

Communities in Space and Discourse
Towards a spatial dialectic in gated residential developments

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Katharina Sucker

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Gutachter:

Prof. Ursula Damm
Prof-Dr. rer. pol. habil. Frank Eckardt
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Asu Aksoy

Tag der Disputation:

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- Assistenz bei der Durchführung der Interviews vor Ort
- Hilfestellung bei Verständigungsproblemen in der türkischen Sprache

2. Orhan Esen

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Introduction

It seems that there has never been a greater amount of knowledge on the social structuring of cities. The greater our knowledge becomes, however, the harder it gets to gain an overview of the enormous amount of qualitative and quantitative data readily available for any city and any subject of choice. Nevertheless, research proceeds, driven by the feeling that there are still a number of aspects that have been forgotten, the knowledge of which might provide us with the necessary tools to regulate and influence the decisions that shape our cities.

At the same time, urban research is witnessing a standstill. Aware of the fact that most aspects of urban development have been looked at not only from one perspective, but from many, we are forced to go back to the beginning and to reflect on the knowledge and the data that has already been produced.

The now widely-used dichotomy of the 'Global North' and the 'Global South' – going back to the observation that cities across the Global South have grown not only at extraordinary speed, but also in ways and directions that differ in many respects from their antecedents in the Global North – has merged together with a series of doubts on the foundations of theory, and its applicability for the times we live in.

It becomes apparent that while existing theories are readily employed for cities in the Global North, they fail to explain developments observable in the Global South. Questions that concern the discipline of urban studies have thus shifted away from accumulating data and digging deeper and deeper down established paths of research, towards the general applicability of theory and the grounds for our understanding of contexts and situations.

While urban sociologists now collectively use a wider range of methods than ever before, they are faced with proof that the accumulated knowledge does seldom have a direct effect on decision-making processes. The modernist conviction that knowledge brings about change has been exposed as an illusion in the context of our times. On the contrary, it seems that knowledge as it is produced is being absorbed into politics that continue to function with devastating effects for our cities.

A widely-reached cross-disciplinary conclusion concerning urban studies is therefore to reformulate the aims of research, and to rethink the ways in which research can influence the process of decision-making.

Throughout this research, with this question in mind, I will argue that cities in the era of neoliberalism are not the result of a decision-making process which is 'participatory' in a modern democratic sense, but which is also not the result of a shrinking community of actors, reduced to the circles of state functionaries and the private sector. My argument is that the often-assumed shift from government planning towards a take over of the

private sector in the interest of capital accumulation is overly simplistic. Various scholars of the neoliberal city argue that the 'passivity' of governments relates to the fact that governmental actions in the neoliberal city have shifted away from their prior regulating functions towards a more activating one. In this research I will refer in particular to the work of critical geographers on the neoliberal city, especially Annika Mattissek (in relation to urban marketing) and Georg Glasze on issues of borders and insecurity.

The approach and perspective of critical geographers in Germany goes back to a Foucauldian analysis of power, reconsidered by poststructuralist social theory. Looking at the neoliberal city through the eyes of political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, the perspective of critical geographers is that of regarding the totality of sectors and institutions from both the public and the private realm as being entangled in a mutually supported continuation of the neoliberal paradigm. Chantal Mouffe argues that, while in the earlier stages of capitalism, the state had remained a body exterior to the economy – regulating the markets, but otherwise underlying its own political programmes – it now requires a much more complex set of economical rules, social codes, identities and symbolisms to legitimize its existence.

Neoliberalism is therefore fostered through the actions and decisions of all individuals in society, shifting beliefs of power and responsibility away from governments or big economic players towards other aspects of cultural reproduction and social discourses. These views are decisive for an understanding of the city in which society and the urban realm are reciprocally linked, demanding a methodological context that appreciates this. A crucial point for my choice of approach is the conviction that analysing authorship of the city as being something socially produced can open up possibilities for other forms of intervention and influence through a redefinition of a political or a public sphere.

In order to understand authorship of the city in its greater complexity, this research project combines an analysis of the built environment with an analysis of its collective imagination in a discourse-analytical approach. By looking at contemporary residential development in the city of Istanbul, I will examine the reciprocity of spatial production on one hand, and social discourses on the other, in order to contribute to a methodology that accommodates for a growing importance of space in social theory. My focus on real estate is based on the circumstance that real estate production is now one of the major driving forces of the global economy, and the largest driving force of the Turkish economy, which has its focal point in Istanbul. The effects of global crisis are felt the most in homelessness and housing foreclosures, which go hand in hand with rising property costs and rents. Real estate, in particular private residential real estate, is now evidently more than an asset, but a central influence in the way cities are organized economically and socially.

In recent years, the Buell Centre of Real Estate Studies at Columbia University in New York has determined that housing foreclosure in the US is related to a shift away from

the question of housing towards a question of the private home. Proposing to discuss the idea of housing as a question of 'housing the American dream', they argued that while dependent on a global finance system, cities do now collectively underlie the hegemony of a neoliberal logic, which, just like capitalism, has its own modes of legitimacy and language of social engagement. Their radical thesis was that the privately owned home constitutes a crucial intersection between socially produced dreams and the finance system, and that foreclosure cannot result from a struggle against the finance system, but by changing the dream instead.

Brought back into a more general context, 'The American Dream' (as it is referred to) relates to how social groups imagine their position or future position in the urban society, inventions that are continuously influenced and changed by intra-, and trans-urban social dynamics. Embedded in the global mainstream, such fictions translate into locally unique forms of appropriation – producing place-specific forms of legitimacy and engagement. In traditional urban studies, these matters of scale have been dealt with via a separation of various theoretical approaches; one dealing with the economical structuring of cities and the distribution of power connected to it, and the other dealing with the cultural and social aspects of urban dynamics. The result has been that rather than combining findings in an integrative explanatory model, economic and cultural aspects are discussed inconsistently, and as if in competition with one another.

While economic factors are often related to the production of the built environment, cultural dynamics (including community dynamics, aspects of belonging and identity) are relegated to the sphere of cultural or anthropological studies where they get lost in the spatial debate.

This debate is carried forward particularly by people like Martina Löw or Doreen Massey, but a comprehensive sociology of space remains underdeveloped. No theoretical model exists, in fact, that illustrates the correlation between space-making and social development. It is therefore important to work within a methodological framework that accommodates for all aspects of urban development in a complex analysis of both macrostructure and microstructure. The assumption of this research is that this is only possible by accounting space a central role in urban development and change. The attainment of the role of urban space as functional, as a container and a product, has been described and analysed in much detail. Such scrutiny, however, has yet to be applied to the visual and communicative forms of engagement that the built environment possesses in the formation and change of society. The aim to which this research aspires is thus a fundamental understanding of how space is operative in social discourses and therefore influential to everything that concerns social reality.

2. Method and Approach

2.1. Discourse analysis in urban research

For the largest segment of sociology, the spatial environment remains out of range. In modernity, the understanding of the city, as well as of architecture, has been reduced to something that *happens* parallel with society.

A change of paradigm in conceptualising space, also known as “spatial turn”, considered that it is not enough for space to be the subject of analysis, but that in order to fully understand it, it would be necessary to integrate space into a way of thinking about society. Central to this turn was the critique of modernist tendencies to regard architecture as a representation of society. The aspired relationship between form and function as a grammar of modernist planning and construction followed an ideal of rationality. The relationship between form and function was considered rational. Hence, one only needed to look at space in order to 'know' how it was used and by whom. With the firm belief in the ghost of rationality, an understanding of the city as a kind of mirror of society caused a belief in its readability.

Space as a kind of language that has letters, words and grammar, cannot go beyond any representational concepts – a circumstance that caused critique and a shift away from the city as text to the city as medium, and then as event (Dreyer 2011). A remnant of the belief that the physicality of the built environment holds a kind of key to unlock the codes of social life is still present in an overly complicated and self-contradicting semiology of the city called “socio-semiotics”.

Represented primarily by Marc Gottdiener and his book “Postmodern Semiotics” (1995), a theory of a semiology of the city, is an approach to urban analysis in which space is central, and which recognizes this centrality by specifically pointing out the intangibility of space and the mediation of the city, which has triggered processes of branding and multiple layers of meaning and meaning production.

To appreciate the problem of representability, socio-semiotics speaks of a “pseudo-text”, rather than a text, but instead of sensitively probing the mix of opposition, unity and contradiction, which defines a social spatial dialectic and which poses the difficulty of a spatial turn, socio-semiological theory demands of the researcher the learning of a complex code language, and to differentiate between multiple forms of reality.

The primary source of misunderstanding concerning socio-semiotics seems to lie in the failure to overcome the thought of modernism and to recognize the essentially dialectical character of social and spatial relationships, which requires an entirely new understanding of concepts such as reality and its production.

As Soja puts it:

“the two sets of structured relations (the social and the spatial) are not only homologous, in that they arise from the same origins in the mode of production, but they are also dialectically inseparable (...) but one hundred years of Marxism have not been enough to develop the logic and scope of these insights” (Soja 1995:78).

While it indeed might be possible to understand the social dynamics behind the physical constitution of the city by intensively dealing with the local history of symbols and their meanings, the titles of research projects that deal with this kind of endeavour speak for themselves in their narrow focus on singular places and cities and their inability to make any kind of generalizing statement that might contribute to a coherent sociology of space. The problem concerning such a social model of space is that, until today, an analysis of space could only be achieved concerning certain processes, but no theoretical model exists that can describe how these processes work together (Löw 2009:263).

Rob Shield's very correct critique concerning any decoding of a social environment – that “it can only be understood by the analyst himself and only for this fleeting moment in time” (Shields 1996) – has been taken up by poststructuralist debate probing the validity of the *fixed constitutive*.

Decoding can essentially only be possible if a certain macrostructure is taken for granted, an assumption that has caused social phenomena, power-distribution and identities to be regarded as naturally there, and therefore never subject to analysis themselves.

Angermüller therefore presses for a general reconsideration of the theoretical foundation, which is to form the basis for a systematic approach towards the creation of social reality (Angermüller 2007:102). Poststructuralist approaches criticise the idea of rigid social macrostructures, as well as the autonomy of the subject in the way it structures our understanding of class, for instance. A critique of a poststructuralist-inspired geography towards a causal spatial paradigm is the allegation that by regarding certain spatial orders as neutral in their relation to social macrostructures, a thorough understanding of a socio-spatial dialectic is hindered, rather than helped.

The theoretical question is therefore not only a spatial one, but a question concerning social theory in general. In this context the work of Henri Lefebvre has without doubt been groundbreaking in regard to pointing out that space and the political organization of space express social relationships, but also react back upon them. Besides Henri Lefebvre's definition of space, space as described by Michel Foucault was indeed closer to being developed into an all-embracing body of social theory with space at its centre.

Foucault's concept of *heterotopia*, as a description of space that functions according to a non-hegemonic logic, has been borrowed in multiple contexts of urban research without being taken seriously as an invitation to comprehend the way space functions in generating empowerment (Schreiber/Glasze 2009). If, on the one hand, one can appreciate that space is constituted through a dialectical evolution with society, and on the other, that social *reality* is created through its interaction with space, it must follow that the constitution of particular spaces – let them be hegemonic in this sense – is closely related to an assertion of a *particular* social reality.

Forwarding these concepts of hegemony into a discussion of "*Sociology of Space*", Doreen Massey (2005) has elaborately criticized the dominant definitions of spatial identity and the categories of *Public* and *Private* that are applied together with concepts such as democratic or non-democratic spatial use.

Her main point is that the way public space is defined traditionally is in fact the description of the absence of public space since it seeks to define a space *symbolic of the public* and is therefore relative to a certain hegemonic social order.

Public space, according to Massey, is not the squares and the piazzas that served as the stages for the voicing of public opinion, but public space happens everywhere in which the meaning and the use of space is contested. "The tendency to romanticise public space as an emptiness, which enables free and equal speech, does not take on board the need to theorise space and place as the product of social relationships, which are most likely conflicting and unequal" (Massey 2005:152). Herein Massey borrows the definitions of *Antagonism* (Laclau) and *Pluralism* (Mouffe) as they are widely used in poststructuralist social science, and applies them to a social model of space. In Mouffe's view, political pluralism is grounded in the idea that "the subject (interchangeably used with society) is not one because the subject is multiple, but it is one because the subject is divided" (Mouffe 2012), emphasising that antagonism is a fundamental principle for social interaction. Laclau's hegemonic theory, when applied to an analysis of the city, puts the struggle for space and its meaning at the centre of scrutiny, emphasizing that social struggle is essentially a struggle for the hegemony of spatial meaning, and this struggle is precisely the essence of space-making itself. A discourse-analytical approach to geography, based on Laclau, is represented for instance by Georg Glasze in his analysis of urban insecurity (2005). Glasze takes as his starting point the discrepancy between increasing measures of securitisation on one hand, and actual figures of crime on the other, in order to show that differentiations between secure and non-secure places are the result of social and discursive structuring, revealing strategies and mechanisms to construct urban (in)security.

The difference between the definition of discourse in reference to Laclau and the definition of discourse by Foucault is its structural rigidity. The issue with Foucault's concept of governmentality is the way hegemonic power constellations are regarded as a

harmonious entity, which lets certain processes appear as predetermined. Laclau, who grounds his theory in a Lacanian concept of *subjectivity*, highlights the impossibility of reaching discursive closure and therefore fixity, to an ambivalence – a non-masterable internal lack – which underlies the signification process. Mattissek (2008) shows in this context that hegemonic discourses, such as the discourse of the neoliberal city, are never rewinding the same symbolic routines, but have to adapt constantly to new situations and changes. Hegemonic practise as a mechanism of discourse intervenes in a non-predictable manner into the discursively structured terrain of social space. The incongruities and disharmonies that emerge due to its antagonistic order pose a threat to the stability of the discourse, which is why they are subjected to the hegemonic practise of welding and mending them into an even harmonic surface again (Mattissek 2008; Angermüller 2007:162). The mechanism that keeps the discursive structure in motion is thus its inherent antagonistic structure, which again constantly tears incongruities into the surface of the discourse.

Central for a discursive concept of space is therefore its *action-implying* moment, which resides in symbolisation, and which stands in contrast to the idea behind representation. While representation ascribes an objectively valid reality to space, symbolisation supposes an active ascription of meaning to space. This does not mean that the subject is intentionally and consciously making spaces and places. A discourse-analytical approach distances itself from a definition of the subject as a self-determined actor. Instead, it regards the subject as a performing agent whose roles and intentions emanate from the discursive constellation as such. Socio-spatial reality is therefore a fundamentally discursive one, rendering irrelevant a distinction between learned and non-learned, discursive and spontaneous forms of spatial engagement. While this does not mean that space has no reality external to discourse, it alternately suggests that any such reality is irrelevant for an understanding of society and the individual – *as subject-in-society* (Mattissek 2008:72).

While such a concept of social reality is important when scrutinizing the role of space in discursive constellations, another point is to accept a relational concept of space. All elements subordinate to discursive constellation, including space, acquire their meaning and their roles only through their relation to other elements. Besides language, all objects, subjects, but also practises, only make sense in their relational form (Nonhoff 2007:9). That also means that space as a discursive reference system cannot be analysed as separated from other reference systems, such as language or images. Nowhere but in our contemporary, highly media-saturated cities is the interweaving of multiple referential signs into configurations of text images, graphics, spaces and sound more apparent. But an analysis of these interrelations has, until now, not gone beyond stating that other than through a determination on the grounds of a grammar, they are based on a

set of habits and conventions that determine the way they are perceived and acted upon. Bauridl points out that Massey's suggestion to analyse space on the grounds of relational concepts is discussed in a sociology of space, while in a discourse-analytical approach to the city, it remains unpractised (Bauridl 2009:225). There appears, therefore, to be a difficulty in including space into discourse-analytical research in general, making it necessary to think about the differences between other visual or material reference systems and spatial ones. The difficulty in generalising that what is applicable to other reference systems in this configuration is also applicable to space seems to lie in the fact that spatial constellations are not only connected to *dispositives* of seeing, understanding and interacting, but also actively limit possibilities of interaction and navigation. What is taken for granted in an analysis of images – that is: Not to look at an image in terms of *what* it shows, but rather *how* it lends visibility to the entity of the displayed objects through their interrelations and contingencies (Türk 2006:150; Miggelbrink 2009:189) – appears not to capture the full dimension of spatial relationality.

Concerning space, the emphasis must be put upon the facilitating aspects of space, in addition to socially controlled possibilities of interpretation. Spaces can facilitate and empower by distributing possibilities, but can also disempower through a deprivation of possibilities. A risk herein lies in regarding such power-generating aspects of space in another category, and falling back into the trap of assuming multiple realities. Financialisation and construction do not underlie an external logic, but must essentially be included into a relational model of thought.

The constitution of space, which has evidently made its way into discourse-analytical discussion, must be joined by the counterpart of construction, without bursting the theoretical framework. A starting point might be to allow the discussion of more concrete practises of space-making – such as real estate investment or urban transformation – to enter the theoretical debate by being discussed as discursively situated and coherent processes.

2.2. The theory of hegemony by Ernesto Laclau

The hegemonic theory of Ernesto Laclau assumes a non-essentialist understanding of society according to which class-related characteristics, social differences and membership to a collective social identity are not regarded as naturally predetermined. Any such characteristics are seen as the outcome of discursive formations which have become hegemonic. Class, according to Laclau, is a perception of a social collective, great enough to be perceived *as if* it has always been there, a result of some kind of natural evolution of things. What the hegemonic theory opposes is therefore the attempt to regard subjects, social class or cultural identities as possessing fixed characteristics. An analysis of discourses does not focus on actors, but on the symbolic reference systems into which society – or parts of society – are entangled, and through which, particular contexts or activities arise.

The way discourses are conceptualized in the theory of hegemony is based on the idea of struggle, a struggle that consists in applying meaning to a referential object – in other words, to establish a clear symbolic order.

With reference to urban space, the change and evolution of symbolic reference systems, and the social systems of belief that relate to them can easily be exemplified with an eye on the historicity of urban paradigms. *Gründerzeit* architecture for instance, which throughout Europe is a key signifier that attracts gentrification, has not always experienced such a high amount of appreciation. Embedded into a discourse of modernity, *Gründerzeit* neighbourhoods had, in the Thirties and Forties, become the target of ideologically encouraged renovation. The garden city, with ample fresh air, spread out landscapes and non-urban lifestyles, was regarded as the superior model of life then. Research on urban marketing and development strategies has shown that it is quite possible to grasp the influence a city's existing urban fabric has on the narrative that is produced in promoting that city to an audience of investors and consumers (Mattisek 2008; Vincenzotti 2011). These research examples show that architectural forms and spatial orders do always derive from a reference to social discourses. It is the temporary connections between space and social visions propagated in marketing processes that lead to the preference of some neighbourhoods over others. A search for often assumed 'hard factors' such as location, proximity to infrastructure, or states of decay that have brought property prices down, is often the grounds for speculation on the city's future development. Such rigid criteria, however, cannot explain aberrations or trends, away from an often assumed mainstream. Surprises are often big, when a whole street with row houses has been bought up and developed, but no interest appears to resonate for what is regarded as a complete hot spot.

Although meanings that can be applied to building typologies or spaces are transient and often shaken by radical connotative change, the capacity of what can be *meant* is not

unrestricted. This might sound logical, but the reason for this restriction is an important aspect to our methodological discussion. While a semiological analysis regards a pragmatism of human activity as the boundary of how space can be interpreted (Gottdiener 1995:24), the perspective grounded in Laclau's hegemonic theory posits the boundaries of meaning as essentially mental, and just as discursive, as the meaning of space itself. Meaning is, in more abstract words, always inherent in the system of reference through which it is produced, and the boundaries of this system are also the boundaries that restrict what can be meant within that system.

The rise of a down-trodden neighbourhood to a new urban renaissance is only possible if it complies with the referential logic inherent in the hegemonic discourse of city-marketing. If for instance, a neighbourhood is widely regarded as a No-Go Area it can only arise in a new attractive light if the characteristics of space can be combined with other positive elements of the hegemonic discourse. Such discursive compliances are demonstrated for instance by impoverished working-class neighbourhoods in their relationship to avant-garde places of creative production. On the other hand, such a process of gentrification would be impossible if the bandwidth of what these places have come to represent cannot be related to the hegemonic discursive rhetoric. That could be the case if certain neighbourhoods, and the way people live in them, are not agreeable to the hegemonic ideological convictions, or if certain signifiers compete with the signifiers of the hegemonic symbolic order, endangering its hegemony. As a part of the hegemonic symbolic order, parts of the city will necessarily be seen as something which the discourse opposes, and therefore be discriminated against and treated with a rhetoric of crime and filth. Such a definition of a no-go area is in itself a necessary side effect of hegemonic struggle, as will be explained in detail below.

The Elements of the Theory of Hegemony

In order to understand discursive inclusion or exclusion, it is important to understand the discourse as fundamentally structured through antagonism. Laclau explains this antagonism through the **antagonistic frontier**. Any discursive formation defines itself by what it opposes, and no discourse can exist without antagonism. An often used example for this is the opposition through which the political left defines itself in its antagonism to a liberal market, and the right wing defines itself through an antagonism to paternalistic or restrictive regulations of the welfare state. Keeping this political rhetoric in mind, the antagonistic frontier also reveals itself as the main structural backbone of the discourse. It orders the discursive elements along a line, and in this way strings them together into a coherent structure.




Fig. a

Without the existence of the antagonistic frontier, the discourse would lack something that holds it together. The reason for this is that the elements of reference that are being integrated into the discursive system – Laclau refers to them as **particularistic demands** – are not interrelated by nature, but held together only through a shared opposition towards something beyond that antagonistic frontier, something to which they are opposed. Each of these particular demands on their own would fail to be addressed in the course of political struggle unless represented under the umbrella of a greater discourse. For this reason, particular demands do always succumb to other related particular demands, which together share a moment of antagonism, and this shared moment of antagonism is described in the element of the key signifier.

In the discourse of the neoliberal city, the term security occupies a key position (Mattisek 2008:113). Many particular demands like those of new building regulations, earthquake safety, new zoning strategies, avoidance of slum area overrun, but also aspects that concern the use of public space, as for instance a ban on hanging up washing across streets or the roaming of domestic animals in residential neighbourhoods, can all be represented under the signifier of security.

Through this variety of signification and the inter-relation of the symbolized elements, an image starts to evolve, which in totality can signify the security discourse as a whole. Structured by the discourse, various compositional images may refer to the verbal signifier *security*, which again might relate to various other non-visual or visual signifiers forming an inter-relational network.

Concerning the character of the particular demands as individual elements, it is important to note that any of these demands outside of their inter-relational network can as well stand on their own in a political struggle. Once in relation to other elements, they assume a position in another struggle – one which might strongly diverge from their original, particularistic one.

To join a greater struggle, it becomes clear that only the relation towards the common denominator, the **key signifier (D1)**, facilitates the difference between the particular demands to be overcome and a condition of analogy to be reached in its place. The term Laclau also uses for the key signifier, '*pointe de captation*', is helpful in understanding the key signifier as a mechanism of *binding together* an unrestricted number of particular elements into the unity of a greater struggle. Within this *chain* of elements, the demand for security for example is just like any other demand – a simple particular claim. Unlike the others however, it may fulfill two functions – one particular one, and one representational of a bigger discursive struggle. It is the only element which is present in its own unique claim (for instance, as a demand for prevention of earthquake-related collapse by means of new planning rules) and a superordinate meaning, representational of the entire repertoire of demands. Since all elements relate to one another in difference and equivalence, the representational function of the key signifier only arises on the grounds of a depletion of its uniqueness. The particularity of the demand has to lose its relevance in favour of its new representational function for the entire chain. This loss of particularity is necessary, though not permanent, and particularity always remains present in its character as an individual element. The signifier does, therefore, move within the realm of two meanings, its particular one and its representational one, losing its particular meaning in the position of the common denominator and vice versa. Since the particular meaning needs to step back for a particular element to assume the position of the key signifier, Laclau and Mouffe also talk of the key signifier as an **empty signifier (D1)**. Its role is crucial to a discursive formation and always oriented on including the largest possible number of particular demands within its reach. Which signifier will rise into the position of the empty signifier though, depends on various aspects and cannot be reduced to purely numerical logic. Going back to the example of security: It is covering a demand for more cleanliness in public space, while cleanliness in our specific context of neoliberalism cannot easily be representational for other aspects of security. The reason is that any empty signifier is never only present in one single discursive formation, but also in others – where it might be evaluated and interpreted in a totally different way. It is indeed possible that outside of a specific equivalential chain, one particular element can adopt a meaning that is antagonistic toward the entity of that chain. As terms, *security* as well as *cleanliness* can mean many things, depending on the context in which they appear. Considering the principles within which the neoliberal ideology are grounded, and which alternative social visions it confronts – naming socialism as its most obvious one – the term *cleanliness* can get caught in a paradox of meaning. To be more precise: Because the term *cleanliness*, when used as a key signifier in the neoliberal discourse, can easily be bent into a connotation of '*ethnic cleanliness*' by critics of that neoliberal discourse, it will not come to represent the neoliberal ideology as

a total. Of course though, it can remain as a particular demand in the discursive realm of neoliberalism, where its particularity prevents it from being 'stolen' by another discourse, which opposes the prior. For any signifier, representationability and resilience are the main prerogatives, and the moment of superiority one signifier has over others, in relation to these assets, makes this signifier hegemonic.

The requirement for change / Floating signifiers

It is quite possible that a discursive formation might assert its claim over another's key signifier. A rather obvious example would be a connotation of social equality produced by a strong and market-regulating welfare system, imposed over the term of security, which at the same time has a firm position within the discourse of neoliberalism.

In other words, the term *security*, while under the hegemony of neoliberalism, implies laws, morals and desires to open up credit to the highest number of people possible, to facilitate construction of private real estate on public land, and to make people believe that a private house is by far more secure than a pension fund. In opposition, one might radically reinterpret *security* by reversing all of the above-mentioned.

Instead, it could imply that the individual's rights and social safety require a strong state – a state that makes sure that the individual does not profit over a certain margin through real estate speculation, and that taxes are high in order to fund social housing projects in addition to financing everybody's pensions.

In political struggle, both discourses would compete with one another to create the highest amount of equivalence to support the appropriation of the term *security*. The competition between two equivalential chains over one signifier is also a struggle for hegemony, which does not mean, however, that the same signifier cannot represent both discourses simultaneously. For this reason, key signifiers that represent two or more equivalential chains according to the theory of hegemony are called **floating signifiers (D1 in b)**.




Fig. b

For Laclau and Mouffe, social space is determined by precisely this struggle over signification – the struggle of each particularity within an equivalential chain to become a signifier for the totality of that chain, and the struggle between a range of discursive systems to appropriate the key signifier of another, and to become hegemonic itself. According to this understanding of the social, political decision-making, economic structures, definitions of culture, tradition, habits and desires are all subsumed under the logic of signification, and therefore hegemonic struggle.

It follows that the instability of signification that includes the floating potential of signifiers is proof of a high potential of social interaction. What is experienced as dynamic about a society is first of all, the flexibility of structures of meaning and the possibilities of multiple interpretations. Autocratic regimes, on the other hand, stand out by means of allocating fixed meanings to social behaviour, without tolerating multiple meanings.

Dislocations and Heterogeneity

With this next step in deconstructing the hegemonic theory, we will come to the essence of what prevents the moment of hegemony from being a permanent one.

Arising from the ability of signifiers to adopt multiple meanings only by getting rid of the specificity they have as particular demands, representation can never be full in the sense that all aspects of that demand are covered by the act of representation. If the signifier was entirely specific towards what it represented, it would not be possible to represent more than one particular demand. In other words – signification is only possible through a lack of precision. It is only a small amount of **equivalence** that ties together the **equivalential chain** – hence its name. Another undefined amount of **difference** between the elements in that chain, however, remains silenced.

To understand discursive change, one has to consider that difference is not something outside of the discursive field, but something internal to it. Through a lack of

representability, this difference constantly tries to undermine the representational signifier from the inside of the discursive formation, causing this signifier to be contested and subdued in a struggle to hold its position.




Fig. c

This split of the particular demands (**D1-D4**) into equivalent and different elements ensures that hegemony cannot be permanent and is only possible by successfully keeping the amount of difference outside of the representational structure. The bond between the elements of the chain has to be stronger on the grounds of equivalence than on the deconstructing forces of difference, and from which follows that within each discursive formation there are always elements which cannot be represented.

Transferring this to our example of security, we could say that what is represented through this term cannot fully cover the particularity of the demand for earthquake-proof renewal. Although the security discourse manages to assemble a great amount of supporters that have accumulated around this demand, it works only by maintaining the illusion that this demand is fully covered by the call for security.

If the security discourse were to adapt a connotation of *social equality* – an interpretation of security offered by another discourse – our first discourse would no longer be able to represent the demand for earthquake-proof urban renewal. It would lose its context and remain, unless represented by another discourse, outside the system of signification. The collectiveness of the elements not covered by the existing system of signification is indicated by Laclau as the elements **m** and **n**. These **heterogenous elements**, although represented under existing hegemonic structures, have the potential to intervene in ongoing signification processes, and make claims over signifiers used by other discursive chains. Demands that cannot be integrated into the discursive field constantly undermine existing symbols and references used by a hegemonic discourse. It follows that one important principle of the struggle for hegemony is to marginalize voices that cannot be integrated for the benefit of the discursive argument. The 'policing of discursive

boundaries', as will be discussed throughout this research, is thus one of the fundamental practises of hegemonic struggle.

Discursive systems of signification are required to constantly adapt and change in order to achieve symbolic closure. By not considering the heterogeneity that is locked out of the system of signification, the risk arises that the amount of heterogeneity grows too large and endangers the symbolic order. In case of a collapse, the key signifiers of the discursive order would dislocate, causing the equivalential relationship that binds the particular demands together to dissolve.

2.3. Hegemony and space

Looking at the city from the perspective of hegemonic theory, the role of space as something that contains social activity is shifted towards a more complex configuration, according to which, space appears as something through which society is created. Space, in this context, is not equipped with any documented representational function that would allow the analyst to draw any conclusion concerning social reality *taking place*.

The definition of culture, traditions and habits, and their involvement with the physical environment, are in the same way subjugated to the logic of hegemony. It follows that cities are not mere physical configurations within which society takes place, but are enmeshed in a process of society's becoming and developing. An assumed possibility of a spatial reading, in this sense, would only set in at the very moment spatial meanings were to reach a state of fixity. The analysis of space, based on its representational function, however, would only work for the expert analyst and only for a fleeting moment of time. Even in this moment in time, in which temporary structures of meaning might be sketched out – as if in a film that has been paused – a spatial reading would only be possible by entirely disregarding whatever subversive forms of meaning or exterior heterogeneities exist outside of the boundaries of the hegemonic spatial order. Any spatial reading, one might say, is therefore a hegemonic practise in itself. In the same manner as planning paradigms come with a disregard of any other form of understanding the city, the establishment of a spatial code would overrule any other alternative for interpretation.

A maximum potential for social change is therefore coupled with a maximum of interpretations and forms of use. Space under hegemonic social order is ultimately bound to the absence of the liberty to appropriate and read that space in a multiplicity of ways. The conclusion Massey draws is that the meaning of space can only be clear in the absence of democracy.

In the broad discussion on the disappearance of public space, such a statement has the potential to reveal in an analytical manner the definition of public space in today's neoliberal context – as an aestheticised and emptied arena that only permits coded behaviour. Not so however as a space, the contours of which are contested and within which what is allowed and what is not is the result of an ongoing process of negotiation (Massey 2005:153). One could say that a social hegemony relates to a hegemony of space, just as a heterogeneous understanding of space relates to a multiplicity of discourses. Spatial signifiers must therefore play a particular role in the constitution and the change of discursive configuration. In order to approach urban space with Laclau, it would be necessary to scrutinize the construction of social reality in its interaction with space, using the terminology and the logic of theory. That would mean firstly:

- 1) To regard the city as an empty signifier.
- 2) To look for the antagonistic structuring of space.

1) The city as an empty signifier

In a discourse-analytical approach to geography, certain characteristics of the physical environment which display the same logic of discursive formations are the reasons to treat the city as an empty signifier. As structured through discourse, however, space does not stand on its own, but relates to other systems of signification. Urban visions as they are discussed verbally, for instance, settle into very specific spatial forms, merging with verbal, visual and spatial systems of signification. These various systems must therefore relate to one another through the structure of the same discursive field. Spatial signifiers, on the other hand, are not as easy to distinguish in their geographical settings as words are methodologically traceable in text. To identify a verbal term as a key signifier within a discursive formation offers a rather precise framework for a methodological approach. All one needs to do is to detect certain frequencies of appearance, which to the analyst by her reading of a sufficient amount of literary material almost reveals itself automatically. Spatial signifiers, on the other hand, work through their compositional integration, and can assume all kinds of scale, starting from particular architectural details and reaching to the scale of entire urban conglomerations. At the same time, it could be argued that the assumed fixity of verbal connotation is a trap that one could easily fall into because of our involvement with language as the most present and dominant means of communication (which makes us blind to the subversive change language undergoes in a constant evolutionary context). The precision of the word as a constellation of letters and sound is unmistakably detectable.

Although according to discourse-analytical definitions, the city can be regarded as an empty signifier, a theoretical proposal for the analysis of space as part of a discourse-

analytical approach has not yet been made. A summary of what can be concluded on that matter has been made by Matissek as follows:

“The city as an empty signifier must be regarded as a contested field opened up by a certain number of competing equivalential chains. Besides discursive formations, such as the welfare state, they arise from the daily appropriation of space as well as from the symbolic universes that are created by the mediation of cities in daily conversation and visual as well as written publication. In each of these referential systems, cities are being represented and created through the logic of retroactive naming” (Matissek 2008:97).

2) The antagonistic structure of space

If we assume that space is subject to hegemonic struggle, we must also assume that space is subject to an antagonistic divide. Spatial signifiers must therefore also relate to existing antagonistic boundaries. But how spatial signifiers are to be defined in terms of physical or imaginary manifestation is unclear. It is only possible to say that the city is perceived in an antagonistic way and planning paradigms that form the ground for the future of the city are themselves also antagonistically structured. According to Schroer, in order to be perceived as something meaningful, space always requires a dichotomic division from what it opposes. It is always structured into a certain hegemonic whole on one side of the frontier and what it negates on the other. Transferring this logic to cities, Schroer in his discussion on urban paradigms concludes that any city constituted in social narrative already contains its own negation (Schroer 2005). This internal divide is absolutely vital for the structuring of the urban as a referential system. Returning to the structuring of the hegemonic field in Laclau, we observe that signifiers are always placed at the boundary to an antagonistic outside. Any social structuring of space therefore requires the separation of spatial qualities into antagonistic elements. This antagonistic division of space can happen with reference to any random particularity the space contains, as long as this particularity can be grouped together with other particularities into an equivalential relation. One of these particularities would then serve as an empty signifier to represent the whole. Markus Schroer clarifies that what applies to the making of space also applies to its understanding. Throughout the history of socio-geographical study, space has always been analysed and understood on the basis of a narrative of historical development. Discourses on the city, their conceptualization and the formation of planning paradigms that result from that conceptualization are always discursively placed, meaning that they contain an internal antagonistic structure which is important in making sense of their particular history. Accordingly, the narration of urban history pictures the city through its dichotomies.

The city is defined by what it is not, from which follows that urban design principles are set up around qualities of the city, which are oriented against an inherent set of

negations. In subjectivist theory this principle would be more closely described as an internal structural deficit or an absence that is believed to be overcome through the act of signification (Žižek, Gönen/Yönoçu). By declaring this deficit part of an antagonistic outside, the illusion of external prevention would be created which would make the policing of the antagonistic boundary essential in the pursuit of the realisation of this identity. To give an example: As part of the developmental discourse of today's postindustrial metropolis, Markus Schroer identifies four dominant dichotomies around which the evaluation of planning success is measured. He counts, 1. Urbanity/Barbarism, 2. Center/Periphery, 3. Unity/Division, 4. Mixing/Segregation.

The diagnosis of crisis in our discussions on the city are grounded in the observation that the negative side wins over the other positive side of the coin:

“Die Krisendiagnosen unserer Tage resultieren aus der Beobachtung, dass die negative Seite die Oberhand über die andere Seite der Unterscheidung zu erhalten scheint. die Leitdifferenzen lauten: 1. Urbanität/Barbarei, 2. Einheit/Vielheit bzw. Ganzheit/Differenzierung. 3. Zentrum/ Peripherie und 4. Mischung/Segregation. Die dazu gehörigen bzw. davon ableitbaren Krisendiagnosen lauten: 1. Barbarisierung, 2. Fragmentierung, 3. Peripherisierung und 4. Segregierung” (Schroer 2005:328).

These dichotomies, according to Schroer, structure our understanding of the city and provide us with a paradigm of planning and development. What gets lost in this dichotomic understanding of space, where one is evaluated as positive and the other as negative, is the awareness that these dichotomies are part of a discursive hegemonic gaze, confirming existing power relations and preventing a more thorough understanding of society and the city.

2.4. Meaning of space

What constitutes the crucial point in the research of the physical environment appears to be the creation of space itself by means of applying meaning to it. The moment in which space acquires meaning is to be equalized with its creation (Löw). In discourse-analytical theory, the act of naming as the essence of the creation of social meaning is central. The same appears to be true for the creation of spatial reality (Laclau, Nonhoff, Glasze, Mattissek). The creation of space in this sense does not precede its recognition, but the transmission of meaning does create spaces that already exist in their physical form in another mental form. Creation and recognition are simultaneous processes. Laclau describes the moment of integrating space into the meaning-constellations of the self as the process of naming, which he calls “inversion”:

“Equivalent relations would not go beyond a vague feeling of solidarity if they did not crystallize in a certain discursive identity which no longer represents democratic demands as equivalent, but the equivalent link as such. Although the link was originally ancillary to the demands, it now reacts over them and, through an inversion of the relationship, starts behaving as their ground” (Laclau 2005).

The choice of the key signifier – *the name* – that assumes the representational function of the discourse, retroactively orders the elements represented under it by giving reason and logic to them. A coherent narrative is created, which sets the boundaries of how events within that space, interaction and changes, are going to be understood and perceived of. Inversion, in other words, also constitutes the process of the creation of spatial reality. Meaning that arises by integrating space into discursive constructs of meaning intervenes into the existing spatial order, it changes these spaces not physically, but symbolically. What happens in this process of inversion happens initially on the level of perception and imagination, but it implies activity in the sense that without an ordering of spatial meaning, there would be no guideline for an intervention into the physical realm of space. It is therefore necessary to proceed with more careful treatment of the term *space*, when it comes to the role it plays in the constitution of the social. The perception of space and its physical constitution, that is certain, does occupy rather different stages and functions in discursive formations. These depend on and presuppose one another, but must not be used interchangeably in an analysis. Although physical space cannot be created without its imagination, the physical and the imaginary reality of space are not congruent as they appear to follow one another in time. The biggest challenge therefore seems to be to develop a model that captures the interdependency between imaginary and physical processes of space-making. Due to the relational links between the narrative structure and physical space, there is a considerable risk in viewing social antagonism in correspondence to boundaries or territorialisation in the city.

This assumption certainly is not far-fetched. Social differentiations, which go hand in hand with confrontation on a daily basis, appear with a certain regularity, bound to spatial configurations. Spatial configurations of that kind are then the result of established social discourses of segregation, and thus perceived as a spatial reference along narratives of social antagonism. The reason they appear as natural interlinkages though, is that they have risen to a hegemonic position. They have assumed a meaning which is suddenly taken for granted and no longer questioned. More subtle boundaries that only begin to arise through the establishment of new social practises would at the same time not even be perceived as such.

Spatial-physical boundaries do only acquire social relevance if they are perceived as socially real. Only when they can be discursively embedded will they make any sense.

Martina Löw differentiates in this context between space and place – place embodying the localisation of imaginary spaces. For Löw, space cannot be regarded as equal with place since the complexity of space would be reduced to only one aspect – its localisation in one place – and the possibility of existence of a variety of spaces in that same place excluded (Löw 2009:270).

Löw's differentiation into space and place is quite helpful at this point, because it draws attention to the dependency between the two on one hand and on the other, stresses the abundance of spatial meaning. Places are important sources for the constitution of various parallel spaces that emerge in relation to the rise and fall of social discourse, a model that is reflected in the description of the empty signifier in Laclau's theory of hegemony. The designation of the city as an empty signifier must be evaluated as useful, but only as long as what is referred to as 'the city' is being looked at in more detail in regard to the collaboration of physical and imaginary space.

The construction of meaning in city marketing

Symbolic appropriation presupposes that physical space can offer possibilities of identification by adapting meaning, which means to be functional as an empty signifier. While emptiness must here be understood as a *putting-aside* of the unique history of that space, it is easy to understand why cities that enter into global competition must inevitably grow more and more similar to one another while losing their very own specific forms, spatial languages and orders. A city that is being marketed globally is in need of accommodating a growing number of diverse narratives (Stack/Robins 1993:304). Processes of contemporary urban development do, therefore, overwrite the very specific history of place that crystallizes in a very unique and localized architecture, but which reduces the possibility of a pluralistic reading due to its specificity. City marketing is successful in representing a maximum of social discourses only by putting the largest common denominator into the position of the key signifier. The key signifiers would acquire a completely new set of meanings and represent a variety of urban discourses through a mystified kind of specificity. In the meta-narrative of global city competition, the city as an empty signifier can only be recognized by relating to already existing narratives of global competitiveness. Only through the means of the meta-narrative – the language of the global market – can a city be recognized internationally, but only does so at the cost of its particular and very unique local history. Such a description also applies to what is commonly observed as 'global architecture', an architecture which nobody seems to like because it lacks uniqueness, but which is still built, because only through transcending its uniqueness does it address the widest possible group of investors. This process is not unfamiliar to a discussion of consumerism. Relating to Bourdieu in this matter, it could be reformulated by saying that the loss of a particular identity, the cause

of which is the (global) marketing process, is coupled with the necessity to create a new particularity in the form of a designed product-identity. This new product-identity then is created through means of a production process, and the way a product is staged, packaged and displayed.

Subjecting the city to the logic of the market thus leads to a loss of place identity:

“A place is often thought of as a unique set of attributes at a unique location. This is especially so before a place becomes commercialized. Therefore, we can expect that when a place enters the market, so to speak, it must advertise itself as having generic qualities, such as being accessible and having this type of service or that. As places become consumed, they lose much of their former uniqueness. Commercialization makes them appear more like other places. As cities have become ever more equivalent and urban identities increasingly thin (...) it is a question of distinction in a world beyond difference” (Robins 1993:306).

If we look at the draining of meaning, which happens in the marketing process of cities from the perspective of the empty signifier, we must conclude that the empty signifier has a limit concerning the creation of meaning. The loss of the specificity of space is a much-bemoaned phenomenon in relation to the globalisation of cities. As cities grow more and more similar, a loss of orientation in the jungle of the generic urban fabric seems inevitable. Following the requirement of signification on the other hand, we come to the result that this absence of meaning is precisely a demand that a globally oriented architecture has to fulfill. The value of such architecture manifests itself in the moment of erasure of local specificity in the discourse of global competitiveness (Berking 2002). Structurally though, the constitution of the empty signifier seems to have a limit to the top – the top meaning the amount of discourses that it can represent.

The common denominator, at a certain point, no longer functions in representing a common identity, in other words, the more it loses particularity, the closer it also gets to risking the disintegration of the chain of particular demands. The greater the discursive community represented in the empty signifier becomes, the weaker the bond between them becomes as well. Problems of authenticity occur coupled with alienation and a feeling of being lost. The result is that the processes that make the city more generic go hand in hand with a search for particularity, but this wish for particularity does not cause the city to become more unique again.

One of the reasons for this must be that no discursive community can exist purely in imaginary space, but must in some way confirm or create their belonging through an interaction in and with physical space as well. Physical space therefore must be assigned a particular role in the analysis of a socio-spatial dialectic with respect to some kind of interface, a junction at which interpretation, perception and imagination are being moderated or regulated (Löw 2009; Shields 2005).

A leading question would therefore be: "What role must be ascribed to the appropriation of space – both in the sense of integrating the physical environment in the meaning structures of the self, and in the sense of having access and the ability to use that space?" My assumption would be that discursive communities can only be upheld if the possibility of interaction on both spatial levels – the imaginary and the physical – is provided. Only through the coming together of both can the deadlock of the 'lack of the real' be overcome and the discourse attain full validity as a social reality.

2.5. Research difficulties

In summarizing the main principle of signification as the loss of particularity in favour of an imagined fullness of meaning, the problem for an analysis of space is an obvious one. A methodological approach that focuses on space has to consider a meaningful content that might not be spatially manifest at the time of analysis. The challenge is to research something that is essentially imaginary and therefore unseen at its intersection with the physical. There is a considerable risk in viewing social antagonism in regard to territorial boundaries in the city. That would presuppose that imaginary and physical space does match. How physical and imaginary space interrelates however, is not clear at this stage. Imaginary space is not manifest and therefore difficult to research through an analysis of discourses.

Massen very generally formulates this research problem as a question of how to deal with invisibilities in discourse analysis. Her main point is that imagination thrives on invisibility. Using the example of wallpaper images from marketing campaigns of finance institutions, she comes to the conclusion that it is not what is visible in terms of objects and subjects shown in the images, but the possibilities of interpreting them as compositions that produce the image reality (Massen 2006:13). What becomes visible in these images is therefore something that depends on the gaze of the person looking at this image.

What needs to be elaborated is, first of all, a definition of the unseen. In her argument, Massen leans on a concept of visibility, which is widely used in discourse analysis (Rengli; Massen; Stäheli), and which goes back to a definition by Foucault described in his book 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' (Foucault 2010:10).

Knowledge, according to Foucault, is the result of an enforced way of seeing, implying that visibility is something that lies within the *act of seeing* and not within the display of objects. Visibility is therefore not to be understood in the most obvious way, where objects that make the composition of the image are either there (visible), or not there (invisible). Theoretically, visibility is therefore externalized from the concrete manifestation of the form.

The discursive meaning is created by means of the form but hidden between the objects on display, and consequently perceived not through focusing on the content of the image, but by perceiving the image as a compositional whole. Visibility and non-visibility are channelled by what Foucault calls *dispositives* of seeing, a term developed to describe an underlying structure of seeing. *Dispositives* of seeing determine forms of perception and understanding and facilitate that the image as a total is experienced as meaningful (Renggli; Mayerhauser).

A discourse-oriented analysis of images does therefore presuppose that the subjects and objects shown do not have a representational value in themselves, but gain meaning only in relation to the other subjects and objects. Images do therefore not only have one image reality but many (Mayerhauser 2006:91) depending on the gaze and the perception of the observer.

An important contribution to the issue of visibility and invisibility has been made by Henri Lefebvre in a more concrete reference to the city. According to Lefebvre, visibility is something that occurs only by narrowing the field of vision, by turning a blind eye to the endless possibilities of seeing things in another way:

„die Blindheit, worin besteht sie? sie besteht darin, aufmerksam das neue Feld, die Verstärkung, zu betrachten, es aber mit Augen zu sehen, Begriffe darauf anzuwenden, die von der Praxis und der Theorie der Industrialisierung geformt sind. Sie besteht in der Anwendung einer nur fragmentarischen, im Verlaufe dieser industriellen Epoche spezialisierten Analytik, die also die entstehende Wirklichkeit reduziert. Damit aber sieht man die Wirklichkeit nicht mehr, man stellt sich gegen sie, gibt ihr eine andere Bedeutung, bekämpft sie, man hindert sie am Entstehen und an der Entwicklung“ (Lefebvre 2003:35).

A blind spot, according to Lefebvre, arises where existing disciplinary models of interpretation create a boundary beyond which meaning cannot exist. Blindness is related to the inability of connecting image-content and composition to existing structures of knowledge, the result of which is that they remain unrecognized and therefore meaningless. Visibility, according to Lefebvre, is not a display of knowledge that reveals itself to everybody alike, but the fundamental result of power mechanisms that operate via hegemonic patterns of perception. Places are recognized and understood according to existing discursive ways of seeing only when the formal elements and the relationship between them respond to conventional forms of perception. Returning to our initial description of spatial reality as something that occurs at the intersection between imaginary and physical space, it is necessary to consider that the appropriation of space into existing meaning-constellations happens not only on the level of imagination, but also through an interaction with that space, its use and its construction.

The difficulty is therefore not to treat imaginary and physical appropriation of space as two separate phenomena. Spatial use and its construction also need to be analysed as belonging to the same discursive structure. Attention must be paid to the ways in which imaginary and physical aspects of space-making intersect.

II.

1. Empirical Structure

Considering the evaluations made above, our empirical approach has to combine data from the imaginary realm of space as well as its physical constitution within a coherent model of analysis. The spatial context of daily life, as well as the existence of space and place within the virtual realm of the media, are equally crucial in the practise of space-making. Which of the spatial references and symbols determine the development of the city is the outcome of hegemonic struggle; both within practises of spatial use and accessibility as well as the appropriation of symbolic references. The challenge for a discourse-analytical approach is thus the combination of multiple reference systems, while established forms of analysis have been developed to suit particular forms of data – in most cases verbal or visual data, but seldom in combination. The following evaluations will not focus on particular discourses to see how they evolved into their contemporary dynamic, but rather on how spatial references operate with others in constructing and changing discursive formations. What shall interest us at this moment of analysis is therefore the whole referential universe through which societal meaning evolves from the perspective of space-making.

The following case study analysis will raise a variety of theoretical questions by looking at socio-spatial narratives on various scales. I will first examine the geographical references in the national narrative of Turkey and will then proceed with a focus on Istanbul. A focal point analysis will subsequently be conducted for specific housing projects in Istanbul, the choice of which will be explained further along. A certain understanding of the social history of Turkey is helpful for a better grasp of the case study analysis and the interviews that have been conducted. The reader is therefore encouraged to follow the argument in the order presented – starting with the way Turkey as a landscape has been imagined by the fathers of the Nation, and reaching to the spatial constitution of residential housing projects in Istanbul and the way residents imagine their position in society today. This method suits the interest of this research to focus not on the content, but on the structural logic of the narratives and the way they relate to space on various scales.

Part 1

The first part of the empirical analysis (Part II of this dissertation) is devoted to gaining founded insight into the role the built environment attains for the construction of reality in the city of Istanbul today. I will compare the way space is integrated into the narrative of the modern Turkish nation with the role space attains under the hegemony of neoliberalism. This comparison has two purposes.

To begin with, it will create an outline of a 'history of imagination' that familiarizes the reader with the symbolisms rooted in Kemalism, which are important in order to understand the main lines of antagonism that shape the city under neoliberal hegemony. The second purpose is to understand in what way the role of space has changed between the period of modernism and neoliberalism, and how geography and space function as integrative elements in discursive constellations. I will explore the discursive structure typical for Kemalism and focus on how Kemalism operates at the spatial interface. After that I will look at the discursive changes that took place in the formation of the (neoliberal) opposition, asking what operations led to this hegemonic shift; what the role of space in this is, and how the new hegemony is constructed and upheld.

It will become clear that the role of space in modernist times is different than it is in the neoliberal city, and that it is indeed active in organizing and constituting discursive constellations rather than fulfilling mere symbolical functions. As during the modernist era, a homogeneous physical and mental geography has formed the basis for social development and change, in the neoliberal city, there is a dissolution of homogeneity taking place. This dissolution of homogeneity makes space for multiple urban realities that evolve in reciprocity with a constant destruction and reconstruction of the city itself. As space has been internalized into the process of capital accumulation, the way society relates to space has changed.

