Cypriot Municipality of Nicosia, Technical Services

Panikos is an engineer currently working at Nicosia's Technical Services in the 'Studies' department. This department is mainly responsible to conduct technical studies. During our discussion he focused on the main urban problems Nicosia faces, and how these are (not) tackled in policymaking.

Athina P. – Head of the Greek-Cypriot team of the Nicosia Master Plan (NMP)

Athina is an Architect Conservator with 23 years of practicing experience. She has been working in various bi-communal Nicosia Master Plan projects since 1999. The past 20 years she focused on urban regeneration projects, ranging from building restoration and reuse, urban interventions, and regeneration strategy development. As the head of the Greek-Cypriot team of the NMP, she was in the position to answer questions regarding the assessment of NMP's work, its future objectives, as well as past and present shortcomings.

Pambos P. – Kontea Project Coordinator

Pambos, a retired mechanical engineer, is the man at the heart of the Kontea Project, which was initiated by the Kontea Greek-Cypriot Community Council in 2006 under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme. Although this bottom-up initiative aimed to protect and restore abandoned and deteriorating cultural heritage in the village, Pambos emphasized as its most significant achievement the constant and active collaboration between the former and current residents towards this goal, and the interpersonal bonds that have been forged between participants.

N.S. – Lieutenant Colonel in Civil Affairs Section of UNFICYP (refused to be recorded and named)

N.S. had been serving in UNFICYP for two years at the time of our interview. He reached the limit of his service in Cyprus soon after. He offered the official UN position as well as his personal (unofficial) opinion on the subject of the Cypriot conflict. He was the contact who arranged my Buffer Zone visit. Moreover he gave me the unique opportunity to visit the abandoned since 1974 Nicosia airport situated inside the Buffer Zone at the outskirts of Nicosia.

Michalis S. – Community Media Coordinator at Cyprus Community Media Centre

Cyprus Community Media Centre is an organization aiming to establish community media in Cyprus, and support its members (local organizations and community groups) by means of: 1) providing training, 2) offering coverage of events, 3) facilitating collaboration between Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot media, and 4) promoting the legal enactment of community media in Cyprus. Michalis is one of the six staff members, currently responsible for reaching out to media to promote the work of civil society organizations, and a contributor in an online newspaper, 'The Cyprus Weekly'.

Orestis – Old Nicosia Revealed photography group

Orestis is a photographer, who together with two friends initiated the 'Old Nicosia Revealed' project, aiming to capture the essence of the historic centre, and help preserving its memories of various pasts. He is active in the civil society of reconciliation.

Katerina – Activist (refused to be recorded)

Katerina, a member of the Occupy Movement, and resident of the historic centre shared with me the experience of political and social awakening that introduced her to Nicosia's antiauthoritarian scene.

Marios – Activist (refused to be recorded)

Marios is a resident of Nicosia's historic centre since 1981. He provided information on the beginnings of the bi-communal movement, and the history of activism in Nicosia. This interview led to an interesting discussion about gentrification in Nicosia, the effects of the Nicosia Master Plan and its vision for the city, which significantly differs from the inhabitants' aspirations.

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