While the spatial imagination of Kemalism centred around a centre-periphery divide in relation to an urban-rural dichotomy, the neoliberal city is a continuous landscape with islands of distinction. The practises of space-making that have evolved through the hegemony of neoliberalism and the power constellations that now determine spatial production will be the key interest in this matter.

Part 2

Having gained a better understanding of the way space is operative in the neoliberal discourse, I will leave the realm of meta-discourse and focus on how it is involved in the creation of social realities of a highly pluralistic urban society. As the production of space is a mode of capital accumulation in the neoliberal city, in Part Two (part III in this dissertation) I will attend to the discursive role of real estate as *Eigenheim* (privately owned home). The privately owned home will also bridge the meta-narrative of neoliberalism with the narratives of individuals and the way they position themselves in the urban society of Istanbul. I would like to explore to what end real estate serves in the neoliberal city concerning social integration and belonging, and how it retroactively creates the reality of the neoliberal city. Highlighting the home as a discursive nodal point, I will describe in what way it refers to narratives of social identity and how, in

return, it shapes and changes these narratives again. The reciprocity of society and space which I want to highlight will be analysed in detail, using precise case study examples – housing projects – that will be placed into the historicity of the urban context and then analysed from the perspective of their inhabitants. In the final case study analysis, I will return to the elements of theory that were introduced at the beginning. I will consider how the theory of hegemony can also be thought of in a spatial manner, and what adaptations or extensions would be necessary to capture the full complexity of the relationship between discourse and space.

2. On the choice of material

Throughout this dissertation a wide range of material will be used upon which I will base my analysis. All material used, whether textual, visual or other, will be analysed concerning the stories that are told. While Part One of the research is based on existing academic literature, citations and images from various archives, the second part of the research proceeds with an analysis of photographs and interviews that have been conducted for the purpose of this study alone. From a wide range of material and literature on architecture and planning during the reign of Kemalism, a small sample has been chosen in order to expose the discursive structuring of space using example narratives as a reference. The discourse-analytical process has to accept that analysis happens at the expense of completeness. The purpose of Part One cannot be to provide a complete picture of social narratives that make up the Turkish Republic. Neither can it provide a description of the whole discursive field that makes up the neoliberal city. The discourses analysed do not, therefore, claim to establish any form of debate concerning the rights and wrongs of deviating perspectives. This is why they are exposed as *perspectives*, and the choice in their favour will become clear throughout the dissertation.

The case studies featured in Part Two of the analysis have been chosen to lend a certain narrative structure to the research itself. This way, the evolution of spatial signifiers and the way they are internalized into different discourses in time and place will be made clear. Comprehension of the social evolution and change will be made easier in this way, making it possible to focus on the theoretical elaborations that are more central to this research. The case study of *Göktürk*, a prior urban district of Istanbul that constitutes a very high number of enclosed residential real estate projects, has been chosen for two reasons. First, it can be understood in the context of conflict within the city of Istanbul; the same conflict that pioneered the development of gated communities and thus kick-started a fragmentation of the real estate market. The second reason is that, due to the management of the district, big investment-led development has created a very high turnover of land and therefore a high concentration of diverse lifestyle-oriented projects. The density with which these projects have been built has led to a collapse of geographical boundaries that usually define borders between districts or neighbourhoods, causing more explicit spatial forms of architectural differentiation. For these reasons, *Göktürk* has one of the most pluralist accumulations of style and architecture in residential real estate throughout the whole city, featuring what is considered to be an *avant-gardist* approach concerning architectural development. With my final case study, the residential project *EVIDEA*, I will analyse a project that emerged in a highly contested architectural climate, and that struggles to define a new spatial language that differentiates itself from everything prior by thematising fragmentation and pluralism itself.

The newness that is created in terms of architectural form with the example of *EVIDEA* gives reason to concentrate on the relationship between spatial and social narratives. Here, a comparison of how different inhabitants imagine their position in society through appropriating *EVIDEA* as their home will allow us to discuss the issue of the boundary concerning its spatial and imaginary manifestations in relation to Laclau's theory of hegemony, to which the boundary of antagonism is central.

3. Research Context Turkey

3.1. Sociological research in Turkey / Challenging theory

Sociological research in Turkey, and particularly research on “the city”, is dominated by a theoretical dispute over deviating models of explanation. The line of dispute is drawn between an economy-oriented approach that seeks a certain logic with capital accumulation and distribution on one hand, and a way of thinking to which cultural aspects are more central, on the other. The reason for this dispute is that the theoretical framework that modern sociological theory follows fails to address the social dynamics as witnessed in Turkey. Particular definitions of class and class-based identity do not correspond with the complexity of social behaviour and practise. The dominating cultural or anthropological perspectives seek to explain social complexity with cultural deviances related to the short and incomplete history of modernisation, while arguing against any universal logic internal to capital accumulation. Such cultural theory, however, must endure the critique that it seeks cultural identities as predetermined and non-adaptive to the societal context in which they are practised. Problems occur particularly wherever local forms of cultural practise are not regarded in national and transnational relations (Schiffauer). The limits of theory tend to be explained by Turkey bordering upon Western culture. Western social theory is not applicable to Turkey without problems because Turkey is not a fully Westernized country – thus the argument.

Turkish sociologist Şerif Mardin contends that the failure to understand contemporary social development in Turkey tends to be blamed by a large segment of Turkish academia for modernity having been *enforced*, rather than resulting from the outcome of a “natural” process. Turkey’s contemporary society is regarded as a society full of abnormal phenomena because it has had to endure severe social discontinuation through the secular-modern reformations led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. According to Mardin, the rhetoric of an enforced modernity is a way to explain variations in social change, which, with the widely applied social theory, cannot be explained otherwise, and thus camouflages the actual source of the problem. The problem, according to Mardin, is that Western social theory tends to focus on the macrostructure of society, which is assumed to be a theoretical fixed point (Mardin 1997). The failure to understand contemporary social change in Turkey is due to the assumption of a theoretical macrostructure that does not allow any consideration of social

phenomena which is not compliant with its internal logic. Such a structural logic proves as too reductive in the context of Turkey's rapidly growing urban societies, which demonstrate great complexity (Eckardt 2009:59). Weakly established or malfunctioning institutions have caused widely practised alternative forms of urban governance that stand in opposition to the institutional logic of urbanisation, making it impossible to discuss issues, such as informality, as irregularities within a system. For post-industrial cities of Europe, where the structures of the welfare state are strong and sets of rules and laws are firmly in place, the universalisation of social macrostructures in theoretical models makes the problems of research not quite as obvious. The case of Turkey, therefore, not only demonstrates the inapplicability of a certain research tradition to other, non-Western societies, but also more importantly, draws attention to the fact that a large segment of social science is uncritical towards itself.

To overcome the theoretical deadlock, Mardin proposes to regard microsociological aspects of society, proposing an approach that is based on three inter-linking loops of communication. "First, the state machine; second, cultural institutions; and third, the complex scheme of language as discourse, sources of self, identity markers, and tacit understandings that underlie both of the other loops and have a structuring force of their own" (Mardin 1997:186). Mardin's perspective is interesting, since it regards as essential the construction of meaning, and the necessity of institutions and the state to act as meaningful elements in everyday societal decision-making. That does not mean that social structuring is denied its importance, but rather, that the structuring of the state and its governmental bodies are themselves institutionalized forms of a social self-understanding. With emphasis on the mutual relationships between the state, institutions and social discourse, Mardin's work can be related to Laclau's hegemonic theory. In this context, social reality, and the categories and structures it relates to, are not naturally predetermined, but always to be seen as the historical result of political processes – a prerogative for the discourse-analytical approach to sociological research (Stäheli; Angermüller). The question of what comes first – institutions, class, or social vision – becomes completely irrelevant in this context because all are seen as mutually interrelated. Social change is instead regarded as the constant attempt to reconstruct a meaningful discourse. The direction in which society is developing in this context depends on the way meaning is structured under this discourse, and a hegemony of one particular discourse is the core of political struggle.

3.2. Modernity and the discontinuation of culture in Turkey

The discrepancies between structural change brought about by modernisation, and the much higher complexity we witness in the way society has indeed evolved, shall be considered in this research. What is relevant about the notion of an imposed modernity in relation to the discourse-analytical approach we use here are two assumptions:

First is the common idea that some form of 'aesthetic' modernism was imported before 'societal' modernity was accomplished. Metaphorically, this notion bears a violating perspective on a society which was not ready, or unable, to appropriate the modernist culture because of its internal circumstances, whatever they might be. The conclusion that is drawn in contemporary studies today is that the Kemalist modernizing project of the nation was one that suppressed society; and that this society, under the surface of aestheticism, remained connected to its true self.

The negative undertone with which *aestheticism* is used in this context, and which by doing so serves to wrongly establish a differentiation between reality and appearance, leads to the circumstance that modernist culture does not receive (as does any other culture) the attention and historical importance it should.

What I want to emphasise here is that modernity through whichever tools it had been implemented, and in whatever power constellations it was realized, is not more or less real than any other culture (Bozdoğan 2001:297) and must be considered in its cultural and social peculiarities for an analysis of the urban culture today.

The other aspect relevant to this research concerns the continuity of social discourse. The idea we get from the terminology of an *imposed modernity* is that the modernising project was a decision realized in a top-down manner, suppressing the true cultural self of a people, which has lain dormant ever since. It might not be wrong to speak of top-down decision making and the lack of democracy in association with Kemalism. These descriptions are quite true – as will be explained below in detail. The problematic idea of the 'breaking free' of a dormant culture is compounded with the idea that some form of preservation has taken place which has frozen the true being of a people who can now, in the climate of neoliberalism, regain its prior form and force.

What will be important to show is that moments of a "breaking free" of an "Islamic" or "Ottoman" culture with the rise of neoliberalism are not in any way original or historically continuous forms of a cultural identity (Aksoy/Robins). How these discursive changes have

taken place in reference to the theory of hegemony will be explained, giving special emphasis to the role of space and architecture in this context.

It is not wrong to say that, with Kemalism, modern Turkish state ideology embraced certain practises of suppression in order to implement another social vision. This social project, through integrating a range of practises on both structural and institutional levels, cooperated in creating a new Turkish narrative that would serve the formulation of a new national collective imagination. This collective imagination, as will be shown, was grounded in a constellation of re-telling geographical and cultural history in relation to the West, applying meaning to the new physical boundaries of the nation-state, and restructuring the imaginary realm of landscapes and cities through new dichotomous relationships.

For Sibel Bozdoğan, the slogan "Being West in spite of the West" posits the notion that Kemalism was troubled by the idea of being colonized by the West, while still wanting to westernise. Post-colonial forms of resentment had to be taken into account in advance (Bozdoğan 2001:108). In order to deal with such resentment upfront, modernisation was officially regarded as an unavoidable destiny that any civilizing country would undergo – that it was not a choice, but inevitability. Turkish modernity would have to be brought about, but not in order to copy the West, and would thus differentiate itself from Western peculiarities. What has led researchers to conclude that Turkish modernity has been implemented as a copy of Western culture into a culturally diverse context were the discontinuities in economic, social, and spatial development of specific modernist nations of post-industrial Europe. Industrialisation, decentralisation and democratisation, which had formed the foundation of Western modern societies, were missing in the Turkish modernisation process (Küçük 2008). In the majority of urban and cultural studies today, a comparison to post-industrial Europe is done in order to point out those 'deficits' that suggest that Turkish modernity appears to be a 'thing' placed into the absence of social progress. The reason to reconsider the history of modernity through the reality of the contemporary city is because contemporary social discourse cannot be understood without this history. The breaking point within modernism which is blamed on incoherence with history (but not with theory) causes an insufficient or incorrect understanding of contemporary social development which will be re-considered through discourse analysis.

Research strategies that would legitimize the Kemalist reign will be pointed out as fundamentally discursive and central to the task of nation building in Turkey.

Legitimation strategies, however, are dependent upon newly arising state ideologies, and have required a cultural revolution through which the prior constellations of social reality were destroyed. The focus of this cultural revolution has been the Ottoman bourgeoisie and its socio-cultural characteristics. To erase the social memory of the Ottoman Empire and render mute the Ottoman bourgeoisie, the Kemalist state employed a large range of strategies of disappropriation and laws that would ensure the impotence of the bourgeoisie, and hinder their involvement in the political sphere of the Republic.

Strategies included a ban on the Ottoman alphabet, language and religious practises, but also signs of societal rank as displayed in the public realm. Everything that reflected and reproduced forms of Ottoman life were included in this ban. The Ottoman bourgeoisie was replaced by a new Republican elite – an elite that consisted of members of the state bureaucracy, who, due to their entanglement in state affairs, posed no threat to undermining its ideology. In the absence of any cultural bond, Keyder cites that the strength of the Republic was to be found precisely in the state loyalty of this "Ersatzbourgeoisie" (1997). The old bourgeoisie, or any large group of aspiring middle-class property owners, had been rid of their status and rights, and thus did not pose any serious opposition, further stabilizing the elite of state-bureaucrats (Keyder 1997:188; Atasoy 2005:56; Küçük 2008:83). In order to create a new national narrative, the civilizing project of the nation embraced an entirely different imagination of the national landscape, one that went hand in hand with the neglect of any meaningful geographical or urban symbolism of the Ottoman Empire. Kemalists turned away from the intellectual and cultural centre of the city itself in order to build strength on the virgin lands in the country's agricultural hinterlands. To see the peasantry as the developing force of national ideology was in this regard not only a reference to the unsoiled mind of the hitherto disregarded rural population of Turkey, but a gesture that granted them satisfaction and success, rather than resistance.

Without a doubt, the takeover of the Kemalist regime and the drastic measures of change have led to a situation of severe oscillation between all spheres of everyday social life and definitions of history, as well as class and identity.

These oscillations have led to the formation of diverse identities that seek a relationship to prior forms of cultural life, but which also internalize the hegemonic ideology of Kemalism. By introducing the term "lifeworld", Şerif Mardin suggests taking a closer look at the micro-sociological processes of change, in order to understand discursive ruptures and oscillation. This term serves as a suitable bridge for the analysis of discourses, since it refers to a realm

of material and immaterial reference through which society constructs a meaningful story about itself (Mardin 1997).

While the rhetoric of an *imposed modernity* suggests that there is some form of cultural inheritance to which Turkish society could return some day in the future, the cultural ruptures that nation-building has caused still need to be considered. Following Keyder on this issue, Kemalism has essentially failed to address the majority of the population and to establish a popular discourse with which people could have identified.

The lack of a popular identity discourse through which the nation-state regime could have been legitimated can be related to the moment of erasure of what Mardin considers to be one of three communication loops (Mardin 1997:186). We can reason that this necessity to create a coherent meaning of social existence goes hand in hand with the constant restructuring of social lifeworlds as constituted through reference systems that uphold and construct social reality. Framing social change in Turkey as a disruption within this lifeworld (or its erasure), we can lead into the theoretical vocabulary of Laclau.

II. 3.3. The imposed modernity in Laclau's words

Until alternative political parties rose to power, the military, which upheld its autocracy until the mid-forties, had found a role model in the father figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The state bureaucrats' perception of the people was thus one where the populace was seen as incapable of knowing what was good for themselves. This autocratic attitude led to a 20-year-long suspension of free social development. The basis for the development of a societal sense of self, appropriation of space, and the possibility of heterogeneous groups to voice their opinions, was hindered. At the same time, national coherence was upheld and enforced by the centralist state, (Da-Dd in fig.d) and heterogeneous notions were forced down through the use of punishment.




Fig.d

Laclau explains that if the society is,

... "conceived as a homogeneous entity designed from a centre of power which, instead of being the social outcome of an equivalential interaction of democratic demands, is seen as the identical substance that any demand expresses, the internal split inherent in any democratic demand within the equivalential chain collapses" (Laclau 2005:208).

In other words, if the homogeneous entity, in our case the Kemalist identity, is not a result of the hegemony of an equivalent chain, it does not contain an antagonistic boundary.

Without this antagonistic boundary, however, no societal demands would cluster together in an equivalent relation – leaving them isolated (D1- D4 fig.1). The link between them would be missing, which means that society would fall apart as soon as the autocratic regime – holding it together by advocating a national narrative (Da) – were to disappear.




Fig.e

Without an equivalent relation, however, there cannot be a discursive closure, and therefore, no outside to which the heterogeneous elements could be banned. This heterogeneity which does not comply with the Kemalist ideology would therefore not be silenced by the social process itself, but necessitated by an exterior force that is not allowing them access to the system of signification. An external act of suppression is necessary to hinder the development of new equivalences, which could, under democratic circumstances, result in a new popular identity competing with Kemalism. Under the governmental regime, this suppression was implemented in three different ways which were designed to suspend free societal development in order to realize the modernisation project. Those three channels would be first and most obviously, the use of military force. Second, the destruction of what Mardin has named *lifeworld* via a cultural revolution. And third, through the writing of a national ideology as one in which the boundaries of the nation would be equivalent to the boundaries of the Kemalist identity.

The last channel is found in descriptions by numerous scholars which criticise the Kemalist project for denying the heterogenic society of the Ottoman Empire, now that a nation-state was established. National ideology has been described in the most popular manner, as the unification of all people in one classless, homogenous society, through the denial of social and cultural difference. Thus described as "this whole heterogeneous field which was an antagonism driven, highly polarized part of a depleted empire, is but one whole set and this set would be the Turkish nation" (Keyder; Öncü). For Žižek, this denial of heterogeneity is a

fantasy of a society which does not exist – discourse-analytically speaking – a society which is not split by an antagonistic division but whole (1989). Taking this further, we learned from Laclau that society is always traversed by an antagonistic split which cannot be integrated into a symbolic order, and that this society is always created through the retroactive narration of its history. The point in creating the Kemalist identity and the struggle to realize it by means of various structural and social transformations is therefore the centre of what defines the nation as an imaginary community. The identity of the national community, though, is not a collection of characteristics that are particular to the people in that particular place and time. The nation is created only through the act of naming the people as an entity. The name not only supports the belief in the coherence of society, but also creates this society itself. One may ask “What makes the Kemalist project different from any other ideological operation?”

Central to this difference, as already mentioned above, is the fact that Kemalism, unlike many other social movements, was not rooted in populism (Laclau 2005:212). The national ideology was not connected to any meaningful discourse that existed beforehand and did not therefore develop out of an equivalent relation between political demands. The difference, in this sense, is not to be found in the ideological structure of Kemalism itself, as an antithesis to the Ottoman Empire, but in a discursive structure which would tie together the particular demands represented under one coherent state ideology. This in fact, was missing.

The second instance of hindering societal development in favour of the Kemalist project lay with the implementation of a cultural revolution. By banning the symbols of public life, changing the language, and disappropriating the intellectual elite, the development of antagonism was prevented, which could have posed a threat of uprising. The Republican language reform, implemented in 1930, destroyed very basic forms of communication, and thus cohesion, within the educated class:

“This reform consisted of the systematic elimination of words with Arabic or Persian roots from the written language and their replacement by neologisms purportedly drawn out of the pure central Asian-Turkic dialects. One of the consequences of this purification was that the Ottoman pre-Republican socio-political vocabulary and rhetoric was eliminated, thus forcing people who were arguing about foundations of society to learn a new way of formulation and debating issues related to an ideal “good society” or if not, relegating them to political mutes” (Mardin 1998:214).

With the Cultural Revolution it might seem to be legitimate to ask why, if meaning was no longer retrievable through Ottoman conventions of speech, governing, clothing, or interaction with public space, the maintenance of the public realm and the policing of behaviour was still so important? Surely any cultural revolution requires a significant form of force – for hierarchical structures always exist in society. Those in the position of advantage will not willingly give up a structure that facilitates their societal superiority. In order to understand the full degree of hegemonic maintenance though, there is another aspect which must not be dismissed: Since hegemonic struggle is a necessary social process, any group, however randomly put together, will engage in the attempt to create a meaningful environment. Martin Nonhoff describes any social reality as discursively structured, saying that any realities exterior to discursive formations are without any relevance to society, and thus to our understanding of society (Nonhoff 2007:9).

No prior social hegemony, however, is necessary for the formation of discursive constellations, since the dynamic that keeps the development of discourses active is essentially a psychological process which is inevitable. Laclau explains this through “effect”. *Effect* is the attempt of a subject to create itself as meaningful through discursive production (Stäheli 2000:55) – but not only existing discourses are adapted.

Single elements are enough to start with. All meaningful elements will then have to be put into some form of relationship, of which representation – the nomination of a key signifier – is essential.

For the state as guardian of a certain national identity, it would therefore be of little use to make sure that only the signifiers of the prior, Ottoman-rooted, hegemonic order will be eliminated from the public realm, for there is an uncountable number of alternative signifying processes which are relational or antagonistic to the current one, and which might enter into a struggle for power. Thus, policing the nation did not only include banning Ottoman conventions from everyday Republican life, but also eliminating the eventualities of any new social movement that might pose a threat to the state order. The control and sanction of assemblies or social gatherings other than for the purpose of homage to the fathers of the Nation has always been a regular measure implemented particularly in the cities – the birthplaces of revolution.

On those grounds, therefore, the assumption that the social and political realm is constituted entirely through the two logics – difference and equivalence – together with the assumption that without antagonism there is in fact no social existence, it makes perfect sense that as

soon as a gap opened up in the anchoring of the regime, equivalences spread widely in all directions leading to what in social studies has been described as a society in wild cultural oscillation. "First the neopopulism of Adnan Menderes, later the renaissance of Islamism, (...) followed by periods of democratic opening (which) were interrupted by successive military interventions" (Laclau 2005:214). Closing this topic we conclude that the *imposed modernity* refers to a fundamental rupture within the meaningful structure of the prior system of signification, which leads to radically new antagonisms and therefore radically new social identities. A more detailed analysis of political undercurrents in the time of one-party hegemony would provide further insight into the effectiveness of various bans that led to a long-lasting disappearance of hitherto common signifiers and symbols of social life. The symbolic repertoire of Kemalism itself, on the other hand, essentially positioned the prior source of antagonism towards any forms of resistance against the Republican project, its symbols, and its beliefs. The Kemalist identity itself, as well as its *lifeworld*, has provided material for new oppositional discourses to emerge, and this observation contradicts the belief that Ottoman particularism continued to exist in a frozen form of perseverance.

3.4. History re-written. The principles of storytelling

Kemalism, as a *project*, anticipated that society go through a progression from imperialism to modernism and beyond in a few decades. The difficult task of achieving such drastic transformation required its implementers to find a way of establishing the national culture beyond the implementation of direct force and oppression. Ideological consciousness had to be rooted in everyday life for the nation not to be continuously exposed to the threat of the internal conflict of civil war (Soja 1995:90). Oppression had to give way to other forms of legitimacy, and these other forms of legitimacy inevitably had to consider the restructuring of social meaning. As much as it is problematic to talk of contemporary urban culture in reference to any rhetoric of 'return' or 'awakening', it is not possible for Kemalism to be appointed a character of *tabula rasa* – an overwriting of a culture through an entirely foreign or new ideology. Instead of talking of a point zero, a national narrative had to relate to existing constellations of meaning and to existing signifiers. Küçük exemplifies this with secularisation. He explains that religion, which has legitimized Ottoman rule, is often misunderstood as having been erased from the cultural life of the Republic. Religion as a key aspect of Ottoman life in Kemalism was repositioned as a signifier in the narrative constellation of the new hegemony. The new role religion achieved in Kemalism, one being subordinate to state control, was in this sense not an attempt to erase religion as a meaningful element altogether, but the result of the re-setting of antagonistic boundaries around the prior hegemonic position that it held under Ottoman rule (Küçük 2008:83). In understanding the full dimension of symbolic coherence that is required to legitimize decisions such as secularisation, it is helpful to think of a story that is being retold and from which, elements of social weight such as religion cannot simply disappear, since their disappearance would raise questions as to their whereabouts, and weaken the credibility of the story. The coherence of that story is important, and for its coherency all elements that have played a role in the past have to feature in some form or another. Once the story line is set, any new events will be interpreted within the framework of that story, confirming it in some cases, but also directing and expanding it. This consistency of the story, however, has its boundaries, given by the symbolic reference system upon which the story is founded. Overstepping the boundaries of signification would equal the collapse of the story line. The moment of collapse is interesting for our understanding of society because it marks the

limits of legitimation. Legitimation can, in this context, be understood as a process lending coherence to a story. As long as decisions internal to the story can be legitimated, the story makes sense.

The key idea in the concept of social storytelling is that it must necessarily be related to the signifying constructs of the collective system through which society signifies itself. Social integration is made possible through the appropriation of societal symbols, or in other words, the integration of societal signifiers into the story line of the individual. These societal signifiers can work as symbolic references in a multiplicity of ways, either congruent with the hegemonic societal discourse or antagonistic to it. According to this logic, all events, however insignificant they might seem, come with the requirement that they appear as meaningful elements in the symbolic repertoire of the collective self. If the boundary of this meaningful construct is reached, the occurrence of a radically new event can only lead to two different outcomes. It will either be successfully signified by creating new equivalences to the already existing particularities of the story, or it will burst the equivalent chain between these particularities through its radical new character, leading to the formation of a new symbolic reference system (Berger & Luckmann 1997:105).

Theresa Caldeira offers an example for a situation in which a radically new event has restructured an individual's narrative in order for them to make sense of their acute situation in urban society. Caldeira's example is related to crime in Sao Paulo – providing a very detailed analysis of the transformative force with which the occurrence of crime can change existing constructs of signification. (A person who experienced an attack in her own home) “has to stick to the available stereotypes to make sense of the assaults and of the changes in her life and neighbourhood. The categories are rigid: they are meant not to describe the world accurately but to organize and classify it symbolically. They are meant to counteract disruption at the level of experience, not to describe it” (Caldeira 2000:33).

The event of crime has to be signified in order not to leave a traumatic mark on the life of the person who has experienced this crime. Signification in the above is therefore a means to overcome personal crisis, dealing with it on the level of consciousness. What is important to recognize here is that this new act of signification does necessarily intervene into the narrative story and the way it was structured so far. All particular elements of the story must be shifted into a new order so as to be represented by the new signifier – crime.

“It is crime that provides the language for expressing other experiences like inflation and social decay, and not the other way around” (ibid:29).

This example shows that a narrative is not only formulated towards the future, but rewritten retrospectively. All other events, no matter how long they might lie in the past, attain new meanings so that they can be explained as coherent to the event of the crime. Berger and Luckmann point this out by describing a person's existence as structured by a vertical layer of time in addition to a horizontal layer of subjective reason:

“(es) muss dem Einzelnen das Ganze seines Lebens, das Nacheinander seines Weges durch verschiedene Teilordnungen einer ganzen institutionalen Ordnung subjektiv sinnhaft dargeboten werden. mit anderen Worten: der Lebenslauf des Individuums muss in der Abfolge all seiner institutionell vorformulierten Phasen mit einer Sinnhaftigkeit versehen werden, die das ganze subjektiv plausibel macht. deshalb muss eine vertikale Ebene (zeitlich) im Leben der Person die horizontale Ebene der Integration und subjektiven Plausibilität der institutionalen Ordnung ergänzen” (Berger u. Luckmann 1997:99).

Transferred to the level of society, this tension between verticality and horizontality, which is constitutive of any systematic constellation of meaning, becomes particularly evident when a change of regime or a shift in the power constellation make necessary the legitimation of a new government. According to this necessity, the legitimation of the new Republican regime in Turkey was required to ground its reasons for actions in the eventuality of the past. Demographic shifts, new power constellations, the development of the built environment, and symbolisation of the material surrounds all had to be relatable to a new historicity, which marked the beginning of Turkey. The national legend of Ergenekon*, a story that described the origin of the Turkish Nation, both in time and place must therefore be seen as central to the undertaking of nation-building as much as the pursuit of structural change – for it inscribed a new symbolic language into the lifeworld of the collective imaginary of the nation. The richness of this story can only sufficiently be explained through an analysis of Kemalism on all levels of verbal, visual and material references. For this research however, two main points need to be analysed in closer detail, for they help to understand the necessity for the material environment to be symbolically included or to be constitutive of discourse.

1) The first point refers to what was said at the beginning: That any representation of reality underlies the logic of antagonism. It cannot be represented as a positive identity, but as a form of antagonism that keeps this identity from becoming actualized. Any legitimation of

power must therefore commence with a promise that any hindrance or lack that makes the achievement of the social utopia impossible will be eliminated.

An additional example will make this even clearer: The idea of civilizing the new nation led the Kemalist state to institutionalize education in Western culture and knowledge, in forms of village schools; the so called *Köy Enstitüleri* (village institutes). These *Köy Enstitüleri* were a form of boarding school in which children were educated, but more centrally turned into honourable citizens of the nation. In the eyes of the authorities, education was regarded as an act of liberation, a birth into the daylight of Republican freedom and civility, as the following citation demonstrates:

“The stares of the children arriving at village institutes were glassy and worried. Most had left their villages for the first time: either on foot or on the back of a horse or a donkey, they had reached the gates of hope through unfavorable natural conditions. Dressed in torn, patched clothes, they comprised the Ottoman legacy the young Republic had inherited. Despite those who chose to ignore this legacy, Ismail Hakki Tonguc was the one to call out to the darkness and extend his helping hand. Silent for seven hundred years, the masses responded to his call and tightly grabbed his hand” (From the exhibition: *Düşünen Tohum Konuşan Toprak Cumhuriyet’in Köy Enstitüleri 1940-1954* at Pera Muzesi Istanbul).

What is clear when comparing these two story lines is the thematisation of struggle. Of what nature this kind of struggle is, and by what circumstances it is caused, however, remains rather unclear. It derives its meaning through the vague idea of a particular hindrance or

* Ergenekon is a legend about the destruction and rebuilding of the Göktürk Empire, and also serves as an origin myth for Turkish tribes and today’s Turkic states. The legend takes its name from the Central Asian valley in which fleeing Göktürks sought refuge and a new homeland. Their empire had been destroyed as a result of battles with Chinese and other non-Turkic forces. They fled into a forbidding mountainous region and at its centre came across an enormous fruitful valley. They decided to remain there and, melting down all of their iron tools and weapons, created an enormous iron door to seal the only entrance to the valley. Here they lived in peace and the clans flourished and became powerful again. After many generations, they became so numerous that the valley became overpopulated. They decided to melt down the iron door to forge weapons. However, no one remained of the generation that had led them through the passes, valleys and ravines into the valley, so they wandered aimlessly through the mountains until a grey mother wolf appeared and led them out of the mountains. On the steppes, after many battles, the Göktürk won back their importance, although they never regained their old unity and rather split into many tribes that nevertheless traced their communal origins back to the Göktürk (www.kamilpasha.com: 25.april.2013).

obstacle signified through the Ottoman legacy. However, the remedy to this darkness is not a particular one, but the transition to the world of the young Republic that is created through a range of metaphorical elements. One particular remedy, for example, could be education (available to all), independent of income, class, or origin, without mention of a reason. In this text, however, education is just a minor element that relates to the element which constructs the ambivalence between light and darkness. It is the darkness from which the children come to the daylight which creates the equivalence between the particular elements and which, in reference to the story, creates the ideological context for arguing the necessity of education. This ideological context therefore creates reason and logic to legitimate a claim, which in its singular and particular nature, is not clear at all. The fantasy of civility and unity in this constellation depends upon the construction of an antagonistic frontier beyond which an undefined form of anti-community fulfills the representational function of the narrative.

2) The second characteristic that becomes obvious is the way the above stories are constructed around people, places, objects and names. Berger and Luckmann say that identity reaches legitimation only when put into relation with a symbolic, and thus meaningful, context (Berger 1997:106). These symbolic references in the legend of Ergenekon are (without a claim for completeness): Göktürk, Gate, Key, Wolf, Anatolia, Mountain. In the story told by Ismail Hakki Tonguç, these references can be: village, children, horseback, gate and darkness. At first glance, some of them, like the wolf (which to this day is the symbol of the nationalist organization, the Grey Wolves) or the village (a metaphor which, in combination with ruralness and primitivity, is now more present than ever in the rhetoric of urban life) appear to be very obvious and familiar. Others, though, are less obvious on a verbal level, but of no lesser importance in the creation of an imaginary landscape. Before proceeding to the specificities of the spatial references, it should be recalled what was said by Miggelbrink and Mattissek: that images, as well as the visuality of space, are participatory in the construction of discourses, and that they do so by being emptied of their specific history in order to be filled with a new subjective-discursive meaning. Reality as something socially produced always underlies the structure of a narrative. Narratives are thus not restricted to the sphere of language or metaphor. All objects, persons, conditions, or ways of doing things only attain meaning as part of a certain

relational structure. No differentiation between discursive and non-discursive elements is therefore possible when analysing a narrative (Nonhoff 2007:9).

II. 4. The role of space in modernism

4.1. The locale of the nation

Space as a reference system in the national narrative of the Republic plays a crucial role for the construction of an imaginary community.

Space essentially requires a storyline to become meaningful and to function as an anchor point for social orientation. The social production of space therefore requires a narrative structure, which connects to prior spatial meaning constellations. The story of Ergenekon demonstrates the necessity to locate the narrative, that is, to integrate the narrative into the meaning-constellation of the environment (Löw 2009:268). In this story the spatial signifiers – such as the mountain range – reveal themselves as essential elements in the narrative of Kemalism. The striving of the Republican regime to better the lives of the people through social transformation must attain a spatial order to be imaginable. This notion of space as it appears in the narrative, however, does not imply in any way geographical or architectural precision. It only implies an imaginary locality in the hinterland of the country, far away from the geographical centres of the Ottoman Empire – an undiscovered kind of land. Through narrative production, this unknown place is charged with meaning through the other elements in the narrative. Only through them does it arise as the birthplace of the nation – the geographical centre – with which Turks, rather than Ottomans, would be identifying henceforth.

As a signifier, the mountain range, through its integration into the narrative of Ergenekon, receives its meaning as an actual location of purity, rootedness and homeliness that is imagined through the story of escape and rebirth. Further, these qualities do not stand on their own, but are related to the existing meaning-constellations of the region within national territories. Through its distance and through the way it is unknown – pure, untouched, and fertile – the mountain range forms a kind of dichotomy to the Mediterranean region, which is urbanised, cosmopolitan and ethnically mixed. Diverse languages and cultures belonged to the everyday image of life in the centres of the Ottoman Empire, signifying quite the opposite to what would be required for the imagination of an ethnically pure and culturally unique national community.

The gesture of withdrawal from the sea region into the mountains, a very grounded and specific natural setting, clearly juxtaposed the undefined space of the sea as an in-between

of nations and empires and the cultural environment of the trade cities. Nature, in its specific topological characteristics has, throughout the history of nation building (not only in Turkey), always played a significant role in the narration of national identity. As much as the mountain range was descriptive of something pure and grounded, it was also the geographical origin of the revolution. From there, Turks claimed their territory, which was originally theirs, but only temporarily in the hands of strangers. At the same time, a boundary was created between the cities (the centres of trade) and the hinterland. This boundary would relate to the centralisation of trade with the port cities, where high levels of affluence and literacy would pose a contrast to rural areas. This boundary, however, did not last long, and was very ambivalent from the start, as the reality of life in the rural lands of the Anatolian region was poor and in no way congruent with the fantasy of a civilized Turkish nation. Being the origin of Turkishness, the hinterland was at the same time the forgotten land of the Empire, the location upon which the civilizing project had to concentrate. The hinterland was therefore both – the birthplace and the darkness – just as the new capital city, Ankara, (as will be discussed further down) embodied both the city and the hinterland. While the educated in the port cities, particularly Istanbul, were relieved of their status and properties, the new nation was educated in Republican culture and ideology in the hinterlands. *Köy enstitüleri* (village institutes) formed the backbone of Republican education, ensuring a certain isolation of the students from the Ottoman Intelligentsia, but at the same time preventing their families from migrating to the cities. Murat Gül explains that *köy enstitüleri*, and the urban-rural divide they created, were fundamentally based on the awareness that in the cities where the literacy rate was relatively high, the spirit of the Kemalist reform could have only limited success (Gül 2009). According to Gül, the reversal of the urban-rural divide came much later with the election of the Democrats in 1940, which turned Anatolia into the symbolic centre of the Islamic cultural movement, and furthermore illustrates its inability to attain to the entire nation equally.

“Turkey in the 1930s was overwhelmingly an agrarian country with more than 80 percent of the population living in rural areas. The influence of the reforms in the vast majority of the 33,000 villages, many of which had very little communication with the cities and towns, was almost nonexistent. The policy therefore was to keep the peasants in their villages, discourage immigration, downplay the attractions of city life, and educate the rural population about the virtues of Kemalist ideology” (Gül:82).

The dichotomous divide between the city and the hinterland can be regarded as one of the key symbolic operations of Turkish modernism. Throughout the structuring of the economy, the rebuilding of the education system and the institutionalization of cultural life, political slogans like "The peasants are the real masters of the nation" (a quote apparently borrowed from Atatürk himself) ideologically rectified and gave meaning to not only the national geographical order, but to the whole state. Peasanthood as an anti-urban sentiment was also an expression of resentment that Kemalists held towards capitalism. Viewing the city as the breeding ground of segregation between classes, unemployment, economic depression and unrest, Kemalists invented themselves as a nation of peasants, and therefore a socially equal, whole and harmonious society. This vision, however, contains a dichotomy, since its resentment towards the urban is resentment particularly valid for Istanbul and Izmir, due to their function as gates to the world. The urban and rural are therefore a very specific notion of urbanity that existed in port cities and a very specific rural dichotomous to it. While in the early period of Kemalism the urban was abandoned through the desertion and destruction of Istanbul and Izmir, the following decades experienced a repositioning of these dichotomous boundaries by reclaiming the city as a signifier of Turkishness. Political struggle and changing narratives have therefore turned the hinterland and the city into signifiers of a floating character in which the 'urban' and the 'rural' cannot be understood without the symbolic implications of Istanbul and Ankara.

4.2. The urban-rural paradigm and a new capital city

Having pointed out the narrative role of the urban-rural divide, we begin to see a resemblance to what Markus Schroer has described as a "Leitbild" (Schroer 2005). In the search for a solution to the problems of the city, Schroer depicts the city as a collection of characteristics, the seemingly opposite of which is formulated into a role model for planning activities. This coincides with Murat Gül's perception that "as for social bodies and constitutive elements of the Ottoman and the Republican states, one would look in vain for anything but contrasting relation" (Gül 2009). These contrasting opposites consist of a variety of social, economic and political particularities to which spatial form is put aside, which, in fact, is vaguely descriptive, but which correlates with the practise of space-making with a very concrete set of spatial characteristics. One example we should all be familiar with is the phenomenon of urbanity. The qualities of urbanity are mostly agreed upon by urbanists and planners, but the spatially concrete form of urbanity changes with concern to time and place. For this reason of indefinability, Thomas Wüst speaks of urbanity as a myth (Wüst 2004). For our cities today we could say that urbanity is understood in terms of high density, liveliness and socio-cultural mixing. By this definition, the ideal urban form that was propagated in the early Republican period was one *without* urbanity. The desired urban model overruled urbanity as we understand it today, due to a belief in the harmful effects of cosmopolitanism, density, and income differentiations between the working class and the class of richer merchants. Attempting to tackle the faults of Istanbul as a busy port city, a new capital city was undergoing planning in the hinterland: Ankara became that new capital city. Not least for its geographical location, the old imperial capital, Istanbul, served Ankara as an antagonistic other in every respect (Bozdoğan 2001:67). Ankara would be everything that Istanbul had lost – a symbol of Turkey's decolonization from Western forces that occupied the country after World War I, and at the same time a symbol of Turkey's commitment to modernize "in spite of the West" – a new symbolic city that would simultaneously be anti-Western and Western (Akcan 2006:31). What spatial vocabulary was there to borrow from when looking West at the great post-industrial metropolises of Europe? The shape of Ankara, while challenging cities like London or Paris, had to live up to a different ideal. *Being West in spite of the West* implied an urban form that would represent competitiveness with European capitals, but circumnavigate the zoning – the bourgeois

neighbourhoods of rich apartments on one hand, and the banlieues on the other. The capital city for the Turkish nation was expected to regard everybody as equal, offer high living standards, facilitate a life close to nature and overrule any discrepancies based on origin or affluency. The vision for Ankara was thus very much in favour of the garden city model of Ebenezer Howard. Planners got much of their inspiration from national-socialist Germany and the housing settlements of that time. A city of low density, Ankara was oriented around a secular center represented through the figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and framed by the municipal and administrative buildings, police headquarters and other buildings representing the secular power of the state (Çinar 2007:164). Hermann Janssen, an urban planner from Germany who was commissioned to do the masterplan for Ankara, openly confessed to his belief in the low-rise, single family house as supportive of the national belief. Janssen argued that the connection to land, the greenery and the horizons to which the garden city model aspired were the origin of patriotism and national identity (Akcan 2012). From which context such argumentation might originate is sufficiently explained elsewhere, but what is interesting here is that while the garden city model in the West had been relegated to the ills of the industrial city, it was introduced to Turkey although Turkey had not, up to that point, experienced industrialisation at all (Önder in Esen/Lanz 2005:133). The features that appeared as the source of antagonism to the garden city model were of a different kind, which, according to Akcan and Bozdoğan, is the reason for a rather sudden change in the paradigm of architectural style driven by the problem of identifying with the Western urban model. Only a short time after the First National Style, a search for a new style began to overcome the 'meaninglessness' of international modern cubist houses, which soon after they were built were experienced as something that lacked identity. What remained indicative of the very different discursive context that raised the family house to the status of the Republican ideal home was the nature of the planning processes itself. It lacked the richness of debate on urban strategies that were to be found in Europe at that time, by giving priority to the architectural form. "The scheme, however, retained the primacy of the architectural object – the individual house – unlike the 1920s *Siedlungen* of Frankfurt or Berlin, where the individual units were completely incorporated into the rationality of the assembly, the anonymous housing blocks or rows of attached units in the German examples were replaced in Arkan's scheme by the sublimated aesthetic of the villa, albeit a miniaturized one, and the different sizes of these villas reflected the social hierarchy of the community" (Bozdoğan 2001:220). Although the garden city model suited

the Republican national discourse, the housing typologies of the single-family house and the housing blocks were differently positioned in the modernising discourse of Turkey. The modernist *Siedlungen* that we know from Red Vienna, for example, were designed to house a class of workers who primarily lived in the rather bad and overly dense apartment neighbourhoods of the Gründerzeit. The multi-storey apartment building in Turkey, on the other hand, was criticized at this stage not so much for the poor living conditions it was offering to workers, but for having been the idealized form of living in the 19th century Ottoman city. The modernization reforms (Tanzimat) that began in the 18th century had introduced the grid, the boulevards, and the apartments as symbols of a Western and advanced style of life in the city. Constructed with advanced building technologies, the apartments had steel frames and reached far above the average height of the wooden predecessors. A complete city of steel and stone existed in the northern areas of Istanbul, representing fiscal power and cultural progress, in sharp contrast to the old wooden city of the historical peninsula. In the Kemalist discourse therefore, the Istanbul apartment came to signify the urban imagery of greed, profit motive and speculation – the cause of malaise and the downfall of the Empire (Bozdoğan 2001:231). In spite of the similarity between the nineteenth-century Ottoman city and the Gründerzeit architecture of the great cities in Western Europe, the discourse of modernity in Europe had focused on planning as social strategy, lending great importance to road systems, densities, district regulation and housing typologies alike. In Turkey, on the other hand, the link between the garden city model and the one-family house was strong, not because it sought to overcome social problems and bad living conditions, but because it stood against an image of Istanbul as the capital city of the Empire.

Ankara; a city superior to Istanbul

In time, with Hermann Jannsen's construction of modern Ankara, Henri Prost was commissioned with a masterplan for Istanbul. Prost's plan was for a shrinking city, since Istanbul had lost most of its governmental and administrative function. Due to this and the displacement of many Greek, Armenian and Jewish citizens, Prost's work was mainly one of beautification. He suggested a set of three major parks; Firstly, Taksim-Maçka Park, the Archaeological Park in Sultanahmet, and a park in the location of today's Vatan Caddesi in order to provide citizens with room to socialize in public. These parks were planned with a

series of adjacent neighbourhoods for the Republican elites, the most representative being those along Cumhuriyet Caddesi and in Gümüşsuyu. Taksim Square and Cumhuriyet Caddesi can be seen as the representational center of Istanbul in the early years of the Republic. Spending time in public space, going swimming at one of the emerging beaches along the Bosphorus, and enjoying free time in one of the numerous parks was the vision of civilized life that drove the transformation of the city.



Img. 1. Hand-drawing by Henri Prost



Img. 2. Public life in Taksim Park

In spite of these changes, Istanbul, deprived of its governmental role, was not seen as a city of the future. Ankara, however, was anticipated to grow in dynamism and power. Building Ankara from nothing represented everything that was honourable about the foundation of the state. A five-year construction scheme portrayed Ankara as the ideal city with its secular, youthful and healthy image. It was this image of newness which led Cemil Topuzlu, the former mayor of Istanbul, to observe, "In my opinion, in order to transform Istanbul into a contemporary city, there is no solution but total demolition with the exception of Istanbul's monuments and gradual reconstructions" (Gül 2009:81).

What Istanbul had to battle, in spite of its increasingly modernist face, was its heritage as an imperialist city which served Ankara as a source of antagonism. The city of Ankara was symbolic of a unification of the urban and the rural as a harmonious entity in one city. This vision led the honorary chairman of the Ankara Master Planning Commission, (and close acquaintance of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk) to say: "The Ottomans built monuments, the Turks are the builders of cities" (Cinar 2007:153).

This conviction was clearly expressed in the masterplan for Istanbul, which transformed governmental buildings into museums, and the museums into decorative elements of a vast urban landscape, which was on a continuum with parks, neighbourhoods and squares. But it was those precise buildings that were now museums which constituted the city in the Ottoman Empire. The urban and the non-urban, the city and the hinterland, must therefore be considered as unstable and ideologically changing signifiers of a politically-charged language about territory and national identity.

Although Ankara was a city in the sense that it was an urban agglomeration of a certain size and a seat of the government, the meaning of the city in the understanding of the early phase of Kemalist planning was entirely unlike the meaning the city had attained during Industrialization. Rather, as a city, Ankara was regarded as the center point of a district, and not dichotomous to the rural areas that surrounded it. It represented the national state without any privileges over the villages, and was easy to reach through a network of railways – all of which formed a nodal point in Ankara. Ankara therefore counterposed the perspective of the city in the 19th century as something superior to the rural.

Kemalism de-crowned the city as the seat of capital accumulation, and symbolized Turkey as a non-segregated, unified nation. But a vital factor for its supremacy was that it was new, a kind of promised land in which everything would be better than in Istanbul. The way Karaosmanoğlu described the motions people went through in setting on the long journey to

Ankara speaks for itself. For those who came from Istanbul, Ankara was “like a secret code of liberation which would light up the eyes of those into whose ears it was whispered”, according to Karaosmanoğlu:

“Hele son zamanlarda, ecnebi işgali altında bir zindan haline giren İstanbulda, bir kaçış ve kurtuluş parolası gibi kulaktan kulağa fısıldanan, her fısıldanışta gözlerde bir ümit ve intizar ışığı parlatan ve o gizliliği kendisine esrarlı bir cazibe veren Ankara kelimesi, ideal Ankaranın adı, zihinde bir hayal ülkesi olarak yaşayan bu yeri adeta bir masal iklimi haline sokmuştu” (**Ankara**; Jakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu 1934).

This vision of Ankara, however, was a fantasy, a dream of a better future, and in that dream it was placed within the untouched homeland of the nation. But neither Ankara as a city, nor Anatolia, were undiscovered land. Ankara was a small Anatolian city, the history of which goes back to antiquity – not even its name was new. Its original name, from the Greek, *Αγκυρα* (*Ankyra*), was phonetically adjusted and changed into Ankara upon Ankara’s declaration as the capital city. Secretly though, as Ankara contained the same paradox as the fantasy of the nation of enlightened peasants. The light and the darkness existed side by side all along. This becomes clear in another passage of Karaosmanoğlu’s book: After their long journey from Istanbul, a couple who set off for Ankara in order for the husband to attain a working position there finally arrived. Tired from the trip, they found a guest house in the old citadel, but they could not sleep. Suddenly there was this noise coming from the courtyard. The courtyard was collectively used by owners of the houses but all the dirt from the houses was on display there. The young girl remembered how sick she felt passing through that courtyard on that day. It was in the same condition. Dirty water ran from underneath the door into the courtyard.

“Bu defa gürültü, sokak tarafından değil, evin avlusundan geliyordu. Ev sahipleriyle ortaklaşa kullandıkları bu avlu aynı zamanda her iki evin bütün pis işlerinin görüldüğü yerd. Genç kadın, eve ilk girdiği anda buradan ne kadar tiksinierek geçtiğini hatırladı. Gene aynı hal. Bulaşık sularıyla yağlanmış bir oluk sokak kapısının altından dışarıya uzanıyor. Onun biraz ötesinde tahtadan bir nöbetçi kulübesinin andıran abdesthanenin kötü kokusu dağılıyor ve bir ipte sıra sıra çocuk bezleri sarkıyordu. İşte bunların altında bir adam, bir kadını dövüyordu” (ib:16).

It becomes clear that antagonism resides not only within the dichotomous relationship Ankara has with Istanbul, but that antagonism is fundamental to the narration of the utopian city Ankara. Ankara contains its own source of antagonism. Without the repulsive way the courtyard or the whole neighbourhood of the historical citadel is experienced, the 'Vision of Ankara' as a youthful, healthy and non-segregated city could not exist.

Understanding that this internal dichotomy is a structural one, indicative of discourse and not a paradox or a confusion, the often interchangeably used notions of the 'City' as signifier are easier to understand. Turning away from the city, which is Istanbul, and creating a nation of city-builders at the same time is indicative of the struggle for hegemony over the city as a signifier. In the narration of the nation, Ankara is ultimately a divided city, and this division corresponds to both fantasy and place. While everything that is dark and uncivilized about Anatolia is represented in the urban structure of the old citadel, the fantasy of the new Ankara does not speak of this reality but contains it in an antagonistic, yet secret, manner in the way this new Ankara is imagined. What applies to the fantasy – the imagined city of the future – though, also applies to the concrete city. Ankara will contain the citadel and the garden city and for those who set off from other cities in Turkey to the new Ankara in the years it was founded, the citadel would be the place they would have fled in their imagination.

Housing for the nation

Turkish officials and intellectuals were well-informed about urban developments in Europe, wary of repeating Europe's mistakes, but supportive of any ideas which would help to formulate an alternative, better-planned model for Ankara. Since it corresponded well with the garden city typology, cooperative housing was popular both as an urban form and as a model for finance. Cooperative housing did not replace the social housing institutions of the welfare state as a planning scheme, but it was preferred amongst those people who had an affiliation with the state bureaucracy. Akcan points out the main difference in the idea of cooperative housing in Turkey as an elitist model of social housing:

"They requested a maid's room and a place for a washing machine in each house (not a common laundry as in European examples) as well as a garage for some houses. These three

last requirements were rather unusual for Janssen since co-op housing in Germany was often meant for low and middle income families. The Bahcelievler cooperative also required a school, a children's square, a marketplace, a casino and sports field with two tennis courts and a swimming pool" (Akcan 2012:85).

Although, as Akcan points out, those one-family housing cooperatives, according to official statements, considered climate and locality. Housing in cities as well as across the entire rural geography of Turkey fails to demonstrate any regional specificity and is built everywhere alike. Even though, in the the architecture of villages, the presence of so-called "köy mimarı" has been an established architectural branch, with many architects working solely in the field of village architecture, the new settlements of Ankara and Istanbul differed little from the architecture of villages spread all over the country.



Img. 3: Eski (old) Bademli/Gökceada(imbros)



Img.4: Yeni (new) Bademli/Gökceada (imbros)

The new towns particular to the Aegean region demonstrated clear favour for a unifying national style, rather than for an appropriate local architecture. The towns had extreme exposure to the sun and a lack of shade, and were, although rated as the favourable form of housing, clearly disadvantaged in comparison to the stone architecture of the abandoned Greek villages which they surrounded. Nevertheless, the new cooperative settlements were

offered as housing to the middle class. Many historical villages, on the other hand, were left abandoned as the original owners fled the country. A few decades in the course of migration, the decaying village core served as housing opportunities to migrants from Anatolia who were unable to restore them. Most of them remain in derelict condition to this day. The creation of housing in Turkey did thus follow an ideal. What is interesting about this, though, is that the new towns were, during their time, regarded as the optimum form of housing and cannot be discussed by differentiating between a local and functional architecture and an ideologically encouraged but dysfunctional architecture. The reasons for the new towns in the literature of planning are numerous, and consider aspects of ventilation space for children to play, greenery around the houses, and a better use of space and daylight. The argument for those houses was thus not made on the grounds of neglect towards the locality. It is rather that the discourse of Kemalism not only brought about new urban role models, but also created an entirely new set of criteria that rationally rectified the planning decisions made. The idea of the garden city established itself as universally correct through mechanisms of objectification and turned a blind eye to all other perspectives. This ideal type is thus objective, as in the course of its formulation, fantasy and its rational knowledge compliment one another.

“Objektiv möglich wird ein Idealtypus dadurch, dass sich bei seiner Bildung die an der Wirklichkeit geschulte Phantasie und das Gesetzeswissen ergänzen” (Vincenzotti 2013:43).

Informal housing

With the garden city model as a universal concept for development, population growth and demographic change were not taken into account. The chief planner of Ankara, Helmut Janssen, envisioned an extremely low density and a sprawling urban development for Turkey as a whole. He based himself on the extension planning of Ebenezer Howard, which meant that once a settlement had exceeded a certain size, a new settlement could only be built at a certain distance from it. This settlement, however, was only calculated at a number of below thirty thousand inhabitants, which rendered it entirely unfit as a concept for a city that would house several million. Through a reduction of the urban extension, better accessibility to public services would have been provided, which would have reduced the costs for infrastructure. Landscape, forest and water catchment areas would have been protected, but these issues did not count for much in the urbanization of the whole country.

One reason for the neglect of these issues could be the notion of conquering national territory, which at a similar time also led Israel to plan for Jewish settlements against the logic of centrality, infrastructure or coherency. A considerable reason for this was a belief that public resource land was something inexhaustible.

After the Second World War, Turkey had massively invested in industrialisation, causing rapid urban growth in large agglomerations. The rather small capacity of the social system to provide welfare and housing for workers, combined with a great worry about the development of poor quality working-man's neighbourhoods, led the state to think of other possibilities for housing workers. The strategy was to exclude urban land from the cycle of capital accumulation and tolerate informal development. Organisations that were politically involved in the housing question, such as the Architectural Chamber, blamed a lack of investment for the sprawl of informal housing that soon covered entire urban areas. The unsolved question of how to house workers was seen as responsible for the poor infrastructure and building quality of massive urban core areas around industries.


This model of self-service urbanisation, however, deserves a second thought in light of the often-acclaimed lack of interest and effort to solve housing issues.

Knowing the critique that Republicans expressed regarding rental barracks and banlieues, an important factor allowing informal development becomes clear. By not forcing workers into narrowly confined dark apartments, but allowing them to take advantage of ample space and daylight in whatever way their building capacities would facilitate, this model without a doubt eased the trauma rural migrants had to experience when confronted with the necessity of moving to the city.

Through the ability to build their own homes, migrants were part of the urbanisation process, and therefore part of the national community. Their role was not of a social group that served another, but of one that served a greater purpose in industrializing and building state power. Through the informal housing concept, people were able to regard a small plot of land in the city as their own, and to live on it in the same way as they would live on their land in the villages. Informal housing districts were thus, without further influence from the outside, single-family home villages, albeit situated in the city.



Img.4



Img.5

Without any input, the vision propagated by the authorities was continued by the people. The new city developed all around the industrial areas – providing easy access to workplaces.

Industrialisation and rising property prices in the cities, though, soon led to a conflict that questioned the state as the protector of private property, causing intense political conflicts over the right to stay, demolition and homelessness (Atasoy 2005:80, Sengül in: Esen/Lanz 2005:82).

4.3. The city as floating signifier / the end of single-party hegemony

“The peasants are the real nation!” (Atatürk)

“Enough! The nation has the word!” (election slogan of Democratic Party in 1950)

As shown above, the problems of legitimacy that brought Kemalism’s downfall are closely related to the failure of the state to gain credibility and trust through populism. The situation of the Cold War further caused a loss of power in the international context, and an uprising amongst the population, which forced the state to gradually open up its autocratic structures. The laws concerning public gatherings were weakened and political parties were being allowed to form. Elections took place. When the Democratic Party (DP) rose to power in the 1950s, a totally different, religion-oriented rhetoric inscribed itself into public debate. Their members came from amongst those who regarded themselves as peasants, but disadvantaged in society. The political movement against the Republican People’s Party or Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) was formed on the grounds of recognition that antagonism resided within the marriage of peasantism with secularism on one hand, and peasantism with elitism on the other. The slogan of the Democrats – “*Enough! The nation has the word!*” – was the attempt to overwrite the existing image of the rising rural state, and to invalidate the ties the early Republic had attempted to make with the education, civilization and empowerment of peasants. The ideas of the opposition over a more traditional national identity contained references to folk culture and religiousity, coupled with connotations of peripherality as opposed to elitism. While until that point, the CHP had defined the rural as national under its own national vision, the Democrats had contested this symbolic connection, claiming it for its own symbolic identity. Successfully uniting the rural population and the migrants through traditionalism, the CHP recognized its loss of power and, as a result, dropped its peripheral connotations, stating that the rural population lacked the prerequisites for state-making (Atasoy 2005).

In the analysis of academic writing on this subject, this turnaround of political references has caused much confusion, even leading to long-standing debates over the 'correct' political narrative. Opinions and descriptions vary strongly, but seem not to fully consider the chronological order of events, or the context in which they were said or published. Depending upon the viewpoint, the Kemalist nation is either seen as peasantist and regards the city as the source of all evil (Gül; Köymen), or as a civilized nation of

urbanists (Cinar; Atasoy). What seems to be a paradox here is not. The definition of the nation by the Republicans as an urban nation became hardened slowly as they recognized their own failure to reach far enough into rural areas with their social transformation project. To define Republicanism as peasantist in the political climate of the 1950s would have been pointless, since it was the opposition who defined itself through ruralness. The dichotomy between the city and the countryside became one between the Republican elites and the rural masses who could not be included in the nation-state building, and who, because of that, did not support the Republicans but the opposition, which they felt were representing them better. According to Keyder,

“The gap between the modernizing elites, whose discourse diverged radically from what could be popularly appropriated, and the voiceless masses gradually emerged as the axis around which the subsequent history of Turkish society was played out (...) No mediations developed between the modernizing discourse of the elites and the practice of the masses” (Keyder 1997:188).

It was the missing connections between the modernizing discourse and the existing social structures of the rural population which made any form of identification impossible. The narrative of peasantist empowerment was too rigid to explain the new reality of rising land values in the cities. In addition to that, the role of the state as a guardian over the civility of the nation was not compatible with the reality of life in *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. As the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods were integrating into the cities' economic and political environments, they sought independence and emancipation, which would render a fatherly state redundant in all aspects of social life. A strong rural culture, as opposed to the Republican '*hat and piano*', further contributed to widening the gap between the elites and the migrant population. The advantage of migrants, according to Göle, was that the social discourses which developed in the *gecekondus* were more flexible in their ability to adjust, and therefore integrate change and variety, than the Republican ideology.

“The majority of the population can easily create hybrid forms in their daily practice of religion, traditional conservatism, and modern aspirations. But the modernist elites, with their value-references tied to binary oppositions, have clearly sided with the 'civilized', the 'emancipated,' and the 'modern'. This generates a cognitive dissonance

between the value system of the elite and that of the rest of the population, which results in contesting legitimacies" (Göle 1997:192).

The rigidity, on the other hand, which Göle ascribes to the elites, must be related to the state being their ideological centre. Discursive change in the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods in opposition to that was developed through people's spatial appropriation of the city and the political engagement to gain rights – rights that were not granted to them from the start. The role of the *gecekondu* in the development of an oppositional movement was increased by state resistance towards the culture of the *gecekondu* and the struggle for rights at its centre. Authorities found themselves in the ambivalent situation of both guarding public resources (depending on urban and industrial growth) and having to grant ownership rights to *gecekondu* inhabitants. In the face of the sheer scale of informal housing, however, the only way to influence urban development was to selectively destroy and grant ownership. This forced inhabitants of informal settlements to engage in local politics, thus forcing local authorities to build their electorate from the rows of migrants. The infiltration of rural culture, traditionalism and religiosity merged into a strong political discourse of emancipation and democracy, overpowering the hegemony of Kemalism. Recognizing the gap between the centre and the periphery in Kemalist ideology, the populism of the DP emerged around the peripherality of the new urbanites. Through slogans such as "Our people have been punished in the police stations and beaten up in the villages" or "Our peasants have been forced to pay taxes despite their inability to pay" (Atasoy 2005:71), they exposed the centralist character of the existing regime, reinvented peasantism as Islamic, and criticised the state for tutelage and oppression. The CHP at that point adapted its political view to regard the cultures of rural populations, the peasantry, the working class, and the private capital groups that began to rise as lacking the Kemalist prerequisites for state-making (ibid:60). From the 1950s onwards, a new antagonistic boundary was drawn between the centre and the periphery, by claiming the centre as modernist and essentially urban, while the rural was considered backwards. The city in the discourse of Kemalism had now changed its connotation, taking distance from the unification of the urban with the rural and defining the city on the grounds of particular urban geographies of higher density, such as the apartment

neighbourhoods of Şisli and Gümüşsuyu, which had been planned for the urban elites. Ruralness also became a negative social connotation used by the CHP to differentiate themselves socially from the Democrats. Since many politicians from the cadres of the DP were people from the Anatolian region lacking a high profile education, the Republicans belittled these people over their "lack of civilization", family background, and inexperience as city dwellers – labelling them as "taşralı politikacılar" (politicians of the countryside).

This slogan clearly shows that the perception of the homogeneous national geography, which was the prior source of national consciousness, was no longer intact.

The city was no longer a signifier of a unified, classless and non-antagonistic society, but the location of ideological struggle as such. There was no longer a hegemonic vision of the city in the sense that a certain range of characteristics, behaviour and spatial order would be taken for granted. Turning the city into a contested signifier, one that would 'float' between the discursive systems of antagonistic political players, would radically change the way it was envisioned and planned under the governments that followed, turning architecture and planning once again into an instrument of power struggle.

Istanbul, contested city

As the city became the location of ideological struggle, urban form and architectural specificities gained new importance. The neglect of Istanbul as the fallen city of the Empire was seen as a big chance by the Democrats who appropriated Istanbul into a discourse of conquest. As Turkey was being reinvented as an Islamic nation, Istanbul began its transformation into a proud national symbol of Ottoman heritage. Both the national as well as the municipal government began to reinvent Turkey as an Islamic nation, and Istanbul as a proud city with Ottoman heritage (Gül). The urban image that was produced during the reign of the DP focused on the integration of Ottoman monuments with a European language of planning. While mosques in the Ottoman "mahalle" (neighbourhood) system structured neighbourhood life, and served as religious and communal centres, the DP cleared the areas around the mosques to make them more visible as symbols of an Islamic culture. Many

wooden "*konaks*" (city houses) in proximity to the mosques were destroyed leaving them as disintegrated objects. Meanwhile, a Parisian grid was laid over the dense road networks and wide boulevards were opened up to form Istanbul's main traffic arteries. Atatürk Boulevard was built to provide easy vehicle access from the historical peninsula northwards, and Menderes Boulevard (Vatan Caddesi) was opened in the location where Henri Prost had planned one of Istanbul's great parks. The speed at which these urban transformations were undertaken went beyond the capacities of the existing planning system. Before, planning had focused only on certain areas, and aimed to accommodate not for growth, but for a city stagnating in size, and then only in response to adaptation to a changed lifestyle. Henri Prost, who was employed by the CHP as the master planner of Istanbul, was mobbed out of his office, being declared incapable of doing the job. A statement he had given as a response to the high demands put on him clearly shows a situation in which planning processes had run out of control and the development of the city was driven by a political dispute, rather than a continuous planning process based on the analysis of demographic growth and change.

"Although the plan for Istanbul has been made for a 50-year period, the municipality has been asking me to implement it within 5 years. We are now implementing the plan, creating squares and parks. But after a while, you see that there is a building erected in the middle of the planned sites out of nowhere (...) I will stay and serve should my contract be extended, but I will not be asked stupid questions such as 'how tall should Ahmed Efendi's chimney be?'" (Gül 2009:133).

The destructive effects of the excess urban transformation undertaken by Adnan Menderes have to be evaluated on the grounds of the city having been turned into the subject of a political dispute. To argue against Menderes on the grounds of actual legal delinquencies would be to echo the voice of the Kemalist cadres who let Menderes hang in the course of the military coup of 1960. Unlawful expropriation of private properties without proper compensation, and the coercion of several governmental agencies (such as the Worker's Insurance Agency) to purchase land parcels alongside the newly constructed boulevards, were, in comparison to the master planning process Henri Prost was commissioned with, no more excessive, and therefore not valid as arguments that led to Menderes' death sentence (Gül 2009). What must be considered, rather, is the fact that Menderes declared himself the

Chief Architect of the country, and the second conqueror of a city that had been rejected by the Kemalist bureaucrats – for it contained everything the Republic was opposed to.

The apartment and its diverse connotations

In order to better understand the contested meaning the urban environment attained in the early and later years of the Republic, Laclau's definition of the floating signifier is helpful. The city as an entity of formal signifiers of architectural typology can relate to multiple discursive reference systems at the same time. These floating signifiers are positioned at the intersection of different discourse-specific worldviews. They hold together groups oriented around a specific worldview "by implying an interpretation only specific to that particular group" (Schiffauer 2009). This is true of the apartment house in Turkey. In opposition to a symbol of cosmopolitanism, but built nevertheless as a rental house in the centre of Ankara, the apartment building is a contested ideological object and requires closer analysis concerning its epoch, its architecture and its purpose. With its counterpart, the single-family house, the apartment building as a signifier cannot be separated from the architectural discourse of the Ottoman modern era on one hand, and the First National Style on the other. Recalling the reasons for the garden city, the single-family house was the preferred form of housing in the early years of the Republic. The single-family house was directly associated with patriotism. A house with a garden implied attachment to the soil and the country, while the family was regarded as the origin of national culture (Akcan 2012:80). In Turkey, the reasons for the single-family house with a garden were grounded in an antagonism of corruption and cosmopolitanism related to the structure of the Ottoman modern era. The core city, particularly today's Beyoğlu district, was under great influence by Greek, Armenian and Levantine architects, and housed the majority of foreigners. The eclecticism of this architecture (the styles ranged from Ottoman Baroque to Art Nouveau) is not distinguishable in the discourse of the First National Style in Turkey, but nevertheless stood as symbolic of an unwanted lifestyle which was represented in the dichotomy between the single-family house and apartment.

The Turkish definition of modernism, quite the opposite of modernism in the Ottoman Era, was essentially non-modern by Simmel's definition. Individuality, anonymity and the dichotomies of public and private which Simmel wrote about would fail to characterize Kemalist modernity. Modernism in Turkey was fundamentally autocratic at its early stages, and can only be compared to parallel developments in Europe. Despite the demonization of

the apartment building, however, other forms of housing besides the one-family house were built in many cities, making it impossible to define the single-family house as the only built form of housing around 1930. What is crucial to observe here is that the city of Ankara was praised as a pleasant new city consisting of small modern houses inside gardens, which the nationalists argued should serve as a model for salvaging Istanbul from the malaise of apartments (Bozdoğan 2012:231). The housing constructed shortly after Ankara was named the capital city featured a rather large range of apartments and complexes, which, in the urban imagination of Ankara, never occurred. The question is therefore, "How could it be possible to demonize the apartment as the origin of a culture to which the Republican ideology was opposed, and at the same time accept the construction of apartments in the most representational city of the state?"

Although deeper research on the architectural debate in Ankara over those decades would shed more light on the discursive structuring of the argument, the formalism of the First National Style plays a crucial role in the reinterpretation of the apartment.

Based on Bozdoğan's research, both types of residential architecture – the single-family house and the apartment building – were standard forms of housing during the 1930s. The apartment, constructed mostly in larger urban agglomerations, served as a form of housing not aimed at ownership, but rent. This rental house (*kira evi*) was not so dissimilar to the 19th century apartment buildings numerous found in Istanbul. Those, however, were referred to as *apartman* and not as *kira evi*. It appears that two very similar forms of architecture, both multi-storey forms of housing in the cities, were treated as totally unlike, one being negatively charged and the other as a necessity to provide affordable housing in the modern city. This was only possible since the Ottoman apartment and the modern *kira evi* already contained an antagonism on the level of style rather than typology. By means of the early *kira evi(s)* built in the First National Style, also known as the "International Style", a gesture of differentiation was already made through the way formal signifiers were positioned in the discourse on architecture.

Through the International Style in Turkey, the eclecticism of the rich Ottoman architectural history was stressed as un-Turkish and locally incoherent. The International Style, which was simultaneously built in many other countries, could actually be claimed as Turkish because it counterposed the stylistically rich architecture of the prior era.

The façades of the International Style were not decorated or ornamented, but minimalistic. Windows had narrow frames that would let in ample daylight. Many had rounded corners

and large balconies that would merge into windows. The simplicity of the form and the straightness of lines in the Turkish vocabulary had lent the First National Style its name – Cubism. Adapting a style from the international architectural debate was possible because modernism in the Kemalist understanding was regarded as something inevitable. The International Style thus symbolized Turkey's claim for a universal right, a right for progress. As a stylistic signifier, Cubism applied to all building typologies – villas, apartments, and cooperative housing. Multi-family houses or rental houses that were built in Istanbul in the early Republic could also not be differentiated from one another. Besides the fact that they had multiple stories, their formal appearance would give no clue about whether the house was owned by a single family, by the community of inhabitants, or built by speculators for letting purposes. The term "Cubist house" thus became a general metaphor for buildings built in a particular era, insignificant of typology or size, and was used in reference to a style rather than a typology in the new emerging discourse of the Second National Style. As a style, on the other hand, Cubism served as a formal master signifier both for the villa and the apartment typology. The Ottoman apartment, however, was not included in that. It was this new architectural style through which an antagonism towards an entire era and its architecture was created.

II. 5. The role of space in Neoliberalism

5.1. Governmentality as a hegemonic mechanism in the neoliberal city

With democratisation, the new political order evolved from the loud volume of the voices coming from the newly urbanizing population. Decades of strife followed a struggle that was fought between the state and the governments, which, after being interrupted by repeated coup d'états, re-emerged in a new guise. The battle for power fought on two separate structural levels, however, was effectively one between two very different forms of national governance. One in which the state was positioned to control and protect, but also to impose its will by behaving as a guardian over the nation, and another that would gain its strength through populism and the installment of the self through the liberalisation of the market. Democracy, market liberalisation, and aspirations of joining the European Union counterposited the closed and protectionist Kemalist idea of governance, which, due to its elitist approach, had been unable to legitimize its rule. The loss of legitimacy in controlling or intervening in matters of public behaviour caused a paralyzing inability of the state to enact its hegemony. The only hegemonic practise the centralist state had left was to pose a coup. This political dead end, however, gave the opposition more reason to critique the paternalistic and exclusionary state practises, and express an open demand for state withdrawal and tolerance. This was not only a powerful argument against the hegemony of the state, which was a hindrance to democracy according to the argument, but also a strong strategy to instill the discourse of liberalisation with an entirely new strategy for hegemonic maintenance – populism. The populism which spread amongst disadvantaged individuals and groups provided people with ideological empowerment to manage their position in society without state corporatism, through an aspiration towards economic growth (Atasoy 2009:110). Legitimation of the regime of neoliberalism was thus shifted from a centre of power towards a system of governmentality (Foucault). According to Foucault, governmentality is a system in which power is not something enforced upon a people, but something that has become manifest positively and freely through the production of knowledge and discourses that is internalised by individuals, and guides the behaviour of populations. This leads to more efficient forms of social control, as ideological knowledge encourages individuals to govern themselves. The key aspect to governmentality is that individuals and society do not perceive of themselves as contributing to the hegemony of the system because neoliberal practises and institutions appear as the outcome of natural processes, and the form of identification that they have produced has crystallized into identities that are taken for granted (Mouffe 2011).

Neoliberalism is therefore a specific form of political rationality, a specific kind of normative political reason (that organizes) the political sphere, government practise, and citizenship (Brawley 2008). The legitimation of a neoliberalism is therefore not a performance required from a government, but something that is absorbed by reason. To gain a better understanding of how neoliberalism is legitimated I want to look at two structural aspects in greater detail.

1) The invention of the individual

First is the inculcation of the belief in individual empowerment. Under a new definition of citizenship, the individual would perpetuate the discourse of neoliberalism through their performative role in society and their aspiration to perform well in the neoliberal market.

2) The individual as mediator between *boundary objects*

Subjects and institutions control the meaning of their environment but this environment also controls their activity. The individual behaves as a mediator between *boundary objects* (Star and Griesemer 1989), creating and confirming the establishment of meaning.

1)

Citizen empowerment propagated by the liberalists did sharpen the contrast between the old bureaucratic order of the Kemalist regime, which legitimated the exclusion of parts of society on the grounds of cultural membership. No social rise was possible under the tutelage of the Republican People's Party, causing growing sentiment against its exclusionary form of rule. The struggle, according to Keyder, is therefore "between the old authoritarian—modernisationist, paternalistic state, and a modernist conception of political liberalism and citizenship" (Keyder 1997:188). Liberalism as a conviction – this is clear – did pose an antagonism to the observational and regulational practises of the Kemalist tradition. Due to this antagonism, a different set of hegemonic maintenance practises were required parallel to the discursive change. A centralist regime cannot be legitimately replaced by another centralist regime. No liberalist rhetoric could possibly legitimate a similarly restrictive public life, as was the case in the early modernist decades. Hegemony consequently had to be ensured from now on through practises evoking liberalism, and this was possible through the dynamics of the market. The belief that the individual possessed their own transformative power made up for the sudden lack of control from above. While under Kemalism, society was expected to rely upon the state to pave the way to a brighter future, and the liberals appealed to the individual to play the part. This change in the role play of power had the consequence of hegemonic practises taking on an entirely different character. On the grounds of democracy, the government could no longer legitimate intervening into public life, in the way the Republican People's Party did. On the contrary, it positioned itself on the outside, creating

a desire for hegemonic ideological strife by connecting culturally-related moral values to the language of the market. Thus market liberalisation also meant the liberalisation of the individual from state tutelage, but simultaneously created a new rule by leaving the individual to forge their own destiny, which inevitably depended on their involvement in the market. Lisa Brawley puts it into different words: Her description of a self-installing form of government points to a belief in the existence of freedom.

A liberal government, according to Brawley, had to adapt to a role different from the paternalistic conviction in favour of "a strategy that controls subjects through an explicit appeal to their freedom" (Brawley 2008). With an emphasis on the freedom of the individual, the meta-discourse of liberalism instills a perspective which regards this individual as self-responsible. Differences in income or problems such as poverty or unemployment under this meta-discourse no longer relate to social difference, inequality or uneven opportunities, but arise as an expression of an inefficient or wrong way of dealing with one's own time.

"mit der Betonung der Freiheit des Individuums, geht in der Metanarrative des Liberalismus auch eine Sichtweise einher, die dieses als Selbstverantwortliches Subjekt installiert und damit Unterschiede des Einkommens oder Probleme wie Armut, Arbeitslosigkeit etc. nicht etwa als Ausdruck sozialer Unterschiede oder gesellschaftlicher Misstände und ungleicher Chancenverteilung, sondern als Ausdruck eines nicht optimalen Gebrauchs der zur Verfügung stehenden zeit interpretiert" (Matissek 2008:45).

2)

The government which used to carry much of the responsibility for redistribution and welfare during Kemalism did not, however, now with the rise of liberalism, step out of the way entirely. Its function is to install a specific form of political rationality and reason, which organizes the structuring of the public sphere, and the image of the citizen with all their rights and responsibilities. It contributes to the hegemony of the neoliberal discourse, but not its origin. Through a means of participation of governmental and non-governmental institutions, public and private markets and individual subjects, the political origin of the neoliberal hegemony goes out of focus. It gains a moment of self-referentiality, an automated process, devoid of actors. The location of power in a system without actors, of course, is the discursive constellation as such.

It regulates who has access to the source of power, but also moves the whole meaningful environment into the centre of power. Subjects and institutions control the meaning of this environment, but this environment also controls their activity. The outcome is a closed circle, in which activity is controlled through discursively-regulated knowledge. A look beyond the boundaries of this knowledge is no longer possible. Cause and effect are only being understood within its limits.

This also applies, of course, to the perception of destiny. The origin of neoliberalism, in other words – its discursive boundaries – are no longer visible. Poverty, disadvantage, cultural convictions but also the place of residence and the environment are understood only in a predefined context of cause and effect relations. Questions such as, “what societal constellations cause my poverty?” must be answered within the logic of discourse, and do therefore also perpetuate its hegemony. The same applies to critique supposedly practised on neoliberalism. The outside position of the critic is an imagined one. The boundaries of meaning “play the role of a vanishing mediator (...). They must disappear, become invisible, if the system is to maintain its consistency and coherence. In other words, the gap separating the genesis of a structure from its self-reproduction is unbridgeable – the structure cannot reflect into itself – the external conditions of its genesis, since it is constituted by means of their repression” (Žižek 2008:215). For this reason, when trying to understand neoliberalism, it is necessary to look at those elements that constitute the boundaries of the discourse. The term *boundary objects*, developed by Star and Griesemer (1989), is very useful in this context because it helps to emphasise the role key signifiers adopt in holding the discourse together. It is “weakly structured in common use, but strongly structured in individual site-use, it has different meanings in social worlds” (Star/Griesemer 1989), and (one should add a third element) it orders these worlds culturally, politically and geographically.

5.1.1 The informal city and the call for liberalisation

The importance of the informal city as the origin and location of the emergence of a liberal discourse cannot be overestimated. According to most sociologists concerned with neoliberalism in Turkey, the foundation for its rise was laid with the migration of large rural populations to the cities (Keyer; Atasoy; Rutz/Balkan). Migrants who flocked to the big cities looking for work in the industries settled in informal neighbourhoods and began new lives as urbanites. The failure of the state to reach deep enough into rural Turkey and achieve an ideological appeal to the widest part of society paved the way for alternative narratives to address groups and individuals who felt excluded from the project of modernity. Parts of the city where migrants settled did thus turn into hubs for alternative political visions that undermined centralist governance. It was there in those areas of the informal city where alternative political visions began to take shape. Chain migration and rural traditionalism provided a fertile ground for the reintroduction of particularistic identities related to religiousness and localism. The networks of self-help associated with chain migration proved to be fertile grounds for fostering feelings of solidarity and civility, and connected it to an idea of emancipation and freedom. Islamic solidarity, political emancipation and the informal city thus served as key signifiers for an imaginary community. Local politicians who supported migrants achieving footholds in

the city saw their chance in arguing against the existing structures that provided immigrants with opportunities to build on public land, but did not provide them with the legal property rights. These politicians were often new urbanites themselves, inexperienced in politics, or else had chipped away from the prior bureaucratic structures, using the liberal jargon to serve their own purposes. The demands they posed in the interest of the people in *gecekondu neighbourhoods* were initially concrete ones, but faced with resistance turned more into fundamental political demands. Having gained a populist agenda, their appeal towards people who had been held in a state of transgression by Kemalist corporatism, uncertain of their rights and their livelihood, grew beyond the demand for particular rights, spreading liberalism as an ideological discourse with which migrants could identify.

A cross-class coalition under the uniting power of Islam

The raids conducted frequently in *gecekondu neighbourhoods* in order to reclaim state owned land through eviction confirmed the antagonism authorities had towards migrants, causing the demand for democratisation and liberalisation to grow stronger (Sucker 2011:35). Different from the elites close to the Kemalist bureaucracy, the growing Islamic opposition was not employed through the state. Their success depended on liberalisation rather than centralisation. In their struggle to re-position religious cultural values eradicated through modernization, Islamists engaged in something that Atasoy calls "transformative resistance". It means a form of populism that is formulated to address a large variety of social groups affected by deep class and region-based inequalities, and holding culture-based grievances against Kemalism. These groups would include capitalists from smaller Anatolian cities, some large firms established in Istanbul, highly educated Muslim professionals from modest Anatolian families, and the urban poor and marginalized (Atasoy 2009:108). Islamic neoliberalism is therefore a highly successful political project with an appeal to all those who see themselves as victims of Kemalism.

As a movement though, Islam is multi-faceted and socially very fragmented, and has produced its own "counter-elites" (Gole in: Cavdar 2009) as well as its own underclass. Poverty in Turkey cannot be thought of outside of an Islamic culture that pushes people into precarious working conditions in order to stimulate growth – all in the name of a counter-movement. By building a cross-class coalition, the Islamic wing has managed to build a bridge between the neoliberal market economy and social empowerment, with the effect that the socially disadvantaged are encouraged to think of themselves as forgers of their own destiny. In other words, the paradigm of social politics consists of a form of ethical disciplining to strengthen society's engagement in economic growth. The individual must emerge as a "morally inspired economic player and engage in a

competitive market economy for wealth creation. It is on the grounds of cultivating this engagement that Muslim capitalists have emerged as a culturally distinct neo-bourgeoisie" (Atasoy 2009:125).

With a critical eye on Atasoy's use of the term *Muslim Capitalist*, one thing must be stressed: It is true that under the long period of market liberalisation, prosperous companies were owned by Anatolian families, especially in regions and cities where the textile industry grew large. Religiousness, on the other hand, became woven into a narrative of resistance and growth, which led to a gradual dissolution of the meaning and practise of Islam. The growing integration of Turkey into the world economy created the belief, in the majority of people, in the personal ability to better one's situation, even if practising Islam was not agreeable to them. This stands in sharp contrast to the political conviction of the oppositional party, followers of the Republican People's Party, who insisted that growing religious sentiments would endanger the social progress achieved through Kemalism. As much as Islam functioned as a boundary object for the neoliberal discourse, it served as an empty signifier around which the oppositional rhetoric was oriented. Islam was thus an offer of identification, devoid of a call to religious practise. Amongst the supporters of the Islamic opposition, Islam was interpreted in a variety of ways, ranging from religiosity to traditionalism and other forms where Islam had lost its religious content entirely, in order to stand for a new non-religious ethic. In its political dimension, Islam must be understood as an ethical stance towards capital accumulation, but not as a true aspiration to return to an age of Islamic rule. Embedded into neoliberalism, Islamic principles fulfill the discursive role as a strategy for asset-building in human capital, defining economic success as the identity of a liberal, democratic and Islamic Turkey (Özyürek 200:135). Atasoy's description of a "marriage between Islam and neoliberalism" (p. 110) is therefore fitting.

The legitimization of poverty

The ideological shift away from a societal consensus of equality, in which the state claimed all responsibility for the wellbeing of its citizens, towards the instillation of responsibility in individual action, is the most central discursive change between Kemalism and its political remnants and the neoliberal Islamic movement. In the neoliberal society, governmental or non-governmental institutions, networks of solidarity or religious groups that offer anchor points for identification step into the place of the centralist state in providing social security and confirmation. The state, which depends on these communes, practises its role by animating civil engagement via a narrative of emancipation and togetherness. Such an appeal to self-help causes an increased market activity, also on behalf of those who can only contribute with their own labour force.

The growth of capitalist unions like MUSIAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği) under the market regulating role of Kemalism has shown that the role that religious and culturally bound institutions have adapted is crucial for re-installing and legitimizing the hegemony of neoliberalism. Apart from offering increased chances to people with similar cultural conviction, the union's main role is to create trust and belief in the systemic logic. State involvement in the economy brought little or no direct benefit to MUSIAD firms. Consequently, they are strongly behind neoliberal economic reforms and legitimize these under the denominator of Islam. But not only established companies (meaning capitalist institutions) constitute the systemic strength of MUSIAD. The role of underpaid workers – people who according to a class-based model of society should be against, and not for, liberalisation reforms – cannot be overestimated. Many MUSIAD companies specialize in textile and clothing production for external markets, a sector which tends to be labour-intensive. Their labour management philosophy is expressed through mutual social responsibility based on moral values and duties so that unregistered wage employment is made socially acceptable. Accordingly, wage earners in this context are not seen as members of a social class, but as family members who are expected to provide services for the common social good based on mutual trust and respect (Atasoy 2009:122).

The strategic role of the government under the hegemony of neoliberalism is to present itself as the ideological supporter from which cultural and religious identification, trust and solidarity emanates. This creation of trust between the state and its citizens is a key condition for the neoliberal politics of the current government in order to promote its programme of Islamic nationalism, individual welfare, freedom and social justice. Mert stresses that the success of politicians from the neoliberal right wing is primarily due to their ability to appeal to the fantasies of the underrepresented (Mert 2005:324). By creating an imaginary community, Islamic solidarity, but also individual self-responsibility, are the key forces of a struggle for capital accumulation. For the poor, however, the identification with the neoliberal discourse is evoked by a narrative of the suppressed and culturally disadvantaged Islamic nation. Such a narrative can be integrated easily into a personal life story which makes people believe that their interests are being represented. Due to the internalization of the discourse and its adaptation as a personal ideology, no connection will be made between their own poverty and the politics of capital accumulation. Disadvantaged groups that identify with the signifiers of Islam, emancipation and cultural suppression, do thus contribute actively to their own exclusion and disadvantage.

5.1.2. Governmentality, Developmentalism and the *Gecekondu*

Empowering the populations of informal neighbourhoods within the particular sector of the urban land market by making them property owners kick-started a process of rapid development. Cities throughout Turkey were turned into major places for capital accumulation through the construction of the built environment, driven initially by small scale development. Many owners of *gecekondu*s used their plots for the construction of a larger building which was then rented out or sold. In the context of today's neoliberal property market, the *gecekondu* is therefore a crucial element in the creation of empowerment, but also as a facilitator of social rise for people with little education. How the *gecekondu* is to be evaluated in this context concerns various aspects. One is about being located in the city and having access to work, another is having the opportunity to possess a house and being able to trade a plot of land in the coming generations. Other aspects, however, concern the imaginary role of the *gecekondu*: Its role in creating an imaginary community of people that formed an Islamic *counter-elite* and a new middle class. Throughout various stages of social transformation, the *gecekondu* as a place and as an imaginary locale has been constantly re-defined and still features in the imagination of the city today. It has undergone a transformation process as urban legend, a key signifier of an empowerment narrative and later reoccurred as "*carpi kentlesme*" (urbanisation gone wrong), and the sign of a failed modernity. It is of little help for this research to deconstruct the entire context in which the *gecekondu* is symbolically used, and in which ways this has changed over time. What is important to point out, however, is that the *gecekondu* served as the physical home and material facilitator, as well as the imaginary place in the political struggle for liberalisation. I therefore want to take a closer look below at how these various aspects intertwine in order to understand what role the *gecekondu* has had discourse-theoretically, and how it has contributed in this context to the creation of urban reality.

At the boundary of two narratives

As discussed in Chapter 4.1., collective imagination is only possible in reference to a location. Just as the invention of the national community as an imaginary community depended on the existence of the Anatolian hinterland, the *gecekondu* – the arrival place of the migrant – has served as an opportunity for people to orientate themselves and to claim a part of the city as their home. Through an involvement with this space, the *gecekondu* was integrated into a political narrative structuring the imaginary landscape of the city. For those that were part of the solidarity networks which involved them in the struggle to realize citizenship, the *gecekondu* played a very crucial role (Yalcintan/Erbaş

2003). It localized, confirmed and developed an urban narrative which would fundamentally influence social and political change. Serving as a signifier of the Islamic movement, the *gecekondu* was also symbolically integrated into the narrative of the political opposition which was losing power (Tuğal Çihan 2005:328). It was the focus of military intervention, and a major target in the fight against what the state considered to be anarchy. From the perspective of the state, the informal city had therefore undergone a transformation process, starting as an aspiration to the garden city – the symbol of a homogeneous and harmonious society – towards a symbol of threat and governmental failure. It was no longer a matter of how to define the shape of the modern city. For Kemalists, the empowerment of people in the *gecekondu*s had led to a collapse of the peasantist ideology altogether (Erkarıslan Önder in: Esen/Lanz 2005).

By claiming individuality and rights, an entry into the land registry, and emancipation *outside* of the Kemalist social model, *gecekondu* inhabitants proved that the project of civilization had failed them (Gül 2009:269). Their existence became proof to the regime that there was little communal thought in the mind of the migrants. They (the migrants) were not worthy of living in the city, so went the argument.

Grounded in a secular ideology, the reasons for the failure of the project of civilization had to be explained through the Islamic conviction that had led to a decay of values, creating a counter-narrative that would lead the existing Kemalist bourgeoisie to disregard a newly developing middle class as the *nouveau riche* without values and manners. A strong opposition between two middle classes developed, one which identified with Atatürk's republicanism, the other which saw the future of Turkey in overcoming the remaining structures of the paternalistic state.

A spatial interface between discourse, possibility and action.

Municipal governments have strategically integrated *gecekondu* areas into the urban land market, and thus empowered the migrant population within the particular economic sector. The major source of support for the gradual establishment of what can be defined as a 'new Anatolian middle class' came from the poor inhabitants of the informal city who have been offered support in gaining the land titles of their houses in return for their political engagement. Supporting the Islamic liberal party through their votes and being awarded support in their struggle to stay, immigrants gained rights as citizens and an entry into the land registry, which enabled them to put their foot onto the property ladder. In reciprocity between political empowerment and economic opportunity, a tandem developed – the location of which was the informal city. The informal city though was not only the location, but also the subject of interest itself. Besides embodying opportunities, it was also a very contested and a very insecure place. While more and more *gecekondu neighbourhoods* gained entry into the land registry, urban land grew

more and more scarce, causing its values to rise. Local governments, therefore, while depending on satisfying voters, had to face up to simultaneously having to defend ownership of land. The legend of 'free land for everyone' began to dissolve, causing more pressure and insecurity. The gap between the state and the military on one hand, and liberalist municipalities on the other, began to shrink on the grounds of migration and public land policies. Since citizens' rights were turned into issues of tutelage, the suspicion towards the authorities grew. Suspicion and individualisation in return strengthened the aspiration for economic success and security – fuelling the neoliberal climate. Although the informal city changed over the decades, and actors constantly grew bigger, the informal city continued to play a crucial role for the maintenance and the strengthening of the neoliberal discourse through various means.

The making of the home owner

The uncertainty that was rooted in the informal city has decreased any form of trust in the authorities. Somewhere in between legality and legitimacy, the *gecekondu* has been a model outside of any regulated system, which by its institutional structure, could *ensure* a right for housing. Other than social housing institutions, the *gecekondu* was never to be relied on. The ambivalence of the authorities to create housing on one hand but to defend state owned property on the other, suspended any form of certainty for success in gaining housing rights. The absence of a structure fuelled tutelage, but it also led to an increased belief in the self-made man. Individuality, initiative and insecurity are therefore born from the uncertainty of housing in the city. In Istanbul, like in other cities with a strong informal economy, this climate of uncertainty has been central in the prosperity of the neoliberal city (Brawley; Roy). To summarize all of the aspects through which the *gecekondu* functioned as interface of space, narrative and action, the concept of governmentality by Foucault is helpful. It is not possible to reduce the *gecekondu* to a single cause. As discourses arise, so does the emergence of actors and the definition of roles. In the debate over the reason for informal development in Turkey, the concept of governmentality clarifies that no plausible answer towards the reasons of informal development will be found if arguments that describe the *gecekondu* as economically logical have to compete with arguments that strictly focus on cultural values. To link informal development to an underlying context of resource scarcity and economic dependency is certainly not wrong, but neither are aspects of values and traditions which, due to the concentration of rural migrants in certain areas, have gained in importance (Öncü 2009:57-58). What is of little help, however, is a debate in which one point of view or the other is propagated as the right one.

By discussing space as an implication of possibility, as Schiffauer (2006) suggests, this possibility and its spatial component might be regarded as integrative to the

governmental model. Foucault's concept of governmentality would therefore need to be reconsidered concerning the particular role that space attains. Space as interface, as something that not only signifies but also implies activity, must be stressed with greater emphasis. For the particular case of the informal city in the discourse of neoliberalism, Ananja Roy uses the word "developmentalism" (Roy 2004). Similar to Foucault's term, it implies a self-reproducing system of development grounded in a state of mind (mentality). As land in the urban fringes of Calcutta is "settled and claimed in a complex choreography of squatting and evictions, the informal city (Roy concludes) is the location where, at a moment of liberalization, the hegemony of poverty is quietly reproduced" (ibid). Developmentalism that is clear is not only a mind set, but a complex correlation between narrative, legitimation and activity. To think of developmentalism as a self-reproducing system of power in which space creates, regulates and manifests power-constellations will be helpful as a closer look at how space organizes social discourses hegemonic in the neoliberal city.

5.2. Neoliberalism, insecurity and the role of real estate

In times of rural migration, the inclusion of *gecekondu* areas legitimised informality as an integral part of early forms of developmentalism. In later years, the informal development of land came to mean locking up new urban territory, since it was the prior cultivation and infrastructural development by squatters that well prepared for the move-in of grand investment schemes. Informal city growth at these stages is no longer discussed as informality but as illegal construction and the doings of a 'land mafia'. As developers grew bigger, the individual squatting of land became more and more illegitimate. There was no longer any political benefit to gain through the toleration of individual squatters. Illegal construction, on the other hand, was greatly beneficial on a large economic scale, establishing something that has been fittingly named an "elite informality" (Roy). Full legal use of public land for private purposes, however, has always been a legend. The fine line between legality and legitimacy, and the resulting uncertainty, was therefore the central element in the instrumentalisation of the informal in a neoliberal economic development discourse.

In Turkey, the climate of uncertainty was greatly charged through another political struggle between the new and the old regime; the paternalistic state and the Islamic counter-liberalism. The reluctance to legalize the existence of those who were not in possession of membership in the state bureaucracy clearly is related to a worry that people who are empowered economically might also claim political power. Military raids within *gecekondu* neighbourhoods and mass expropriation were therefore activities that aimed at reclaiming power in addition to reclaiming land. The early struggles of neighbourhoods to gain property rights were simultaneously struggles to be freed from the tutelage of state structure and the inequality of power distribution. Social and political security is therefore a key aim in the struggle for property, and has remained so since that time. According to Yalcintan and Erbaş, the illegality attached to the state of informal settlement prevented the *gecekondu* population from exercising their rights as citizens (Yalcintan/Erbaş 2003:97). As informal inhabitants of the city, they were neither able to demand better working and living conditions, nor to question the legitimacy of the Kemalist state. External interventions by the state, and later on by municipalities who outgrew its dependency on the migrant worker, did thus always pose a risk to individual livelihoods, causing mistrust and individualisation. What it also caused, however, was an intensified desire for property ownership. The ownership of private property arose as a solution to insecurity, as well as a personal form of achievement and status, and was grounded in strong neoliberal rhetoric. The ethic of capital accumulation that evolved around this time is best described by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) report on Islamic Calvinism in Turkey:

"The traditional Kayserian spends his life calculating his sales and purchases, his debt and credits, his incomes and expenses. The Kayserian knows his account. In a country where everything changes rapidly, it is not possible to produce efficient public policies with this approach. In politics everyone must expect at any moment any kind of external intervention. Anyone who goes into politics should be prepared for everything and needs to take risks. The Kayserian who builds his life upon calculations is very sceptical about politics. Instead of putting himself into trouble and risky situations, he prefers to improve his business" (ESI: Issue 9/2005).

For a city that has an informal development history like Istanbul, private ownership concepts have an immense concentration on urban real estate, more so than in cities in which housing had been a concern of the social welfare state. In the social welfare system, housing is part of the responsibility carried by the state, which subsidises social housing for low income individuals. Renting a house or an apartment is normal, while under the absence of a welfare system, the individual is exposed to market forces. It must not be forgotten, however, that a speculative housing market is not simply caused by the withdrawal of the state from its responsibility, but by a complex combination of desire and space-making, in which new actors, classes and cultural groups are gradually and unequally empowered. The early *gecekondu* model and the turnover of land on a grand scale for the primary purpose of capital accumulation involved very different practises. In the early years of migration, one could even say that the *gecekondu* model had replaced a form of social housing (Sucker in: Frey 2011). It was tolerated because only through the *gecekondu* could the development of class and inequality initially be avoided, upholding an ideal homogeneous national society (Erkarıslan Önder in: Esen/Lanz 2005). Özyürek argues that "Kemalist corporatism assumed that Turkish society was exempt from interest conflicts and that status differences helped it to realize nationally shared goals" (Özyürek 2007:135). The later development of the *gecekondu* into a centre of small scale capital accumulation and the dissolution of a communitarian idea was probably not predicted. In the early *gecekondu* model, the low capacity of the state was compensated for with public resource land – land which at this stage of development was not part of capital accumulation just yet. The absence of the welfare state and the inability to house workers adequately had made it necessary to compensate for this structural lack by tolerating informal development. The *gecekondu* model can be evaluated therefore as a strategy to integrate people with rural backgrounds into the urban environment and turn them into citizens by involving them in local politics. The later forms of developmentalism that led existing real estate companies to grow and invest massively in urban development changed use-value oriented spatial production into capital-oriented spatial production (Esen 2005; Şengül 2005). These two phases of urban development are to be differentiated between, as they reflect the Zeitgeist of two different eras. More than that however, the gradual progression from one phase to the

next demonstrates that we are not dealing with a change of regime, but with a gradual shift in how land is evaluated socially and economically, and how it has influenced the production of reality in the city.

While it is possible to regard the *gecekondu* model as a welfare-oriented form of urban development, the *gecekondu* as an object of discourse is also a key factor in the creation of the liberalist mind via a simultaneous process of empowerment. In other words: The *gecekondu* inhabitant of the 1950s and 60s and the landlord of the 1980s is the same person. What must be emphasised is that the material and political circumstances, and the ways that possibilities have been distributed amongst the socially weak have led to an ideological shift, causing the discourse – for which cultural Islam was a main signifier – to evolve and change gradually. The ESI report demonstrates that the traditional Kayserian, as portrayed there, is religious. He is not part of an established bourgeoisie. He is employed in the industries and he lacks secondary education. In the context of the cities' industrialization, many who had to work in the industries have turned themselves into property owners. For the first generation migrant, however, this was not the primary aim. The aim was a humble dwelling and a job in the industries. Property at this stage was not connected to much fiscal value. If the entry into the land registry was successful, the self-built home was privately owned but effectively only served the purpose of shelter. For the migrant, habitation in a self-built home was therefore neither a sign of low status or poverty, nor was it an investment chance paving the way to greater wealth and status. Informal development for capital accumulation set in though, with an increased awareness of the value of land, an awareness that was followed by changed laws for land usage and occupation, a process that came with time. A new law passed in 1960 that facilitated the ownership of storeys was a response to that, but certainly in itself increased construction for the purpose of selling, making ownership and property trading easier.

“With increasing migration into the cities, and due to the increasing land prices during this time, the government decided to encourage the real estate market by legalizing unit ownership (...) while each building had a single owner before this law, each apartment unit could now have a separate owner. This proved to be excessively attractive for small business contractors who bought the land and constructed apartment blocks, usually without commissioning an architect, and made a profit by selling units to different clients” (Akcan; Bozdoğan 2012:161).

Real estate development – without a business career, but with a form of entrepreneurship with an individual business plan – was not an unusual combination for that time. In the Istanbul context though, the migrant's appropriation of land for the purpose of dwelling, and the construction-companies' investment schemes that emerged in this climate

cannot be treated as two independent phenomena. In both periods, the informal construction of housing for the purpose of dwelling and the informal construction of housing for the purpose of capital accumulation are to be seen as two different time-related practises of the same liberalisation narrative, which has firmly integrated real estate as a hegemonic practise.

5.2.1. What is urban segregation?

Clearly, neoliberal urban policies have severe consequences on the shape of the city, and concerns of territorialisation and accessibility in terms of movement, as well as on public and private services. It is also necessary to take a critical stance towards the belief that the shape of the city is an outcome or a result of a pre-existing set of policies. What has been elaborated on up to now is that no form of translation from discourse into urban form has taken (or is still taking) place, and that any assumed translation is perpetrated by a certain definable group of actors, of which there are landlords, investors and specific political decision-makers. Against this background I would like to take up the phenomenon of urban segregation, and discuss it as a particular way in which space functions in legitimizing and re-inscribing the neoliberal hegemony. Segregation is a phenomenon that has been widely discussed in the context of the neoliberal city, and is a leading concept and motivation for research done under the umbrella of a critical geography. In the Turkish research context, it is coupled with a simultaneous reflection on the distribution of power, rights and resources, as well as on the inequality arising out of this distribution (Keyder; Rutz/Balkan; Kuyucu; Cemal Yalcintan). While certain debates on segregation address urban policies, others focus on the formal aspects of the city (Cekic; Baycan-Levent; Genis). While authors base their presentations of the neoliberal city on notions of a dual city, which often is related to the discussion of 'fortified enclaves' (Low; Caldeira), the images produced in such descriptions help to point out that inequality related to neoliberalism exists, but these images do not contribute to an understanding of how exactly this inequality is constituted. Although particular urban forms, such as gated communities, are regarded as "an efficient force in the fragmentation process" of the city (Özkan/Evrin 2006), the way the physical form of the city fosters and reproduces the neoliberal hegemony on a narrative level remains unquestioned. To pose my questions, therefore, I will not refer to urban segregation as a phenomenon that is widely claimed to be known. As a term with a definite connotation, the word, 'segregation' claims that problems are already known and that these problems are grounded in a very specific formal condition of the urban environment. To exemplify this, I would like to take a closer look at a description of the city used by Ihsan Bilgin to explain the dual structure of Istanbul.

... "since the 1950s, Istanbul developed from the Marmara Sea axis towards the Black Sea, totally depending on its own dynamic. Now decision-makers tried to fix a second city on top of it, a city in the boundaries of which actors in the globalisation project should be enabled to live isolated and protected. While one Istanbul was left entirely on its own terms, the second projection of Istanbul was simply glued on top of it. The new managing elites of Istanbul, who are employed in the international finance and business centres and whose income has reached world standards, tend to distance themselves from the city, not only in regards to work and entertainment, but also in regards to their place of residency. The luxurious residential colonies that developed after the 80s cover this. They are strung together along the hills facing the Bosphorus, granting access to the new landscapes of work and enjoyment via the Beşiktaş-Büyükdere express road. Equipped with pools, tennis courts and green space, they allow their inhabitants to lead their lives only between office, home and hotels. From there it is equally easy to leave the city without being confronted with it. The express road feeds the new 'TEM' motorway, facilitating easy access to both airports on the European as well as the Asian side" (Bilgin in: Esen/Lanz 2005: 96).

Bilgin's example can be regarded as a typical description of the segregated city. This description serves to create an image of the city in which an urban form, but also certain stereotypical characteristics associated with that form, is related to a certain discussion about urban segregation. Actors and the social groups they belong to are already defined in that description, and so are assumed patterns of behaviour, and the attitudes of these groups implied in the text. "It is easy to leave the city without being confronted with it" implies that there is an intention to avoid that confrontation, drawing a very particular portrait of the group which in the text is referred to as the "managing elites". The point I want to make here is that Bilgin's text is not only a description of the physical structure of the city, but also an elaboration on those responsible for it. Through the way language is used, the guilty and the victims of segregation are defined, and this is achieved through a discourse-specific use of language and words. In order to discuss urban segregation in the context of this research, I first want to distance myself from this assumed knowledge on how segregation comes about. My argument is that in order to understand the full dimension of segregation, it is necessary to abolish an actor-oriented analysis, and to pay some attention to the way space is operational in discourse. In the following I therefore want to turn the analysis to the active or reality-creating component of space, and for this a model of thought, in which the physical constitution of the city appears as a result of segregation, is counterproductive.

Instead, I want to talk of urban segregation as a specific kind of relationship between space on one hand, and social narratives on the other; a particular way in which space operates discursively. To do that I will discuss the phenomenon of social fragmentation, and then turn to how space related to this fragmentation during the time of

neoliberalism. The way I define social fragmentation is not necessarily related to economic discrepancies, but refers to different social realities running side-by-side. Social narratives crystallize in specific forms of identity, which can result in particular definitions of class or other forms of identity-related belonging.

Depending on their discursive context, various discursive communities relate to space in a very specific way, which means that these communities relate to a particular reality of the urban environment. This assumption is the premise for Martina Löw's elaborations on the relational and performative aspects of space:

“der Wandel der räumlichen Vergesellschaftung kann nur dann erfasst werden, wenn Raum nicht als Hinter-, oder Untergrund des Handelns verstanden wird, sondern Raum in den Handlungsverlauf eingerückt wird” (Löw 2009:268).

Following Löw, it is therefore not wrong to say that social fragmentation always goes hand in hand with a certain form of spatial fragmentation, but the side-by-side of physical and imaginary space – in Löw's words: the situation of “many places in the same space” (ibid.) must be considered.

Horizontal fragmentation

To bring us closer to this question, it is necessary to return to the antagonistic structuring of the urban society and its fragmentation into groups.

Istanbul's contemporary urban society is a society that consists of two very different kinds of social fragmentation: The first and more obvious kind relates to a growing gap between income levels. This vertical kind of fragmentation is not new to the neoliberal city, but began its history with the rise of capitalism. Vertical fragmentation went hand in hand with manifestations of class-based urban zoning; the development of bourgeois neighbourhoods on one hand, and working districts on the other. Another form of fragmentation, which is not related to class, can be described as horizontal, since it refers to a fragmentation amongst social groups that are on the same level of income. This horizontal form of social fragmentation is a development very common to societies that went through a change of regime, and as such, antagonism is not only oriented around questions of income and class-related signifiers, but also around cultural habits, ethnicities or beliefs.

In Istanbul, fragmentation amongst similar income levels began to intensify when a new hegemonic discourse, which competed with the discourse of the prior urban elite, became manifest. The antagonism was between the more established elite and a new economically empowered Islamic elite. Cavdar uses the terminology of Güle to describe

the new Islamic middle class as a "counter elite" (Cavdar 1997:8). The social climate of the post-industrial years in the Turkish research context is often discussed as a struggle between or within what is defined as the middle class of Turkey (Atasoy; Keyder; Bozdoğan/Kasaba; Rutz/Balkan). Others also refer to this development as the rise of a new middle class, focusing on class shift and cultural change in relation to migration (Öncü; Güle; Aksoy; Bora; Navaro-Yashin).

Until the hegemony of Islamic liberalism, the established urban middle class, mostly those who had risen to status through their sympathies with the Kemalist regime, differentiated itself from the growing migrant population on the grounds of income. (Rutz/Balkan 2009). Although differences between old urbanites and new arrivals had also caused territorialisation, the segregation of the urban landscape was a simple north-south dichotomy. The boundary between territories was gradual and flexible, causing the middle class to move further northwards as the migrant population grew larger in the city centre (Bilgin; Esen in: Esen/Lanz 2005).

The empowerment of migrants in the particular economic sector of the urban land market, however, enabled an ideologically different class of people to traverse territorial boundaries and to appropriate spaces in the city, which until then were restricted for use by older urbanites. As income was no longer a decisive sign of social belonging, territorial boundaries were increasingly blurred, causing rapid and very expressive repositioning of cultural and spatial signifiers in relation to competing middle class discourses. Ayşe Öncü explains that:

"The beneficiaries of state-subsidized housing in the earlier eras were able to capitalize on the land cheaply acquired (...) The condominium law (unit-ownership law) of 1965, coupled with the relaxation of building codes and regulations which facilitated the development of high-rise apartment complexes, meant that in a very short span of time entire neighbourhoods of suburban style housing were eradicated to be replaced by apartment blocks. (...) The process had exhausted itself by the mid 1970s with new cohorts of fixed-income groups, both blocked from access to urban land in the absence of state subsidies, and unable to pay the rents of luxury flats which had become the sine qua non of middle class life style" (Öncü 2009:50).

The earlier beneficiaries of subsidized housing who belonged to an established middle class had thus out priced the members of their own class. An additional factor was that two markets developed around housing development. One market was comprised of construction by state owned enterprises, and another based on small scale entrepreneurship. Both sectors had very different methods and ideas, and served a culturally diverse group of buyers.

"Rapid but uneven growth has resulted in a clear bifurcation between an advanced sector, composed of state owned enterprises and large private firms, on the one

hand and a highly competitive but backward sector performing low capital intensive activities with non-unionized low wage labour, on the other” (Öncü 2009:52).

This fragmented housing market was embedded within a general change in the habits of consumerism in Turkey, providing different cultural groups with different styles of housing, interior designs and lifestyle concepts. It is in this context that Navaro Yashin also talks of a “market for identities” (Navaro-Yashin in: Kandiyoti/Saktanber 2002:67). Throughout Istanbul’s real estate boom, which placed the construction sector at the front of the Turkish economy, the demand for lifestyle-related interior designs, house fittings, tiles and flooring increased greatly, making the cultural aspects of housing ever more distinct. Places of consumerism created an additional fragmentation according to which groups of buyers they would address. Durakbaşa and Cindoğlu provide a very detailed observation of shopping malls as a newly developing site of consumption since the 1980s, in relation to the reproduction of class, gender, and age hierarchies (Durakbaşa/Cindoğlu in Kandiyoti/Saktanber 2002). The size and the concept of shopping malls, and the spaces of eating, drinking and clothing sales they featured, offered a competitive new kind of public space in a city, which, due to small scale property speculation, had been densified to a degree where a need for open spaces had become one of the most pressing issues of a planning process dominated by private real estate. These shopping malls, and the consumerist landscapes they constituted, are decisive in the spatial separation that became manifest during the real estate boom of the 1990s. By serving as a playground for diverse cultural groups, they constitute a distinct symbolic economy defining a wide range of symbolic languages that were later adapted by the real estate market in addressing a specific group of buyers. At the same time, they localized urban consumerism by concentrating specific groups of buyers in specific locations in the city. Where to build a shopping mall and what kind of shopping mall to build was not only a question of providing for an existing market, but also of serving the function of locking up new territories. The construction of shopping malls has, for this reason, often been confronted with resistance and hostility amongst the local population. Although such reactions were always grounded in seemingly rational reasoning concerning the violation of building regulations, which was standard practise in developments of that size, another more effective reason must be considered as a protest against the style of audience these new malls often attracted. Shopping centres not only claimed to offer goods, but also to offer good ways of life. The popular term, *yaşam merkezi* (living centre) instead of *alışveriş merkezi* (shopping centre) is most telling in this context. Due to the development of distinct cultural languages that made it possible to visually order the urban society, the development of the environment turned into a cultural struggle. In order for citizens to protect the boundaries of social identity and belonging, the neighbourhood, the workplace and the leisure zones turned into crucial choices. Social fragmentation which had begun to develop around levels of income entered into

reciprocity with an increasingly territorial urban landscape. Where to live and where to spend time was now oriented around complex concepts of belonging and estrangement from certain ways of life. In a city under neoliberal hegemony, where belonging to a class or social circles requires a constant renewal of proof, adequate housing is a question of uncertainty where the rapid change of the built environment poses an enormous threat not only to socio-economic status, but also to individual identity. The role of individual identity in this context is not to be underestimated. It far exceeds the importance granted to it in a discussion about style. Judith Butler knows that identity and belonging is fundamental to societal existence, stressing the means and the channels through which identity is created as vital elements of social life. Since humans rely fundamentally on social belonging for their survival and persistence and whatever they are is constituted at the juncture of their relations to social institutions, this means that when these relations are destroyed, they are threatened with "non-being or modes of social death" (Butler 2012). What is added to the corrosion of social belonging is the factor of individualisation and the changed role of the state – not to balance structural inequality – but to animate the individual to work against his structural disadvantage. Neoliberalism represents a radical de-politicization of structural inequality, along with an increased tolerance for it. Social inequalities are not seen as structural or political problems, but are rather seen to be the result of imprudent choices individuals have made, without regard to anything that might constrain choices (Brawley; Mattisek). The transferral of all responsibility upon the individual, and the animating function of the state to call upon the citizen to better his social position through increased economic activity, closes the circle by enhancing personal and social insecurity.

The city of the others

In the context of urban insecurity and the struggle to belong, Glasze talks about the figure of the stranger as an imaginary construct. As boundaries are differentiating between places of belonging and places of otherness, places of otherness are experienced as insecure – for they threaten belonging and personal identity. What belongs to the self and what to the other, what is secure and what is insecure, relates to discursive knowledge about the self and the environment of the self. Places of otherness and places of insecurity are being stabilized and reproduced by narratives continuously retold and performed in space in the shelter of social environments (Glasze 2005).

In Istanbul, discourses of otherness hardened when the prior middle class status of the old Istanbulites was contested by the Islamic *counter-elite*, through an integration of space and real estate into the social practise of belonging and identity. Because income and territory had increasingly been appropriated by discursively diverse other groups, social membership, which was previously defined in terms of economic status, now required

other forms of signification. The vertical fragmentation of the urban society was no longer a good enough source of belonging. Various other forms of horizontal fragmentation, whose inevitability had also referred to places in the city, can thus be seen as an attempt to reinstall boundaries of belonging. For the old middle class, a key aspect of counter-elitist struggle emerged around the speed with which people had gained affluency. People who had grown up and raised their own children according to the modernist convictions, and people who thought of themselves as belonging to the circles of an old urban bourgeoisie stood together against an economically powerful urban class whose urban history reached back merely a few decades, and who claimed to be the new urban elite only on the grounds of fiscal power. The lack of culture and civility was a key criteria for a differentiation and increasing hostility towards a *nouveau riche* middle class. Arabesque music, gold chains around the neck and a luxuriating behaviour in public space were amongst the most important characteristics of a cultural group who undeservedly made a lot of money. Ayşe Öncü describes the *yeni zengin* – the *nouveau riche* – in an analysis of “Istanbulites and others” (1999). She evaluates the birth of the *nouveau riche* as a figure of disgrace in the perception of the old middle class as coincidental with the moment in time when Istanbul’s opening to the world economy and the buoyancy of its consumer market posed a kind of new threat to prevailing cultural hierarchies. The vulgarism of overconsumption in the lower classes was an entirely different thing in comparison to overconsumption among the rich. The *nouveau riche*, because he had access to the top range of the consumer market soon copied old middle class tastes, which threatened the established cultural codes and hierarchies (Öncü 1999:110). According to Esen and Rieniets, the *nouveau riche* assumes a much softer definition along levels of income:

“The older generation (of urbanites) had constituted a relatively coherent Republican elite in itself with common group identity and shared cultural values. They were used to sharing their urban space with the middle class positioned just below them, just as they shared their cultural and political values and their ideals. Hence, they respected the habitually adapted codex of common behaviour in a tightly built urban space. Regardless of their wealth, those who had internalized a codex of specific values through education and socialization were accepted as members of the old elites and were granted access to common social space. The recent upper classes lack this ability for several reasons” (Esen/Rienietz in: Eckardt/Wildner 2008:97).

Recently wealthy members of society who could invest in property with ease pushed forward into established middle class territories, while the members of the Republican middle class were no longer able to participate competitively in the urban land market. Anxiety and anger against the *nouveau riche* found various forms of expression in the realm of cultural specificity. The *nouveau riche* were predominantly non-urban, Islamic

and of a migrant culture. Öncü highlights new forms of migrant urban culture – such as arabesque music – which created aversion amongst advocates of Republican culture. Arabesque and the *varoş* – a hard to define troublesome place from which cultures of otherness emanate – both belong to the same context of cultural and social discrepancy. According to Gönen & Yonucu, the term *varoş* implies that the urban poor are both culturally and politically marginal people, they are not able to modernize and pose a threat to the state with their support of radical political organizations (Gönen/Yonucu in: Bourke 2011). Since its first emergence however, the term has undergone an extensive career, yet it continues to have negative connotations in Turkey even today. It can refer to a neighbourhood, a place in the city, but can also expand to something on a larger scale. In general, it refers to a marginal place that is somehow troublesome. Perouse notes that even in the international context “we could recently hear a politician declare, ‘we are not the *varoş* of Europe’” (Perouse). Any elaboration or description of the *varoş* would therefore require the narrowing of the term to one particular perspective, with a unique reference to time and place. Depending on the perspective, different segments of society had defined their own *varoş* in a different way. For the older middle class, who were increasingly marginalized in their status; those people who had arrived as peasants and gained housing rights by illegal squatting were put onto the same step with the affluent nouveau riche who turned over land on a large scale. United under a narrative of criminality, the urban poor, new arriving migrants, the land mafia and various other predominantly religious groups who were economically well-suited, were regarded as a threat towards the state and the future of the city and the nation. The story of the ill-mannered speculator, who came to the city and appropriated public resources (land) for his own benefit, is an argument often presented as the main reason for the choice of a property in closed housing complexes and will be analysed in greater detail in the coming chapters.

The point to be made here though is that in the *varoş* narrative of today, which I will discuss as ‘the people without culture’, the historical background of the people and their precise history in the city always remains in the dark. The ‘people without culture’ can therefore be anybody, and signifiers to symbolise this group can vary from the different ways religion is practised, to the foods that are consumed and the cars that are driven. Amongst all signifiers, however diverse, one characteristic always remains the same: The destruction of a city to which nobody would ever agree to have contributed.

5.2.2 Segregation, insecurity and private property

"What effects us the most is internal security; our own children. The problem of external security was solved a long time ago" (Caldeira 2000).

Questions of belonging, territorial struggle and an irregularly developing construction sector had turned urban space into the centre of socio-cultural dispute by the beginning of the 1990s. The *varoş* image that emerged with the nomination of the city of the others created a foundation for the fear of living in the wrong place and of moving freely through the city. Luckmann and Berger explain the rise of fear by the effect boundary situations can have upon the routine of daily life. Boundary situations threaten the routine of daily life by questioning the reality upon which they are based. Under constant exposure to boundary situations, the meaningful construct of social reality cannot be maintained (Berger/Luckmann 1997:105), with the result that fixed and appreciated routines would be questioned concerning their legitimacy. To define a *varoş* is therefore not only a reaction of fear against social decline, but a reaction to a possible collapse of the foundation of reality. Remembering the principles of retroactive storytelling, the necessity of integrating new experiences and events into the personal narrative must be considered a reason for wanting to keep the exposure to such new experiences controlled. This is possible by limiting one's movement in the city to particular places, and by avoiding contact with people from other socio-cultural spheres. Restricted movement requires that areas in the city are first nominated as no-go areas. These restricted areas need to be positioned in a certain way within the mental geography of the city. As fragmentation increased, so did the complexity and the rigidity of spatial boundaries. No-go areas began to be a central feature in the urban perception of the majority. The ways in which migrants, minorities and the urban poor would appropriate urban space in their neighbourhoods (although known before) would, with increasing risk of being exposed to the other, provoke discriminatory behaviour (Berger/Luckmann 1997). In an environment where belonging is at risk, a parallel of *gecekondü* neighbourhoods, enclaves of poverty and the territories of the better-off would not be possible without an attempt to defend territorial boundaries. A "shell of exclusion is necessary for a social group to experience itself as a separate entity (...) which leads groups that are particularly anxious about their distinctiveness to generate and perpetuate conflicts with other groups" (Zerubavel 1991:41-42). Different forms of moving and acting in space, such as hanging the washing in the street instead of in drying rooms, or making a fire in front of the house and sitting around it instead of sitting around the television or the dinner table, would determine spaces of otherness. Not the static spatial arrangement, but a comprehension of space as "relational arrangements of living beings and social goods" makes up these spaces (Löw 2006:120).

Spaces of otherness do therefore require the perception of another human being who experiences discomfort when moving through these spaces. The discomfort experienced would cause individuals to stay away from such encounters and to create various forms of spatial recognition which would facilitate avoidance. Patterns of recognition would help the individual to avoid boundary situations before they arise on the grounds of discursive forms of seeing and perceiving. Rutz and Balkan observed that the focus of middle class desire in this social climate was, "the homogeneity of a lifestyle cleansed of urban clutter – of poverty, of immigrants, of elbowing crowds, dirt and traffic – a world of safe and anti-septic social spaces where the *ideal home* signifies clean air, clean water, healthy lives; a homogenous setting and a cultural milieu" (Rutz/Balkan 2009:33). The protection of the boundaries of social belonging through an avoidance of the other does clearly have multiple forms of practise. It includes avoidance and discrimination, as well as the creation of spaces of the self and spaces of otherness.

Real estate as discourse-operational mechanism

The creation of spaces of the self, as demonstrated in the previous chapters, is crucial for socio-cultural belonging. Space, in this context however, is not only symbolically appropriated, but also physically manifested through human interaction. As made clear by Öncü, involvement in the urban land market can be seen as an active creation of territorial and spatial boundaries, possible through the agency of investment. The choice of housing and the struggle to own property in the city have turned urban real estate into a mechanism operational in the neoliberal discourse, and a means of maintaining hegemonic forms of belonging. While privately owned real estate during the early phases of liberalization has created possibilities of economic rise, through which it was possible to climb the social ladder, private real estate during the times of neoliberalism has become more and more a signifier of a social identity itself. The place of residence in a segregated city is more important and socially relevant than ever. As real estate is becoming more expensive and less people are able to afford the house they deem appropriate, the real estate market poses hurdles to belonging, and turns governmental and financial institutions into gate keepers of social identity. In order to understand how the desire for a private house is discursively produced and how it leads to the institutionalization of social discourses, it is necessary to look at the meaning that is created around home ownership, as well as modes that legitimize ownership facilitating forms of governance.

To approach this I want to point out 4 steps, one by one, throughout which the private house becomes fully established as a discourse-operational mechanism. Real estate will thus be analysed concerning the role it plays in the creation of developmentality.

1. The first one is the rise of discourses of security due to social fragmentation and segregation.
2. The second is the attempt to ease insecurity by appropriating real estate.
3. A third one is an institutionalization of private property ownership within governmental housing policies and its nomination as the only way of gaining social security and belonging.
4. The fourth step is the emergence of blind spots beyond the boundaries of discourse, which limit perception and understanding of hegemonic forms.

1.

As already mentioned, social fragmentation gives rise to struggle over urban territories. The threat that others will invade territories of the individual and thus endanger social belonging creates fear and discrimination. While narratives of insecurity offer cultural profiles of social antagonism, they work to legitimize territorialism. The *varoş* discourse, and the spaces of otherness in relation to it, give rise to the fantasy of the city as a place with which to fully identify. The dream of a harmonious *non-segregated* city legitimizes the exclusionary behaviours against migrant and minority populations, and particularly people of a new affluency, who endanger the social status of traditional middle classes by buying them out from their traditional territories in the city. In their recent research, Gönen and Yonucu have shown that it is discourses of otherness that are at the centre of legitimizing the discriminatory behaviour of citizens by the police and other criminal justice institutions towards populations who live in marginalized conditions (Gönen /Yonucu 2011:88). In their research, such marginalizing conditions are informal neighbourhoods like shanty towns, inner city neighbourhoods with a high migrant or Kurdish population, but also previously established middle class neighbourhoods that are now the centre for populations with a different lifestyle. More importantly however, Gönen and Yonucu have found that the same discourses of fear and violence are at the centre of the argument for the remaking of cities through urban renewal and development. Their research demonstrates a full integration of space into discourses of insecurity. Transversing territorial boundaries in the city is experienced as insecure because spatial transversal is perceived of as a social *boundary situation*, if simultaneously the economy channels certainty and uncertainty through fiscal power.

2.

The private home is directly related to urban security discourses in two ways. While investing in real estate during the neoliberal era is predominantly motivated by unpredictable financial markets and sky-rocketing property costs, segregation and the related urge to live in an appropriate neighbourhood with the right neighbours is a greater factor in highly segregated cities. Segregation and economic insecurity in reciprocity perpetuate

urban insecurity, because economic decline is directly related to losing one's grip in the desired social circles. Living in the right neighbourhood is a symbol for social membership to a far greater extent than in cities where neighbourhoods are socially mixed. Class membership, therefore, directly corresponds to being inside or outside of certain urban geographies (Mayerhauser 2006:74). Social boundaries correlate with spatial ones. The inside versus outside differentiation regulates the accessibility of specific social, economic or cultural resources. Securing an inside position by securing residency in a privately owned property ensures social membership to a certain extent, even if the individual is faced with social decline through losing fixed income or other forms of investment.

Investment in a private house or apartment, according to Brawley, is therefore also an investment in the stability of *home* (Brawley 2008) because in the neoliberal city, economic decline also poses a threat to social and personal identity. Because investment in real estate is bound to an investment in the right neighbourhood, it directly increases unequal development. The home is turned into a decisive mechanism to trigger and perpetuate far-reaching developmental practises, while at the same time functioning as a remedy to the socially polarizing effects of developmentalism itself.

Urban development in Istanbul has shown that real estate firms do attempt to satisfy a buyer's search for a home in a socially appropriate environment:

"With the appearance of new social classes, and the rise of living standards, developers also increased their standards of quality of life. This situation pushes developers to create a main strategy for the market. This marketing strategy is usually a lifestyle or a neighbourhood life, because of the regeneration of the lost social values as reflections of globalisation and also because of the need to escape from the crowded city" (Baycan-Levent 2004).

More and more housing projects the size of entire neighbourhoods have developed, leading to a greater demographic and infrastructural fragmentation throughout the metropolitan region (Rutz/Balkan 2009). This spatial fragmentation has received much attention in research on urban segregation since the 1990s, and is particularly discussed in the research context on gated communities (Esen/Rienietz in: Eckardt/Wildner 2008). These strong forms of urban segregation make social fragmentation manifest, as greater spatial separation relates to social homogenisation in private and public sectors, schools or institutions for health care. In Istanbul, middle class households had to receive their healthcare from overworked and underpaid doctors in overcrowded and underfunded state hospitals. The result was increasing social differentiation that, in the context of the real estate boom, inevitably meant greater spatial separation between new middle-class spaces and those of other middle-class fragments (Rutz/Balkan 2009 28-29). For families with children, a highly segregated urban environment turns the choice for the right school into a choice for the right place to live. As schooling becomes more competitive, a

stress-free environment for good learning, contact with other families with similar educational and social aspiration and proximity to schools, evening classes and sports programmes, become crucial elements of choice for the purchase of a home. Rutz and Balkan describe how the restructuring of the educational system in Turkey is plugged into the neoliberalising urban economy, causing more and more competitive social relations within similar income groups. The family becomes a key agent in the reproduction of social antagonism (87-88). Not living in the right neighbourhood increasingly means also not being able to offer the best learning facilities to one's own children, increasing insecurity and fear of social decline even more. The reciprocity between insecurity and private real estate investment produces a mental state which Engin describes in his profile of the "neoliberal subject" (Engin 2004). The neoliberal subject, as described by Engin, has given rise to a large segment of studies on segregation-related forms of neurotization that are the result of the neoliberal urban economy (Engin; Brawley). In searching for the places and social contexts in which anxiety is reproduced, Brawley describes the private home in the following way:

"Being continuously neurotized in other domains, the home becomes the last remaining domain in which the subject can manage and stabilize anxieties and insecurities cultivated in them. So the home is caught in a double movement of neurotization: first it gets constituted as a domain through which anxieties and insecurities are managed and stabilized and second, (the fact) that it is constituted as a domain of stability and security generates increased anxieties about its creation and maintenance as such a domain" (Brawley 2008:12).

The question of maintenance that is mentioned should not be underestimated. As financialisation will be discussed in more detail below, ownership of property in the neoliberal city is caught in another vicious circle of insecurity since ownership in most cases is only a psychological form of ownership, providing the illusion of not having to worry about paying rent. According to research on property ownership by the Buell Centre for Real Estate Studies at Columbia University, this psychological sense of ownership is more important than actual economic ownership when it comes to houses, because it offers the illusion of security. What it provides the individual with is "the right to say that you own your home, when in fact you do not" (Buell Hypothesis, p. 41).

3.

Like many other countries with a strong welfare state (social housing as a fully institutionalized model to provide affordable rent for the needy), social housing in Turkey has always been based on a private ownership model. Considering that social housing is not only the total of apartments owned by the public, but also a social vision, the privately owned piece of real estate also has a corresponding narrative. The private

house is just as institutionalized within social and economic policy as is the public housing complex (ibid.page.52). A changed governmental role, which is often described as a "withdrawal of the state", has been central to the dismantling of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberalism. This change in governmental action away from balancing inequalities towards animating cities, communes and individuals to increase their own competitiveness, relates to a major ideological shift. Matissek shows that for Germany this shift is based on an antagonism towards the social welfare state as such, coupled with the belief in the indolence of the individual as a *passive* beneficiary of state services (Matissek 2008:57). However, as I have shown in the previous chapters, in Turkey the discourse of neoliberalism has a different ideological legitimation. In the absence of the welfare state, the shift has been legitimated on the grounds of antagonism towards tutelage and the exclusivist cooperatism of the Kemalist state.

Returning to the role of private real estate in the neoliberal city, what is called 'home' is always defined in opposition to something else, and this something else can be found in the definition of home in the prior hegemonic system towards which neoliberalism is antagonistic. Opposition to the welfare state would relate to the desire for a home in opposition towards housing as an institutionalized public service. This opposition clearly is the privately owned house. In Turkey, on the other hand, social housing has been provided on the grounds of home-ownership in the first place. In other words: owning the house is nothing special. In Turkey there is no paradigm change consisting in a replacement of public rental housing by private ownership oriented models. Public versus private does not relate to any discursive boundary, as there is no antagonism between the welfare state and privatisation. Instead, antagonism is located within the narrative of public housing policies itself, while privatisation is a process that is internalized by public institutions rather than shifted upon the private market. After the 1980s, public housing institutions in Turkey did therefore emerge as competitors within the private market, functioning like private companies themselves, rather than balancing private market forces as external bodies (Kuyucu 2008). Kuyucu explains that TOKI, the mass housing association in Turkey, and the alleged key provider for social housing today, has received much criticism in recent years for acting like a private investment company. TOKI was founded in 1983 as a public association provided with the task of lending inexpensive credit to the less affluent for the purchase of a house. This concept of social housing provision, by enabling the poor also to own a house, goes back to the liberal politics grounded in the climate of *gecekondu* legalization processes which Turgut Özal carried forth with his reign as Prime Minister of the neoliberal party, ANAP. What the major change brought about with the foundation of TOKI was the formalisation of social housing, informal development, like in prior decades via the *gecekondu*, was increasingly sanctioned. Another factor that played a role in the social housing policies of ANAP was the institutionalization of housing as such. While official public support for the construc-

tion of homes has primarily been provided by another public finance institution, the Emlak Bankası (Emlak Bank or Retirement Bank), credits had been lent predominantly to members and families of the Kemalist bureaucracy. In line with Islamic neoliberal policies, TOKI followed the aim to overcome Kemalist corporatism, which was regarded as tutelage, and strategically supported its own voters by turning them into home owners. In the beginning, TOKI did therefore address buyers from different socio-cultural contexts. While the Emlak Bankası and TOKI both provided housing loans to socially diverse populations, TOKI's housing policies contributed to the manifestation of antagonism and segregation by addressing socially distinct urban groups. In later years, with the growth of TOKI, many construction projects were developed on the grounds of public/private partnerships strategically involving partners close to governmental circles (Tan, Kuyucu). The Emlak Bankası, on the other hand, was closed and replaced by funds and companies involved in real estate construction, specifically addressing the social heritage of the Emlak Bankası. While social housing finance increasingly involved partners from the private sector, development projects became more and more revenue oriented. TOKI began to construct housing for the middle and upper ends of the market through more and more complex strategies of urban transformation and urban renewal (Kuyucu 2008/2010/2011).

What TOKI's social housing policies led back to however, was its alternative social vision, not in favour of corporatism which provided funds only to the white Turkish middle class with fixed income, but in favour of new social climbers with a migration history.

Notable in the analysis of mortgage advertisements today is the notion that this cultural dichotomy no longer figures in. The dichotomy that is featured instead is the definition of the home as an opposition towards renting. This particular way of defining 'home' in the neoliberal city of Istanbul though, is devoid of context. Renting instead of buying has never been a prerogative of housing policies. So where does this antagonism come from? Embedded into the narrative of home, the history of local housing solutions before the introduction of the mortgage system in 2002 is entirely erased. Living in state-subsidized low income housing, but also state-subsidized cooperatives or other forms of shared ownership dwelling, is all equally symbolized under the signifier 'rent'. Home, on the other hand, connotes buying. With the erasure of social housing, history in Turkey is also erased, based on the fact that social housing to a large extent has been provided via the *gecekondu* model. Besides other minor forms of social housing based on subsidized rents, or cooperative housing, no majority of the Turkish urban population has ever been renting rather than buying.



Fig. f

Nevertheless, discourses of home in the neoliberal era are defined on the grounds of an antagonism towards renting. The advertisement above, by Garanti Bank, a major mortgage provider and an important finance partner for privately owned mass housing in Turkey, demonstrates this shift. “From rent – home on the shortest route” as the bank suggests, can be achieved by buying a mortgage. The mortgage is therefore a symbol for coming home. The dichotomy between *rent* and *ownership* as corresponds to *home* and *not-home*, however, turns a blind eye to the fact that ownership via the mortgage system, and ownership as such, are two different things. A mortgage does not ensure ownership before it has fully been paid, and until that day arrives does not actually provide any social security. To define home on the grounds of an antagonism towards rent is therefore an ideologically-created belief in the security of the home. But the security of the home cannot be provided via a mortgage.

4.

Being at home on one hand, and renting a flat on the other, are based on an antagonism only in the specific discursive constellation of the neoliberal city. This has not always been the case. In socialism, to rent institutionalized public housing was far from socially demeaning. Districts like Red Vienna (see below) – at its time a major achievement in housing policies and the pride of planners – were representational of an ideology of non-segregated, socially sensitive society.



Img. 6: Karl-Marx Hof / Vienna

The subsidized social housing block thus existed as an ideal urban form, filling the word 'rent' with a particular meaning. When the massive demolition of housing projects as failed social experiments made place for a new era of liberalism, renting was also ideologically abolished to make place for a new ideal of housing. Property ownership was on the rise. In Turkey, though, the rental house has a variety of connotations, as it existed always parallel to ownership-based forms of housing. As renting has never been a hegemonic practise, it also does not signify an antagonistic discourse towards liberalism. The political battle that European cities witness in the face of liberalisation – the selling out of social housing stock to investors in the process of which thousands lose their homes – does not exist in Turkish cities. In Turkey the battle is one of house-owners against house-owners. This makes the term 'renting' as an antagonism towards the new generation of home-ownership crucial. As home ownership and the related fantasies of a 'varoş-free' city are imagined on the grounds of an antagonism towards renting, the fact that home ownership has equally been the ground upon which the city of the *gecekondu* was built is entirely erased from the consciousness of the city.

Today, the notion of renting is functional in discourses of home in a much unspecified way. It does not actually refer to particular models of rent-based housing. As home ownership creates an imagined distance towards the *varoş*, ownership, home and security oppose renting, insecurity and everything that threatens belonging.

The term 'rent' as an antagonism towards home points us towards a new form of political blindness, which de-facilitates other forms of housing not based on mortgage to occur as alternative urban visions.

This blindness, according to Zerubavel, is essentially created by our social environment. It affects how we perceive the world, and helps to determine what actually enters our minds in the first place (Zerubavel 1997:35). Blindness towards any other form of

housing that is morally and socially upright determines the search for home in the neoliberal city as a struggle for economic and social rise, accumulation and investment; and ultimately the avoidance of lower social circles that pose a threat to social rise. This form of "moral focusing" (ib.) facilitates the making of choices, and the separation of the relevant from the irrelevant. It helps the individual determine a structured life in the city, to set aims and to make decisions. Any object or reality that lies outside of that circle of moral focusing remains unrecognized, which is why it is suitable to talk of a blind spot (Lefebvre). According to Renggli, without the existence of a blind spot there would not be any *pure* or *open-minded* form of seeing, but no seeing at all (Renggli 2006:190). The blind spot therefore, determines social perception and evaluation. In the search for a home in the neoliberal city of Istanbul, that means that the history of housing has become impenetrable beyond the boundaries of moral focusing. The internalization of the neoliberal discourse closes its boundaries towards other forms of understanding and evaluating this history. Forms of social housing, the history of small scale informal development and the possibility of micro-financed or subsidized housing in Turkey has been banned from the consciousness of the city. *Gecekondu* development now is seen merely as a model of urbanization gone wrong (Cihan 2005:330; Mert 2005: 319). In the neo-conservative imagination of Istanbul, the *gecekondu* can neither be pictured as a form of social housing based on ownership, nor as a home, because imagining the *gecekondu* as a privately owned home would provoke reflections on how it has been financed. Other forms of ownership not based on private sector mortgages but micro-financing or subsidized forms of ownership are overruled by the boundaries of discourse-related imagination. An additional factor is that the informal city, or that which it has turned into, does not fit the image that figures into the neoconservative vision of Istanbul as a global city. The perspective of the global city which Islamists share with other world powers looks at the *gecekondu* and its reality as some kind of catastrophe (Cihan 2005: 330). For various reasons, including the eradication of informality, mortgage-based models of finance and new definitions of the urban, any reality of urban space that lies beyond these moral cornerstones, is defined as belonging to the *varoş*, and whatever counterposes notions of home.

To summarize how the private house became fully established as a mechanism born of a discourse which it reconfirms, the most necessary aspect to mention is that although it is presented in four steps, there is no chronology and thus no cause and effect relationship between any of the four. One gives rise to the other, but as segregation is mentioned as the reason for the feeling of insecurity in the city, segregation is also a result of the institutionalization of property-ownership. The discourse created around real estate is therefore a closed circle. It would be wrong to claim that any one actor – be it the individual, the government, or the finance institutions – are to be made responsible for the establishment of the hegemony of real estate. It

would also be misleading to claim that private house ownership has led to segregation and poverty, poverty crime or urban fear. The same is true in the reverse: Any seemingly external starting points of explanation of how neoliberalism operates function as inner moments of a closed circle of its self-reproduction. The closure of discourse by Žižek is therefore described as a system based on a vicious circle. The attempt to tackle the questions of its origin and the role of historical description is to go only through the fantasy which masks this vicious circle. Neoliberalism is a narration, and as such, a system which retroactively organizes its own past and its own origins (Žižek 2008:212).

III. 1. Identity, real estate and the struggle to belong

1.1. Public Sector housing narratives

In the neoliberal city, real estate is not just an object of desire, but an element that is active and fully operational in stabilizing the hegemony of neoliberalism. In this context, real estate orders and empowers gate-keeping institutional and financial bodies that provide and restrain access to social belonging. These bodies are discursively posited. They emerged in their fully-fledged format not only as beneficiaries of neoliberalism, but as their driving force. Such is true for public housing institutions. While degradation of public housing is a much bemoaned side effect of neoliberalism, the case of Turkey shows that the public hand has not withdrawn from the scenery of urban development in order to give way to the private hand. On the contrary, neoliberalism has given rise to public mass housing institutions as a competitor in the urban development market (Keyder; Kuyucu).

In spite of this transformation, the image of the state as benevolent father has remained fully intact. Starting off with the task of providing cheap housing to urban migrants, until its transformation into a company benefitting from the consumerist capacities of the middle classes, the provision of *social care* has remained the centre point of the institutional narrative (Atasoy).

State-led engagement in urban development is thus encouraged by a narrative of public support, social care and an increase in power of wealth both for the individual and the nation. As has been discussed earlier, however, governance is now legitimated on the grounds of a neoliberal narrative, radically changing the connotations of social welfare, collectivity and citizenship (Mardin; Matissek). The role of the state is one that encourages citizens' engagement in economic growth, managing self-directed care rather than actively caring and counter-balancing inequality. Özyürek's observation that in the early 90s the government organized a very effective political campaign that mobilized local women and built on the already existing relations of trust in the neighbourhoods (Özyürek 2007:119), corresponds with what Atasoy defines as the concept of justice in the AKP politics of brotherhood: "The creation of trust between the state and citizens is a key condition for the neoliberal politics of the AKP in order to promote its programme on human welfare, individual freedom, and social justices" (Atasoy 2009:110-110). Ayşe Cavdar describes religiosity as a form of capital in itself (Cavdar 2011). As trust in the authorities is the ground of a citizen's engagement in growth, social housing narratives are internalized as personal dreams of a better life in the city provided for through governmental support. Citizens' prior forms of habitation

beyond the formal system of mortgage-based finance are degraded to the image of the shady, the dirty or the retarded. In the neoliberal city, home ownership does not equal home ownership. At first sight, new social housing projects presented by the authorities appear to be an entry ticket to a new formalized world of clean and organized urban space that leaves behind the mess, the dirt and the shadiness of other forms of shared ownership or rental housing, summarized as insecure living conditions. However, mortgage-based housing is presented as an ideal form of living in spite of people's existence outside of the formal system of capital accumulation. They are encouraged to acquire mortgage contracts for homes for which they cannot pay. As many are faced with the absence of choice, for others a house from the authorities comes with a lack of insight into its conditions, and constitutes therefore, a violation of citizens' rights in the same way as a forced eviction would (Uzun-carsilioğlu Baysal 2011). Against this background, a model of social housing cannot be granted the purpose which it claims to serve – the provision of housing. Its main aim seems to be to engage people in a change of life from the informal to the formal, from existence on the margins of society to respectable citizenship; the way official discourse defines it, and most importantly, a new physical environment worthy of the neoliberal subject ideal. Recent research on state-led urban renewal and the formalization of housing connected to it has shown that before urban transformation, homelessness has seldom been a problem in the city of Istanbul. It has shown that on the reverse, the way social housing in Turkey has been put into practise in the last years has perpetuated poverty and homelessness rather than help it (Ünsal/Kuyucu in: Göktürk/Soysal/Türel 2010; Islam 2010). Before the property boom that set in after the financial crisis of 2002, shelter was always to be found in multiple forms and conditions not connected to public sector housing. While religious foundations or migration-related networks have been offering shelter for the homeless and the new arrivals to the city, the formalization of labour markets and the full integration of urban land in the inner city has eradicated much of these opportunities. The role of the public sector herein concerns less the provision, but rather the replacement, of other forms of housing available before. The scale at which social housing institutions engage in urban development by offering formal housing to those living in bachelor flats, self-built, squatted and abandoned houses in urban central areas has increased drastically. Social housing institutions, by not following the prior aim of providing housing to the urban poor, but instead offering 'alternative' ideologically-compliant forms of housing, embrace a narrative of social care understandable only against the meaning of the word '*social*' in the discourse of neoliberal-Islamic politics. In 2010, the mayor of Istanbul's Fatih district summarized his understanding of social care in the following way: "This is the most social project I've ever seen. We will buy the

houses from the present owners and they can move into brand-new lodgings as soon as they're finished and pay off the difference over 15 years." (cafebabel 39, March 2010)

The project that he referred to has been an intensively studied and widely much-lamented case of resettlement led by the social housing institution, TOKI, a case which rose to fame also in international media as 'the Sulukule case'. The financial and legal circumstances of this project have been discussed in much detail and can be studied in the publications of Islam; Ingin; Tan; Kuyucu and many more.

What is of more relevance to this research is the connection that is being made between social support and the entry into a mortgage-based property contract. Many people who have accepted (or were made to accept) the new conditions, lost the houses provided to them by the authorities due to the fact that they failed to come up with the money they were legally bound to pay. People who moved to the new TOKI houses explained to me that the peripheral location of the new houses, the exclusion from informal labour markets due to this distance and the lack of flexibility to pay off debt later, if not fiscally, with manual labour or other goods, were the main reasons for the failure of the resettlement schemes. Housing foreclosure, deeper poverty and homelessness was the result – as people lost their homes and returned to living conditions that were more precarious than their original ones. While people's journey from urban transformation areas to new formal housing in other places tends to be ascribed to an all-embracing lack of choice, and the confrontation, with brute force, by the authorities, one major question has not achieved any attention at all: The question concerning why mortgage contracts of that kind are being signed at such high rates, and signed not only by the poor, but also by the middle classes who are severely affected by housing foreclosures just the same. Research by the Buell Centre of Real Estate Studies on housing foreclosure in American suburbia suggests paying more attention to the internalization of the dream of owning a house, which in the research context of America has been elevated to a life dream. The elevation of house ownership to the position of a life achievement and personal fulfilment might hold an explanation to why people take on a burden they cannot carry. Without a doubt, brute force and the destruction of houses with people still living in them is a reality connected to state-led housing development that cannot be denied. The desperate situations which inhabitants of neighbourhoods subject to resettlement schemes are faced with though is just a small number and it is not enough to put the blame on governmental expropriation alone. The victimized image thus created leads to a neglect of asking questions concerning the internalization of *varoş* discourses by property buyers on all income levels, as well as by the authorities.

Cross-class coalitions and the dream of the own house



Img. 7 Urban transformation advertisement by the municipality of Ankara

The above poster put up by the municipality of Altındağ, a district in the city of Ankara, demonstrates that resettlement is integral to narratives of a non-antagonistic city. The belief is that a harmonious city can only be achieved by ridding the urban environment of traces of otherness, however these might be defined. The point made in this poster is that through the engagement in urban redevelopment by the authorities, the disgrace, danger and liabilities represented on the left-side image of the urban environment is eradicated and replaced by the respectability, tidiness and cleanliness represented by the image on the right. This is achieved by tearing down the neighbourhood of Cincin and rebuilding in its place a project that consists of spaciouly arranged apartment houses, wide roads and a blue sky. Proud to name himself responsible for this achievement is the mayor of Altındağ municipality, 'Veysel Tiryaki'. In a similar manner as the mayor of Istanbul's Fatih district claimed Sulukule an unacceptable urban environment, the erasure of Cincin in Ankara is not only meant as urban renewal but also as an erasure of a societal other. As the complete destruction of Sulukule is rectified not only on structural or economic grounds, the impoverishment of its residents matters little – as those who live in such conditions are not regarded as citizens of the city: "They are merely a disgrace, criminals, occupiers, vandals or worse" (Gönen/Yonucu in Bourke 2011).

In a speech on the Sulukule urban renewal project, the mayor of Fatih put it this way: "Once upon a time gentlemen were living in Sulukule whereas it is the living area of occupiers now." Such a statement makes clear in what way public opinion constitutes a no-choice situation concerning an issue as crucial as citizenship. The social housing models that are offered to the residents of Sulukule are not an opportunity, but an ultimatum – a last chance to become a full member of society or to drop out and lead a life on the margins of society. As 'occupiers', residents of the *varoş* are deprived of rights, their homes are not regarded as homes, and their livelihoods, jobs and ways of life do not deserve protection. In order to be recognized as a full citizen you have to be included in the mortgage system and have a credit rating. But the participation in the finance system, payment of interest, and the monthly income and tax required for mortgage payments is not an openly spoken of criterion for citizenship. It is simply taken for granted. The outspoken criterion is an image of urban life that echoes a certain aesthetic of urban space. Images of ideal citizenship are reflected in official urban development discourses. The home of the citizen, on the other hand, is pictured as formalized housing, privately owned in a secure urban environment, free of clutter and dirt. The *varoş* image created in the image of old CinCin overlaps with narratives of insecurity, while the new CinCin supposedly offers a remedy to such discomfort.

What is absent in those images is any information concerning the addressee of such development discourse. The replacement of old CinCin by a new development is assumed to be a universally-experienced *good* undertaking. Who lived in old CinCin? And who will live in the new neighbourhood? What the conditions are and so forth is information that is simply not provided. Many urban transformation projects in Istanbul witness an increase of property costs of over a tenfold of the prior prices. Prior inhabitants are thus unable to stay, which means that a different group of buyers with higher affluence will move in. This calculation is done before the initiation of the projects, and constitutes the most central economic factor for its implementation. In public development discourses on the other hand, the urban poor are made to believe that the interest represented by the authorities is theirs as much as the interest of the middle classes or any other group.

The fantasy of the home as defined as an escape from the city of the others functions as a cross-class coalition hiding the fact that collectivity only resides in an antagonism towards whatever does not comply with the fantasies of home in the neoliberal city. As the home addresses the fantasies of all sections of society, the hegemony of real estate renders invisible the antagonism between economic growth and social welfare. While citizens experience income-related class differences more than ever, the role played by social housing in the perpetuation of inequality is subject to a discursive blind spot. Here, social housing posits no

counterforce towards home ownership-related property speculation, but social welfare is legitimized through the strategy of home ownership. It is for reasons of the narrative of home that people who are presented with the opportunity of social housing are presented with the privilege of a home, and the opportunity to escape the *varos̄s*. How this is put into practise appears irrelevant. The home and the *varos̄s*, and the responsive dichotomy between the secure and dangerous, the dirty and the clean in public debate lead to the erasure of the fact that the answer to insecurity via the purchase of real estate is not a solution but a problem in itself.

1.2. Appropriation of the city through urban renewal

More and more people are seeking to belong and more and more people are not counted as belonging (Miller 2007).

Defining a "city of the others" appears to be the foundation for principles of urban development. For Turkey therefore, the *varoş* is central to formulating these principles. It determines places and spaces for urban renewal and change. A "city-ideal", as Schroer suggests, is therefore essentially formulated on the grounds of a "non-city". It can only be defined through what it excludes. Notions of home play a central element in the city's future, but they also lead to strengthening the boundaries of belonging. Both home and *varoş* are terms that relate to a large number of urban spaces in Turkey. Dilapidated neighbourhoods, but also the territories of the nouveau riche, the apartment jungles of the informal city and many other typologies of urban space can pose as places of otherness. The *varoş* does not have a definition in and of itself. As a negation of home, it refers to what blocks the way to security and social belonging; however, this something is very imprecise and varies across class and culture. The *gecekondu* as a place of otherness is a result of an inability to understand the *gecekondu* (Önder 2005). As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the hegemony of mortgage-based housing has the effect of blind fields overshadowing the history and the socio-economic context of the informal city. According to Erkaslan, urban phenomena that cannot be explained on the grounds of the historicity of the existing social narratives are described as abnormalities (Erkaslan 2005:134). The *gecekondu* is a place that lacks stable socio-cultural characteristics and can therefore not be ordered symbolically. It is neither a neighbourhood of the poor nor of any other homogeneous group. Its unpredictability and its ability to produce unexpected or unknown social phenomena, however, render it a danger to the ruling class.

According to Vincenzotti, discomfort in relation to the experience of space may also be traced back to an inability to make sense of that space. Spaces that are '*neither nor*' would be experienced as such if they could not be appropriated symbolically. These spaces would remain in the "realm of the unaesthetic" (Vincenzotti: 264-270).

It is unclear the kind of reactions such an inability for symbolic appropriation might provoke. According to Gönen and Yönücü on the other hand, the existence of spaces of otherness are relative to middle class fantasies of the non-antagonistic city and used to legitimize the taking-back of the city through urban renewal. From their perspective, the *varoş* is a fantasy-object that takes the inevitable failure to reach the desire for security and belonging into account in advance. They relate their evaluation to Diken and Lausten's argument that the ghetto is a necessary thing for the imagination of a just and harmonious city:

"If the hole did not exist, the city would have been a whole. The camp, in this sense is the contingent space that hinders the urban order that would have been, if the camp did not exist. What this fantasy hides is, of course, that the camp is a necessary effect of existing power relations. And precisely as such, the camp participates actively in the construction of the contemporary urban reality. Paradoxically, thus, the camp is what holds the city together: thanks to it, one can fantasize a non-antagonistic city" (Diken/Lausten in: Gönen/Yonucu 2011:94).

Diken and Lausten's argument relates to Lacan's psychoanalytical concept of lack which Laclau also uses to explain why discourses are constantly evolving but never creating the desired form of identification. What Gönen and Yonucu don't seem to take into account is the fact that the belief in the possibility of reaching that desired state is real. Instead, their argument is that "these fantasies legitimize the re-taking of the city by the middle class and the exclusivist policies against the city's marginalized populations" (Smith in: Gönen & Yonucu 2011:94). By arguing in this way, they deny that fantasy is an actual driving force for urban development, and that it is part of the reality of the city, as well as its perception. Misunderstanding the reality concept which is presented in Diken and Lausten, they argue instead that "the current government in Turkey seems determined to turn the fantasy of the non-antagonistic city into reality" (ib.) In order to understand how visions of the non-antagonistic city evolve, it is necessary to regard the discourse of the ideal city as the location of social reality itself.

It is clear that practises of urban renewal are never legitimized on the grounds of achieving a city ideal. The reason must always be an assumed rational one. Thus, Islamic cosmopolitanism does not openly admit its antagonistic source, but instead retreats to an argument of insecurity, crime or risk. Recognizing forms of antagonism within visions of the city, in the process of analysis, often goes hand in hand with the assumption that this antagonism is an obvious and a constructed one (see Walton in: Soysal 2012). The insecurity felt, brought into connection with the *varoş*, on the other hand, must not be underestimated or rendered as devoid of reason or fact. Discourses of insecurity can be experienced, and are therefore a reality for a large percentage of the population. Tuğal Cihan is therefore right in his observation that the perspective of the global city adapted by Islamists regards the inhabitants of *gecekondu neighbourhoods* as disastrous (Tuğal Cihan 2005:330). He fails, however, in scrutinizing the social context, in which this perspective is adapted and how this *disaster* is experienced.

The interrelation between insecurity and urban renewal is clearly recognizable, as are the experience of the *varoş* and the desire of the non-antagonistic city. Much research has shown that urban renewal increases homelessness, poverty and social unrest, but it seems too easy to account for this effect by rendering a particular group of decision makers responsible for this situation. It would be more helpful to recognize that insecurity

ity or estrangement is not something that is created through particular practises of planning alone, but something that does and will always exist. Ways of dealing with this can worsen the situation or enhance inequality, but the origin lies within the way reality is constructed by the individual and by society. We could say that social boundaries and insecurity exist as a matter of fact, but in order to account for this, certain places in the city must serve as an explanation. In the same way, we could say that places of otherness exist as a matter of fact and because they do exist, there is estrangement or social insecurity. Insecurity, places of otherness and the vision of an ideal city relate to one another in reciprocity; no cause and effect relationship explains this.

To approach this cycle, we might follow Vincenzotti (2012) who starts her argument by identifying that the integration of urban spaces into individual "meaning-constellations" is inevitable, but not always met with the same emotion. In her analysis of the intermediary city discourse, she makes out a large range of different approaches to deal with spaces not integrated into the symbolic order. They reach from an oppositional standpoint, which would result in deconstruction, to a euphoric enthusiasm to preserve the different qualities of that space. A search also exists for legitimisation strategies that would qualify spatial aspects based on strategies of historicisation, exotisation and appropriation by usage. To categorize appropriation strategies, Vincenzotti refers to three different world-views, which she defines as belonging to "*opponents*", "*euphoricists*" and "*qualifiers*". Vincenzotti suggests that the different attitudes of dealing with space depend on how spaces can be discursively integrated. The form of appropriation, and especially the will to interact with spaces that are not known, depends on the strength of the hegemonic spatial reading and the will, or the reluctance, to stretch discursive boundaries. Whatever the approach, spatial appropriation is an ongoing process caused by the necessity to make sense of our surroundings.

Following Vincenzotti, urban renewal might also be understood as spatial appropriation. It goes without saying that destruction is always grounded in an oppositional stance towards the demolished space, but to regard destruction in the context of appropriation is more helpful for a theoretical understanding of the discursive function of urban renewal practises.

The destruction and reconstruction of entire neighbourhoods such as Sulukule (see below) contains an eradication of all that is shady, insecure and unmentionable about a place. Its eradication, however, is regarded as a social project and something that is progressive about the envisioned city. Certainly, economic benefits play a role. To dismiss the intentions of urban renewal programmes as sheer money-making, however, would be reductive. Despite the effects of homelessness, social unrest and segregation attached to resettlement, the new environment that is produced grants legitimation to the institu-

tional order of the urban renewal programs – by establishing the symbolic hegemony of the just and secure city (Berger 1997:105).



Img. 8 Sulukule before the transformation



Img. 9 ... and after



Img. 10. Computer Rendering of the urban transformation area of Sulukule

Through the manifestation of a new spatial order, and the symbolic language of the renewal discourse, heterogeneity is eradicated, de-facilitating different kinds of symbolic appropriation in the current social climate. The transformation of the area and the resettlement of people to the peripheries create both a symbolic change as well as a change of spatial use. Urban transformation thus defacilitates other forms of appropriation or interpretation, therefore contributing to the stability of the hegemonic urban vision. Urban renewal in this sense is not an outcome or an effect of neoliberalism, but is a discursive practise in itself – a practise for neoliberalism to persist as an ideology.

1.3. Exotisation, historisation and the ideal of pluralism

Due to many years of neglect and decay, inner city areas in Istanbul are often exposed to gentrification by a variety of groups. Tarlabası in Beyoğlu is such an area and is currently undergoing massive urban renewal. Tarlabası, prior to its declaration as a renewal area, received much attention from a variety of scenes – mainly, transit-travellers and international cultural tourists who were on the lookout for something not easily revealed. A strange kind of fascination with decay appears to have functioned as a foundation for a variety of alternative imaginations, in sharp contrast to the images of Tarlabası proposed by the municipal government. The biggest contrast, though, resides in an attitude that seeks to qualify what is already there, rather than to demand an erasure of the area. Alternative Tarlabası images are thus generally more 'preserving what is there already', which explains why they are considered socially more acceptable and sometimes even democratic. In the climate of urban renewal, alternative images often also seem to be determined by a mood of protest against this very renewal, mainly because they seek beauty in those details that renewal discourses declare a reason for destruction. Tendencies to preserve, to qualify or to discover beauty in decay are thus coupled with urban renewal discourses, defining themselves through them and depending on them for the production of a symbolic language.

One such alternative would recognize that renewal is followed by homogeneity and the disappearance of the original populations. An alternative vision of the city might seek authenticity in the small scale and the intertwining of the formal and the informal; in other words, it would resist large scale urban redevelopment. What might be perceived as secure or clean by one group might be perceived as the loss of the city's soul by another. Another alternative vision of the city might focus on ethnic and cultural mixing as an ideal urban society. Representatives of such visions would speak in favour of groups in the city that are marginalized by urban change or people who connect their personal stories to experiences of multi-ethnicity.

Whatever the perspective, people who criticize governmental forms of urban renewal try to qualify urban space in order to legitimate its current state. The *qualifiers* have made a preliminary decision to keep decayed neighbourhoods intact by adapting their gaze upon them (see images below). In doing so, they would search for a potential of those spaces to become fully representational of *their* perspective on the city.



Img. 11: Computer Rendering of Tarlabası Renewal project



Img. 12: *Photoshopped* image of a street in Tarlabası

A critical stance towards the effects of urban renewal is at the centre for a qualifying approach to space, encouraging an attempt to search for the special, the humane and the unusual within such areas. To shed light on these idealisations of neighbourhoods often

inhabited by the low-income, Derya Özkan refers to the social damage created jointly by the state and the private sector under the rubric of urban transformation (Özkan 2012). Özkan suggests that with an increasing awareness of the destructive effects of urban change comes the possibility that the now-moderate forms of interest in alternatives, brought in by smaller groups of academics and artists, will soon turn into a form of mass tourism, involving much greater numbers of people. To support Özkan's speculations it is necessary to look at the development of transnationally produced city images. These include an analysis of the channels through which *the exotic*, *the informal*, or the *chaotic* of urban areas are regarded as qualifying elements in discourses of the *authentic*, *heterogeneous* or the *just city*. A widely-observed fascination with *the informal* and *the chaotic* by highly educated people from western countries suggests that *qualifiers* of *varoş* areas belong to a specific social group. This group is not threatened by immediate poverty and can therefore not see any personal danger in decay; particularly if that decay is not in their immediate surroundings.

It might also be helpful in this context to analyse the perspective these people have on the spatial context of the cities from which they come, and how they relate to Istanbul within this context. The sterility of cities' core-areas, the history of formalization of urban economies and the rigidity of spatial use related to it, as well as the lack of social mixing in European or American cities – all of these might allow us to understand the transnational context, in which contrasting images of diversity or chaos are being held up as an ideal.



Img. 13: Painted Wall of a ruin in Sulukule



Img. 14: Self-built *gecekondu* by an Architect's office in the Netherlands

Within the context of these forms of spatial appropriation, it is interesting to note that, although such encounters with the city are with something unknown, they are not evaluated as negative. The *heterotopic*, *informal*, *chaotic*, *diverse* or *authentic*, in this context, stand for a certain pleasure in experiences that don't comply with normative forms of urbanity. On the contrary, they point at another kind of desire that juxtaposes the de-

mand for *the clean, the ordered and the secure*; aspects that, in the social context of the Turkish lower middle classes, are something generally perceived of as desirable. And yet the location and the thinking of a *here* and a *there* does strongly influence fantasies about other places; reachable, yet somehow separate from one's immediate daily life.

What I assume we are observing is also that the exotisation of people's under-pants hanging in the streets is not a mental state common to people who have grown up in Istanbul. The same diversity and the informality sought and appreciated by people from abroad are evaluated differently by young Turkish academics. One major reason for this could be connected to the way changes in the city are experienced over time. The rapid urbanization, which was particularly intense in close proximity to hubs of a new urban economy, was witnessed by many "old urbanites", with feelings of territorial loss. Different culturally-bound behaviour and the social discourse or "gab" between residents and new arrivals, did cause an aversion towards migration and groups which were speedily identified on the grounds of certain behavioural patterns – generally, a lack of consideration, manners and other assets considered honourable or civilized. A perception of urban growth is that it is happening too fast and is often experienced in relation to a threat emanating from people moving in. Cem, who is in his mid-twenties, grew up on the Asian side of Istanbul, in a part of the city which witnessed very drastic migration in the late 80s. Due to the rapid urbanization he experienced throughout his adult life, he feels very pessimistic about the future of the city. When asked to imagine what Istanbul would look like in the future he answered in the following manner:

"They started to landfill the sea; some parts of it had already been landfilled anyway, and the process continued with more speed. I saw that the Bosphorus had gotten a lot narrower. I saw very pessimistic images – not positive at all.

In my vision, the sea had a muddy colour; there were some blue areas, but mostly it looked very murky. It was dirty, just like the Golden Horn before it was cleaned.

There was no greenery left at all. I noticed that there weren't any birds in the sky or any fish in the sea. Even the sun looked hazy. Everything was grey and black. There wasn't any greenery left and the sky and the sea had no colour" (Apx.Istanbul-Time-Travel-Experiment/B2).

Cem experiences continuous construction and city growth as something threatening, and wishes Istanbul was still the way it used to be during his childhood. He claims that urban growth has made everything that was special about Istanbul disappear. Cem grew up in parts of the city which were not densely populated at that time. His family home is situated in Kadiköy, a preferred summer-house location before the construction of the first Bosphorus Bridge. Only with the construction of the second Bosphorus Bridge and the development that followed did the Asian side of the city begin to expand. Until that

time, urban growth related to migration focused on the industrial areas of the European Side. With the 1990s, migrants came to the Prince's Islands, and the hills between Kadıköy and Ümraniye began to fill up with informal housing. Cem experienced the arrival of migrants in his teenage years, at a time when urban development still occurred through small-scale construction. The image of the migrant arrival, which came and life continued as he was used to, is thus a very present image in the memories of many people his age.

Tuğçe (22) grew up in Kağıthane, but her family already had a summer house on Büyükdada. Although her family has a migration background itself, she, growing up in Istanbul, experienced migration as something close to an invasion. She describes the most significant aspect of this invasion as behaviour which was unacceptable for people of her education and upbringing. While as a child she thought of these behaviours as funny, they are now a reason to define the others as invaders, responsible for the misery of Istanbul today. She now puts her experiences, which as a child she did not think much of, into a very clear narrative of *otherness*. As she regards herself as belonging to an *original* population of the city, the newcomers are seen as a separate group. Culturally distinct behaviour, for Tuğçe, signifies belonging:

“In the past, the beach used to belong to the islanders only. We used to leave our houses, go for a swim in the sea and then go back home. Now, the beach is crowded with a lot of people who come from Istanbul, and that’s one of the biggest problems of the city – the population-explosion, caused by people who migrate to Istanbul. In my view, the islands have been victimized in order to satisfy the vacation needs of the immigrants; because it’s cheap and not too far, thousands of people flock to the islands, and that gives you an odd feeling of alienation. Of course, neither I nor my Armenian friends on the island have any intention of alienating anybody, but you can see the difference very clearly. The behaviours, manners and everything – for instance the way some of these people sit on blankets at the beach. Or the fact that they bring a whole watermelon with them. I found all that really funny when I was a child. Now, I know better, but my friends still think it’s funny. And these people even knock on your door sometimes and ask if they can take a shower at your house” (Apx. Istanbul-Time-Travel-Experiment/12C).

As opposed to Tuğçe, Cem does not consider any particular social or cultural group responsible for the negative change in the city. His view of Istanbul is non-segregational; he describes a hope for everybody to live together side-by-side. This vision of a harmonious city goes together with the complexity and cultural richness that he loves about Istanbul. Talking about his “Istanbul vision” he refers to the Ottoman Empire, which he imagines as a multiethnic era. Soon however, it becomes clear that the tolerance he displays towards culturally-varied urban populations is limited to a narrative of the cosmopolitan city, which overlaps in his imagination with an Istanbul of the

Ottoman Empire. The tolerance towards complexity, which he formulates in this narrative, is based on an exclusion of new arrivals, and therefore has the characteristics of an idyllic fantasy world that lacks a realistic way of dealing with migration and growth:

“There is an incredible amount of disorder and complexity in Istanbul – always has been and still is. Istanbul also has something unique that no other historic city has: Nowhere else in the world have so many different civilizations coexisted. I agree, between 90 to 95 percent of Istanbul’s population is Muslim today, but the Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Muslims have peacefully coexisted for many centuries in this city. We can’t say the same thing for any of the other major cities in the world like Athens, Rome, Moscow, Berlin or Paris. I think this could be one of the messages of Istanbul. There is a bridge in Bostancı built by Sinan the Architect. In the old days, Istanbul had a unique visa system. People from Anatolia weren’t allowed to migrate to Istanbul whenever they wanted. The river under that bridge in Bostancı used to be a lot bigger in the past – its water used to flow faster. People couldn’t walk across the river, so they had to walk across the bridge. Soldiers waited at the entrance to Istanbul and questioned people as to why they had come to the city” (Apx.Istanbul-Time-Travel-Experiment/2e).

The imagination of a past that reaches further back than the personal history of the subject-narrator is a strategy very common for a symbolic appropriation of the city (Akcan; Özyürek). As I have shown in chapter II.3.3, retroactive writing of history occurs in social contexts, where the future of society must be imagined anew. Future visions always go hand in hand with a reinterpretation of the past. However, there seems to be a difference in the way the past is being re-imagined in the neoliberal city. Mainstream visions of the *Neo-Ottoman City* appear unrelated to cultural, ethnic or class-related boundaries. Instead, they embrace ideas of multiculturalism, diversity and liberty. Comparing the visions of Kemalism with the visions of *New Ottomanism*, one would find that, while the prior openly confesses to propagating a validity of a singular history, narratives of the Ottoman past are connected to a narrative of plurality. The vision of the *Neo-Ottoman City* accepts that multiple urban groups imagine the history of the city in a different way. *Neo-Ottomanism* “necessarily tolerates alternative chronotypes and imaginaries of space and place” (Walton in: Göktürk/Soysal/Türel 2010:100). While the early neoliberal Islamist discourse explicitly confronted the exclusionary convictions of Kemalism, today’s *Neo-Ottomanism* obscures the spaces that represent the city in contrasting ways – especially Kemalist – without confronting these representations overtly (ibid.). Such a non-confrontational strategy makes the vision of the *Neo-Ottoman City* hard to come by. It fits an ideal of democracy and liberalism, which is more exclusionary and non-democratic than ever, but which as a vision is hard to criticise. The way democracy is formulated today does thus radically diverge from the way it used to be formulated in the politics of the Islamic government in the 1980s, where accession to the global markets

was not only a strategy for economic growth, but a strategy to liberate and empower minorities and to democratize a very closed-up, elitist and centralist-oriented nation. In the course of two or three decades, democracy has turned from something that seeks inclusion to a vision of a new middle class; one which wants to surpass republicanism. This vision is increasingly exclusionary. Historical visions of the Ottoman city and its celebration as cosmopolitan, pluralistic and democratic, take exclusion into account. It is interesting to note that the propagators of *Neo-Ottomanism* do not see a dichotomy or a paradox in this at all. One interesting example of this is demonstrated by Cem through his description of the visa system. The image of peaceful togetherness connected to fantasies of the Ottoman city, and the control of who is allowed to enter and who isn't, do not necessarily occur as elements of antagonism. Peace is only granted to those with good intentions, but not to unwanted migrants – this is legitimized on the grounds of what is best for the city. "...if it helps to preserve the city, then why not? It's like population-planning, which is also a bit oppressive, but I think these types of preventive measures can be really good for the city in the long run" (Apx. Istanbul-Time-Travel-Experiment/4c).

In order to fully understand the way in which fantasies of a non-antagonistic city are signified through a narrative of pluralism, I want to point out the transformation that pluralism as a term has undergone over time. Essentially, according to the Kemalist conviction, the majority of national territory was inhabited by uncivilized people. The cities were the centre-points for cosmopolitan behaviour which was regarded as corrupt, segregated and selfish. For these reasons, exclusion, disappropriation and displacement were acceptable as practises that would better Turkish society. The 'ideal society' on the other hand – and this is the key difference to exclusionary practises in the neoliberal society – was one of a homogeneous nature. Harmony was considered to inhere within the absence of plurality and difference, precisely because both class and cultural differences were seen as the cause of conflict, greed and struggle. What history has been a witness of is therefore a complete re-evaluation of plurality in the narrative of the ideal society – from being an element of antagonism, to becoming a desirable criteria. Cem's idea about a pluralistic Ottoman city closing its borders to the Anatolian hinterland, has clear references to the official development discourse of Istanbul, its reinvention as a European capital and the side-by-side existence of religions, ethnicities and cultures. If looked at from an international context, the "Neo-Ottomanisation" of Istanbul can be linked to the development of multiculturalist policies, which have been discussed since the 1980s.

In the imagination and the marketing of cities, pluralism is something that is related to the historicity of a place. Whereas during modernity, the historicity of the city tended to be rather homogeneous, the neoliberal discourse embraces the existence of multiple histories:

„der neue Blick richtet sich nicht einfach auf die Geschichte, sei es die Siedlungsgeschichte oder Naturgeschichte. Die Qualifizierer, die die Taktik des geschichtlichen Bezugs verfolgen, betonen die Pluralität der Geschichten, auf die sie sich berufen. Die Verbindung des geschichtlichen Bezugs mit dem Pluralitätsgedanken, ist als Versuch zu deuten, die konservative Idee, das Identität primär durch Bezug auf die Geschichte des Ortes entstehe, mit einem fortschrittlich, demokratischen Element zu verknüpfen. Auf der Objektebene entspricht diesem pluralistischen, subjektiven Zugang zum Charakter eines Raums das Nebeneinander bzw. die Gleichzeitigkeit unterschiedlicher Raum-Geschichten oder Siedlungsgeschichten (wie es bei Baling und Christ heisst)“ (Vincenzotti 2012:264).

For the marketing of cities in the neoliberal era, the pluralistic idea does indeed make sense. It is non-confrontational, as Walton puts it, and therefore suitable in appealing to the largest possible audience. It would be necessary, however, to analyse to what extent *Neo-Ottomanism* is capable of forming an urban 'umbrella vision' for Istanbul – in the sense that it might be able to offer forms of identification to a socially and culturally diverse middle class. Nur's imagination of Istanbul's past, for instance, is directed towards the modernist period. To her, modernism appears to be progressive and democratic, particularly concerning women's rights, with no conflict between modernity and liberty:

“I have lived in Istanbul for 33 years. I wasn't born and raised here though. But still, the first thing that came to my mind was the image of Istanbul in the 1950s when women, who had been given a bit more freedom after the Ottoman era, were walking on the cobblestone streets of the city. They were wearing hats, modern clothes and high heels – I sensed them. I heard the sound that their high heels made on the cobblestones” (Apx. Istanbul-Time-Travel-Experiment/24e).

The appropriation of the city through historicisation is a very contested practise. It is doubtful that the urban changes which happened under the ruling AKP are pleasing to people who are politically and socially affiliated with Kemalism, although AKP politics do not openly state their opposition to other political visions. The ban of alcohol in public spaces, the debate about the construction of mosques, and other major changes to public policies – such as bans on demonstrations – are alarming to democracy. In effect, these have turned municipal decision-making into something that receives much critique and fierce opposition by non-AKP followers. In spite of the discursively unifying effects of the *Neo-Ottoman* idea as a pluralistic one, we can agree with Kymlicka (1995:18) who notes that the term *multicultural* covers many different forms of cultural pluralism, each of which raises its own challenges. Generalisations about the goals or consequences of *multiculturalism* can therefore be very misleading. In Istanbul the opposition against the *Neo-Ottomanisation* of the city appears to relate not only to an increasing visibility of re-

ligiosity in public spaces, but also to a rather ruthless neglect of the city's eco-systems and the selling-out of developable land for non-sustainable construction. The simultaneous non-democratic developments in the city, unequal access to space and services, segregation, and finally the homelessness caused by the transformation of the city seem to outline what Madianou considers an apparent paradox, concerning the concept of multiculturalism as an inclusionary one. "The irony of stressing difference as a means of refuting primordialist perspectives is that one reproduces the same ideology one purports to question" (Madianou 2011:447). Perhaps the irony Madianou sees in this is not an irony after all, but a paradoxical form of legitimation. It might refer to a form of denial or the creation of a blind field through which ideologies become invisible to the people who propagate them. As Žižek believes, actual multiculturalism can only emerge in a culture within which its own tradition, the tradition of this culture – its own communal heritage – appears as contingent (Žižek 2006:79).

Exotisation and historisation as two attempts of spatial appropriation appear to depend on the degree to which one identifies oneself with a local history, and whether one's personal belongings are under threat or not. As many foreigners who come to Istanbul for shorter or longer periods of time tend to find access to the symbolism of the *here and now*, their urban imagination does not highlight the historicity of the city. Historisation, on the contrary, is even perceived as blindness towards the reality of the presence. As Vincenzotti's differentiation between exotisation and historisation helps to describe certain narrative groups, it might be misleading to believe that one narrative practise is oriented towards a backwards oriented form of story-telling, while the other prefers to cope with the presence. We might look in vain for the reference points that *exotisation narratives* seek to establish with existing histories of place. They will, on the other hand, contain references to the historicity of the imaginary space of the subject narrator. Narratives of place, as has been elaborated in the previous chapter, always require the narration of history with the subject at the centre point of that history. One would therefore need to know to what extent the personal history of the subject-narrator overlaps with the history of place. Ottomanism or Kemalism as imaginations of Istanbul are both narratives with firmly established spatial signifiers. Their historical truth is therefore one that is accepted by the mainstream – so individuals who are socialized in the city would need to take a position to this mainstream. The question is: How would people, unfamiliar with this history, but who are part of the international community, relate to the city? As Berger reminds us, discourses make an offer of identification (...) but access to discourses is also not equally granted to everybody alike. While exotisation might appear not to be linked to the historicity of place, the symbolic field upon which it is based might be located somewhere else. Urban imaginaries might therefore relate to how far places are imagined on TV, the internet or other media. Just as social and political changes always evolve transnationally (Schiffauer 2009:62), so do discourses and imaginations about

places evolve translocally. Fantasies of the heterotopic or the exotic city, on the other hand, are to be regarded in the context of a contingent culture. In this way, that particular place is not identified, and therefore does not reveal itself as historically constructed.

1.4. Concepts of loss and the creation of the city through Nostalgia



Img. 15: Street in Tarlabası from 1965 / photographed by Ara Güler

Orhan Pamuk, throughout all of his novels, attributes one particular characteristic to the Istanbul that he loves. For Pamuk, the beauty of the city resides in everything that has decayed; in the destruction of the wooden houses on the Bosphorus, burned to make space for new roads, the suffering of the elders who lost their livelihoods under the regime, and the neglected landscapes of the monuments. In essence, all that which appears to have gone forever and which embodies mourning for loss. It was also Orhan Pamuk who gave name to this feeling that marries beauty with loss – a loss of the past – *Hüzün*.

This nostalgia for the past is a form of historicisation which is restricted to an imaginary past, because its resurrection is understood to be beyond the impossible. Nostalgia therefore comes with a very implicit form of sadness – accepting that the future will not return this loss. Place-bound nostalgia is therefore a historicist evaluation of the

environment that takes into account the inability to reach an imagined social harmony residing in the past. This is because the new political order poses a significant hindrance. With the destruction of a place, a person's ability to feel at home is believed to be destroyed for good and the sadness over this loss, which Akcan refers to as melancholy, is being attributed to the environment through an act of projection. "It is not a single individual who is melancholic, but the city's landscape (manzara), the beautiful object that elicits the feeling of melancholy as a collective emotion. Melancholy thus goes beyond the isolated individual and infiltrates the city and its houses" (Akcan 2012:114). A passage from Tanpinar's book "A Mind at Peace" (Seelenfrieden) can help to demonstrate this coalescence between the subject-narrator and the reference system of the material environment:

"Inmitten dieses Elends, Drecks und Verfalls glänzte dann plötzlich ganz unerwartet ein Brunnen aus alter Zeit mit vergoldetem, aber zersprungenen Baldachin auf, zeigt sich in einiger Entfernung davon die harmonische und Achtung gebietende Fassade eines Mausoleums, dessen Kuppel eingestürzt war, tauchte später eine von Kinderlärm erfüllte Medresse auf, deren marmorne Säulen umgestürzt waren und aus deren Dach ein Feigenbaum oder eine Zypresse ragte, oder es lud eine Moschee, die sich trotz allem Ruin noch auf den Beinen hielt, mit ihrem ausgedehnten Hof und ihrer Ruhe zu Dingen jenseits der Freuden dieser Welt ein – ebenso überraschten Frauen, die inmitten der zerlumpte, verkrüppelten, erschöpften, schlecht rasierten oder mit unfrisierten Haaren sich auf der Strasse tummelnden Menschen beiderlei Geschlechts die Armseligkeit ihrer Kleidung mit ihrem Blick, ihrer Haltung und der Kraft ihrer Persönlichkeit besiegten, sodass man gar nicht anders konnte, als nur auf ihre Gesicht zu achten."

Here, individual loss is related to a spatial context. The individual or society attributes his inability to make sense of a new environment to the destruction of the familiar. This is not surprising, considering that a meaningful relationship with the environment is very important (Berger; Matissek). The gaze into the past as a memory of loss, however, is clearly motivated by a difficulty to relate to the environment that exists in the present. Typical forms of mourning over a city's past, demonstrated by Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar, can be related to a pessimistic stance towards the foundation of the Republic. The images of Istanbul created by Tanpinar oppose the modernizing gaze that went along with the destruction of the Ottoman city, seeking meaning in destruction and decay. As these forms of urban melancholy still persist and are carried forth by authors such as Orhan Pamuk, they constitute one important Istanbul vision. Özyürek suggests urban melancholy to be a marriage between commodification and desire for the past. Özyürek claims that "nostalgia and privatisation are among the powerful driving forces behind neoliberal ideology which turns objects, relations and concepts into commodities and transforms political expression by converting it into an issue of personal interest.

Nostalgia, in this context, becomes a convenient desire that can transform public concepts such as the national past or identity into personalized commodities" (Özyürek 2006). The essence of the way nostalgia is conceptualized here is the reuse or the reformulation of concepts that lie in the past into marketable narratives. That is true to the extent that the branding of space and the trade of real estate require methods of story-telling that relate to the historicity of places. Nostalgia therefore occurs in combination with urban production and the marketing of the city. But Akcan knows that a gaze into the past is also a phenomenon which exists beyond accumulation. As opposed to Özyürek, Akcan excludes capital accumulation in her approach to urban melancholy, focusing instead on melancholy as a psychoanalytical concept.

"Usually in mourning the subject overcomes the feeling of loss after a period of grief, however in melancholia, he or she resists confronting the loss and preserves the lost object, person or ideal in the shelter of his or her ego. In mourning, reality passes its verdict that the object no longer exists. In melancholia, the intense attachment of the ego to the lost object eventually leads to the lost object's internalization. Now it is no longer the world that seems empty, it is the self" (Akcan 2012:106).

Concepts like melancholia (the term for the condition) and melancholy (the state the subject finds itself in) that are borrowed from psychoanalysis, might be helpful for understanding the complementary and antagonistic nature of hegemonic struggle as a struggle for identity – a parallel one could draw on the theory of hegemony as that of the missing link, through which discursive processes are explained as ongoing and constantly reformulating. One might wonder what leads to melancholy in the neoliberal city, asking to what extent the adaptation of discourses is possible at all, or to what extent discursive change can be restricted by accessibility to urban space.

I would suggest removing the concept "Not to be able to move on, but to preserve the *lost city* in the shelter of one's own ego" from this psychoanalytical context, and would ask whether these intense forms of nostalgia, which we are observing in our contemporary cities, do actually have anything to do with the way meaning is created through urban space. Melancholy and melancholia, as Akcan explains them, might be inspirational, but are minimally helpful in providing a deeper insight into the social structure of historicisation and nostalgia.

III. 2. The SITE, the gated community and the fantasy of an open city

2.1. The suburban house and the gated community

In the following chapter I will take a closer look at how urban visions are produced as real estate projects. By looking at how these projects are chosen and appropriated by their residents, it will be possible to make more definite statements concerning the dialectic between the housing environments and their residents, and in which ways they do or do not satisfy the search for belonging in the city.

The references used are collocated from two sources:

1. From presentations given by Istanbulites about the image they have of Istanbul, provided within the framework of an art-project, called the "time-travel-experiment" by the artist duo Ute Hörner and Matthias Antlfinger.
2. From interviews I have undertaken with people who reside in the SITEs subject to this research.

Branded housing projects – whether in the form of branded urban landscapes, business improvement districts or private compounds – have received severe criticism concerning their impact on the privatisation of public space (Glasze; Webster/Franz; Minton; Low/Smith) and the commodification of space through excessive branding techniques (Zukin; Critchley). Much of the discussion concerns the way 'symbolic economies have invaded urban space' with the result that space often appears as themed, a 'commodity' or a 'landscape of consumption'. The term "disneyfication", which was first used by Sharon Zukin in her book "The Culture of Cities", has been widely used in this context and has deepened a debate about the relationship between the city and a growing symbolic economy – increasingly focusing on space. However, such a differentiation between a supposedly real space and a simulation of space as a commodity is problematic.

Essentially, it suggests a generalizable difference between 'the real' and 'the unreal', or categories of narrated and non-narrated spaces. Thinking in such concepts could easily lead to an assumption that some kind of marketed space diverges from *the reality* of the city since it constructs a utopian and imaginary – and therefore *unreal* – form of urban existence.

However, real estate today comes onto the market as a vision of life; a promise made to particular groups of a home in the city based on their ideals, needs and fantasies.

Living in the city is therefore not to be separated from a seemingly commodified urban environment; branded spaces serve as an orientation and an offer for people to identify with certain ways of life. But more than that, space as a physical constitution cannot be distinguished from the stories told through formal and architectural languages. Both the imaginary and the physical intertwined are what create spatial reality as such.

As discussed in previous chapters, branded housing projects incorporate notions of *home* in a discourse of *the here* and *the there*, *the inside* and *the outside*, *the self* and *the other*. Visions of the *city of the others* are thus comprised of the marketing campaigns of residential real estate, but not as an idea that is contained for the purpose of marketing alone. It is rather that belonging is created through the act of narration itself, and that real estate is central to the moment of narration. Real estate is thus part of the process through which urban reality is created, and it evolves and changes together with the evolution of space and architecture. Since the mid 90s, when large scale corporate housing began to market large scale real estate projects that propagated social belonging through thoroughly designed lifestyle concepts, narratives of home have continuously evolved. The urban structure of Istanbul has by far now surpassed the image of the dual city Ihsan Bilgin described in his article. As differentiation has become more and more distinct, north-south or centre-periphery dichotomies have slowly dissolved and evolved into a very diverse urban landscape.

In the 90s, one focus of development was on the construction of sub-urban style housing for the middle classes who wanted to leave behind the urban centre. Investment-led urban development proceeded with forms of SITES, generally discussed as “Gated Communities”, due to their employment of surveillance and security concepts, contained form and private management (Baycan-Levent/Gülümser 2007; Cekic/Gezici 2009; Genis 2007; Evrim/Kozaman 2006; Esen/Rienietz). Due to rather excessive discussions on this topic, and a very heated political debate about urban politics, marketing strategies have incorporated a negative image of the gated community and its accompanying discourses on privatisation of space, widening gaps between income groups, social segregation and urban sprawl. It is therefore nothing unusual that housing projects which are marketed as an exclusive urban environment for like-minded individuals also claim to make a contribution to a more public and sustainable urban environment.



Img. 16: Villa in Kemer Country




Img. 17: Bomonti Apartments

While there exists a strong tendency to reawaken fantasies of the modernist city, the city centre itself has gained greater attraction, making it more interesting – also for the affluent – to leave their suburban villas and reside in luxury inner city apartments. This return of the affluent to the city centre is accompanied by discourses of a more compact and cosmopolitan city; discourses that are now propagated by the same populations that used to live spread apart along the forest belt and the lakes of northern suburbia. It is not uncommon for owners of houses in exclusive SITES, such as Kemer Country, (img. 16) to leave these places behind in search of a more urban life in a project like Bomonti Apartments (img. 17). The reasons for these decisions are multifold; a key factor, however, seems to be that the exclusivity of suburban living has become lost and no longer functions as an asset of an old elite that regards itself as culturally distinct, intellectual and cosmopolitan. Another assumption is that life in a SITE used to constitute a possibility to identify with a certain non-urban lifestyle, as an ideal distinct from life in the city. As affluence is no longer bound to cultural characteristics, many residents of Göktürk who had their social centres around Bağdat Caddesi, where their families used to own summer houses, were confronted with new neighbour-ship to groups of the newly rich, who settled in their close proximity. This has blurred the boundaries between the old urbanites and the newly rich, creating enough potential to shift territorial boundaries and provoke a search for new forms of distinction. As the conversations with residents in Göktürk have shown, some have reacted by moving away. While one person has already made that decision, another appears to be taking it into consideration. Two people, however, have maintained their position and their perceived rights as first-comers. Interestingly though, in their cases, I could observe other forms of dealing with the intrusions into their social and territorial spheres. Below I will first of all explain the changes that were happening in Göktürk and which triggered social conflict. Proceeding to the next chapter, I will then discuss the protection of social boundaries, and in what way this might relate to space.

The SITE / A fading utopia

The construction of large scale urban residential projects has been restricted to the city's forest belts or waste lands ever since urban renewal became a standard procedure in unlocking inner city space for reinvestment. Göktürk, in the north of the European city, is an example of a location chosen due to its distance from the inner city. Until recently, the entire administrative area of Göktürk was covered with large developments, resisting the penetration of small scale growth into what looks like an agglomeration of islands. In Göktürk this development has been facilitated through the declaration of the area as a municipality with a planning department of its own. During the early years of

development, planners propagated the investment of large developers by parcelling the land in large plots (Cekic/Gezici 2009).



Img. 18: Urban land structure in Göktürk

The speedy urbanisation of Göktürk happened therefore through the selling of the biggest land-parcels down to the smaller ones. Today, there is a large variety of SITES in Göktürk, many of which do not place themselves in the upper end of the market anymore. According to Cekic, the construction of Kemer Country – the first gated community in Göktürk – has created a magnet effect for other developers to come (ib.) As square-meters became more rare and prices more expensive, many developers had to give up using ample space, which until quite recently has been the biggest asset of housing projects in Istanbul. Prestige resided predominantly in scale and green spaces. Two decades of urbanisation in Göktürk, with land parcels getting smaller, has now caused a rather mixed urban structure. The smallest compounds consist of single blocks only, and the long duration of construction in that area has attracted low-cost housing for workers both in the centre and in informal housing on the edges of the district. Since large open spaces were no longer available and the construction of golf courses, large private gardens and green areas was no longer profitable, developers had to find other ways of marketing their projects. Architecture became more important. With the invitation of popular architects into the design process, projects began to be differentiated through materiality, construction quality and design; a new step in the history of SITE development in Istanbul. Architects had never been employed to help the marketing of projects and to leave their fingerprint at the same time. The earliest SITES were characterized by their remoteness and their location away from the city centre,

following a general trend of a particular social group to leave the urban grind in order to be away from it all. Social belonging was created through a shared desire to be away from the crowds, and to live a distinct life in a one-family villa rather than an apartment. The SITE became a distinct form of life away from the ordinary and amongst those who shared a common world view. Most buyers of properties outside of the city centre would be inspired through direct contact with others who had moved there or – as I learned during the course of this research – through their relationship with the developer themselves. In the early 90s, the SITE was something that made a statement, not of being part of the city but of another 'translocal' community. The SITE, a rather rare form of living in the city, did not demonstrate much uniqueness in style except for the mere fact of being a self-managed, introverted housing project in a remote place. SITE dwellers signified their belonging to a particular social circle through their mere habitation in the SITE. Not everybody, so they believe, was able to reside in respectful relationship with others, share a common social space, treat special-use areas as such and be trusted in close proximity to other's private property. Bülent, a retired army colonel in his 60s, believes that it is a matter of upbringing and civility to inhabit a SITE in a respectful and appropriate way. For him it is a feature of character that qualifies a person to keep order in the house and live in limited space without creating damage, filth and chaos:

"The Turkish people do not know how to live in these kinds of places. Before we came to live in this place we did not have any criteria of choice (he referred to the spatial layout of his apartment in Istanbul-Levent where he used to live). A female neighbour – they have chosen a triplex with an interior staircase – chooses to climb the stairs every day. I, on the other hand, am living on the floor below, in a duplex. The square meter space, I mean the usable space, is quite less than hers – but when they think they need a staircase they have to climb it" (Apx.No.7/5c).

The Kemer Group, the developer of Kemer Country, is a company that has attracted members of a more established middle class to Göktürk. It became popular through the entrepreneurship of its founder Esad Edin and his vision; to create a refuge for those who mourn the change the city has undergone as a result of migration and neoliberal politics. Esad Edin's vision was to create a new home where values that had gotten lost would be given renewed attention, where space and greenery would be preserved, and where people could find a cultural and a social refuge. On the website of Kemer Country it is written:

"Set out on a sunny morning. After just fifteen minutes on the E-6 expressway, as you make the turn to Kemberburgaz and things start changing, it already feels like you're heading home. Everything gets greener, if the windows are down, you can hear birds

singing. You've entered the ten kilometres of prime forest that encircle Kemer Country like a sea of green, ensuring that it will always remain an island of serenity.

The natural beauty of Belgrade Forest with its countless species of songbird and the rolling countryside featuring lakes and ponds as well as aqueducts by Mimar Sinan, probably the greatest Turkish architect, are home to a planned community offering 13 different types of villas, townhouses and apartments in the style of traditional Turkish architecture, which blend into this magnificent landscape as if they had been there forever" (www.kemercountry.com).

The vision of Kemer Country as an example of the first emergence of SITEs in Istanbul was firmly grounded in a belief that the city is not an appropriate place to exist. In the 90s, however, the relatively low number of SITEs throughout the metropolitan region demonstrated a certain homogeneity in style. One could recognize a SITE upon first glance. It was embedded in greenery, had a repetitive housing structure and no mixed-use facilities. Kemer Country represented a vanished pleasure. It constituted a utopian fantasy as a contrasting antithesis of a very negative and crowded Istanbul image.



Img. 19: Kemer Country Aerial View

By its inhabitants, at those times people of high affluence, the SITE was perceived as a refuge for people who wanted the city to be whole, but had to accept the impossibility of this because of the unacceptable behaviours of other groups of people. Over the years, SITEs have become associated with a mindset of seclusion. Çiğdem, talking about a

drawing she made to demonstrate the way she imagines segregation in Istanbul, describes it in the following way:

“People are separated into different groups – they alienate each other saying: “You are not one of us” to each other. They don’t feel like they belong to the same group. In my mind, I even start labelling people as ‘those who are in my group’ and ‘those who are not’. Those who are in my group are against this kind of grouping and separation. They are the ones who try to find a balance between everybody and everything in Istanbul. And the others are the ones who deny the need for such an effort. The separation into groups is reflected in the city’s architecture and general appearance. The brown dots, these areas here, represent the city’s chaotic, outcast and crime-infested neighbourhoods inhabited primarily by an angry group of people, whereas these pinkish grey areas represent protected neighbourhoods of Istanbul where more problem-free people live” (Apx. ‘Istanbul-Time-Travel-Experiment’/8c).




Fig.g

Çiğdem is very aware of segregation in the city. Interestingly though, she does not regard herself as involved or *part of this problem*. From her perspective it is not the inhabitants of the SITES who cause segregation. Rather, segregation was there before the solution – the SITE – was found. The SITE is therefore the home of those who do not want to segregate themselves or discriminate against others. It is the people in the rest of the city who are the real cause of the problem the city endures. This narrative overlaps with the *varoş* narrative. This shows that the individual self, as much as respective groups in the city, do not perceive themselves as being part of the city's problems. The dichotomous Istanbul image Çiğdem has in mind is rather typical for how the city is widely perceived. The stereo-type which consists of spacious suburban gated

developments on one hand, and of chaotic and dense indefinable structures on the other, is a starkly simplified perception of a divided city. Today, gated communities no longer consist of villa-type housing only (Baycan-Levent/Gülümser 2009) – such a differentiation by formal languages is therefore not true. Nevertheless, *the here* and *the there* requires an imaginary specificity to be perceived at all, and this requires a spatial description. As Cekic has observed, housing typologies in Göktürk changed a lot due to a revision of the implementation plan which allowed for construction up to five floors along the main roads. “This resulted in a drastic change in Göktürk's appearance. Independent villas were the dominant housing type in these projects. In this area, where in the beginning of the century country house types were dominant, gated and fenced apartment blocks started to develop too (...) Depending on the density and type of buildings, the lifestyle in independent houses with gardens in the area has been replaced by a different user profile for a life in apartment with security” (Cekic 2009).

As more and more heterogeneous people came to reside in SITEs, places like Göktürk became ordinary. For the earliest residents of projects by the Kemer Group, the consolidation of Göktürk comes close to a renewed loss of home. The places in the city where many had lived before, the neighbourhoods around Bağdat Caddesi, Nişantaşı or Levent – all areas that used to be remote in location and social distinction – have turned into busy urban centres. Seeing this happening again in Göktürk for Selin equals the loss of a large opportunity:

“I think we missed a big chance. You know they should not have let them build those five-storey buildings and everything. They should have stayed at three storeys. Without apartments. Keep this part private and with the green. So if people want to have something green, they could live here. Now they are making so many apartments and everything – so many small places – I don't like it either. I mean there are so many things in the city. Small buildings without gardens. I think it could have been better if they kept it like this. I'm sure they are going to build something here” (makes a gesture toward her garden)
(Apx.No10.10/9c).

The establishment of the SITE as a standard form of housing for many of the first buyers has destroyed the belonging the SITE had given them before. The close proximity to new neighbours that are perceived as intruders causes discomfort and reactions that range from anger and defensiveness to some kind of resignation, which is often enough to take the final step and move away. A changed relationship with the environment, and different ways of appropriating it physically and symbolically, are the result of an attempt to counterbalance change and reinstall the boundaries of social belonging.

2.2. Maintaining and redefining boundaries of social belonging

Losing a sense of place or feeling alienated through the social and spatial change of one's direct environment can be met with multiple reactions. The cause for fear, anxiety, or the decision to move away is difficult to tackle theoretically. Reactions strongly depend on an individual's personal mental constitution, but also on their financial situation, the way they are socialized in the city, and many other factors. My suggestion, however, would be that if the opportunity is there, the decision of moving away can only be based on a perception of life in the new location. To be more precise – I want to suggest that the individual has to feel attracted by a different environment as well as be able to symbolically appropriate it. If no imaginary affiliation can be established, and if an alternative urban imagination is missing, people will be inclined to stay and fight for their rights. What I am interested in are the ways of discursive reorganization that accompany the decisions of staying or leaving. Since both decisions have to be legitimized, the evaluation of the place and the way it is symbolized must be adapted to what one can easily define as a threat to the existing definition of being at home in Göktürk. Below I want to discuss the reactions of early Göktürk residents towards the social and spatial changes in two steps. My claim is that there are two ways of maintaining and protecting belonging when confronted with such a situation.

1. Staying in the place one feels uncomfortable in would require a confirmation that the present definition of belonging in the city is right. In this way, discomfort about the presence of the other needs to be relativised by strong reasons to stay.
2. Belonging can also be re-installed by reordering the symbolic environment related to a change of place. The way space is discursively integrated would be altered by changing the house one lives in, or by moving to another part of the city. Through this adaptive behaviour social boundaries could be stabilized again.

Whatever the decision – to stay or to leave – the struggle for maintaining belonging must be accompanied by the attempt to differentiate oneself from the other, while maintaining a clear spatial reference system. The differentiation I make between moving away and staying, and the symbolic operations that accompany both decisions, is for the sake of analytical clarity – but between the two there is, of course, a grey area. Sometimes people who stay might also regard themselves as being in the wrong place. They would feel alienated but remain put nevertheless. However, I want to examine these reasons in upcoming research, since it does not fit the framework of the questions that are posed here.

1. Staying put

Understanding discursive integration of space as the foundation for drawing social boundaries, I want to refer to Mayerhauser, who urges us to switch from a classical 'above-versus-below' hierarchy of social differentiation to a horizontal 'inside-versus-outside' differentiation:

“Das soziologische Gebot der Stunde lautet: Den sozialen Differenzierungscode von der klassischen, vertikalen Oben-versus-unten-Hierarchisierung, z.B. sozialstaatlich abgefederte Schichten oder Klassenmodelle, auf eine horizontale Drinnen-versus-draussen-Unterscheidung umzuschalten, die den jeweiligen Zugang zu bestimmten gesellschaftlichen, wirtschaftlichen oder kulturellen Ressourcen regelt“ (Mayerhauser 2006:74).

Discussing concepts of segregation in this context, I have mentioned that segregation relates to the attempts of different social groups – hierarchically and horizontally fragmented – to define their identity in the city. Mayerhauser's *inside-versus-outside* differentiation is important because it helps us to go beyond an understanding of financial capacities, or the struggle to buy ourselves into one or the other segment of the property market. Breaching territories is therefore not only a question of money, and cannot be explained through climbing some kind of social ladder. Horizontal fragmentation relates both to cultural and social accessibility independent of income. The question is thus: How do people of the same affluence and therefore the same access to the real estate market define themselves as socially distinct? *Inside-versus-outside* – to use that language – connotes therefore an inclusion or an exclusion of a social circle and its symbolic language. It also relates to financial capacities, but in addition to regulating access to assets and resources that are connected to these capacities, forms and behaviours of investment and consumption are decisive.

While accessibility to the real estate market unlocks territorial boundaries, affluence must be considered a factor for the creation of the possibility to surpass social boundaries. By establishing territorial boundaries through investment in real estate, struggle for differentiation grows strong, where belonging is a problem for many people with similar spending capacities. Such a struggle has been identified as existing between middle classes and having repercussions on the real estate market (Öncü 1997/1999; Cavdar 2011; Rutz/Balkan 2009).

There are also, however, other forms of social differentiation towards groups of people that do not pose a direct threat to social belonging because their access to the real estate market is limited and they could never afford to conquer middle class territories.

Antagonism towards people who lack the same opportunities, however, is also an obvious occurrence – although logically this might seem unnecessary. It might be that inferior

groups – meaning financially disadvantaged groups in the city – are a necessity for the legitimization of power struggle, since they confirm middle class identity. I would suggest that above-versus-below hierarchisation does not happen inside the boundaries of social identity, but instead structures these boundaries from within. It is a hierarchy *internal* to social identity. This internal hierarchy is necessary to maintain the belief that there is an inside that is worth protecting and an outside that poses a threat to this inside. I argue that protecting social boundaries that mark horizontal differentiation can be achieved by setting up a hierarchical order – that is, by claiming that the other intruding group is inferior. I was able to identify a narrative structure, which I refer to as “*the people without culture*”. Within that narrative structure, however, there are various other forms of symbolic operations that I claim are made for the purpose of defending horizontal boundaries of belonging. These symbolic *figures* which I refer to as “*I am not who I appear to be*”, due to their paradoxical structure, are figures within the narrative, through which the ideological nature of the narrative is camouflaged.

a) “The people without culture”

As explained earlier, social identities are defined through what they are antagonistic towards. In an urban environment that is constantly exposed to migration and demographic change, these identities don’t remain fixed for long. A constant redefinition and an adjustment of social narratives are required. In Göktürk, those who moved there in the 90s were rather homogeneous in character and status; today this homogeneity appears to gain increased importance through a new opposition towards new arrivals. Those who moved into the close proximity of projects like Kemer Country are described by early residents as ‘*the people without culture*’.

The people without culture have the financial capacity to live in the same territories, but their social distinction cannot be defined on the grounds of income alone. The coming together of pluralism and financial capacity breaches an outdated spatial logic, according to which, people of diverse affluence resided in different territories out of necessity. In an ‘ideal’ class-based society, having money functions as a kind of gate-keeping mechanism to protect the boundaries of social identity. In the neoliberal climate of Istanbul, on the other hand, diverse social groups began to rise to greater affluence – claiming traditional middle class territories in the process. Many inhabitants of the early SITES in Göktürk began to mourn the invasion of the newly rich, who bought up the villas from the prior inhabitants and started living there themselves. To Bülent, the newly rich are invaders who do not belong there. They live a life of abundance but beyond style, and do not know how to behave or to be considerate:

"People who have bought at prices around two thousand started to sell at one and a half million. Therefore, you see the relationship in our country between money and culture is a contradiction. People with money, who have no culture, began to live here. If they see people who, like you, are from a more intelligent class background (aydin sinif); if you're intellectual, they crush you. How? Here, there and everywhere they listen to arabesque (Turkish folk music), they make köfte. If you are sitting, watching the passing of the birds, wanting to take a photograph, the guy is there doing his fry-up, as if the smell of it would not disturb you. This is what makes us sad and why we distance ourselves" (Apx.7/8e).

Recent social change in Göktürk has shown that a large number of people who have been living in the early SITES have now moved away. To talk of other groups in the neighbourhood as cultureless refers to a particular behaviour found inappropriate in and around the houses within the neighbourhood. It is usually accompanied by the desire to move and redefine belonging through a change of geographical and architectural setting.

b) "I am really not who you think I am"

Coupled with *the people without culture* narrative, there is another constantly reoccurring symbolic figure that is used to define social hierarchies. Interestingly, this symbolic structure camouflages itself as open-mindedness, while being operative in the exact opposite way – as a discursive closure and an inscription of boundaries. While the *people without culture* narrative is an open confession of social distance, the *I am really not who you think I am* narrative works in a compensational way. This way, the narrator protects himself from being regarded as discriminatory. This pattern is only recognizable through its repetitiveness. Exemplifying it in only one case will appear coincidental, and could be understood as my personal evaluation of a one-off case. For this reason I want to provide a few examples, and discuss in the following chapters in what constellation they might also be found in more direct reference to the built environment.

When I talked to another resident in Göktürk a few days after I had met her for the first time in a café in Levent, I asked her whether she got home alright that evening that we had met. She said of course and that she had taken a taxi. So far that was what I had assumed anyway, but then she added something – something that I thought of as contradictory to the story of her life in Istanbul that she had presented to me before. She said that she enjoyed the ride very much, had a good conversation with the driver and stressed that the driver had called her 'Abla' the whole time. She asked me whether I knew what that meant. I told her that I was familiar with this habit, conduct which would have been rather unusual within her social circles. Forms of addressing people in Turkey are culturally distinct, and whether you say 'Abi' (brother), 'Abla' (sister) or 'Efendim' (sir/lady) to a stranger, usually says something about your background. Another interviewee, a lady who worked for Vakko (a Turkish clothing company) before she had

her first child, said something similar yet very different. Vakko is one of the finest clothing brands in Turkey and accordingly, her taste for designer fashion was very exclusive. When our conversation circled around the geographies of the city which she frequented the most, we came to talk about Beyoğlu. She mentioned Taksim and Beyoğlu as her favourite places in the city, especially İstiklal Caddesi, where she often went to look for clothes in *Terkos pasaji* (Apx.No.8/13d) I was surprised because Terkos pasaji is an underground passage where retailers heap their products onto a big table, and people dig and scabble about for a bargain. It is usually frequented by those who cannot afford higher quality clothes, but does not contain products of high quality sold cheap because they are remnants from the last season. The things sold there are poor quality. However absurd it might seem in the context of Damla's history at Vakko, it might very well be that she shops in Terkos pasaji, although her look told me otherwise. However, whether these statements are just narrative expressions dropped in conversation, or whether they relate to actual concrete behaviour is beyond the point. It is important to recognize, however, that these statements seem to breach the coherency of the narrative by contradicting its symbolism. The rest of the interview with Damla can be read in the appendix and parts of it will be discussed further. Here, I only want to say that design and appearance are important elements for Damla to define herself socially and culturally.

In this context, it appears that through these statements the created narrative is undermined by a contradiction. The contradiction appears as a discursive feature through which the discursivity of the narrative is camouflaged. But how can this be evaluated theoretically? And how does it relate to space identification? Returning to our discussion about governmentality and developmentalism in the paragraph 'real estate as discourse operational mechanism', it has been concluded that any discourse functions on the grounds of a closed system. The system cannot reflect into itself. It is upheld through the creation of *blind fields* which make it impossible for the discourse to recognize itself (Foucault; Žižek; Lefebvre). The advantaged and the disadvantaged, facts and reality – all are understood as the outcome of natural processes (Mouffe; Angermüller). They are assumed to have been there forever. This assumption out-rules the ability to recognize both the advantaged and the disadvantaged and facts and realities as something socially constructed. The same applies to the narrative of *the people without culture*. The understanding of *the people without culture* hides the standpoint of the narrator as an individual, who defines herself through a separation from another group. In her eyes, *the people without culture* simply are the inevitable condition of their own cultureless-ness. The personal standpoint of the narrator, however, is never visible and is replaced by the belief in a universalized perception. This universality is not only a side-effect but also a necessity for the credibility of discourse in the eyes of the narrator itself. Discursive boundaries are thus something that need to be protected, in order to protect the

credibility and therefore the hegemony of the discourse – and in this context, I suggest to understand this particular figure of speech that reverses the symbolisms of the narrative. The biggest threat to the integrity of the narrative is for the narrator to realize her own narrative structure. I refer here to Staeheli, who reminds us that the way Laclau defined a discourse is based on Lacan's *Theory of the Subject* and is therefore comparable to the categories of the conscious and the subconscious. "Bei Lacan ist das Unbewusste in einer Systematik der Entstellungen, Verschiebungen und Kondensierungen der Diskurse zu finden" (Stäheli 2000:55). I will not go into psychoanalysis at this point, but the comparison alone is enough to make it clear that discursive maintenance is a language operation directed to the self, and not to the person listening. Credibility and legitimacy are issues with which the subject-narrator is concerned – not to convince others, but to uphold her own reality. For the narrator to be confronted with her own narrative would come close to forcing her to look upon that narrative from an outside position, in which case the narrative structure would collapse. To prevent that, certain figures of speech and other symbolic operations are used to make the individual position in the narrative invisible. To Bülent, who demonstrates the most aversive stance towards an intruding group of people which he renders cultureless, it is a matter of decency to be involved in a foundation called "Kültür bilincini gelistirme vakfi" (Cultural Awareness Foundation) (Apx.No.7/12b). This foundation takes children from the ghettos (he uses the term *varoş*) and familiarizes them with Turkish cultural institutions and places in the city that are identified as culturally important. In spite, or perhaps one should say 'because' of this 'charity work', the ghettos remain places of otherness. It becomes clear that his involvement in the charity is different than other people's involvement in NGOs, in the way the relationship with the children is ideologically structured. In our conversation it becomes clear that the charity work creates a feel-good factor, without any claim that children from a lower-class background should be receiving the same education and opportunities as children from the middle class. In the absence of such a claim, the charity confirms the educational structure that is in place – by legitimizing the hierarchy within which the educated do charity work for the uneducated; as an act of selflessness, and not as an act of counterbalancing inequality. That social boundaries are kept fully intact in spite of the charity work becomes clear during our conversation. I am repeatedly warned not to walk around in Istanbul too much, and most certainly not to go to Sultanahmet, (a neighbourhood) wearing my shorts, because "it would be dangerous" (Apx.No.7/21d). Upon asking what Bülent thinks would happen if I *did* walk around in my shorts, I am only answered with an ironic smile – I am expected to learn for myself. As a foreigner I am confronted with belittlement, due to my lack of understanding of what makes certain people in the city dangerous. I am not part of this society and am thus blind to the social reality Bülent is involved in – that is how I interpret his smile.

My evaluation for these figures of speech and other non-discourse-conform actions like the demonstrated involvement in charity for people regarded as inferior is that they are mechanisms of discursive maintenance, and therefore beyond the awareness of the narrator. This 'cheating' on the discourse, performed by the narrator by undermining discursive boundaries, is an unconscious mechanism to protect discursive integrity. Revealing the ideological boundaries of one's own reality would endanger the natural order that is assumed as its foundation. *The people without culture* are perceived as a natural deficit in society and accordingly, it is natural to dislike them. Openly expressing dislike, on the other hand, for the circles to which Bülent belongs and which he considers intellectual and civilized would not be ethical. Friendly belittlement, rather than outright disgust, is therefore a way to demonstrate superiority that better suits the given codes of conduct of the 'civilized urbanite.' At the same time, this puts into place the constructed inferior, as 'naturally inferior'. This natural inferiority – or rather 'incapability' – to live a civilized life, Bülent then exemplifies with the urban renewal project of Sulukule:

“Look, there used to be a place called Sulukule. During the times of the Ottoman Empire, the Romani population – we now say “Gypsy people” – used to be located there. One day they said to them, “We are going to build beautiful new houses for you”, and they brought them away from there to some place somewhere. They took them to those Toki houses... because people wanted to make money in this place. What I want to say is: these people cannot live there (in the newly constructed housing blocks by Toki). What we realized then was this: People who don't want to leave their lives in this place do not know how to live in an apartment building. What do I mean, when I say “they don't know how”? – Very simple. Open this door for instance. They would not even be familiar with a door there – shoes, coats and the like would be in front of the door. All other stuff that you need for the house would be there as well. They are not familiar with the most common lifestyle (ortak yasami bilmiyor). Because of this, people who were resettled forcibly are most certainly going to be unhappy. So they start arguing: “Stop with this noise ... the TV is too loud ... turn it down” (...) look there is a guy who has a barbecue on the balcony” (Apx.No.7/18d).

In his argument, the inability of the resettled to stay in the social housing complexes designed for them is explained on the grounds of the *people without culture* narrative, and thus ascribed to their cultural inability to live a decent life. Questions concerning the payment of unaffordable mortgages, immense distances to the labour market and many other practical concerns are not even raised as possible reasons for the failure of resettlement schemes. The sympathy presented towards people, who, when placed into a spatial environment not according to their assumed needs react in an inappropriate manner, naturalizes social difference. Social behaviour appears as bound to natural characteristics that individuals from particular cultural environments are born with, making it impossible to question these differences. It is interesting to note that, based on

the grounds of an unchangeable cultural identity, discrimination is being legitimated as equally natural. One could speak of a form of discrimination which takes into account in advance that it might be taken as discriminatory, and therefore invalidates critique before it can be voiced. The underlying discursive operation is that the ideological structure of the argument is seemingly recognized and invalidated by the narrator himself. Doing that, the discourse is denied its own discursivity. But without being ideologically embedded into the symbolic context of *the people without culture* narrative, the sympathy for the inferior could not exist. Foucault does therefore speak of "positive figures within complex systems of confinement", the purpose of which is to protect discursive constellations from disintegrating (Foucault 2010:27).

III. 2.4. EVIDEA / Contested space or neoliberal Utopia

Project descriptions

The following case study is an example of the more recent changes in conceptualizing gated forms of living. EVIDEA, a housing project by joint architects based in Istanbul, is regarded in the eyes of critics as a pioneer in residential Turkish architecture. According to the architects, EVIDEA challenges existing formal discourses in an attempt to overcome gated forms of living and offers an environment that brings people together rather than contains them. However, EVIDEA is a project conceptualized by an investment and developer company – Yapı Kredi Koray. It was not constructed with the participation of anybody else but local authorities and the architects, and they decided on the design process within the format they were provided with by the client. In organizational or financial terms there is therefore no difference to be found in comparison to other residential projects led by real estate investment. In terms of spatial order, EVIDEA is a gated and enclosed unit which turns its back upon the outside environment while framing a large interior space for community use not accessible to the public. Like other SITES, EVIDEA is managed privately and rules of public behaviour such as noise control do not apply but are implemented by an elected committee. What is different to the SITE discussed earlier in this research is that EVIDEA is not a luxury project, and in this sense offers housing to a wider spectrum of society in regards to income. Residents of EVIDEA feature high-income professionals, families, young couples and students who share two- or three-bedroom units. Although recent urban development has increased square meter prices due to a planned metro-line, at the time this project was constructed, prices were well below those in other areas with high numbers of student residents.

The reasons for EVIDEA to be considered a 'pioneer-project' are beyond the provision of accommodation for people at a wider spectrum of income. Its conceptual idea is to create a 'real community', not brought together on the grounds of a 'community-myth' gated communities are often associated with, but on the grounds of a symbolical absence and the provision of communal space. The three architects who were involved in the design of EVIDEA, Ihsan Bilgin, Nevzat Sayın and Emre Arolat, can be ascribed to the core of what Bozdoğan refers to as *New Turkish Architects*. All practise, or have been practising, as mentors at the same architecture faculty and share similar attitudes about Istanbul's recent development. The conceptual idea for EVIDEA is thus introduced through the voice of architects socialized and well-connected in Istanbul, who simultaneously are involved in the academic study of architecture and planning both in Turkey and abroad. Rejecting the idea of gating, EVIDEA conceptualizes a socially *just* city within the framework of SITE architecture. According to Nevzat Sayın, EVIDEA is an attempt to escape the

routines of supply-and-demand oriented architectural production, which has elevated the gated community to a mainstream form of urban living. A critical stance towards developmentalism is combined with the search for a harmonious community life beyond the boundaries of culture and class disputes. The urban vision that serves as a role model for EVIDEA is socialist European architecture. For the architects this is not a secret:

“People want to be together. This segregation in the city is really a big problem, but I believe that people do not want to live in segregation. They want to be together, but they do not know how (...) I am a socialist. And for me a very big role model for a city is Red Vienna. You know the concept? (he starts drawing the plan of EVIDEA) We wanted to create a space where everybody can be together. Do you know the Karl-Marx Hof? (see image page 98) There is a block here, here and here (draws 4 blocks that form an internal courtyard). There needs to be some wind coming through for the air to circulate, and in this courtyard there are a number of functions – for example, over here there is an area with only nice smells, the green, the flowers and so on and here an area with a restaurant, barbecue” (Apx./Interview-transcription 3).



Img.30: EVIDEA plan drawing



Img.31: EVIDEA / Rendering Interior courtyard

Nevzat's presentation contains a belief in the possibility of a *non-segregated* city. As discussed earlier, the formal language and materiality is typically invented by reversing certain symbolisms connected to the city of the others – in this case; the gated community. EVIDEA in this sense is very similar to Kemerlife 21, which also seeks a new architectural language in an attempt to overcome standardized SITE typologies. Apart from fantasies of a whole society, EVIDEA contains a symbolical link to utopias from the past. It is a nostalgic project. Interestingly though, this nostalgia is not directed towards historical moments of Istanbul but the history of another European city. This, on the other hand, is not surprising seeing that architectural visions refer to transnational architectural discourses and images. The theoretical concept of nostalgia by Akcan which I discussed in chapter 5.3.3 is relevant here, and evidently more so, as Nevzat talks about Istanbul on a greater scale.

Team: If you were a planner, how would you design the city around EVIDEA?

Nevzat picked up a pencil and started drawing.

"I thought that if it were possible to have many EVIDEAs; (draws a grid with many courtyard developments) how this might be. Here there could be a project like EVIDEA, there could be a park, (he draws one of the blocks not as a block-border construction but as an empty block) here, there could be other functions like public functions". After a few seconds he has finished sketching a grid-city. (Apx./Interview-transcription 3)

Architects that belong to the circle of New Turkish Architects are notorious for their positivism. The hegemony of a neoliberal market forces them to adapt if they want to continue to practise, make a name for themselves and enter into alliances with business partners which, as a matter of choice, would be avoided. Dealing with such a situation is reportedly not easy, and many architects resign from their practise unable to live up to the expectations of the neoliberal market. To look back in history and identify one's practise with non-, or pre-capitalist visions could be a way of creating a meaningful discourse and avoid the difficulty of legitimizing involvement in a neoliberal market. It is important for an architect to believe in his work, whatever visions he has. The image which EVIDEA contains though, must be regarded as antagonistic to the segregation Istanbul has experienced over the last decades, and within this trend must denounce the symbolics of the segregated city. Architects that claim to distance themselves from an *architecture of representation* in order to create something *real* thus demonstrate a lack of awareness about their participation in (re-)producing architectural discourses, and therefore, symbolics. A discussion about EVIDEA, in the same way as about Kemerlife 21 or Kemerlife 22, under the banner of identity- or memory-loss, must be rendered a farce. An indicator for this is the observation that architectural discourses that take a distance to the gated community are growing into a new kind of mainstream themselves. To be against the gated community has adapted populist formats. For various social reasons, and not for aspects of structural quality alone, New Turkish Architecture is now a pioneering discourse. It succeeds in its positivism, claiming to overcome segregation. It propagates an urban vision that is tolerant towards difference, but in this tolerance and positivism it is compatible with the neoliberal culture. The post-political identity of the architecture of the present era should be analysed in respect to that neoliberal meta-narrative. It is true that it does not offend or directly attack anybody else's cultural conviction by being openly confrontational, but it is neither politically neutral. One might even say that *Neo-Ottomanism* and New Turkish architecture are similar concerning their narrative structure. While the prior uses an abundance of symbolism in order to appeal to a majority and not exclude anyone, the latter avoids symbolism all together. Both narratives though are ideologically specific and depend on antagonism. The antagonism the concept of EVIDEA is based on is clear, and it corresponds well with Nevzat Sayın's intention to create a 'real community'.

According to Bozdoğan, the good intentions behind the design of EVIDEA are of little use, and forms of segregation are being upheld in spite of its alternative residential type (Bozdoğan 2012:275). She links the way SITE architecture defines a boundary between public and private use, accessibility and gating, to the phenomenon of segregation. For her, EVIDEA is a project not capable of intervening into the vicious circle of segregation. Architecture, according to Bozdoğan, is banned to the realm of the aesthetic and the commodified, a realm of experience detached from the reality of political intervention. Bozdoğan's evaluation is not unusual, but it reflects the opinion of architectural critics. Her argument is based on a disjuncture of possibilities of spatial use on one hand, and form as something purely symbolic on the other. Her belief is that symbolic appropriation of space does not weigh politically but belongs to the realm of niceties.



Img. 32: EVIDEA seen from the other side of the motorway

Considering that space in order to be meaningful requires physical and imaginary forms of appropriation, such an evaluation is problematic. On the other hand, Bozdoğan is right in her critique of EVIDEA since accessibility is limited, shielding inhabitants from the outside environment and creating a parallel public sphere on the inside of the project. Although the architects state that the design for the outer facades has been realized not in accordance with their plans, the project makes no gesture of interaction with its surroundings. Altogether it would not be wrong to say that there is no attempt to engage with the surrounds. EVIDEA is indeed, in that sense an impenetrable, non-interactive monument. This opens the question of how EVIDEA functions as a home to its inhabitants and in what way it confirms, perpetuates, alters or blurs existing boundaries of culture and class fragmentation.

Having described the intention of the architects and the spatial discourses that led to the design of EVIDEA, we should summarize that EVIDEA is not based on a participatory design process, but that it embraces a specific ideological conviction with a very specific, yet transnational, symbolism. That, of course, leaves the question open whether there is such a thing as non-ideological space at all, seeing that space can only be produced where there is meaning. The architectural concepts underlying the design process reveal antagonism and therefore a clear social standpoint. It is structured as an ideology and it embraces nostalgic visions of the past. These are all elements of discursive structuring. Having learned from the early SITES in Göktürk that people who live there share an ideological bond, it would be interesting to know whether the way EVIDEA's architects perceive the project also complies with the inhabitants' perceptions, or whether there is *any* common perception or something that binds people together at all. The question, to put it differently, is whether EVIDEA creates in any way an imaginary community, and if so, through what mechanisms of spatial appropriation this community would be created.

Being at home in EVIDEA

In order to draw any further conclusion concerning the social effects EVIDEA might have, one should ask in what way residents identify with their SITE, and whether forms of appropriation vary or resemble one another. One might either suggest a certain detachment from known formal languages – in this case residents in EVIDEA are not expected to belong to one particular social milieu; or that there is something that binds people together which does not comply with the categories of an old and a new middle class, but which challenges the hegemonic social order. Perhaps EVIDEA offers an opportunity for people to live in an environment without making certain choices – an environment which circumnavigates mainstream middle class fantasies, and offers other forms of appropriation. That would mean that in EVIDEA, space is contested. Contested space on the other hand, does not comply with only one vision. It is contested precisely because it accommodates for multiple visions. It is an offer to freely use and appropriate the environment both in a symbolic and in a physical way. For EVIDEA though, the vision of the architect is precise both in symbolism and in spatial programming.

Conversations with people, however, have revealed that the symbolics of EVIDEA and the way it suggests spatial use and interaction is not rooted in the spatial memory of the city and is therefore not associated with class or culture. Residents did not regard the spatial set up of EVIDEA as symbolic of a particular social milieu, describing their first encounter as surprising and new. From the outside the perception was not even positive, with facade and shape being defined as "bad German architecture" (Apdx.No.5/4c) or "prisonlike" (Apdx.No.4/7c). In comparison to earlier projects analysed here, descriptions lack all the signifiers related to a narrative about the nouveau riche invader. The

attributes which residents of Göktürk often used for others: "avam" (ordinary), "pretentious" or "without taste" did not occur in the interviews with residents of EVIDEA. That means that residents are not only from a white-Turkish secular middle class background, for whom this language is typical, although EVIDEA does appeal to that specific group. No further visual or verbal discourse presented on a website changes or complements the way EVIDEA might be perceived. The architects are not introduced as a marketing tool and therefore do not provide for identification with the project through some kind of persona. Interviews have shown that residents do not know who the architects are. Based on these grounds, my assumptions were therefore that residents are from very a heterogeneous social background and that they, if at all, have very different ideas about community life and what might be waiting for them when they move to EVIDEA. This assumption is supported by the negative first impression which several interview partners shared. In SITES from the 90s, attraction to formal signifiers ranks high in the decision for a new home. The choice for an apartment in EVIDEA though seems to be encouraged in a different way. Below, I will introduce three people who have lived or still live in EVIDEA. I will introduce the ways and means they attempt to appropriate the SITE as their new home.

Contested spatial geographies

Başar first came to Istanbul in 2002. Upon his arrival in Istanbul he first moved in with his cousin who runs a small art space in the centre of the city. After he got married, he moved to EVIDEA with his wife. Başar is rather new to Istanbul and open-minded concerning places to live. He said that while he really enjoyed living with his cousin, he and his wife decided to move to a place that is more suitable for bringing up children. Looking for somewhere to buy an apartment, they asked for the help of a real estate broker who showed them a few projects by developers well-established in the market. Although he works for a bank in Levent, EVIDEA is quite convenient for him since it is easy to reach via the motorway. With two children, they felt increasingly uncomfortable in EVIDEA, and decided to move to another SITE on the road to Şile in the north. This SITE is a project built in the style of the early gated community model. It is much smaller than EVIDEA and houses only 150 people in 50 detached houses. (At a greater density, EVIDEA houses 500 people.) Apart from differences in density, however, the spatial concept of EVIDEA differs greatly from that of Başar's new home. While in EVIDEA people live in blocks, the courtyard is the central feature of the project. It combines a variety of spatial uses other projects seldom have. A 50-meter Olympic swimming pool, tennis courts, playgrounds and large multi-use green spaces are side-by-side with a community centre that includes a lounge and a restaurant, supermarket and hairdresser. For Başar, it was this courtyard, the space, the colours and the whole ambience that created his sympathy for EVIDEA. It was something new and surprising, which he did not expect

from the "prison-like" look of the outer facades. The courtyard and the central location that facilitates easy accessibility to the whole city were his key criteria. As accessibility in a city like Istanbul counts as a matter of convenience, people's use of the city tends to be restricted to very particular places. Not so for Başar. As he adapts to his new location, he has not developed any prejudices towards Taksim or Beyoğlu. His change of place did not come along with an adaptation of his Istanbul image and movement through the city.

"I used to live close to Taksim. At that time I used to go to places near it. When I got married I went more to places like Nişantaşı. When we moved to the Asian side, we went more towards the Boulevard (Bağdat Caddesi). To Taksim, I can say, I haven't gone for a long time. When some friends who work here get together to go to Taksim, I join them. When I go out with my wife, we prefer to go to some places on the Asian side. We use the coast near Bağdat Caddesi a lot as well. For eating fish, we prefer to go to some places in İstinye / Yeniköy. We don't really visit this side that much anymore. Titanic (a restaurant) for example. On the other side, we know some places that have recently opened. So we really use the other side more than coming here" (Apdx.No.4/11d).

What is significant about the places he names, apart from the rather numerical way in which he sums them up, is that they combine locations from very different social milieus in the city. Başar's use of the city far exceeds the rather limited collection of places people in Göktürk tend to frequent. However, they still remain rather elite and do not feature typical blue-collar areas, or areas inhabited by religious groups either. Following Başar's statements throughout our whole conversation, I would suggest that it is probably not wrong to assume that the choices his wife makes are an important influence on him. At several points in the interview, he revealed his ambivalence about the priority he gave to his wife and their family plans. Başar's rather undefined mental geography of the city, however, does not speak of any exceptional ideological conviction concerning Istanbul. He is rather relaxed about his position in society. This is interesting when paying attention to the way Başar tells his personal story. Origin, career, choices he made and any other aspect concerning the way in which he perceives himself living in Istanbul remain entirely in the dark. As Başar's perceptions of himself and perceptions of the city are very unclear, they differ strongly from Bülent's statements. For him, living in one of Göktürk's earliest SITEs, categorizations of civilized and uncivilized behaviour go hand in hand with categorizations of civilized and uncivilized places in the city. Since Bülent perceives himself as well-educated in what civilized life seems to mean, he gets upset when people in his SITE do not behave according to his ideas.

"When in Göktürk, we stay on our balcony, read our newspapers and our books, listen to a bit of music at a moderate noise level (laughter), and go to bed" (Apdx.No.7/10f).

This 'normal' behaviour on the other hand is constantly disrupted by people who appear to lack certain codes of behaviour.

"Here, there and everywhere they listen to arabesque (Turkish folk music). They make köfte. If you are sitting, watching the passing of the birds, wanting to take a photograph, the guy is there doing his fry-up" (Apx.No.7/8e).

Bülent's geographical imagination is ordered in accordance with people's behaviour. Focusing on shopping centres he considered Beyoğlu a bit "avam". Notions of the ordinary, the pretentious and the dirty with regards to Beyoğlu are shared by most people socialized predominantly on Bağdat Caddesi.

"We go to Akmerkez. For the cinema, the theatre – well for the cinema we go to Kanyon, (another shopping centre in Levent). We also go to Beyoğlu (...) but Beyoğlu is a bit avam (ordinary) For shopping we also go down to Beşiktaş, sometimes to the Bosphorus. There is a place we go to in the mornings. We have breakfast there. It's in Istiniye. They make really beautiful tea there" (Apx.No.7/22d).

Emirgan, on the other hand, just adjacent to Istiniye for Bülent is not suitable, although there are multiple places to have breakfast in Emirgan.

"The breakfast there is huge. This much black bread; (shows half of his finger) this much cheese (shows a quarter of his finger) and tomatoes. That's enough" (Apx.No.7/23b).

Unlike Selin or Boran who reveal much about their personal history, Bülent creates an image of himself mainly by describing whatever does NOT agree with him. The idea we get about his personality is a negative image of others, described with much passion and precision. Such descriptions of others in the conversation with Başar are missing. While he does not talk about groups in the city which would reveal his perception of the urban society or what the boundaries of his social environment are, Başar's comments about his neighbours in EVIDEA are not necessarily positive, nor are they negative, proving of a very high degree of reflection and self-critique.

"We have to look at our own behaviour as well. Of course, we greet our neighbours but somebody to whom we go or say, "Come over to our place" – no. We did not have any friends like that. Just people who we thought were nice and whom we met sometimes on our way saying "Hi hello, how are you?" when we arrived (...) somebody invited us for dinner; but the fact that we never went (...) it's actually our fault – our very own fault" (Apx.No.4/13e).

Such an incoherency of imaginary spaces and the narrative of the self are unusual for people who have lived in Göktürk since the 1990s. Their opinions tend to be rather clear. It is possible to tell by the degree to which knowledge about others, and knowledge about places is fixed, whether a person has a clear or a changeable mental geography of the city. Discriminatory social narratives about people of other social or cultural status for example are always connected to the naming of No-go areas in the city or places of danger, while if the narrative structure is interrupted and has no linearity, there is also no construction of a stable geography. The creation of imaginary space retroactively appears

to help a person to orientate herself by guiding choices and creating affiliation, repulsion or belonging.

Belonging and alienation

Cenk, who moved to EVIDEA together with his parents in the first year it was built, spent his adolescence in Samatya where he “grew up in the streets” as he says. He stayed a year abroad and now studies and works in Kadiköy. For someone who lives in a SITE, this is a very unusual statement because it is widely perceived as an antithesis. This is particularly true for families with children. A parent’s decision to move to a SITE is often connected to a choice between raising one's children in the streets or in a 'secure' environment, where they have contact with other children in places that are selected. Children often travel far distances to schools, sports clubs or music schools. They spend a lot of time on motorways and do not have much exposure to street life. Children of traditional families, many of them from a low-income background on the other hand, would believe that children can learn from the neighbourhood. Boys especially are expected to stand their ground and to fight their way on the street. The street is a kind of testing ground for real life. Cenk's ambivalence about the benefits he enjoys in EVIDEA on one hand and his identity as a kid who grew up in the street, is therefore a sign that he distances himself from the youth who have only ever lived in SITEs. This distance he takes is accompanied by a critical perspective of the SITE as an urban development model and as something that has negative effects on the social coherency of the city. He feels this way because he has friends inside and outside of the SITE whom he meets with equal affection but not without perceiving their inequality in many ways.

“Well, I tell you something. The population in the area – I mean the people who live in the surrounds. Between them and the people who live in this SITE there is a big gap. In terms of education – the way people think due to that. For instance: Behind this, there are the walls, and behind the walls, there are fields, vacant spaces. We have a friend who lives right at the end of the area there; ground floor – in a house with a garden. Just at the end of the field, his flat is outwards oriented, overlooking the field. We could see him from here. Whatever he does; there is a big discrepancy between us” (Apdx.No.6/14c).

For Cenk, the SITE is not a symbol of social belonging and he does not integrate it into his personal narrative as the place where 'people of his kind' live. On the other hand though, he does not reject the SITE either which means that there is no imaginary boundary between the SITE and the rest of the city. Feeling comfortable where he lives, there appears to be no necessity for him to protect the integrity of SITE life. He does not identify with EVIDEA, neither as a place nor as a community. This makes him aware that there is indeed a variety of aspects to be considered when deciding between the SITE and the open city and that there is not only one perspective to it. Thinking of his own life

in EVIDEA, he presents a very ambivalent perspective about the SITE and the new generation of people who will not experience living in the city.

What is interesting about this is that while there appears to be no distinction between the people on the outside and the people on the inside of EVIDEA, Cenk makes a very clear distinction between himself and the “kids” who have grown up not knowing about the outside world. Feeling comfortable in the community of EVIDEA is therefore connected to a clear idea of who belongs to his friends and who doesn't. Boundaries of social belonging are thus not relative to the physical boundaries that surround him, but appear to be fragmenting his belonging from within.

Team: Is there anything you don't like about this place?

Cenk: Kids!

Team: Why?

Cenk: Well. I'm not pissed off with them actually. They just grow up. But I grew up in the streets – in Samatya. In the streets you are faced with danger on a day-to-day-basis, you are faced with strangers on a day-to-day basis. You have these experiences. You learn how to behave in these situations. These kids here are enclosed by four walls. Too much energy stored up. There is a lot to complain about. I am talking about an age group of 15-year-old teenagers. They make life uncomfortable for people. They do stupid things. We have done this as well. But because it is here, it causes trouble. I have done that. In my neighbourhood everybody had his own house. Who is going to know what you are up to? If people deserved it, I threw snowballs or plums against their windows. But in here, because everybody knows everybody, you can't do that. People can go mad. So in EVIDEA there is a website you can become a member of. If you have got something to complain about you can do it there; on the forum. For instance – there is the screaming of kids all night long. People argue about stuff, but they never actually face one another directly online. They start arguing that way. We have a SITE manager. I have been here now for about 5 or 6 years. Since I have been here, the number of people participating in the selection of the SITE manager has decreased. It becomes less and less personal. Even I wrote on that forum recently. The kids are causing trouble, about whatever, until long after midnight, because they are closed in within these four walls. It's really unnerving. People are working. Most people work, only some are retired. In the city the noise stops at some point, but not here. Now it has become better because there were a lot of complaints. But generally 12 o'clock, 1 o'clock. Why? Because people sit in the cafe at these hours. If the adults sit around there at this time, the kids will do the same. There is nobody who stops them. And if nobody stops them, they will carry on like this. They will. They are children. They have an inner urge. Look, there is a small park here, there is some lawn. The crowd that hangs out at the edge of the pool is certainly 15-year-olds, perhaps 20. They hang around there – chat – that's the way it is. There is no other place to go (...) When I used to live in Kadiköy, we went all the way up to Kartal. You are independent. You can go anywhere. But here you are like a dog in a cage. (Apx.No.6/13e).

Although Cenk does not like his life very much in EVIDEA, he still appears to be well integrated into the community. He has a lot of friends there. No conflict exists between belonging and dissatisfaction. Not to comply with other people's behaviour does not automatically mean to be afraid or alienated. During our conversation, Cenk mentioned several times that he would like to move out of EVIDEA, but this wish to move is based on a very clear description of the situation inside EVIDEA and the categorization of people into groups. It appears that Cenk's sense of orientation within EVIDEA is very clear, while in the greater context of the SITE, it isn't. That gives him confidence to move out. For Başar the opposite is true. He felt very uncomfortable in EVIDEA and insecure concerning his relations with people. At the same time though, he does not have any particular affiliation with any place or group on the outside. While for Cenk, visions of life in the open city – the street – structure his belonging inside EVIDEA, for Başar, EVIDEA and the rest of the city appear to be one continuous landscape. There are no imaginary boundaries between the street and the SITE, the SITE he lives in and other SITES, or between places and other places in the city. Although like Cenk, Başar does appreciate in a detached kind of way the beauty of the architecture and the convenience of the facilities which he had in EVIDEA, it becomes clear that his inability to relate to the community causes strong feelings of alienation, discomfort and fear. A scene that occurred in the summer on the occasion of a community party is the only description of a situation met with strong emotion and strong opinion.

Başar: (...) there is this summer welcoming party. This creates a lot of noise; because they do not control it. It is a management problem.

Team: It is once a year right?

Başar: Yes, once a year. But it drove us crazy. You see our child had just been born, we could not participate. Inside the baby was sleeping and outside there is this noise like growling thunder. For hours and hours, until midnight we sat. We closed our living room door in the back room. They could have just paid a little bit more attention actually.

(Apx.No.4/16e).

The fact that it "drove them crazy", that they sat in the back room for "hours and hours" makes the scene appear as if they were at the mercy of the surrounding environment. Not being part of the community appears to create alienation and fear. Being part of the community though, as Cenk makes clear, does not necessarily mean agreeing with everything people do. Being part of the community only means having a system for evaluation and a stable structure of meaning that facilitates the person to say yes or no, good or bad, or acceptable or not acceptable. Not to relate to the surrounds means not to be able to evaluate it – and that means neither positively or negatively. Not being part of community life, being unable to relate and to voice one's needs is a crucial effect of social alienation. Shortly after this happened, Başar and his wife decided to move away from EVIDEA to another SITE, but this decision was made by Başar's wife. This singular event

of the party is not a credible reason for the decision to move away, but I would suggest that it serves as an occasion to argue for the lack of consideration people had. Such an argument is important to rectify the decision to move. It is not possible to move without knowing why. Although this cannot be confirmed with the data provided here, I would suggest that alienation is not automatically met with the consequence of moving away, because the decision of where to move lacks ground. Here I would refer to the interrelation between inner and outer boundaries to support my argument. It seems that the social structure inside the SITE also structures the outside of the SITE, the surrounding city. For Cenk at least, a mental geography of the outside appears unnecessary for the creation of belonging and orientation. The outside is appealing, just because it is the outside. Since he describes himself as a person different from the youth of EVIDEA, he regards himself as a person who belongs to the streets rather than the SITE. This enables him to create new ideas about the city, the image of which is still in the making but embraced with a positive attitude. As for Başar, on the other hand, a coherent narrative concerning the inside or the outside of the SITE is missing, there is no spatial orientation and therefore no mental connection to a place, and this also explains his alienation and his fear of exposure to his neighbours.

The struggle for spatial use and the struggle to belong

In EVIDEA it seems, an apartment does not come within the comfort zone of an imagined community. People are coming from very different backgrounds and have very different expectations. The gated community of the 90s, however, was a very clear and a very unique notion of home which addressed a very specific group of people. EVIDEA is not like that. It attracts through its offer of ample space, facilities and moderate price, but without the promise of a like-minded community. That means that people have to individually get accustomed and voice their opinions if they want to be heard. People who decide to move to EVIDEA are curious, open for something new or they come with their own ideas in mind of how spaces should be used and people should behave. At the same time, EVIDEA accommodates people who do not necessarily have a precise definition of their social environment or who are equally at home in multiple locations.

As the design of the project concentrates all social life in the interior courtyard, particular groups who live in EVIDEA have appropriated these spaces in their own way. The pool area is the territory of the youth and the restaurant is occupied by different people at different times. The use of space is subject to a specific rhythm depending on the time of day, but this rhythm can be disrupted and it can change. Participation in life in the courtyard is a requirement if people want to influence or change the way it is used, and the way people behave there. For many, this turns the experience of living in EVIDEA into a process during which they are unclear whether they like it not. The struggle to create a

meaningful neighbourhood goes hand in hand with a struggle to declare rules for spatial use. While, as we were shown, an internet forum used for any concerns brought up demonstrates a very heated discussion about rules and behaviour, a high ratio of fluctuation in EVIDEA proves of rather unstable community ties. However, seeing that EVIDEA houses up to 500 people, it could very well be that a core of residents exists who have been there for a longer time and who do feel very much at home in EVIDEA as a community. In order to be able to draw a conclusion in this regard, it would be necessary to interview the majority of EVIDEA's residents, an undertaking too large for the framework of this research. Here, the knowledge about changing managements and changing rules shall suffice to conclude that EVIDEA does not attract buyers or renters that would be identifiable as in favour of a particular lifestyle, ideologies or social circles. In such an environment where meaning appears to be contested, Burak has found his very own personal way of relating to his neighbourhood. Inviting us into his apartment, he allows us to read the messages people had sent to the forum, an intranet where people can write their concerns and their complaints. The forum was very active. Many people were quite angry about behaviour they considered to be wrong. Such included noise, barbecues and the dropping of litter and toys around the communal areas. For Burak however, this wrestling about correct community behaviour is not a factor which bothers him in any way. Neither is he in favour of particular groups or demands. On the contrary, EVIDEA for Burak is a place where people are nice, where they know each other, and where identities don't count. This narrative of friendship he relates to his childhood memories.

“When I was a child, we had a summer house in Çesme, but it was not a SITE and I was always looking at the children living in a SITE. They always had a lot of friends. Nice friendships. I thought it would be so cool to live in a SITE. So I always had this in mind when moving to a SITE – like, when you move to a SITE you have more friends (...) During my study years I was living in the heart of the city. I had a good nightlife. Going out every night, but I also wanted to live in a good SITE. I wasn't thinking about having more friends at that time, but it was in my mind from my childhood. I realize it now” (Apdx.No.5/15b).

Since Burak's picture of EVIDEA resembles a holiday resort, his ideas about community are those of placelessness and freedom. As we were there during the summer months, he invited us to spend the day by the pool and just hang out in the SITE. Many people invite friends from the outside, he said. On various occasions, when asked to talk about any potential difficulties or conflicts, Burak did his best to prove that people really are friendly and open. In doing so, he takes existing narratives of social segregation and reverts them into a narrative of friendship using well-known symbolisms. The best example for this is a statement through which Burak makes his point, that inside EVIDEA people do not comply with the stigmata typical for the social context of the entire city.

Team: Do people gossip in a way that you don't like?

Burak: No (...) I had a neighbour. He was living alone. He was divorced. He was 36 years old. Because of his job, he was travelling a lot. We had a good relationship. Sometimes I was going to his house to watch football. Sometimes he was coming here. He was kind of religious. Sometimes people bring him alcohol when they travel abroad. And he does not like to drink. The first day we met, my mother and my brother were at home, so I invited him to our place. He also had his parents staying with him. They came and they were really nice people. We say Anatolian people. In the first minutes we became friends. He saw my bottles, and asked me if I like whiskey and which brands I liked. So I said my first choice is always Johnnie Walker Black Label, then Jack Daniels, and then Jim Beam; so he said "come with me", and we walked to his house and he gave me one Johnnie Walker Black and one Jack Daniels. This was on the first day we met. (Apdx.No.5/16e).

An Anatolian background and religiousness feature as signifiers in various strong narratives of people who are threats to the secular culture of the Republic, who have no culture or who invaded the city but don't belong there. Being from Anatolia, in a white Turkish middle class environment is a stigma that provokes suspicion. Anatolia is the imaginary origin of an Islamic counter-elite, that receives much support from the neoliberal AK-Party. In recent years, AKP politics have seriously altered public life, and begun to influence the way people live by suggesting how to live or how to behave. "You should have three children", and "you should not consume any alcohol", are amongst the strongest invasions into people's lives, and have sparked much anger and panic. For Burak, to portray his neighbour as a person from Anatolia who does not drink but accepts other people's liking of alcohol with tolerance and affection, is certainly not a neutral description of his personality, but a statement used to stress that EVIDEA is a place where the hostility and the controversy of the outside world do not apply. This way, Burak himself also takes a distance to social conflict, inventing himself as an individual to whom social boundaries are not important. Using established stereotypes of social conflict and inverting them, throughout our whole conversation, was a practise often repeated to create a harmonious image of the neighbourhood. This image though, stood in sharp contrast to what I read parallel to our conversation on the internet forum. There, people complained about other people's behaviour, noise and littering, something which Burak did not appear to take very seriously when I asked him whether he himself would not be bothered by these things. A year later when I returned to EVIDEA to collect some additional information, Burak no longer lived there. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction I concluded, do not relate to the positive or negative narratives people create about their neighbourhood. This could not be made any clearer comparing Bülent's very negative description of his life in Göktürk with Burak's life in EVIDEA. On the contrary, it seems that people are inclined to create strong fictional worlds in order to compensate for a lack or to legitimize their staying in a place they are not comfortable in. A lot of critique directed at living conditions, at the same time, does not mean that people are prone to

move away. Criticizing the presence of conflict might after all *not* relate to a wish to overcome the boundaries between the self and the other, but constitute a necessary mental operation, to hide the fact that one's own identity depends on these boundaries. What the pattern of this is, and with what kind of regularity people behave according to the stories they tell, cannot be said here. To do that, further research would be necessary. What can be looked at with the data provided here is the setting of social boundaries through the agency of spatial imagination.

Understanding the SITE through its boundaries

It seems that a reflection on the personal role in society or in the community causes gaps in the narrative, and consequently openings in the boundaries of social belonging. The way of argumentation found in the interviews with Başar and Cenk are in this sense quite a contrast to the interviews undertaken in Göktürk. Although different in argumentation, all interviewees in Göktürk demonstrated that their feeling of *being at home* relates to rather clear mental geographies. What was also revealed was that a lack or vanishing of this belonging, due to overcrowding or other factors, is followed by a changed perception of the environment and a different imagination of space. My conclusion is, therefore, that gaps in social narratives relate to a high degree of social flexibility and a dynamic and changeable imagination of the city. Moving between one or two social worlds, like Cenk described it, opens up the boundaries of established social perceptions and allows the individual to reflect upon his own circumstances. That would also mean, that while gaps in the narrative are an important facilitator for self-reflection, the absence of a narrative must equal the experience of complete meaninglessness, and hence, a free floating in space without orientation. Ryan describes this kind of spatial experience that does not offer any halt and reference in social narratives in a follow-up to Fredric Jameson 'Postmodern Hyperspace'. "Postmodern hyperspace has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world. The only possible relation to this postmodern space is the feeling of being lost, and the only possible movement is aimless wandering." (Ryan 2001:260). Such "smooth spaces" (Deleuze/Guattari) do not provide any points of halt, since they lack the necessary anchor points. In terms of antagonistic structuring, that also means that there is no categorization into spaces of *the here* and *the there*. Correlations with personal narratives are only provided in the sense that meaning-constellations are open and flexible and in a constant state of flux. To relate undefined narrative constellations to Deleuze and Guattari's definition of smooth space seems possible here, and such a comparison seems applicable, both for personal narratives as well as for collective ones. The way EVIDEA was experienced by its residents from the start was not against the

background of a collective imagination of the Inside and the Outside. People's imaginary boundaries did not overlap. For a SITE, this is unusual. For the early examples I discussed in Göktürk, the opposite was true. They constituted communities of the like-minded, even creating a kind of small version Society-Space-Model in Göktürk. Like on an urban scale, early Göktürk residents stood together against the late-comers and experienced one another as a community. This community had its own spatial imagination, which formed the grounds for their collective imagination as a community. The communities of the like-minded encountered in Göktürk were created through stable spatial narratives, and recurring formal and geographical signifiers. 'Ankara', the 'SITE' and a 'civilized' spatial environment stood united against the sprawling mass that is the city today, and the groups that are assumed to have caused it. Spatial narratives were constructed around a shared antagonism towards the intruding figure of the *nouveau riche*, a figure that is entirely missing in EVIDEA. The choice in favour of EVIDEA, it became clear, has not been made on the grounds of a collective social vision connected to EVIDEA's architectural concept or setting. A comparison of the three residents' statements has already made clear that within EVIDEA there are either individualized ways of collective imagination or no collective imagination. As the definition of space and the architectural language employed do not signify existing forms of collective identity, people who live in EVIDEA are from various social and cultural backgrounds. This is already clear when looking at the descriptions people gave of their first impressions of EVIDEA. All of them experienced the outside of EVIDEA as undesirable and were not encouraged by a vision which they connected with its spatial signifiers. This was not the case for any of the SITES in Göktürk. There, choices were made because one appreciated the developer or one identified with the place and the architecture. As all of the inhabitants I interviewed have very unique perceptions of EVIDEA, they also legitimize their choice not according to mainstream social visions. Since we learned from Laclau that imaginary communities are created through an equivalential relation, the absence of such equivalence must suffice as evidence that the definition of the community internal to EVIDEA is only loosely defined. At the same time, EVIDEA does not shield its inhabitants from any more or less loosely-defined outside without this exclusion though there is also no imaginary spatial boundary that overlaps in any way with the physical constraints of EVIDEA. Physical enclosure does not create imaginary belonging; an observation which seems surprising, when looking at the SITES in Göktürk, and the way they, at the same time, also appear to create collectivity. This turns the interrelation of physical and imaginary boundaries into a crucial subject for investigation.

In the chapter 'maintaining and redefining boundaries of social belonging', the conclusion was that losing one's sense of belonging can be met either with the imagination of another place, or with the defence of the home towards groups considered a threat. In the first case, new spatial narratives and a transgression of spatial

confinements are the result, in the latter, the maintenance of confinements receives much attention and energy. Walls, fences and security measures are the result. In other situations, physical enclosure can also be experienced as confinement. Cenk, for example, sees himself as belonging to a social context that transgresses the boundaries of EVIDEA, and he therefore experiences EVIDEA's enclosure as something restrictive. His friends live in EVIDEA, in the neighbourhoods around EVIDEA, in various other SITES and in the city centre, rising questions as to why he should live behind walls at all. While Cenk's social network occupies geographies that transgress the physical boundaries of the SITE, making these boundaries appear redundant, for Başar they seem to increase his isolation in the SITE. By moving to EVIDEA, Başar has not integrated into the SITE community. The physical confinement and the introversion of the SITE though, create a notion of community to which he is aware of not belonging. For Başar, living in the city centre where people mix and life is more diverse was more comforting, although the exposure to noise was much higher there than it was in EVIDEA. It seems that the isolating effect EVIDEA has on him increases the feeling of vulnerability, and the confinement of the SITE makes a great contribution to this. My assumption is that the enclosure of a space, when belonging is absent, might increase alienation by pointing out the fact that one does not belong there. Enclosure is therefore experienced physically as well as mentally by lending unity to the people who are confined by this enclosure. Unlike Başar, Burak perceives EVIDEA as a community of diverse but friendly people. His perception is very positive. What is interesting about his description is that we cannot find any notion of 'anti-community' that would be culturally and spatially defined. Notions of otherness for Burak do not exist in any way relative to Istanbul or its geographies. The notion of otherness which he excludes in his narrative of friendship is rather symbolic of anything that poses a hindrance to friendship, but it does not order the social and spatial environment. The reasons for this become clear as we get an idea about his social life. As a guitarist in a rock band, he often plays in bars in Kadıköy and enjoys city life very much. The SITE and the open city in Burak's narrative of friendship though, do not pose a dichotomy at any moment in time. Burak is at home both in the SITE and in the city, and he rectifies his choice not on the grounds of social boundaries, but on the grounds of a very rich personal history, in which both the SITE and the city feature as positive memories. As he does not define himself as belonging to one or the other, neither can he localize places of exclusion, which leaves geographical orders rather vague. Notions of the excluded are based on a constructivist perspective of society that has a tendency to categorize and to order, to name and to discriminate. In Burak's narrative of friendship, everything that would create a meaningful discourse of the others is absent, and so is a spatial imagination of the city. The absence of a collective identity that I want to conclude goes along with an absence of collectively-imagined spatial boundaries. Imaginary and

physical boundaries do not overlap. Individual residents identify (or not) in very diverse ways with the space, use it the way they want, and imagine it the way they want.

Spaces of inside and outside

An indicator that certain patterns of use and behaviour in EVIDEA are up for debate is the internet platform. There, a very vibrant discussion with lots of complaints and lots of suggestions can be seen. The interior courtyard in this sense is more public than the architecture might suggest. How it is used and how people ought to behave is a continuous discussion. The courtyard therefore constitutes a kind of public space within the confinements of the SITE.* As EVIDEA appears to create a secondary public in addition to the outside public of the city, *privacy* and *collectivity* have a double connotation. Being restricted to private access only, the project creates an entirely private realm that is shielded from the city outside. On the inside, however, the separation between private and public is repeated. As the relation between the SITE and the urban environment creates a clear cut between the inside and the outside, so do the private realms of the apartment create a sharp boundary towards the communal spaces of the courtyard. One could argue with an architect in what way these borderlines between the private and the public have been conceptualized. As all apartments between the first and the seventh floor have a balcony, this balcony could be understood as a semi-public or transitional space from which you can observe and visually participate in community life. Participation, however, remains an entirely passive, audio-visual experience for all inhabitants of apartments higher than the first floor – over eighty percent of all apartments. This observational character of the private sphere is an experience repeated on the outer facades of EVIDEA. Built all the way up to the plot boundary, there are no commercial or other facilities which would enliven the zone between the inside and the outside. The same, it seems, also applies to the inside of EVIDEA. As the balconies suggest a flowing transgression between private and communal areas, the experience that they create is more that of a panopticon. Distances are too great to facilitate communication to the other side and, when in the courtyard, one belongs to those being observed. Upon analysing the layout of the apartments, one encounters similar sharp boundaries between private and communal spaces. Corridors are entirely absent throughout the whole SITE concentrating all movement to the elevators shared by only three apartments at once. These elevator shafts reach all the

* With Public in this sense I want to refer to Massey who says that Public space is the social space where, in the absence of a foundation, the meaning and unity of the social is negotiated at once, constituted and put at risk. What is recognised in public space is the legitimacy of debate about what is legitimate and what is illegitimate. (Massey 2005:153)

way down to the car park, where ascribed parking lots ensure the shortest possible walking distance from the car to the apartment door. Reducing the routes of movement to an absolute minimum, an apartment in EVIDEA offers the logic of pedestrianism similar to that in a skyscraper. A major difference though is the spatial layout of the block that contrasts the verticality of a scraper. In the architectural tradition of social housing the horizontal block would correspond with long corridors, often located on the outside of the building, which enables everybody to access everyone else's front door. Apart from providing the simplest solution for accessibility, open corridors also provide spaces of informal use, storage and an extension of the private into communal areas, something that does not exist in EVIDEA. These spaces at first glance appear not to serve a purpose, yet they facilitate informal encounters, and if designed well, invite one to linger, have a cigarette or to observe the surroundings. Apart from these activities, transitional spaces simply constitute soft boundaries. They constitute spaces of transgression, where the boundary between the private and the public is subjected to everybody's personal perception. Individuals who do not interrelate with others in the block might choose to draw an imaginary boundary at their front door while others might like to spend time in that zone of transgression, making this boundary disappear in their imagination. With the best intention of convenience, the restricted access corridors in EVIDEA create a hindrance to the making of contacts, since social existence is restricted to the intimacy of the apartment or the liveliness of the courtyard. In between there is nothing. To Başar for instance, the private elevator shafts are something that keep him from interacting with his neighbours. He never meets anybody by chance, but to take the step and approach people directly or even accept dinner invitations is not something he would do. One aspect of his new SITE that he particularly likes is the fact that between the private domain of the houses and the green space into which these houses are placed – and which are open to communal use – there is an intermediate zone of a porch and a front garden, which belongs to the house, but which is part of the landscape-architecture as well. This porch, from where he can interact with his neighbours without leaving his private domain, creates a certain kind of intimacy:

“Now when I get home I greet my neighbours. From my porch I see when neighbours are coming home. It is a very different environment – these front gardens. When people cross through you see each other, say hello, have a chat. It's a bit more intimate (samimi)”
(Apx.No.4/14c).

If spatial boundaries can negatively interfere with a person's behaviour towards others, they also must be expected to have more complex effects on social integration and the feeling of belonging. The most crucial aspect about transitional spaces, I assume, would be that they are flexible in use, unclear concerning their symbolic structure and therefore *appropriate* in multiple ways. Transitional space does not only constitute corridors but also spaces in the city, the use of which is not defined. Bordering on spaces that do have

a spatial hegemony, transitional space facilitates experiences or situations one would normally avoid. This might enable individuals to contest and expand their geographical boundaries and imagine geographies in a different way. Rigid spatial meanings, on the other hand, lower the capacity of people to appropriate these spaces in their very own personal way, making them shy away from entering these spaces whenever their 'programmed' ways of use cannot be adapted. Intermediate space, the meaning of which is unclear, does not create pressure for a particular kind of performance. Here, multiple forms of appropriation are possible, creating a feeling of acceptance rather than an urge to conform. In the next chapter, I want to return to the theoretical context to elaborate on a more general theory of hegemony and boundary spaces.

IV. 1. Evaluations and Summary

1.1. Discourse and space

Throughout the last chapters I have analysed the way social discourses interrelate with spatial reference systems. I have looked at a variety of contexts, starting with the foundational narrative of the Turkish Republic, collective housing narratives in the neoliberal city and personal stories of people who are living in gated housing projects somewhere in Istanbul. All of these examples have proven to be constituted discursively. The way the environment is perceived and the way environments are produced is based on a narrative. Such a narrative structure, I have shown, is ordered by social boundaries and consequently an 'other' through whom spaces of the self are territorially and formally defined. Identification with spaces is therefore only possible through a coherency between a variety of signifiers that are in some way or another equivalent to one another. One can therefore follow Berger and Luckmann in their analysis of social reality as something structured by a vertical level of time and a horizontal level of plausibility, and apply this logic to the structuring of space. Horizontality and verticality structure the narrative as a system within which meaning is constituted:

“(es)...muss dem einzelnen das Ganze seines Lebens, das Nacheinander seines Weges durch verschiedene Teilordnungen einer ganzen institutionalen Ordnung subjektiv sinnhaft dargeboten werden. Mit anderen Worten: Der Lebenslauf des Individuums muss in der Abfolge all seiner institutionell vorformulierten Phasen mit einer Sinnhaftigkeit versehen werden, die das ganze subjektiv plausibel macht. Deshalb muss eine vertikale Ebene (zeitlich) im Leben der Person die horizontale Ebene der Integration und subjektiven Plausibilität der institutionalen Ordnung ergänzen” (Berger 1997:35).

It follows that as narratives are retroactively adapted and changed, so is the way the built environment is evaluated and subdued to changes. The interviews that were conducted in Göktürk have revealed that for a person to feel at home in a place, a coherent mental geography within which the place of residence constitutes meaning and makes sense is necessary. The lack of belonging in the city, on the other hand, goes hand in hand with an unstable perception of the environment, or problems concerning the making of choices of where to live. From these observations one can conclude the following:

1. Individuals and social groups in the city always seek to define stable narratives of the self and consequently stable spatial meanings. Since belonging derives from meaning, the naming of spaces of the self and spaces of the other is inevitable for urban existence.
2. In order to accommodate for change and diversity, and to integrate socially and culturally different people into the urban society, the evaluation of the environment must be flexible. That, on the other hand, also means mental

geographies must be dynamic and this dynamism goes to the expense of clarity and consequently belonging.

The interviews conducted in EVIDEA have further shown that incoherencies concerning the way the city is imagined relate to a high degree of social flexibility and ability to move between social worlds and adapt different angles of seeing. Moving between social worlds opens up discursive boundaries of established social perception and allows the individual to reflect upon her own circumstances. The ability to see one's own social position is necessary to evaluate one's contribution to the hegemony of the neoliberal city, but it also loosens the individual's integrative position in the urban society. Individuals thus run the risk of free floating in space, the reality of which is constantly reformulated. How society deals with this danger of meaninglessness has been shown through our elaboration on how urban insecurity is answered with increased investment in private property. In our contemporary cities, the hegemony of real estate thus counterbalances what Fredric Jameson has called "Postmodern Hyperspace".

"Postmodern hyperspace has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world. The only possible relation to this postmodern space is the feeling of being lost, and the only possible movement is aimless wandering" (Ryan 2001:260).

These two dynamics – property ownership on one hand, and the democratisation of urban space on the other – which only in combination determine social life in the city, open up a highly conflicting field with contradictory social needs and demands. The city has to constantly seek a balance between offering fixity and halt to people, but at the same time question urban hegemony and thus 'endanger' belonging by giving room to the question if urban life can also be different from the mess that constitutes the city in its current state.

1.2. The neoliberal city as discourse

From Robert Park we know that society requires the formation of communities, and that communities always contain a moment of exclusion. This dynamic is not new to society; and not new to urban life in general. This research however did not intend to challenge the principles of community and discourse, but to question the role the environment takes in the formation and change of social belonging. The assumption that was made was that space assumes a crucial role in the structuring of social reality, but that an analytical approach to how this works must embrace a definition of space wide enough to contain physical and imaginary aspects. The further assumption was that social development requires the possibility of interaction on both spatial levels – the imaginary and the physical – and that only through the coming together of both, socio-spatial narratives can attain full validity as social reality.

We further found out that the formation of the social employs a variety of spatial practises, symbolic and concrete, independent of ideological content. The reality of the modern as well as the neoliberal city can be described as systemic in the sense that the power mechanisms behind spatial use and meaning do not reveal themselves to society but are assumed neutral or universal. As social discourses require a reference to space, they retroactively are responsible for the creation of space. The definition of the city itself – its normativity – is something that constitutes the rise of institutions that concern the production of (and life in) the city by determining the language of urban dialogue. Planning and housing institutions, laws concerning urban development and systems of finance must be seen as sedimented and institutionalized forms of discursive knowledge. The empowerment or disempowerment of people as actors has also shown to be integrative to these same knowledge-structures and thus discourse-analytically comprehensible.

In order to take a closer look at the systemic nature of spatial production, the peculiarities of neoliberalism have been elaborated on in more detail by suggesting working with the terminology of Ananja Roy. *Developmentality*, rather than its linguistic origin, the concept of *governmentality*, which was developed by Foucault, describes a system that is self-reproductive, and to which the production of the built environment is central. In its transgression from modernism to neoliberalism, urban space has more and more been turned into the subject of antagonistic struggle itself, while before dichotomies of the urban and the rural, the centre and the periphery had determined the structuring of society. As social struggle in the neoliberal city embraces the struggle over a living space, the fragmentation of space and the problem of belonging have reached new dimensions which cannot be thought outside the terminology of real estate anymore.

Real estate has therefore been elaborated on as a spatial interface between social narrative, possibility and financial power in order to critically ask in what way the built environment can be seen as contributing to the hegemony of neoliberalism.

The analytical approach was to firstly analyse the socio-spatial origin of liberalization, and then to proceed by looking at how urban space has increasingly been integrated into the neoliberal language. Three main issues have been pointed out concerning the interrelation of space and neoliberalism in Turkey.

1) That for the specific case of Turkey, the informal city – at stages substantiated with the umbrella term *gecekondu* – served as the physical home, facilitator and imaginary location for the struggle to overcome a strong and tutelage-prone state through liberalization. The *gecekondu* thus constitutes a threshold between a socialist-centralist and a liberalist-centralist system, the latter of which has established the hegemony of private property ownership.

2) That private property has become a kind of discursive interface, and that it can be regarded as a location of power in the neoliberal city. Real estate adopts hegemonic functions, and has turned into a remedy for a problem which on the other hand it also constitutes. Consequently, the security that is seen in the appropriation of real estate is also *the cause* of segregation and hence insecurity. This vicious circle constitutes the systemic identity of the neoliberal city.

3) That people, through the way they are socialized in the city, emanate as empowered or disempowered by adapting certain narratives as their identities. As social discourses develop institutionalized forms over time, the access to their symbolic and non-symbolic worlds acquires certain gate-keeping functions, which harden their narrational nature and also limit people's possibility of choice between social narratives. Accessibility to urban space constitutes such a gate-keeping function. Adapting social narratives is therefore not free of choice, but limited and influenced in connection to spatial accessibility.

1) The informal city and the neoliberal idea

As the *gecekondu* takes on a crucial role for the rise of neoliberalism in Turkey, it also explains why governmental languages are those of religiosity. The reason is that the *gecekondu* has empowered segments of society from rural Turkey, where people lived according to tradition and religious value systems.

However, neoliberalism is a global phenomenon and this dissertation cannot give sufficient explanation about how the built environment adapted such a crucial role in upholding neoliberalism. What can be pointed out, however, is an explanation towards

why neoliberalism in cities of the global south holds sway with a seemingly unrestricted hunger for development, which leaves cities of the global north behind on all parameters of growth. Institutions that developed under the hegemony of the welfare state in the cities of the global north seem to slow down developmentalism, and a culture of participation in urban concerns encourages people to resist and voice their opinions if matters come to the selling out of their city. The dependency of large groups of society on markets of informal labour, informal housing and family networks appears to fuel developmentalism through the absence of law and a cultural (and education-related) vulnerability to populism. Informal city growth or development of illegal buildings through a 'land mafia' works exceptionally well as a mechanism to unlock undeveloped land in the periphery, which, if control mechanisms that hinder informal growth were in place, would not be developed. The absence of the structures of the welfare-state, in a neoliberal society, in combination with an ideology of religious solidarity, makes sure that all responsibility rests upon social networks, families and individuals which aspire to social rise through economic growth. These non-institutionalized networks do therefore foster neoliberalist discourses with reference to family values, traditions, or religiousness.

2) The circle of insecurity and property

In chapter 'II.5.2. Segregation, insecurity and private property' we could identify a reciprocity between segregation and neoliberalism. To recognize that segregation is not a side effect of neoliberalism but a process through which neoliberalism is perpetuated has shed some light on the central role real estate – and therefore the built environment – has adapted in hegemonic maintenance. If one can talk of *actor-ship* in the neoliberal city, the main actor would be the built environment itself. With reference to Berger (1997) the built environment has been described as a sphere which, attached to the symbolic lifeworld of society, accommodates and makes meaningful institutional behaviour and social roles, and in doing so, legitimizes hegemonic order. To take influence on physical space, to channel its use but also inscribe meaning to it, is a fundamentally political act, an implication of power. To appropriate space is not only the very act of space-making itself, but it must also be regarded as a hegemonic practise.

3) Defining accessibility in the neoliberal city

In chapter 'I.2.4.' I have introduced Lefebvre's terminology "blindness", which has been scrutinized in chapter 'II.5.2.2' for the example of real estate as a discourse-operational mechanism. There, the argument was that an evaluation concerning a good living place goes hand in hand with discursive ways of seeing which hide the possibilities that lie beyond discursive boundaries. In the same way as Foucault, who regards the discourse

as a "mirror image of truth before our own eyes", Lefebvre understands discursive ways of seeing as seeing with one blind eye. The impression that one gets from this – also a point for which Foucault's definition of power as dispositive has earned much criticism – (see Mara-Daria Cojocaru: 2012 on the latest perspectives) is that the individual is a kind of victim to her own bigotry. In some way or another, Foucault as well as Lefebvre see discursive closure, and the 'blindness' that comes with it, as an afflicted form of brutality, that lends character to the discourse as something which narrows, suppresses, denies access and victimizes, but never something that empowers, opens opportunities and facilitates. However, it is not a person who defends the discourse because she is consciously and dreadfully petulant. Conscious or not, the awareness and possibilities of individuals are created only in the social context and this, as we know, features a range of limiting factors.

It might be exaggerated to see the city purely as a dispositive, as much as it is fatuous to grant people the will to unrestrained open-mindedness and tolerance. But certainly, people do have a consciousness, and decisions are made on the grounds of that consciousness. At the same time, one should not forget that choices concerning one's social life are often as limited as choices concerning the place of residence can be. That means that affiliation or belonging are not entirely free of choice, but happen on the grounds of context and opportunity, which are strongly influenced by the urban landscape. Placed into a geography of controlled access and possibility, the use of urban space also regulates who has access to social environments and who does not. Because of limitations to public and private use, affordability and social acceptance, spatial narratives cannot always be randomly chosen. Members of discursive communities have to comply with certain rules, social codes and languages in order to perform within the boundaries of discursive reference systems. Nobody can enter the order of discourse without living up to the required social standards that are set by the discourse itself, and which embrace a complex choreography of behavioural and factual codes (Foucault 2010:25; Mayerhauser 2006:79). Spatial access in such a context also means access to social realities, which makes it even harder for an individual to transgress social realms and make a personal choice concerning a living space. As places of residence are connected to social contexts, the neoliberal city limits personal freedom on various levels concerning possibility but also identity.

These limiting factors, on the other hand, are only one side to the relationship between space and discourse. In order to fully understand the ways issues of accessibility regulate social and spatial integration, Foucault's concept of power has to be expanded by the facilitating components of discourse. In other words: Aspects of power must be supplemented with aspects of empowerment. My suggestion is therefore to rethink the implications of empowerment from Laclau's standpoint, and therefore add to this list by considering aspects of facilitation, power-shift and therefore also discursive change. Considering that

hegemony is a dynamic status that requires constant legitimation, the question arises of what happens if meaning-constellations are in *the process of being fixed*.

Limiting factors relate to discursive closure at the moment of hegemony, but hegemony can be contested, re-inscribed and changed, and this opens up space for re-interpretation, re-appropriation and re-construction. Space, which exists outside of the hegemonic order, or which simply makes diverse offers for interpretation, can be a location for alternative ways of appropriation, empowering people through their personal interaction with that space. Inhabiting, using or looking at space from multiple angles, crossing from one sphere to the next or being forced to exist outside of the social order, constitutes a potential for alternative ways of urban life. New forms of spatial appropriation, however strange, unacceptable or silly they may look at the beginning, can create new forms of spatial imagination and collectivity, creating the potential for entirely new power constellations.

1.3. Discourse analysis and urban research / Difficulties and prospects

On the following pages I want to return to the methodological difficulties that I have encountered in this research, and which I also want to reflect upon in the context of future research on the city. The comparison between modernism and neoliberalism has revealed that there is a certain logic concerning the interrelation between discourse and space. This comparison has also shown that there are substantial differences in the way space is functional within discursive constellations during modernism, and today, during neoliberalism. To disregard the systematic structures of modernism and neoliberalism would render irrelevant decades of research on methodology for another universalizing theory that claims that the city is simply a discourse, with everything in it emanating from a standardized discursive logic. To describe the logic of discourse has revealed to be not quite as simple as it might appear starting with a theory like Laclau's theory of hegemony. Hegemony and antagonism, on the other hand, serve as outstanding analytical principles to understand society-space inter-linkages. At the same time though, they are very coarse and hardly suffice in explaining hegemonic strategies and practises and the reasons for their diversity. I therefore want to point out two problematic aspects that I have encountered in the course of this research. Both have already been touched upon in my formulation of research difficulties (chapter II.2.5) at the beginning, but they shall be reformulated the following way:

1) A theory of the subject or a social theory?

The way discourse-analytical approaches have been used in research on the city is very diverse and resembles rather a patchwork of methodologies that bear no standardized methodological framework. As discourse-analysis has its origin in linguistics, approved methods employ the analysis of large text corpora and other forms of data. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, are not practical in an analysis of society-space inter-linkages. Researchers therefore use a combination of written texts, images and narrative interviews, the number of which necessitates the question concerning the representability of data. In addition, *discourse theories* are not *social theories* in the strict sense of discipline, allowing the question to what degree conclusions concerning society can be made at all.

2) Researching imaginary spaces at the intersection to the physical

To simply see space as a material reference system in discourse would disregard that space is continuously in the making, and sometimes undergoes stages in which it re-

mains unbuilt. A definition of space must not equal connotations of 'spaciousness', but consider other forms of mental connectivity which are not spatial in the material sense of the word. There is a fundamental danger in directly applying theoretical terminologies to the built environment by claiming for instance that social antagonism directly translates into territorial boundaries. To do that, would block the research at the point of intersection between imaginary and physical space, falling back upon wrong convictions that society has a material equivalence in forms of the built environment. Such a belief would take the city as a coded form to which there is a grammatical key that unlocks secrets about its social constitution. To capture this problem, I have formulated it as an issue of "how to deal with invisibilities in discourse analysis". Further down I will summarize my findings concerning this issue and discuss to what degree the concept of the 'virtual city', a concept that captures the spatial intersection of the imaginary and the concrete, might be useful for an approach in combination with discourse analysis.

1.3.1. On the subject in discourse analysis

In our comparison between modernism and neoliberalism, the most prominent of results was that the maintenance of hegemony during times of modernism has necessitated external forms of intervention and an active policing of public and private spheres of urban life, while during times of liberalization the state increasingly withdrew from enforcing public order. The neoliberal city has been identified as an organism which reproduces its own power-constellations through the agency of a citizen's engagement in economic growth. The responsibility that now rests on the individual must appeal to a voluntary engagement in society and an ability to establish a personal relationship towards the neoliberal development discourse. For matters of social integration, the individual has to relate in her very personal way to a neoliberal society which, if her position in that society cannot be legitimized, would endanger social integration and therefore public order. A similar change could also be identified for a socio-spatial dialectic. While in times of modernity it might be possible to talk of a national community and a collective imagination of territory, globalization and the dissolution of the nation-state makes it increasingly difficult to talk of ONE society.

The conclusion was that to talk of neoliberalism as one discourse is difficult because neoliberalism manifests itself in a large variety of social ideologies which upon comparison are so complex and contradictory that not one language of neoliberalism can be found. The suggestion therefore was to think of a neoliberal meta-narrational structure that frames an uncountable variety of personalized narratives subordinate to that meta-narrative. The crucial point is that neoliberalism is not an ideology in the sense

that it predetermines cultural or social conviction, lifestyle or values systems. Pluralism made it necessary to rethink "the subject" as an empirical dimension in discourse. Is the subject a collectivity or an individual, and if it is a collectivity, to what degree is an individual's personal narrative representational of that collectivity?

This question is one of theory as much as of methodology, since it requires an analytical framing that deals with the reality of individualization and fragmentation that we encounter today. Existing research on the neoliberal city has shown that hegemonic social discourses are never rewinding the same symbolic routines, but adapt to constantly new situations and changes (Mattissek 2008). Through our case studies this could be confirmed. The analysis of *Neo-Ottoman* imaginations of Istanbul, described in chapter III.1.3. *Historisation, exotisation and the ideal of pluralism* have revealed a great diversity in formulating the symbolic life world of the *Neo-Ottoman City*.

In addition to that, the analysis of the interviews conducted with people in gated communities revealed a greater insight into the way personal relations are established through the symbolic life-world of the city. To be part of the urban society means to have an explanation for the state of things – segregation and conflict being part of this. This explanation, at the same time, must also be functional in explaining the social position of the narrator, his personal story and his place of residence. It is not possible for an individual *not* to relate to existing social discourses without experiencing disorientation or alienation in the city. Personal relations to social discourses are essential for social integration and would, if missing, cause serious problems related to a lack of belonging. For our theoretical approach, this means that the individual cannot be thought of as outside of society. The explanation discourse-theory holds in the face of this circumstance is that social discourses are only adapted because they make an offer to bridge a personal lack with the vision of a social ideal. This lack Laclau describes in reference to Lacan through the term "effect". The relationship the individual has with society results in this personal lack, which essentially is a psychological effect, but which must be seen as a social phenomenon because it is relative to social order. A theory of the subject must thus consider that the subject creates herself in relation to her surroundings and therefore to society. We can but agree with Stäheli, who says that for this reason, not all but some psychoanalytical approaches to social research can be useful. A Lacanian theory of the subject can be used for a psychoanalytically-framed production of social meaning, says Stäheli, because "psychological processes are always already thought as sociological processes" (Stäheli 2000:56).

The observation that was made throughout this research is that an analysis that considers subjective forms of symbolic appropriation can help to explain discrepancies or an overlapping of multiple discursive reference systems at the same time. Another point

to argue is that discourses do not shift together with the entity of society but may also dissolve or change due to a process in which more and more people refer to other alternative narratives to make sense of their personal existence. To talk of society without considering the individual can therefore be misleading. How to evaluate narrative interviews with individuals, on the other hand, must also be treated with care concerning the high degree of individualism with which people can relate to the urban society, especially if their role in that society is critical or loosely defined.

1.3.2. Physical and imaginary space

The boundaries between functionality and imagination are blurred. Outside of social structure the city can be seen as a landscape of boundaries, vacancy and occupation. The way space is ordered, infrastructure is made to connect to neighbourhoods, and roads create connecting links with other neighbourhoods, workplaces, places of health and leisure, however, are not free from mental forms of engagement through which access and connectivity, movement and possibility make sense. Wherever access is possible, accessibility gains meaning. Following Nonhoff we can argue that the question whether space can exist external to discourse or not is irrelevant because space, in order to structure social reality, has to acquire meaning. Beyond that, space is irrelevant for an analysis of the social.

“Die soziale Wirklichkeit kann insofern als wesentlich diskursiv verstanden werden, als sie eine sinnhafte Wirklichkeit ist, in der sich die Bedeutung aller sinntragenden Einheiten erst in Relation und damit in Differenz zu anderen Einheiten etabliert. Somit sind Diskurse explizit nicht auf die Sphäre der Sprache begrenzt: Auch Objekte, Subjekte, Zustände oder Praktiken ergeben erst im sozialen Relationsgefüge eine je spezifischen Sinn und sind insofern diskursiv strukturiert. Die im Feld der foucaultschen Diskursanalyse gebräuchliche Unterscheidung von diskursiven und nicht-diskursiven Praktiken entfällt damit“ (Nonhoff 2007:9).

Individuals always have to make sense of their own life story in relation to the society they live in. Events and occurrences, but also the surrounding physical world, will be integrated into a narrative of the self. It is not possible to intellectually embrace the material world without any relational systems of meaning or vice versa.

What has become clear throughout this work is that the way meaning is constituted does vary from person to person. People with similar economic status may have entirely different mental perceptions of the city, which supports the idea that the social position cannot be evaluated concerning any fixed variables like income status, background and

the like. Social reality is therefore not an equally perceived phenomenon, but something that arises from the social gaze of the individual.

It was then argued that urban reality requires an engagement with physical space. One has to mentally embrace the physical environment in order to act in it. The intersection between the imaginary and the physical is the location of space-making itself, (Löv) and this intersection is also the empirical location from which possibility and movement emanate. In support of this, interviews have shown that spatial interaction requires imagination. In chapter '2.2. Maintaining and redefining boundaries of social belonging', it became clear that moving from one place in the city to another necessitates the imagination of that other place. Place identification happens in mental space and precedes the decision of moving. That also means that individuals who remain unsatisfied or alienated in the place they live, are hindered by internal circumstances that prevent them from interacting with the city on a mental level, in addition to other external circumstances that restrict their movement. The failure to integrate space into a meaningful narrative of the self also interrupts social interaction with the city, because no imagination guides this interaction. This complies with what was discussed on issues of accessibility on previous pages. Accessibility refers to a restriction and facilitation of people's movement, but also mental forms of access or *denied access* that are constituted through ideological or social boundaries.

The relationship between boundaries of imaginary space and boundaries of space that can also be reached physically is crucial. It was said already at the beginning, that the two do not overlap, but how do they interrelate? Schiffauer suggests the moment of implied action as a space of possibility which connects a physical location to the imagination of a place:

"The description of spaces can only be effective if they are connected with possibility. Nobody is going to be jealous if another category of people lives at a higher standard. On the other hand, do descriptions of a better life or depictions of places in film suddenly gain a very real kind of meaning if there are routes of migration that offer access to these kinds of places?" (Schiffauer 2006:172) (my own translation)

In other words: The boundaries of imaginary space also depend on physical accessibility. On the reverse, physical space can only encourage interaction, if this space offers forms of appropriation imaginable for the individual who exists in that space.

The mutual interdependency of the physical and the imaginary Schiffauer tries to make clear by differentiating the imaginary from the fantastic. Fantasy, according to Schiffauer, remains in the head and is not charged with eventuality. The imaginary on the other hand implies possibility, it "names the realistic but not the realized" (Schiffauer

2006:164). In urban studies another term has been introduced to deal with this kind of eventuality – the terminology of the virtual. It describes action-implying forms of spatial imagination.

“Doyle describes the virtual as the sheer contingency of an un-actualized event, a program that may be successfully run. Real but not actualized, the virtual is a consistency such as a configuration of a code that remains to be executed” (Shields 2005:381).

The virtual does therefore exist at the intersection of the imagination of – and the physically realized city, one step closer than the mere imaginary form of space can be to the physical. Shield’s emphasis is that the physical city cannot be created without an imagination that precedes it. Like words and language, a city as the actual manifestation has as a precondition its virtual existence (Shields 2005:380). Physical and imaginary space are in a reciprocal relationship, which presupposes the existence of the other for its creation. The terminology of the virtual, says Eckardt, is helpful because it captures a kind of “being in the process”.

“Die virtuelle Urbanität stellt eine Vorwegnahme möglicher, anschlussfähiger, zukünftiger Weiterentwicklungen der Stadt dar, und Realität wird als eine weitgehend Konfiguration des städtischen vorweggenommen bei der der permanente Austausch mit den Kommunikations- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten an einer Schnittstelle zum physischen abläuft” (Forer/Huisman 2000) (Eckardt 2011:181).

The act of space-making, if we describe it with the terminology of virtual space, is taking place only if the back and forth between imaginary and physical space is possible. That means if appropriation is possible both mentally, by integrating space into personal narratives of meaning, and physically by being allowed access and use.

IV. 2. Towards a theory of the boundary

In this final chapter I will scrutinize the intersection between imaginary and physical space through the concept of the virtual, but focus on the virtual effectiveness of boundaries. Asking in what way social boundaries interrelate with physical boundaries, I will try to develop a point of departure concerning the way virtual space is constituted. Summarizing my findings about the interrelation of social and spatial boundaries and the way these boundaries are upheld, I will look at the famous work of Levi-Strauss from the 1960s, "structural anthropology", asking what can be learned from his comparison of two mental maps that inhabitants of indigenous villages drew of their village. This comparison, when reconsidered against our theoretical and empirical findings concerning the boundary, I will argue, allows us to draw some further conclusions on the way to an understanding of virtual space, and might reveal one direction or the other on how to proceed in future research.

2.1. Understanding virtual space through its boundaries

To specify the intersection of *the physical* and *the imaginary* through the concept of *the virtual* means bringing to the point the complexity of a society-space interrelation. The question though remains of what exactly happens at this intersection between imaginary and physical space. To the greatest extent, this transgression remains methodologically or empirically not further penetrable. The virtual city has in a way become a research mystery. To think of how the virtuality of space really operates in the creation of social reality one might have to look beyond the boundaries of urban research. A short excursion to Lacan's definition of reality might help to theoretically come closer to what the virtual is all about. According to Lacan "the real is that which resists symbolization" (Lacan 2002). His point is that reality cannot be symbolized. Although Laclau does not use the word "real", the same thought can also be found in the theory of hegemony. The process of *inversion (retroactive naming)* that provides the empty signifier with meaning is nothing but an act of *fantasy* in the Lacanian sense. It is the naming of an imaginary fullness representable only in its negation. This inversion, which has been explained as a "retroactive effect of naming" in the introductory chapters, Nonhoff describes as an operation of symbolising something which resists symbolisation:

"dieser Signifikant ist einerseits ein Partikulum, ein differentes Element wie jedes andere. Andererseits aber verkörpert er in einer Art paradoxen Kurzschluss zugleich das spezifisch Allgemeine der betreffenden Formierung von gesellschaftlichen Forderungen. Von einem paradoxen Kurzschluss muss man dabei sprechen, weil das Allgemeine unter den

Bedingungen eines Signifikationssystems, das auf der Differenz verschiedener Partikula beruht, nicht repräsentiert werden kann, weil es aber zugleich durch ein Partikulum eines einzelnen Signifikanten, repräsentiert wird. Damit unterläuft dieser Signifikant die differenzbasierte Funktion der Signifikation selbst. Er vollzieht eine unmögliche Signifikation, weshalb er auch als leerer Signifikant bezeichnet wird" (Nonhoff 2007:13).

According to Laclau – and this is also the conclusion drawn in discourse-theory – there is no difference between reality and *perceived* reality. Reality is always a social construction of meaning, and therefore a subjective perception of the world. Discourse-related forms of perception are the mental operations that structure social reality. The question is, then, how to evaluate something that is actual, something that *does not* resist symbolisation. In our case, the question is how do we empirically analyse and evaluate concrete space, if the "physically actualized city" is not *the real*?

Actual space, as this study has shown, is integrated into the meaning constructs of discourse and therefore structures reality, but it is not the location or the substance of reality. If physical space is not a manifestation of reality, the reality of space exists in the *not-yet actualized*. This makes the definition of the virtual city a crucial point of analysis. According to Deleuze, the *virtual* is not opposed to the *real* but opposed to the *actualized* (Deleuze 1966). We could ask whether the actualization of a territorial boundary would somehow undermine the social reality from which it emanates. The moment imaginary forms of antagonism become concrete, the actualization of that space might change the structuring of that imaginary space. The concretisation of space would then cause the dissolution or the change of reality in the city. Yet, how can we apply this theoretical assumption to what has been observed in this research?

What could be observed was that the SITE could only serve as a mental home, in forms of an imagination – a fantasy of the non-antagonistic city. The moment residents became aware that the SITE was in fact a creation of their own social position, the SITE began to constitute a problem. It became increasingly difficult to legitimize living in a SITE. This moment was the time the terminology of the "gated community" became a popular discourse.

The emergence of the terminology "gated community" for Istanbul I evaluate as the moment the social reality of an increasingly segregated society became physically apparent, but it is also the moment at which this physical appearance was first rejected. To identify with the "gated community" would be to make a public statement of being racist, elitist, selfish or socially destructive in any other way. Several observations in this research confirm that belonging in gated projects deteriorated with the gated community discourse arising. One has been elaborated on as a new typology of the SITE that claims that it is totally against the gated community, and the other is the petulant reaction of some people who, cornered by the gated community discourse, insist on the terminology

“SITE” and defend it with all kinds of rhetoric as an idyllic world. These two kinds of reactions we find reflected in the interviews with Selin (Apx.10) and Bülent (Apx.7), but they can also be found in the discourse on 'New Turkish Architecture' on one hand, and observed forms of *hyperfortification* on the other.

To reinforce fortification and exclusion through services of the security sector must be regarded as a deadlock from which only hostility, but no alternative democratic or peaceful forms of urban life, can emerge. *Hyperfortification* is related to an impossibility to imagine alternative forms of life in the city, the reasons for which are complex and not always the same. To think of alternatives though goes along with the recognition that the SITE is an antagonism symbolized in architecture and space, and this recognition leads to the displacement of the SITE as a notion of home. Recognizing the gated community as a fortified enclave renders impossible feelings of homeliness on the grounds of securitization and gating. The most important aspect of *New Turkish Architecture*, although it repeats the typology of the SITE, is therefore to provide the illusion of the open city. Today, the gated community and its fortified character is something which is now detested by those social groups who used to live in gated communities. I have related this symbolic change to a hegemonic shift in the discourse of the established middle class – a change in architectural style, but this is not all there is to it. More importantly it appears that the concretisation of boundaries seems to obstruct the virtual effectiveness of boundaries. Once concrete, the effectiveness of boundaries gets lost. It seems that the moment the gated community emerged as a term for something people created in order to exclude others, it was no longer functional in the creation of belonging.

The second observation that gives reason to consider the virtual effectiveness of the boundary is the way territorial spaces negatively interfere with an individual's freedom and capacity to integrate into the urban society. For individuals who are new to the city, who are yet to develop forms of social belonging in the city, or who would locate themselves in multiple social spheres at once, the imagination of a transgressive self is vital for a process of integration. But if transgressive space is absent, the integration process is only possible through an enforced decision – where to belong – upfront. Many people who come from the outside would seek a place in the city which would allow for a personal and limitless interpretation of urban life, and intermediate spaces, changing or gentrifying areas provide for that. To provide for integration, the physical city has to make an offer to define boundaries of the self in a way that is not locally specific, but imaginable in a variety of trans-local ways. If, however, the symbolisation of that space is rigid, due to limitations of its mental and physical accessibility, spatial appropriation – and consequently integration – is hardly possible.

A segregated city – I conclude – thus makes it harder for people to find their place in the city. It is through this way that a segregated city causes alienation. The case of EVIDEA and the interview with Başar made this clear. For Başar, the rigidity of the boundary between the private realm of his apartment and the communal space of the courtyard increased his alienation from the community. With the zone of semi-communal space, from which he can observe the social happenings in his new SITE, interaction with people from the neighbourhood is finally possible. Encounters within this intermediate zone do not bear the social codes of established forms of interaction, but these informal encounters are only possible where the boundary between the self and the other, which is needed for interaction, can be imagined, overcome or reinvented freely.

2.2. Boundaries and narratives

On the following pages I want to ask whether it is possible to capture the interrelation between narrative and space through the theoretical agency of the boundary. I want to elaborate on the following three observations:

1. Social hegemony goes hand in hand with the imagination of clear spatial boundaries. (The narrator is unaware of his own discursive position / he thinks his mental geography is a universal categorization of good and bad places)
2. Narratives that bear no hegemonic structure, but instead prove of the individual's location in multiple discursive systems, go along with flexible narrational and spatial boundaries. (The narrator is able to look at his own location and reflect upon his own social position in the urban society)
3. Social boundaries are constantly in need of protection. Alteration and re-inscription of boundaries through new symbolisms is only one way of dealing with this. Another way to protect social boundaries is for the narrator to camouflage his own location in the narrative. Symbolic paradoxes built into a conversation, or social behaviour which is assumedly contradictory to the behaviour one assumes to be compliant, have been evaluated as mechanisms to camouflage social boundaries.

Although it might appear that points 1 and 2 are clear, point 1 is the most difficult to research because there is no direct way in researching imaginary boundaries. To come to the conclusion that hegemonic social order relates to an imagination of rigid spatial hierarchies has been difficult in the sense that no person or group would have openly drawn a picture of a fragmented space of which he himself is the author. On the contrary, representatives of a hegemonic social order would claim that the city is an open landscape, into which particular other groups negatively interfere. The grounds upon which I made my conclusion on this point was the way interviewees added that there are dynamics or people who live in the city and who obstruct the city's openness through their presence and actions. I have therefore discussed in *III.1.2* and after, in *III.2.1* the systemic character of fantasies of the non-antagonistic city. The space that is inhabited by the self is always experienced as a conflict-free, democratic and harmonious world in which no boundaries exist, and the difficulty in researching the boundaries of that inhabited space lies in the person's lack of awareness, and as we will discuss later – attempts to deny that the illusion of that harmonious world depends on a very fierce mental territorialisation of the city. Thinking of the city as a harmonious world causes the individual to be oblivious to the boundaries in his environment. That goes so

far that if a physical border – a wall, for example – is intersecting two neighbouring areas, this border may be regarded as irrelevant to mention due to it being perceived as a natural parting of the good from the bad. 'It is something that is just there, because it makes sense.'

Narratives that bear no hegemonic structure on the other hand, prove of a mental space that is flexible and changing. As a researcher though, one is easily tricked into believing that boundaries dominate a perception of the city, of whoever locates himself in multiple spaces at the same time. The reason is that without a hegemonic structure, reflection upon one's own role in the urban society is possible leading to the mentioning of boundaries and borders. It is this reflection which is the facilitator for seeing one's own narrational location. I have concluded for this reason that gaps in social narratives relate to a high degree of social flexibility and a dynamic and changeable imagination of the city. Interesting in particular was learning that interviewees, whose mental geography was unclear, saw little legitimation in a physical wall, or a territorial separation in their direct proximity. Other than people who had a clear discourse on the city, these people were actually able to look upon urban space from multiple perspectives and therefore question the legitimacy of the existing spatial order. From such a position, the condition of the city is no longer perceived as the natural order of things and this might facilitate this person to think of other ways of how this space could be structured.

A comparison of points **1** and **2** makes it clear that the mental geography people have of the city does not mirror the physical condition of the spaces they inhabit. As certain physical boundaries in the city appear to be subscribed to the natural order of things, there is no awareness of their presence. For people who lived in gated communities and who argued their choice on the grounds of a fantasy of the non-antagonistic city, the space of the SITE was pictured to be continuous with those spaces of the city that were occupied by the self in the narrative. The SITE as a narrational place is thus never something that segregates but something that connects, and so is the physical barrier that contains the space of the SITE not functional as a boundary but a link to other selective places in the city. These correlations I will discuss further down in more detail because they might tell us more about the interrelation between imaginary and physical space. The question of what social processes actually cause the materialization of boundaries in the city remains. For now it is only certain that the imaginary and physical reality of boundaries does not overlap in time, or if at all, might only do so in the fleeting moment in which they are contested and therefore changed in the imagination.

Coming to the third point, the correlation with the two prior might not be that obvious. What I want to point to is the transgression between the two stages of hegemonic and non-hegemonic structures. Particularly in section II.3 of the research, I have devoted

much time to explaining what causes social hegemony and what causes social hegemony to collapse. My intention is not to be repetitive, but to remind us of the practises that are at work to protect the state of hegemony. Hegemonic maintenance, or the protection of identity, is an essential part of social practise and there are various forms to pursue. What I want to point out at this stage again, is only one form of hegemonic maintenance, and that it bears a structure and logic that might be worth reconsideration concerning the virtuality of space. In chapter *III.2.2*, I have discussed that the boundaries of discourse are something that constantly need to be maintained. While, to the subject-narrator, these boundaries appear to be constantly under threat, they are of course not perceivable as boundaries. I have argued with Stäheli and Lacan that it is rather due to the pervasion of the subconscious into the narrative structure that plays of words and symbolic twists sediment as language games in the story line.

Stäheli does, therefore, draw a parallel between the boundaries of discourse and the boundaries of the subconscious (Stäheli 2000:55). As discussed further up, the narrator is not believed to occupy the field of meaning. Interviews have shown that the self in the narrative is always perceived as point zero in the story line. The narrator does not actually see himself, he does not occupy the story world, on the contrary even, the story is built around the narrator at its centre (Ryan 2001:131). Only through the act of surpassing the boundaries of discourse and assuming an exterior position can the discourse be recognized as a discourse; and only at the cost of the discursively-produced reality disintegrating. Protecting the boundaries of social belonging does therefore include symbolic operations, through which the narrator is prevented from being identified with her discursive position. On the grounds of discussing a narrative figure which I referred to as: "I am not really who you think I am" (see *III.2.2*), I have explained that by adapting certain symbolism of the antagonist, the narrator takes the loss of their own discursive legitimacy into account in advance. There is no danger to the legitimacy of the discourse in adapting symbolisms of the antagonist, because antagonism resides within the boundaries of discourse. What is being prevented through this mechanism, however, is the ultimate integrity of the discourse as a closed system – the disintegration of its boundaries.

The closure of discourse that installs the discourse as a self-referential system, and which legitimises it by raising it to the status of the universal, depends on the outside boundaries of the discourse, but these boundaries can only be upheld as long as the subject-narrator remains unaware of his own standpoint. Hiding his standpoint can successfully be achieved by changing the position within the discursive structure – by staging an imagined negative perspective from the other side of the antagonistic boundary. Through assuming the perspective of 'the other,' the narrator hides his own subjective involvement, stressing the fact that he himself is neutral, but that antagonism is simply there, thereby confirms the closure of the discourse. Of course these

mechanisms that protect the integrity of the subject-narrator have been attended to with much detail in a different context of academic work. At various points in this research, however, the boundaries of discourse have been brought into relation with the boundaries of space in the city, and to deepen that idea shall be my attempt on the following pages.

2.3. The Virtual reality of the boundary

The question that arises here is whether there is anything one can learn from what appears to be a double-sided narrational structure. It seems that narratives contain, or can contain, symbolic reversals, the function of which is to hide the boundaries of that narrative. At multiple stages in this research, the nature of discourse as a closed system has been discussed, stating that the boundaries of discourse are never visible to the narrator. A disintegration of discursively-structured space, I argue, does therefore go hand in hand with the narrator to see where he is located in that space.

If it is really as we suggested above, that the reality of space resides in its virtuality, and that its concretisation would change or dissolve this reality, we might find a similar double-sided structure in space. This might mean that what there is to look at in an analysis of space is the coming together of *narrational space* and another *virtual spatial structure* that undermines this narrational space in order to obscure its boundaries – to protect them by symbolically undermining them.

Now, there is one important aspect to consider. The definition of the virtual as an 'implied' form of spatial concretisation contains an element of time. Or, in fact, one could talk of a 'time lag' that lies between the imagination of space and its concretisation. As we could see through the interviews, the verbal construction of a real space is something that can happen very fast. It only takes a few sentences to create a (narrative reality) of the city, and another few sentences to create that other symbolical or (virtual structure) that obscures the position of the narrator. The actualized space in that narrative however is not material, forcing us to rethink the chronology of imagined and concretized space in the context of spatial production in the city. Urban spatial production requires time and the gap between imagining space and building it is quite large.

Thinking in material categories, I have to stress that I do not assume that material space is built with a double structure, but that this double structure stretches across all stages concerning spatial production, including processes of interpretation, accessibility and appropriation. (In other words: Space as a process of implied action.)

To bring this aspect of time to the point, Shields is quite right in pointing out the importance of Deleuze and Guattari's specific contribution to the concept of the virtual.

"Objects are always simultaneously virtual and concrete and thus always becoming or changing from what they are empirically at a specific instant" (Shields 2005:381).

The important detail in this observation is the mentioning of the "becoming or changing", which actually also allows us to say: Objects are *never* simultaneously virtual and concrete, *but always* becoming or changing from what they are empirically at a specific instant. Spatial production is thus never confirmative or repetitive, but evolving and surpassing its own meaning-constellations constantly. New forms of antagonism precede

the actualization of boundaries and vice versa, but they never overlap. We must herein agree with Martina Löw, particularly on her *third point*:

“spaces are, first, an expression of the possibility of pluralities; second, they point to the possibility of overlapping and reciprocal relations; and third, and for this very reason, they are always open and indefinite with respect to future formations” (Löw 2006:120). Considering all stages of spatial production, the above proposal concerning the double-structure of space can be formulated into a question:

How can the search for two spatial structures help us to learn about the reciprocity of imaginary and physical space? – And considering that it will be necessary to define the structuring of space as a moment one might ask: “At what stage of spatial production does space become physically manifest?”

Claude Levi-Strauss and the social structuring of (village-) space

To consider this question a little further I want to introduce research by Claude Levi-Strauss on structural dualism. In his article “do dual organizations exist” (Levi-Strauss 1963:139) Levi-Strauss, who, in the pursuit of solving a structural problem, stumbles across some interesting detail and introduces two different mind-maps which indigenous people propose for their village. What Levi-Strauss assumed in this research was that the way people imagined the spatial order of their village depended on the way they were socialized within the community of the village. While some imagined the village as a circle divided diametrically by a line, others imagined the village as a circle divided by another interior circle that shared its centre with the centre of the village:

“When the influence of the moiety division upon the village structure was examined, Radin noted a curious discrepancy among the answers of the old people who were his informants. They described, for the most part, a circular village plan in which the two moieties were separated by an imaginary diameter running northwest and southeast. However, several informants vigorously denied that arrangement and outlined another, in which the lodges of the moiety chiefs were in the centre rather than on the periphery. According to Radin, the first pattern was always described by informants of the upper phratry and the second by informants of the lower phratry. Thus for some of the natives the village was circular in form, and was divided into two halves, with lodges scattered throughout the circles. For the others, there remained a twofold partition of a circular village, but with two important differences. Instead of a diameter cutting the circles, there was a smaller circle within a larger one; and instead of a division of the nucleated village, the inner circle represented the lodges grouped together, as against the outer circles, which represented the cleared ground and which was again differentiated from the virgin forest that surround the whole” (Levi-Strauss: 1963).




FIGURE 6. Plan of a Winnebago village according to informants of the upper phratry. (After P. Radin, *The Winnebago Tribe*, Fig. 33.)




FIGURE 7. Plan of a Winnebago village according to informants of the lower phratry. (After Radin, *op. cit.*, Fig. 34.)

Fig.h

While the purpose of Levi-Strauss's research was to scrutinize the nature of dualisms disregarding its metaphysical or physical constitution, the point I want to draw attention to is the way the social structure of the village relates to the spatial environment. The difficulty it seems is that we don't know the built reality of the village. We only know that for those villagers who imagine the village structure to be organized in a circle divided by a diametric boundary, the outer boundary of the village is an irrelevant issue. For those on the other hand who imagine the village structure to be concentric, the outer boundary is an important element, which is described with much detail. However, both mental maps of the village are produced by people living in the village and who perceive the village structure in these two different ways.

Fig.i

Levi-Strauss and Laclau: Diametrism and spatial hegemony

Talking to the villagers, Levi-Strauss has found out that an imagined diametrism relates to a variety of dichotomies between social groups, between aspects of the physical world or between moral or metaphysical attributes. The same applied to the concentric perspective. When he analysed the nature of the dichotomies, Levi-Strauss found that the way they were structured was unequal, presupposing one as superior to the other. With the same kind of dichotomies which have been identified as forms of antagonism, residents of the city of Istanbul have described their relationship with the city. While Levi-Strauss found dichotomic words in the description of villagers like superior and inferior, elder and younger, noble and commoner, strong and weak, the same kind of oppositions have been extracted from the narratives people used to rectify their residency in a SITE.

This has been made clear through a description of a civilized way of living by constructing a narrative of *the people without culture* (chapter 5.2.). What differentiated the narrator and his social circle from the others were equally elements that covered the

entire spectrum of metaphysical existence. Behavioural codes, food, kinds of music, matters of transportation or the vehicles used were all structured according to a logic where the superior was summarized under a notion of the "civilized". We also found in the empirical data provided by this research that the antagonism between metaphysical aspects relates to aspects of the physical world, since statements on civility are always made in relation to certain places in the city. My argument on the grounds of these similarities is that we can equate the imaginary diametric village structure with Laclau's description of social hegemony. I discussed in point 1 in the prior chapter that "*Social hegemony goes hand in hand with the imagination of clear spatial boundaries.*"

In Claude Levi-Strauss's research this clear boundary, I argue, equates to a diametric internal division. And Levi-Strauss adds another important element:

Diametric dualism has been identified by Levi-Strauss as static because "it cannot transcend its own limitations" (ibid.). A clear antagonistic boundary is a precondition for hegemonic social order and results in the closure of the discourse (Laclau/Mattissek/Nonhoff). The self-sufficiency of the system that sets in under the condition of hegemony lets the outside boundary disappear. The internal division is enough to imagine the entity of the village as confined. Its outside boundaries become irrelevant. A diametric spatial imaginary is therefore self-referential and experienced as an entity to which there is no outside. (Laclau/Mattissek/Stäheli/Nonhoff) "In a diametric system, virgin land constitutes an irrelevant element, the moieties are defined by their opposition to each other and the apparent symmetry of their structure creates the illusion of a closed system" (Levi-Strauss 1963:152).

Levi-Strauss and Laclau: Concentrism and the intermediate zone

Levi-Strauss has devoted pages and pages to listing the dichotomic relationships within the village, comparing several of them in different parts of the world. To cut a long story short, I want to restrict myself to mentioning that what he found out was that there existed multiple irregularities within the village structure, where villagers count themselves to one village group by adapting characteristics of another, or where they would not adapt one dichotomous characteristic but invent a third. A third group of characteristics would emerge as not belonging to the dichotomous structure but a triadic one. In his book, Levi-Strauss described these irregularities as a re-occurring structural *triadism* – that is not a dichotomy of two elements, but an interrelation of three.

In Laclau's theory of hegemony we find a similar triadic structure looking at the sketch that he prepared to explain the notion of the floating signifier. (see fig.b page 14)

Boundaries of antagonism can only be overcome through a reference to other symbolic systems that lie beyond. To be located in one or more discursive systems makes boundaries of antagonism visible and thus changeable. According to Levi-Strauss, such

an implicit triadism that we can see as the intersection of two antagonistic boundaries is inherent in the spatial structure of concentric dualism. Concentric dualism is dynamic and lacks a clear antagonistic divide specific to a hegemonic social order.

“In the village, we have already singled out a concentric structure and two diametric structures. These varied manifestations of dualism exist side by side with a triadic structure. Actually, each of the clans is divided into three classes, which I shall call upper middle and lower” (ibid.).

This triadic social structure can be related to the asymmetric structure of an antagonistic boundary that shares its empty signifier with another antagonistic boundary. The clear divide between the self and the others which is signified along a hegemonic frontier, and which relates to a symmetric diametrisation, in an imagined concentric village structure, does not exist. Without this clear antagonism however, no hegemony and without hegemony no systemic closure sets in. This makes us question the inside and the outside – or in other words – the boundary of the village.

In an imagined concentric village structure that has an exterior boundary, the constitution of this boundary is suddenly an important part of imagining social belonging. But in what way do the hierarchical spaces; *village centre*, *cleared ground*, *timber line* and *forest* relate to one another, and how do they relate to the social dynamic?

Villagers who imagine their village to be concentric are either ambivalent or uncertain about their social status within the village. That does not have to imply confusion. They might simply be able to see themselves as belonging to various levels in the village hierarchy at the same time. Their social structure contains dichotomous as well as triadic elements, which according to the logic of the theory of hegemony, points to an intersection of two or more antagonistic boundaries, so that in some cases signifiers represent two or more equivalential chains. Intersecting social boundaries – in other words: the location of the individual in various social realities – does not create an imaginary space that has a symmetrical division. Contested space we can conclude is *never* symmetrical. Instead contested space is imagined as ordered in a hierarchical manner of centre and periphery.

As belonging is contested, *the Inside* and *the Outside* become important. Intersecting social boundaries – the triadic about Levi-Strauss’s dual organization – relate to a perception of the village as divided into three hierarchical, concentrically organized spaces. The *village core*, where every member of the village community lives; an interior peripheral circle, the *cleared ground*, which is attributed to an undefined kind of use; and the outside space of the village, *the forest*. Awareness exists that there is a spatial order that relates to the social structure of the village, but since the position of the self

is unclear, a symmetrical dichotomy gives way to an undefined *intermediate zone*, which functions like an extension of the village core. The village structure, which then consists of an interior and peripheral circle is imagined to be surrounded by a physical barrier that marks the difference between the inside and the outside.

Levi-Strauss and Laclau: On the virtuality of the boundary

In the following paragraphs I want to draw a more explicit parallel to the structuring of space and discourse, referring to Levi-Strauss's village model and the discursive characteristics of space-making, which have been elaborated throughout this research.

1. The simultaneity of both models shows us that there is an impossibility of reaching a permanent hegemonic order. The discrepancy points us to the issue of the missing link. Harmonious fullness is not reachable.

The splitting up into two perceptions of the village in Levi-Strauss's research points us to a structural instability, which we already have been introduced to by Laclau. It is an imbalance within social relations that prevents the village community from stabilizing itself into a permanent hegemonic order. This imbalance points towards the impossibility of a 'true' social identity. The concurrence of both spatial models in the same moment of time was mentioned only arbitrarily by Levi-Strauss, but it receives particular importance in the context of what is 'virtually real' or 'process-like' about space-making. The virtuality of space defines the procedural appropriation of space into social meaning constellations, and their procedural change. 'Effect' (Laclau) causes temporary articulations of relations, provisional and partial enclosures, and their repeated practises.

2. The two models are not 2 stagnant perspectives of 2 different stable groups in the village, but both groups can adapt at different stages both perspectives.

The spatial model of Levi-Strauss has shown two rather contradicting spatial geometries, but this contradiction only seems to be one, as one searches for the answer to what the *actual* condition of the village structure is. The mental impressions of the village structure that have become clear are not the subject of social relativism, with a spatial organisation that by one group of villagers is perceived differently than by another. Space in the diametrical model is as relevant for the perception and reality of villagers as it is in the concentric model, but the absence of detail in one demonstrates an inequality in relation to the rich description of detail in the other. Diametrical space is a simple symmetrical geometry. Concentric space though is geometric but also textured (brush, cleared ground, timber line, forest). On this ground the existence of two models

of imaginary space can impossibly be led back to the perspective of left and right, inner and outer. It is more likely that what is expressed in the two different spatial models are different kinds of stages in the mental constitution of the self in relation to the village-society and the place. The village is not split into two groups of people, belonging to either side, left or right, or central or peripheral, but all people in the village at certain points in time may experience the village as either diametrical or concentric. This is the most important point.

3. The two models taken together constitute a model for space in the process of making.

Laclau says that, "a situation where only the category of empty signifier was relevant, with total exclusion of the floating moment, would be one in which we would have an entirely immobile frontier – something that is hardly imaginable. Conversely, a purely psychotic universe, where we would have a pure floating without any partial fixation is not thinkable either. So floating and empty signifiers should be conceived as partial dimensions – and so as analytically distinguishable – in any process of hegemonic construction of the people" (Laclau 2005:133).

The process in which discourses formulate are temporarily fixed, destabilized and then changed again describes the full process of the formation of the social. A model of the social is procedural. It contains an element of time. My thesis would be that similar to Laclau's model of hegemony, Levi-Strauss's ambivalent village maps can, if put together, picture a spatial model of the social. As I explained above, the diametric model and the concentric model of the village are not equal, but descriptive of two diverging stages of spatial production. I have also argued at various points in this research that the imagination of interaction with space is the grounds for its physical manifestation. One could amend the question: "At what stage of spatial production does space become physically manifest?" to asking: "Which of the village models captures which processes of space-making?", but at this point it does not suffice to look at the village model any more. Below I want to draw a parallel between the village models and the empirical findings.

The intermediate zone and its relevance for social (spatial) change

Space in the diametrical model is socially real just as it is in the concentric model, but the absence of detail in the imagination of villagers in the former demonstrates a non-equal relationship to the very detailed spatial imagination of the latter. Diametrical space is a simple symmetrical geometry. Concentric space though is geometric as well as it is textured (brush, cleared ground, timber line, forest). Considering that these two spatial models are not equal for the reason that one entirely lacks information on spatial form and detail, we may draw the conclusion that the constitution of the physical environment

is of a different relevance for villagers whose integration into the village community is non-hegemonic. Spatial imagination in the concentric village does not only include the imagination of boundaries, but it also reveals much detail about the materiality and form of boundaries, including the material nature of the spaces inside and beyond those boundaries. In the concentric model, precise enough details exist that would enable physical involvement with space, its appropriation, as well as concrete forms of use. These descriptions suggest interaction with space, or in other words: the described spaces contain the potential to imagine interaction. In the diametrical model such a potential does not exist.

Accessibility and the possibility for a physical and mental engagement, we have learned, are necessary for spatial appropriation – if that space is not already known through other forms of social evaluation. Since spaces cannot be symbolically appropriated only, physical interaction and therefore the actual condition of that space gains importance. I would assume that details, texture, and especially physical characteristics that allow the individual to imagine moving through that space; to imagine appropriating that space through his own body; being physically present in that space; are only perceived if appropriation is not limited to discursive ways of seeing. I would argue with Zerubavel that an environment which is firmly integrated into the meaning-constellations of social reality is a space the meaning and the appropriation of which is limited due to moral focusing. “Not only does our social environment affect how we perceive the world, it also helps determine what actually enters our minds in the first place” (Zerubavel 1997:35). I would assume that because of this, spatial texture and details lose their relevance as soon as an environment has been given a meaning.

The following observations from this research would support this argument:

Interviews have shown that negotiation with the urban environment increases whenever people’s narratives are loosely defined, while people whose social identity appears to be rather rigid have very little interest in other parts of the city. They 'know' in advance what life in a certain part of the city is all about, although they have never actually set foot in these areas. My evaluations on these grounds have been that people who are more open-minded towards the city and its people – like for instance the interviewees in EVIDEA, locate themselves in more diverse forms of imaginary space. They can consider the possibility and imagine living somewhere else, or spend time in other parts of the city they are not so familiar with.

It is no coincidence that neither Cenk nor Başar felt particularly comfortable living in EVIDEA, since the boundaries between private and communal spaces within the SITE and the boundaries between the SITE and the city limit the possibility to appropriate the SITE and its surroundings, both physically and symbolically, in a free way. It is no coincidence either that the SITE in which Başar lives now, and which he feels very

comfortable in, lacks the implicitness with which boundaries were defined in EVIDEA. The intermediate space of the porch in Basar's new SITE now provides him with the opportunity to interact with people on his own terms and not on terms that fixed definitions of the private and communal would dictate. Still within the private realm of his house, but at the same time already outside in the communal space of the neighbourhood, speaking to others while being on his porch, constitutes a form of social interaction freed from convention. Considering that Basar's evaluation of neighbourship and social environs is dynamic as much as it is critical, the spaces of the private villa, the porch, the fence and finally the landscape which constitutes the neighbourhood-space-interlinks, strongly resembles Levi-Strauss's model of the concentric village. In terms of the spatial hierarchy that emanates from the centre, the concentric organization of all space and boundaries, the textural detail of the landscape, and not to forget Başar's ability to be in multiple places at the same time, bear a strong parallel between the two. The porch in this case is a space that functions as an intermediate zone, extending the private space of the home, while making permeable the boundary between the private and the communal space. The new quality of life Başar explains he has gained through this intermediate space supports the idea that the imaginary component of space, together with the possibility of creatively appropriating that space, attains a different role for people who are on more flexible terms with society. Due to the connections that I made between Levi-Strauss's map of the concentric village, Laclau's description of social change as correlative to open narrative structures, and the here-made findings on the spatial construction of social reality, my evaluation is that a symmetrical space relates to the moment of hegemony while concentrically organized space relates to a moment of social change. Intermediate spaces are the location of social change in the way they facilitate imagination and the negotiation of social boundaries. Without intermediate space no social change would be possible.

Initial conclusions concerning the structuring of virtual space

The idea behind developing a theory of the boundary was to bring us closer to some kind of explanatory model of society and space interaction, which ultimately was intended to understand social development through spatial terms.

We have identified a model of the social as an interaction of diverse mental and physical spaces, finding confirmation in the concept of virtual space proposed by various scholars as the location of social reality (Shields; Löw; Berking; Eckardt; Ryan). Since capturing the reality of space with the terminology of the virtual was considered imprecise, I have tried to come one step closer to what virtual space actually means using the here provided theoretical foundation and empirical data. The boundary as a concept for a definition of social and spatial identity lent itself as a suitable theoretical and empirical

tool. Equipped with this tool, I have tried to look for the spatial structure of virtual space asking first of all, whether such a structure might resemble the structures we can find in narratives – “a coming together of *narrational space* and another *virtual spatial structure* that undermines this narrational space in order to obscure its boundaries” (see above). This was the assumption since the reason we are talking of virtual space as “real” is because the reality of space cannot be captured in an empirical moment (Shields). Through the terminology of the virtual we are dealing with a spatial model in which the reality of space is always already past its physical reality. The moment physical space is constructed, its reality has already moved on to another space. Physical space is not a mirror of social reality. Imaginary space, on the other hand, is not the location of reality either, because imaginary space can only exist through its interrelation with the physical world.

To come closer to the structuring of “real space” I asked, at what empirical moment the actualization of space takes place, looking at the imagination, the concretisation and the material manifestation of boundaries. The conclusion was that symmetrical space lacks the imaginary component for actual interaction. Such a symmetrical space for instance could be found in the interviews with Cem, Boran and Bülent who live in Göktürk. Their descriptions of the city contained a very clear idea about what is a good city and what isn’t, coupled with a rather clear dichotomic divide between a self and an *excluded*. These dichotomies constituted the inside of a space which is split and an outside which cannot be perceived, separated by a boundary which the narrator is not aware of. The interesting thing here is that there appears to be a paradoxical structure. Occupying a space that is sharply divided into a here and a there assumes that the space one occupies oneself is continuous. This basically means that to occupy a symmetrical space – and in the case of the people who lived in Göktürk – being contained by a physical boundary – relates to the impression of an open city. The fantasy of the open, non-antagonistic city has the structure of a symmetrical space.

To look at this the other way round, I asked how the city is perceived by an individual who occupies a concentric space – to borrow the terminology of Levi-Strauss. Here we find again a discrepancy. People who occupied a space that is not symmetrical perceive of the space which they occupy themselves as somehow segregated from a space that lies beyond. While occupying a space which is “smooth” (how Deleuze and Guattari (1988) have put it), the anchor points urban space might offer are something these people are aware of, but which are not taken advantage of for the creation of social reality. Living in a SITE themselves, the SITE walls are a strong feature in the perception of their living space in relation to the city. My claim is therefore that we are dealing indeed with a paradoxical structure of real space. It is important though to treat

symmetrical space and concentric space as belonging to the same process of spatial production. The virtuality of space resides precisely in the reciprocity between the two. If we come back to the comparison with the narrative structure that we found in the interviews, certain aspects of spatial and architectural change in the city of Istanbul, which so far have not been discussed any further, appear in another light.

Considering that the policing of social boundaries (the protection of social identity) also means the policing of spatial boundaries, the awareness – or the “becoming-conscious” of the prior, which would lead to their collapse, might also bring to a collapse the boundaries of space wherever they create awareness.

A question that might develop this further could be under what circumstances does the antagonistic structure of spaces in the city create awareness, and what social processes for instance might lead to a de-territorialization of the city?

I want to close my thoughts regarding the structuring of virtual space with an open question concerning some observations made in this research: As already mentioned, certain places of the city like Göktürk have been decisive in changing the architectural mainstream and the direction of architectural production. Göktürk is a place which in a very short time has experienced an almost extreme form of urban fragmentation. Only 15 years after development began, architectural trends have radically changed. What has changed especially was the discourse of architectural production in this area. Many early residents of Göktürk now seek an urban milieu where the languages of gatedness are reverted to connote slander when it comes to the gated community. The gating practises of the discursive other that moved in later have created an awareness concerning the gating practises. To be confronted with the fact that the space one occupied is a space determined by boundaries has been met by people in a variety of ways, ranging from practises of hyperfortification to refraining from the SITE altogether and moving back into the city centre. Further research would be necessary to understand these diverging reactions fully. I argued that a decision to move into the centre can only be made if other forms of imaginary space, and other possibilities including the facilitating component of having money to move, are given. Other forms of imaginary space however depend on the complexity of social interaction in the city, a complexity which we find is shrinking as urban segregation proceeds.

Escaping the gated community is not possible, if the imaginary space is limited to the extent that no other forms of life in the city can be imagined. Hyperfortification may be a reaction in the climate of possibility and space being absent. Feelings of extreme discomfort, panic, hate and other forms of discriminatory behaviour might not be forms of neurosis (Ingin) commonly observed in the neoliberal city by sheer coincidence,

considering the lack of movement and the inhibition of diverse social experience neoliberalism causes, and the lack of spatial imagination that its hegemony exacerbates.

Appendix

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Graphics and images

- Fig. a: taken from: Laclau (2005): On populist reason. New York. Verso
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- Fig. c: taken from: Laclau (2005): On populist reason. New York. Verso
- Fig. d: own drawing
- Fig. e: own drawing
- Fig. f: www.garantimorgage.com / *last updated: 15. Feb. 2013*
- Fig. g: [www. Istanbul-time-travel-experiment.org](http://www.Istanbul-time-travel-experiment.org)
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- Img. 1: <http://wowturkey.com> / *last updated: 15.july 2013*
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- Img. 3/4: personal archive
- Img. 4/5: not known
- Img. 6: personal archive
- Img. 7: Poster by the municipality of Ankara. *Credits: Tolga islam*
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- Img. 26/27/28:personal archive
- Img. 29: [www. Kemerlife21.com](http://www.Kemerlife21.com) / *last updated: 15.july 2013*
- Img. 30/31: <http://www.mar-ka.com> / *last updated: 15.july 2013*
- Img. 32: personal archive

	A	B	C	D	E
1	Boran Ekinci / Boran Ekinci Architects				
2	Boran is an architect who lives in Göktürk. The project he lives in he has designed himself. He has been involved in the architectural design for many SITES.				
3	Rec. Time	personal story	the role as an architect	on the city	on the municipalities
4	00:00	I am from Ankara, I was born some place else. In Diyarbakir – east side, but when I was 5 years old I came to Ankara and lived there. All my friends are from Ankara. You know they are architects, Can Cincici, for example – from Ankara. I knew him from childhood or Mehmet Kütükcüoğlu; they are all from Ankara. My partner Hakan is from Ankara, and there are so many guys. All these people now live in Istanbul. Maybe 80 percent of my friends. They are all living in Istanbul now.			
5	27:50	<p>Team: Can you talk a little bit about the work you did in Göktürk?</p> <p>Boran: In my first project we were three partners. Two friends from high school. Maybe 10 years ago my partner worked with another office, but he had no practise. So they asked me. "Hey, Boran let's do it together", so I started to work together with them on that project and it is maybe the, – not the first but maybe the second – modernist or rationalist project. You know all buildings in this SITE – you know Kemer Country for example – has colonial features and curved forms and small windows. Something like that. Just Han Tümertekin's Aytek. Do you know Aytek? Just this project is modernist, but most people did not like it during that time, because its site plan is weird. I lived there. I like that place but maybe at the first look you don't like it.</p>			
6		<p>So we produced this project (the one he lives in) and the construction company opened it for sale. They sold 60 percent in one day. There was construction going on – it had not even begun yet. But they sold all of it. And every company wanted to build like this. They thought, these kinds of buildings we can build tool. It is selling well. So they started to work with Emre Arolat and Han. Han made two other projects here – not colonial style.</p> <p>I hate this SITE logic. It is meaningless. I don't like it but you can't do anything. It is realistic.</p>			
7	32:29			<p>In Turkey the city is so problematic you know. If you want to built an apartment you have no chance. There is no ground to build. Most places are forbidden – at the Bosphorus for instance. Most of the time you have to tear down another building.</p> <p>You know in Ankara if you want to build a house you can buy a plot and build it, because city planners plan for a growing city. It's alright. It's logical. But there is no such planning in Istanbul. Just some guys making SITES. It's stupid.</p> <p>There are transformation projects. Istanbul needs these transformation projects. Maybe 90 percent of Istanbul will change. It's a huge city and terrible! When you look from a birds eye view, Beyoglu is small. Every place is so terrible. They have to change. And maybe 100 years later Istanbul will have changed.</p> <p>Team: But you would still like to live in Beyoglu.</p> <p>Boran: Badgat Cadessi, Nisantasi, Beyoglu. Old city. Old City is kind of nice but the new city. There is nothing in the new city.</p>	
8	54:30				<p>Göktürk is connected to Eyüp municipality. I went to Eyüp one time for a job. We have good relations with the municipality. I begged them. I wrote a new set of planning rules and I said. Please do it like that. Consider it. Because there are such stupid things. Do you know what <i>cikma</i> is? (he draws a <i>cikma</i> – a bay.) They said: "You have permission to build without counting the square meter space of the <i>cikma</i>." So everybody builds <i>cikmas</i>. The other one is <i>sacak</i>. And they say you have to build <i>sacak</i>, but you don't count inside the roof. This is Istanbul style. This is Istanbul buildings. At the Bosphorus; in Göktürk.</p> <p>Team: So it's not an aesthetic thing? It's maximum use of space? But what interest does the municipality have in allowing these kinds of forms?</p>

	A	B	C	D	E
3	Rec. Time	personal story	the role as an architect	on the city	on the municipalities
9					<p>Boran: Hikaye! (Narrative) There used to be a guy called Sedad Hakki Eldem. He led the second national style. He used to be a good architect, but he made many of these buildings. The students of Sedad Hakki Eldem imagine the Bosphorus and the city like a Seda Hakki theme city. Because of that they force people to build these kinds of buildings. The municipality knows that developers will comply to that.</p>

	A	B	C	D	E
1	Cem Erözü / Cem Erözü Architects				
2	Cem lives in Göktürk and has his own architectural office in Nisantasi. He went to the German High School in Istanbul and lived and worked longer periods in Austria.				
3	Rec. Time	personal story	the role as an architect	on the city	on the municipalities
4	1:00	The actual inhabitants of Göktürk are now and ever badly off. They did not manage to start their businesses there. We often see some shops open and then they close again.			
5	09:00	I used to live in Cihangir but when the children arrived – of course it makes it impossible to live in this city. The children need space to move freely.			
6	11:26	<p>My wife and I talked about this yesterday; that when the children are old enough to start university, we would consider moving back into the city but this time not directly into the city but more on the Asian side – around Bagdat Caddesi or between Badgat Caddesi and the coast. Because the coastal zone also offers very good conditions for living. For instance one can cycle or walk on the promenade. One can sit there. The air is good.</p> <p>But I would never live in the city itself. For instance, I would never live in Nisantasi, even if it's ever so close.</p> <p>Team: For most people Nisantasi is a very attractive neighbourhood.</p> <p>Cem: Not for me. Because now I can take advantages of cultural offers also on the Asian side. For a concert or the theatre one can go there sometimes or also combine it by taking the boat and the bike. To Nisantasi, it is really easy to get to. Therefore I prefer a better protected place for living.</p>			
7	34:16	<p>Being an architect I can discuss these things with the authorities. For instance the regulations concerning building heights. They are at 9 meters 50 centimeters. I can say:</p> <p>"Well I don't want to build at 9.50. I want to build at 12.50 – I want another storey."</p> <p>But in return I will pull back the building from the plot boundaries and create some more free space on the ground. So all in all I have slightly higher buildings, but I have more quality on the ground. So this is a thing I can make a deal about.</p> <p>The planning system in Turkey today depends on some basic form of trust.</p> <p>There are a lot of people who are like foxes, who make sure that they get more and more. They try everything. So the guy at the authorities, who has no expertise, simply reacts by saying no to everything because they are afraid that I get 12.50 meter and on top of it I can also build according to the building width legitimately.</p>			
8		<p>Team: So he does not trust that you will do as you say?</p> <p>Cem: No. But I would say to the authorities. "It is your duty to maintain control over these things. Because this is your job." As an architect I can make an alternative solution, and then we can discuss what is better, but this kind of discussion has to happen between experts, not between an architect and a politician. So that's why in Turkey architects have very little chance to be assertive.</p>			

	A	B	C	D	E
3	Rec. Time	personal story	the role as an architect	on the city	on the municipalities
9	35:30				<p>The municipalities have a completely different perspective on all of this. (he means planning) Because some idiot managed to convince the municipality to erase minimum spacings toward the plot boundaries. The municipalities thought: "Oh, great! – per 100 sqm we can build 10 sqm extra, and then we can earn 100 Euro per sqm on the side." I thought that Göktürk municipality was one amongst three municipalities in the whole of Turkey without debt. They constructed like champions out there.</p> <p>This commission grants permission for construction They cannot even differentiate a plan from a section. They can't read technical drawings. So we had to explain to them: "This is three- dimensional etc." If I had a position in the municipality I could discuss with the architects wonderfully. I could listen to their offers and then we could, as experts, discuss our aims. You see we have common aims. Quality of life. We could find a middle way somewhere, and then realize it.</p> <p>Team: What about the cityscape? Maximum profit is of course one factor. But city marketing these days is of course very important.</p> <p>Cem: (very assertive) Not an issue!</p>
10	39:50				<p>Team: And there is no exercise of influence on building typologies? Cem: (Shakes his head.) Team: (talks about the conversation with Boran Ekinci, who said that bays and other formal elements that are characteristic of the Sedad Hakki Eldem house are encouraged through building regulations. Cem: I'm hearing this theory for the very first time. That there is an attempt to bring back the Sedad Hakki Eldem style by not counting bays to the ground sqm amount. Might be. But those people who I'm dealing with certainly do not know Sedad Hakki Eldem's name.</p> <p>Team: No, but there is an image of style one can have in one's head.</p> <p>Cem: The cultural level of these guys cannot possibly be in accordance with that. Perhaps those people in the greater municipality – yes. There the people have a little bit more of an idea of these kinds of things. But in Eyüp for example...</p>

	A	B	C	D	E
3	Rec. Time	personal story	the role as an architect	on the city	on the municipalities
11					<p>Just a while ago I had an argument with the municipality of Hadimköy.(...) There we have two factory buildings. For me, cityscape is a very relevant issue because I have written my master's thesis on this. Cityscape for me means first of all adjustment to the locality...and integrating certain attributes that help orientation in the city. My problem on the Asian side for instance is that I am constantly lost because one cannot differentiate between places there. Everything looks the same. But on the European side; in the historical neighbourhood. In Nisantasi for instance it is not possible to get lost. You can always orientate yourself. For instance, with reference to these factory buildings, I always make sure that I integrate such accentuations that facilitate orientation.</p>
12					<p>Yet after the owner of this factory had changed, the new owner just put an extra storey on top it; on top of my factory! Without my knowledge! I saw this and, – I sued them. You cannot do this. It was a very beautiful building according to my means. We did a lot of work there. You cannot do this. You can't just build a row of columns along the outer facade of the long section and put an extra storey on top.You cannot do this! And the municipality...? (mimics ignorance) Ok I said, then I'm going to sue you as the municipality; and then we can see. You either take a position or (..) This is an illegal building.</p> <p>Now I see the cultural level.This guy; he doesn't give a damn, and he doesn't even know about the existence of a law to protect authorship of architecture. He has absolutely no idea. How can I talk with such a person about quality of life, cityscape, materiality etc.?</p>

Nevzat Sayin / NSMH Mimarlik (Nevzat Sayin architectural services)

Interview written down from memory

Team: Can you tell me about the key concept of EVIDEA?

Nevzat: People want to be together. This segregation in the city is really a big problem, but I believe that people don't want to live in segregation. They want to be together but they don't know how. I am a socialist. And for me a very big role model for a city is Red Vienna. You know the concept? (he starts drawing the plan of EVIDEA)

We wanted to create a space where everybody can be together. Do you know the Karl-Marx-Hof? There is a block here, here and here. (draws 4 blocks that form an internal courtyard)

There needs to be some wind coming through for the air to circulate, and in this courtyard there are a number of functions. For example, over here there is an area with only nice smells, the green, flowers and so on, and here an area with restaurants – a barbecue.

The interior space of this courtyard is very beautiful, but I would not know how to do that. I mean I can describe how I want this to be. I can describe an atmosphere, but for the design of the interior space we work together with a landscape architect, and they did a very good job. This project is the first in Turkey. There are no other examples of this kind. We presented the project to the client. At first, they did not want it. They were very suspicious about this working. They said: "This looks like a communist block, we won't do it". Our answer was: "Yes of course – it is a communist block". We explained the project and at the end we voted. There were 45 people and we voted 3 times. It was 40 people who were in favour of it and only 5 who were against it. Now it's very successful. The construction was planned to be done in phases. (In this model of development, the money that comes in through the first sold units pays for the construction of those that follow. This way interest rates are saved.) But after the first one, they decided to do the other 3 in one go. It's really incredible. In the summer, it is full. They don't go away for holiday in the summer. People go there to spend their summer. But (...) there is not a second project like EVIDEA in Istanbul. It is the only project like that. Often when there is one project of a new kind and they sell, others follow. There is another project we made also. "Narcity". It is similar and now I am planning another project close by.

Team: I talked to somebody who used to live in EVIDEA. Their decision was also based on the layout of the SITE. They found it through a property company. He now lives in another place – another SITE with a villa typology. He said that the interior courtyard was the decisive feature for their decision.

Nevzat: In EVIDEA you have the choice. You can be in the front of your apartment; or towards the courtyard. All units are oriented towards that courtyard. If you want to be alone you can go to the back of your apartment.

We created this project in order to say: "This is for you". Maybe not for everyone but sometimes you have to be able to say this. It's hard but it's important. (We talked a bit about villa type SITES in Turkey.)

Team: The example of Karl-Marx-Hof – Red Vienna. To me it seems that it is part of a greater whole. The Karl-Marx-Hof was never suggested as a solitary project. There are surroundings that are adapted to it – like a continuation of it. EVIDEA, however, has nothing around it.

Nevzat: Yes, unfortunately.

Team: Well, if you could decide on the surroundings, if you were a planner, how would you design the city around EVIDEA?

Nevzat: (picks up the pencil and starts drawing)

I thought that if it was possible to have many EVIDEAs (draws a grid with many courtyard developments) how this might be. Here there could be a project like EVIDEA, here there could be a park (he draws one of the blocks not as a block-border construction but as an empty

block), here there could be other functions like public functions (after a few seconds he has finished sketching a grid-city).

Team: What about the streets? In your drawing there is public space between the blocks, what would it be like? I mean the outer facade of EVIDEA is very closed. There are only bedroom windows, but no windows on the ground floor go down all the way. There are no doors. It is a typical backside of a building.

Nevzat: Yes, I really don't like the outer facade of EVIDEA. It was not my idea. I did not plan it this way. I don't understand why they made it this way.

Team: So, in your idea of the city it would be different.

Nevzat: (starts drawing again) Yes, of course. Some of the streets could be quiet; some cafes maybe; other streets however could be wider. They could be like main arteries (draws main axes into the grid he has already drawn).

Team: To me this drawing occurred a bit like Berlin Blockrandbebauung. I knew that Nevzat had just returned from Berlin so I asked him whether he had liked Berlin.

Nevzat: I stayed in the Hotel Hayat in Potsdamer Platz. It is a very good place. They did a very good job there. There are these arcades. Right next to the Sony Center, there are these arcades by Renzo Piano. They are fantastic. It is the best example of arcades in the world. There are a lot of very good projects. Also behind the Brandenburg Gate, there is a project by Rem Koolhaas. But I don't understand why it is so very empty. I also went to the Philharmonie. A very beautiful building. The acoustics are amazing. I changed my position from there to there to there. (draws a sketch of the interior spaces, making dots where he sat) and here I figured, here is the best place. From here you can see the conductor.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Basar Senin / lives in: EVIDEA, Ümraniye						
2	Basar first came to Istanbul in 2002. He works in the Is-Bank Headquarters in Levent as an IT engineer. Upon his arrival in Istanbul he first moved to his cousin`s apartment. She runs a small art space. She lives in Pangalti. Then he got married and moved to EVIDEA together with his wife. When she was expecting their second child, they looked for a bigger place. Now he lives in a Villa-type SITE on the Road to Şile, north of Ümraniye.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4	05:37						Basar: We looked at developments by certain companies. Team: You went along more according to company names? Basar: A bit like that, yes. This Yapi Kredi Koray (a real estate investment company). It is a company with a very good name. We looked at SITES in the area that were by this company.
5	06:10						The constructor was of course a criteria. Projects we did not know the developer of (...) It had to be a developer that is a bit more trustworthy. For instance we looked at places by Agaoglu; a company that has a name. This was a criteria.
6	06:10		I thought the place was quite central. In terms of transport it was a rather central place. An ideal location. It was said that the metro will be brought there as well. So it was a strategic choice. In 2015 there would be a metro. We had only one car for example. So I thought even if I go to Taksim on some evening without my wife, I can come quite comfortably back to EVIDEA. There is a bus from there, so I can come back home comfortably.				
7	08:00		When we took a look (at EVIDEA) from the outside, it actually looked repulsive. Team: What did it look like? Basar: It looked like a prison. Not very attractive. You could say like a prison. From the outside there is nothing appealing about it. But the inside is different. A very different, very green place. All the colours add to it. You know the coloured sun-panels you see from the outside? They also block the noise (...) but we heard this from many of our friends. Looking at it from the outside they thought: "What kind of place is this?" But from the inside it was a different experience. Those blinds – there is not just one kind, but every balcony is different.				

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
8	09:15		<p>There is a feeling that you can easily be seen from across the other side. But actually it is too far away. It is not possible to see what is going on on the other side. There is full height glass for example. In our kitchen for instance there used to be glass from floor to ceiling. You can see the whole SITE from there. It is a nice place.</p> <p>The balcony as well. I really liked it. My wife also liked it. We looked for a place with a balcony in fact.</p> <p>Team: On which floor did you live? Basar: On the 7th floor. I preferred that. You have a larger view. I thought that on the lower floors it could be a bit enclosed. So a balcony from which you could have a view (...) and the kitchen (...) we had an open kitchen and 3 rooms. In fact the open plan kitchen model in that SITE was this one.</p>				
9	14:40					<p>Team: Did you use any of the facilities in the SITE? Basar: We could not really take advantage of it much. If you come home around 7 or 7.30 you are kind of tired. Before we had our first child we had some more time to use the facilities. For example on the weekend – for an hour or two we could go to the pool. One year later when we had a child we could not really benefit from that anymore. If you are single, and you don't have children you can do that a lot more. Perhaps it's also a question of mentality; of attitude (...) a need to change your focus. All of our focus was on the child.</p>	
10	17:50				<p>What I realized was this. Those that use the pool a lot are women that don't work. Housewives. They can spend the whole day there. From the morning until the evening without leaving. I realized that this place is mostly appreciated by people who don't work. When you move to this SITE and you enjoy its facilities you kind of look at it as some kind of 5 star hotel. Especially in the summer. Going on holiday, booking into some hotel is nonsense. There is a huge pool. If you're a bit weak there is a cafeteria.</p>		
11	23:32			<p>Team: Can you tell us a little bit about what places in the city you go to? Basar: I used to live close to Taksim. At that time I used to go to places near it. When I got married I went more to places like Nisantasi. When we moved to the Asian side. We went more towards the Boulevard (Bagdat Caddesi). To Taksim, I can say, I did not go for a long time. When some friends who work here, get together to go to Taksim I join. When I go out with my wife we rather go to some places on the Asian side. We use the coast near Bagdat Caddesi a lot as well. For eating fish we prefer going to some places in Istinye / Yeniköy. This side we don't really visit that much anymore. Titanic (a restaurant) for example. On the other side we know some places that opened recently. So we really use the other side more than coming here.</p>			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
12	26:00						<p>Team: Do you know about the development near the Black Sea coast?</p> <p>Basar: Well in these forest areas it is not allowed to build. But those are lands with 2 b status. They are opening these to construction. I guess you know that. So they will fill up I believe. And how this is going to happen is quite crucial. If they are going to build villas it is one thing, but if they are going to build apartments it is a another thing.</p> <p>Team: But you don't know how it is going to develop?</p> <p>Basar: No I don't know.</p> <p>Now if the weather is good I'm spending time out in the garden. From there I can see the forest. The trees. I can hear the birds sing. The noise of the animals I can hear from our garden. If they are going to build apartments to the north of our SITE it will create a wall. It can become uncomfortable.</p>
13	28:15						<p>Team: In comparison to EVIDEA: What are your neighbours like? Did you make any contacts in EVIDEA? – friends? How about the place you live in now?</p> <p>Basar: Well of course we have to look at our own behaviour as well. Of course we greet our neighbours but somebody that we go to, or say: "come over to our place" (...) No. we did not have any friends like that. Just people which we thought were nice and whom we met sometimes on our way saying "hi, hello how are you?" when we arrived. Somebody invited us for dinner. But the fact that we never went (...) it is actually our fault – our very own fault.</p> <p>People used to do a lot of stuff together, watch football together, play cards – and they weren't all from the same apartment. They lived in different apartments. They must have met there. (in the SITE)</p> <p>It is very nice in fact. If you want you can throw a party – invite everybody.</p>
14	31:28						<p>In EVIDEA you don't come across a lot of people. The elevator – this is something I liked – Your parking lot is very close to the apartment. There are quite a few parking places, but when you go down by elevator your car is right there. So you go down, get in the car and go.</p> <p>Then, on your way between the elevator and the car you don't really meet any people. But now when I get home I greet my neighbours. From my porch I see when neighbours are coming home. It's a very different environment. These front-gardens. When people cross through you see each other say hello, have a chat. It is a bit more intimate. If you sit on your porch and you hear people talking on the street you say hello and sometimes join in for a conversation. Its a smaller SITE as well. (50 villas and 150 people / it was 500 people in EVIDEA)</p>
15	39:00						<p>When we were sitting on our balcony in EVIDEA you could sometimes feel a little bit uncomfortable about the traffic noise.</p> <p>Team: Although your balcony faces the inside of the SITE.</p> <p>Basar: It faces the inside but the SITE is not entirely enclosed. There are these gaps between the block. The traffic noise comes in through there. I guess in the D-Block, that one furthest away from the motorway there is less noise, but where we lived you could feel uncomfortable sometimes.</p> <p>Noise was definitely a factor. At least for my wife. I don't care that much; however if the balcony door is open you cannot understand what is said on the TV, you have to turn up the volume. Sometimes when sitting on the balcony you hear certain things, which you might not hear another time. It's psychological -- if you're enjoying yourself you don't mind it.</p>

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
16	43:57				<p>Basar: There is this summer welcoming party. This creates a lot of noise. Because they don't control it. It is a management problem.</p> <p>Team: It is once a year right?</p> <p>Basar: Yes, once a year. But it drove us crazy. You see, our child had just been born. We could not participate. Inside the baby was sleeping and outside there is this a noise like growling thunder. For hours and hours, until midnight we sat. We closed our living room door, from the back room. They could have just paid a little bit more attention actually.</p> <p>Team: But they informed people of this event didn't they?</p> <p>Basar: Sure they did.</p>		

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Burak Kilyaran / lives in: EVIDEA, Ümraniye						
2	Burak has recently finished university and is now 26 years old. He is an IT engineer working for an IT company on a shift basis. He plays in a rock band and often performs in bars in Kadıköy and Beyoğlu.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	on the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4	00:00	I first lived in Ortaköy in a small house because it was close to my university. It was a cheap house and I don't think I would live there right now. I don't think I could stand more than one hour in that house because it was kind of horrible. For one year I was there. I had a friend who bought a house in Besiktas, so I moved to his house and stayed there for a year and a half. Then I moved to Üsküdar. It was a nice duplex house. It was not a fancy house but it had a room upstairs, so I lived there three years. The first year I lived there on my own. The second year my brother came to Istanbul for his studies. And I lived with him there for a year and a half – or something like that. He is still studying in Yeditepe University. He was always telling me that it is so far from Üsküdar to go to University, so he wanted to live somewhere nearby, also in a complex, that has a swimming pool, that has a garage for the cars and other facilities. So we were looking for a house around here or maybe in Atasehir.					
5	6:26		First we looked for a house in Atasehir but the rents were very high. For example the Uphill Courts which were his goal; but the rents were very high. And then someone, a friend of ours – a friend of my brother who was living here said: "Hey you should take a look here. It is nice I think you would like it". Then we were looking at some places close by and we liked some houses there, and my brother said he had a friend who was living here and we should look here. You know outside of this place you can't understand anything. It just looks like old style German blocks, close to each other. Like ghettos maybe. And I said "what"? (in bewilderment) I don't think it will be nice inside. But when we entered – you know my house was there at first (pointing to another flat across the block) – it was a big house at first. The first house that they showed us was that one. So we just loved the house and we made the agreement on the same day.				
6	9:30	My house was there first. It was big. 3 rooms. My landlord decided to sell my apartment (in EVIDEA). We lived there for 2 years. But the rent was high. At first it was 1350 for three rooms. But it was like 140 meters square. It was too big for us. I think my brother was spoiled at that time. Team: But the parents paid? Burak: Yes the parents paid.					
7	17:00	Yeah, first we were looking in Atasehir. We were a little bit ignorant about here, and also other places in Istanbul where there are complexes. So we had Atasehir in mind because we knew there were nice complexes there. So we visited a few complexes including Uphill Court and there are some more complexes of Agaogolu (a developer) But we found out that the rents were really high. At that time this house (here) at 1350 TL had a very nice view, and in Uphill Court an apartment of 90 sqm, without a nice view was 1400; and I didn't like the ambience there. When you go inside, you just realize that people don't know each other. And people are only living there. It is not a nice habitat let's say. But when I came here (...) you just see it on people's faces that when they see a stranger they think. "Who is this? Is he new here?" It's like people know each other here.					
8	18:50						Burak: We also looked at Nar City. Team: The same architect. Burak: Yeah? Oh yes, it looked quite similar.

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	on the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
9	20:20						Team: Do you use any of the facilities? Burak: Well, yes, I do. We played a lot of table tennis with my brother and I sometimes watched football games with our neighbours. We watch together down in the restaurant. And I use the swimming pool when I come home from work Also during the weekends. But most of the time it's very crowded during the summer, because people invite their friends.
10	22.00		In the first week in which we were here, it was summer and we were down at the swimming pool and we were talking about the house as a "room". As if it were a hotel – "Hey I forgot my towel in the room" (laughs)				
11	25:50			Team: Do you have to go to Beyoğlu for music? Or is there anything on the Asian side? Burak: We played in "Shaft" for instance. It is the best club on the Asian side for rock music. Team: You like Kadıköy or Beyoğlu but you don't consider living there? Burak: Yeah, I do. I would love to, but you should decide whether you want to live in an apartment or in the city. Like – in the heart of the city – always busy, or if you want to live nearby the office. And in a nice (...) I mean a better house with better conditions and facilities (...) but now I'm working, and I have gone out to the bars a lot. When I was a student and when I was at high school.			
12				Very nice staff – One thing that made me like this complex more. We went to the swimming pool with a girlfriend of mine. And we came back and she said. "Oh, I forgot my glasses". She had just bought them. She had forgotten them in the restaurant. So I called the restaurant and they said, "Yes, we found your glasses". So I said to them, "Okay, we will get them tomorrow. Please keep them for us". And the next day we went to the restaurant and they could not find the glasses. The guy I was talking to said, "They were right here next to the till", but they could not find them. So the owner came and asked what the problem was. He said he knew my name and he said, "Hey Burak please give us a couple of hours, and I will call you in your apartment". I said "ok", so he called and he said that he could not find the glasses and he promised me that he would pay whatever the price was for the glasses. So one day we went to the swimming pool, and I saw the guy and he said. "Hey Burak, we are very sorry we don't know what happened to your glasses; so please tell me how much they were".			
13	33:17				My girlfriend told him that they were 400 lira, so he took out his wallet and paid her 400 lira – directly without any question. Team: Because they were first found and then lost? Burak: Yeah. Team: If they had not found them before, they would have had no obligations at all. Burak: Yes that's right. Team: Also this way they had no obligations. Burak: Yea. Also for example. I thought that, if I had raised this issue in the mailing list of the complex (...) "Hey the restaurant had my glasses and they lost them, and they won't do anything about it", it would be very bad for them.		

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	on the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
14					<p>"I can't stand living in Üsküdar, let's move to a better place. Let's move to Uphill Court."</p> <p>I agreed on one point with him. During my study years I was living in the heart of the city. I had a good night life. I was going out every night, but I also wanted to live in a good SITE. So I agreed with my brother on that point and we started to look at Uphill Court and other places.</p> <p>Team: But for you it was more about having more friends? A better social life?</p> <p>Burak: It was subconscious. (laughs)</p> <p>I wasn't thinking about having more friends at that time, but it was in my mind from my childhood, I came to realize.</p> <p>Team: And is it fulfilled here? Do you make friends here?</p> <p>Burak: Yeah, a lot. If I go downstairs I'm pretty sure that I can find someone to go to the pool or to play tennis. I'm pretty sure.</p>		
15	36:30	<p>Burak: When I was a child, we had a summer house in Cesme, but it was not a SITE and I was always looking at the children who were living in a SITE. They always had a lot of friends. (...) I thought it would be so cool to live in a SITE. So I always had this in mind when moving to a SITE. "When you're moving to a SITE you have more friends", I thought. (...) For example: I was living in Üsküdar and I was buying my furniture from a second hand store. I like it and I don't like to spend money either. For example, I don't buy new stuff for myself. But my brother is totally different than I am. For example: I did not have a car in Istanbul; but my brother when he turned 18 he forced my parents to buy a car. So then he moved to Istanbul, and the first day he said that he couldn't live with this furniture and he wanted to replace them. So we went to IKEA and we bought a lot of stuff for the house. I was totally different.</p>					
16	59:00				<p>Team: Do people gossip in a way that you don't like?</p> <p>Burak: No. I was telling you, that while I was living in the bigger house I had a neighbour. He was living alone. He was divorced. He was 36 years old. Because of his job he was travelling a lot. We had a good relationship. Sometimes I was going to his house to watch football. Sometimes he was coming here. He was kind of religious. Sometimes people bring him alcohol when they travel abroad. And he does not like to drink. The first day we met my mother and my brother were at home so I invited him to ours.</p>		
17					<p>He also had his parents staying with him. They came and they were really nice people. We say "Anatolian people". In the first minute we became friends. He saw my bottles and asked me if I like whiskey and which brands I liked. So I said my first choice is always Johnnie Walker Black Label, Jack Daniels and then Jim Beam, so he said: "Come with me". And we walked to his house and he gave me one Johnnie Walker Black and one Jack Daniels. This was on the first day we met.</p>		

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Cenk Akar / lives in: EVIDEA, Ümraniye						
2	Cenk grew up in Samatya. He is 25 years old. His parents bought an apartment in EVIDEA while he was at university. They live there together.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	On the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4	6:00			<p>Team: Where would you want to live? Cenk: Kadiköy. Not the European side. The European side is too hectic. Team: More hectic than Kadiköy? Cenk: The European side? I think so. Yes. Because you see Kadiköy, up to Bagdad Street there are very beautiful places to live, like Suadiye, Bostanci. These places are elite – peaceful. Not in the center of Kadiköy. Around Kadiköy. I think Kadiköy is more beautiful than Taksim.</p>			
5	11:00		<p>When we started living here – because we were one of the first people who lived here – we knew those that were coming in after us. When we were playing football it was us who started and other people began to join us. You need a chance to join. So we had formed a group and once you have formed a group you don't have a problem anymore. Whenever you are up for a match, you call one another, go down (into the court) and play. We even go out to play. If there are any friends from other SITES we go outside to play with them. Our pitch is very small. Theirs is big. There is for example "Idealist" (another SITE). On the other side there is "Agaoglu Country". In this area, there are a lot of SITES – In Cekmeköy. Near <i>Idealist</i> there are a lot more, but we never went there. Only in <i>Idealist</i> we had plenty of friends.</p>				
6	13:45		<p>Team: What about age in this SITE? Are there a lot of children in this SITE? Cenk: There are a lot of people who are waiting in line. Now you don't find an available apartment in this place. They are all gone.</p>				
7	16:30		<p>Team: Was it a change for you moving to EVIDEA? How did you feel about the different SITE? Cenk: All the flats face the inside. Living together is a very nice experience for people. People gather in the courtyard. This works as a social centre. It is the right kind of place for making friends – chatting to people. It is like I said. Whenever you go down there – it does not matter what kind of family – whether you have a kid, a partner. If you are sitting around at home, you can get bored. It is a bit like Kadiköy. You can just go outside. There is no other place in the area. That is why you can very easily make friends here. You don't stay on your own here.</p>				
8	19:44			<p>Team: Whenever you have time on the weekend, where do you go, what do you do? Cenk: There is "Meydan" on top of the hill. It is a shopping centre. It has a nice cinema. We go there. In Cekmeköy there are some nice coffee shops. The closest is Atasehir. The coffee shops in Atasehir. If we go a bit further away, there is Bagdat Caddesi. I hang out in Kadiköy most of the time. You can go anywhere. You don't have to depend on the shuttle. Because I have a car. But you can take a dolmuş as well. My brother for instance takes the dolmuş. Around here there are many kinds of transportation. They go everywhere. You can take a dolmuş to Üsküdar and from there it's easy to get to Taksim. If you want to go to other corners of the European side, that's difficult – traffic. You have to make your arrangements one day before. When you go, then you have to stay. When both bridges are jammed it is a nightmare. Every day the same nightmare. You have to avoid rush hour.</p>			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	On the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
9	23:00						<p>Team: There are some plans to make a better road network.</p> <p>Cenk: It's too late.</p> <p>Team: Why too late?</p> <p>Cenk: Because the population is already larger than the capacity of this city. Turks, before they built the sewers, started building the roads. Then they dug out the roads to build more sewers, but in an insufficient manner (...) More digging again (...) There is no plan. That's for sure. All spontaneous. Whatever is believed to be needed – right away it's done. But without a plan. It can take 10 nights. Whatever it is that needs to be done. And no one thinks: "Are we disturbing people or is it fine to do it now?" For sure there is no thought wasted on that. People should not be troubled by this work.</p>
10	27:00						<p>I went to Brisbane. It is a newly founded city. It is regarded as a third world metropolis by the Australians, yet everything there is according to plan. The place is founded on a riverbed. Everything is planned. "This is going to be there, that is going to be there". I cannot say that about Istanbul. Perhaps it can become like that in a few years. As a result of the construction. Especially Istanbul. Those things that would have been necessary ages ago. Australia is very different. There is no comparison actually. But one thing I can say. You are free there. You can sit by the coast and drink beer. And everyone does it. Nobody says anything. I had a Turkish friend in Australia. We travelled together. We were sitting outside with our beer bottles wrapped in newspaper. Within a second, security turns up; looks at us (...) We had a hotel but (...) you see we are regarded as a threat. Everything is forbidden. You always have these watchdogs. They have a problem with everything. A life under control.</p>
11	29:12						<p>Cenk: Let me return to construction. You have seen our buses. In Australia they have the same; but it is done so well over there. In the city centre there are high rise buildings. – Skyscrapers. These skyscrapers connect to the road though. At the basement level there are bus stops. Every block has its own bus stops. You can be sure that you won't find bus stops there like the ones you have seen in Kadiköy (...)</p> <p>Take a look at the construction here. It is chaos. There is absolutely no system. Everybody does as it pops into his head. Over there for example in these forests they built houses. If you take a look on Google Maps you can see. In 2010 this area was totally different.</p>
12							<p>They started to go into the forests. But they don't think, "If the forests are gone would people still like to live here?" In America, in Australia, we played football. There are large football fields. Large green areas the size of this SITE. There are green areas as well as construction, but here? (...) Do you remember the park we passed by on our way to EVIDEA? It was between two motorways. There are no more parks in Istanbul. The irregular construction of the city has killed areas like this. That's why there is all this going on about urban transformation.</p>
13	34:50						<p>Team: Did your family buy this apartment before it was constructed?</p> <p>Cenk: Yes, beforehand. It comes cheaper this way.</p> <p>Team: Did you ask them how they chose? (...) because personally I would be scared to buy something that I cannot see. Did you ask them? Did you wonder about this?</p> <p>Cenk: It was a matter of trust in the construction company.</p> <p>Team: Which one is it?</p> <p>Cenk: Yapı Kredi, Garanti. Garanti Bank provided the finance.</p>
14							<p>Yapı Kredi Koray is the construction company. People trust those names. They pay money before they get what they are buying. And of course it is possible to see in advance what you are going to get. Before my parents came here, there was a Sinpas-Project up the road. "Sinpas Aqua City". The houses there look like normal 3 to 4 apartment houses. Also a large SITE. With a pool and stuff. They decided on this one. So it's a matter of preference and trust.</p>

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	On the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
15	40:50				<p>Team: Is there anything you don't like about this place? Cenk: Kids! Team: Why? Cenk: Well. I'm not pissed off with them actually. They just grow up. But I grew up in the streets – in Samatya. In the streets you are faced with danger on a day-to-day basis. You are faced with strangers on a day-to-day basis. You create these experiences. You learn how to behave in these situations. These kids here are enclosed by four walls. Too much energy building up. There is a lot to complain about. I'm talking about an age group of 15-year-old teenagers. They make life uncomfortable for people. They do stupid things. We have done this as well. But because it is here, it causes trouble. I have done that. In my neighbourhood everybody had his own house. Who is going to know what you're up to?</p>		
16					<p>If people deserved it, I would throw snowballs or plums against their windows. But in here, because everybody knows everybody, you can't do that. People can go mad. So in EVIDEA there is a website you can become a member of. So if you have something to complain about you can do it there. On the forum. For instance that there is the screaming of kids all night long. People argue about stuff but they never actually face one another directly online.</p>		
17					<p>They start arguing that way. We have a SITE manager. I'm here now for about 5 to 6 years. Since I have been here the number of people participating in the election of the SITE manager has decreased. It becomes less and less personal. Even I wrote on that forum recently. The kids are making trouble, about whatever, until long after midnight, because they are closed in within these four walls. It's really unnerving. People are working. Most people work, only some are retired. In the city the noise stops at some point but not here. Now it has gotten better, because there were a lot of complaints. But generally 12 o'clock, 1 o'clock. Why? Because people sit in the cafe at these hours. If the adults sit around there at this hour the kids will do the same. There is nobody to stop them. But if nobody stops them, they will carry on like this. They will. They are children. They have an inner urge. Look, there is a small park here, there is some lawn. The crowd that hangs out at the edge of the pool is certainly 15-year-olds – perhaps 20. They hang around there, chat. That's the way it is. There is no other place to go. (...) When I used to live in Kadiköy, we went all the way up to Kartal. You were independent. You could go anywhere. But here, you are like a dog in a cage.</p>		
18	40:50		<p>Team: Are there any places to walk to from here? Cenk: Well, I will tell you something. The population in this area – I mean the people who live in the surrounds (...) Between them and the people who live in this SITE, there is a big gap. In terms of education – the way people think is due to that. For instance: Behind here are the walls, and behind the walls, there are fields, vacant spaces. We have a friend who lives right at the end of the area there. On the ground floor. In a house with a garden. Just at the end of the field, his flat is oriented outwards, overlooking the field. We could see him from here. Whatever he does. There is a big gap between us.</p>				

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Bülent Arkali / lives in: Istanbul Istanbul, Göktürk						
2	Bülent used to work as a pharmacist for the Turkish army. He is a retired Colonel. They came to Istanbul during his study years. He has been living in Istanbul Istanbul since 2003. They have a daughter who went to the Austrian lise. She now lives in San Francisco.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4	00:00						I believe this SITE was constructed by a French architect. An award-winning architect.
5	03:00		Bülent: What can we say concerning the choice of this SITE? For us the SITE had to be out of the city. It seemed a very tranquil place – a place to relax one's mind (...) and – we are 2 people and this space is about 160 sqm large. It offers a lot of different uses. Every centimetre is designed nicely and well usable.				
6	03:55		Bülent: Please don't be offended (addressing my Turkish partner) The Turkish people do not know how to live in these kinds of places. Before we (the Turkish people) came to live in these places, we did not have any criteria of choice. A female neighbour has chosen a triplex with an interior staircase. She chooses to climb the stairs every day. I, on the other hand, am living on the floor below, in a duplex, the sqm space, I mean – the usable space is quite a bit less than hers – but when they think they need a staircase, they have to climb it.				
7	04:40		The architecture for us was a reason of choice. If you think of the social facilities as being very convenient... Well (...) a short time after we settled here the values increased.				
8	04:40				People who have bought at prices around 2 thousand, started to sell at one and a half million. Therefore, you see in our country the relationship between money and culture is a contradiction. People with money who have no culture began to live here. If they see people who, like you, are from a more intelligent class background, (aydin sinif). If you are intellectual, they crush you. How you ask? Here, there and everywhere they listen to arabesque (A style of music associated with migration). They make köfte. If you are sitting down, watching the birds, wanting to take a photograph, the guy is there doing his fry-up, as if the smell of it would not disturb you. This is what we get upset about and why we distance ourselves.		
9	06:00		In Etiler there is a choice of art, concerts, cinema, theatre, for example last week there was a concert at Vienna (the name of the hall where the concert took place). We went. But sometimes going and coming back is difficult because of some construction work on the road. This is why we live both there and here.				
10	06:40					On the weekends, my wife goes on an escape. (cracks some jokes). We come here. Here (in Göktürk) however there is not much going on. There are some cinemas but they don't show any films. We come here, we stay on our balcony, read our newspapers and our books, listen to a bit of music at a moderate noise level, (laughter) and go to bed.	
11	09:20	As a couple we travel all over the world.					
12	12:00	We have a little foundation. We are still working to set it up. We take children from the ghettos (varoş) and we familiarize them with Turkish cultural institutions; show them the Vatan Sarayı, Sultanahmet Cami – try to teach them about it. Team: What is the name of the foundation? Bülent: Cultural Awareness Foundation (Kültür bilincini gelistirme Vakfi).					

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
13	14:20				No, I don't have any relationships with the neighbours. Well, sometimes I have a chat; about football, about a match, about theatre. Because I am always doing a lot of stuff, I make some contacts, but generally people stick to themselves here. There are certain units and between these units are closed walls. It's a closed system. I can't get to the person next to me for instance. Talking about relationships; we get into the elevator for instance and come across a woman going my way. She does not say good morning. Just like that. She does not greet us.		
14	15:30		<p>Team: But you would recognize somebody who is not from the SITE?</p> <p>Bülent: People who don't live in the SITE don't come inside. (suddenly very clear and articulate): The Turkish people want to get to know somebody who lives in a SITE. They are watching it in movies or they see it 'god knows where', but in the States there aren't that many people who live in SITES. Are there many in Germany?</p> <p>Team: No.</p> <p>Bülent: Of course not, because there is no need.</p>				
15	15:30		<p>Bülent: So what happened? Why did SITES develop in Istanbul? Because there is so much underdeveloped land. The population is that large. So, I will try to explain this in architectural terms: We used to develop the land in a horizontal way, but vertical developments started to pop up. The old Istanbul used to be a city of 2-storey structures made from brick. After that what happened was that the Istanbulite started to become familiar with apartment houses. At the beginning of the century, we began using concrete. The wooden houses disappeared and concrete houses were being built. 5 to 6- storey apartment houses were being built. The Turkish people then changed from using the 'ala turka' toilet to using the 'a la franka' toilet.</p> <p>Now the 5 to 6- storey apartment buildings are not enough any more. Now they have to build 100 metre tall skyscrapers. Then, those people who wanted to escape this distress came to places like these. But did you see what is happening now? Look right at the entrance to this SITE, TOKI has started to construct a 20-story building.</p>				
16			<p>What I'm trying to say is that there is a beautiful place created, and then with the help of some credit this place is ruined again. So what happens is that those with money will again start to look for a new place. Right down that direction at the edge of the sea, they will construct a place like Kemer Country (one of the very first SITES in Göktürk known for its prestige.) The rich ones will escape to that place then. Because they are going to be sick of this place here, because now there is going to be ordinary housing.</p> <p>Check this out! Here there is a house for 1.5 million dollars and right behind it you find an apartment for 2 hundred thousand! (long pause)</p> <p>Anything that is built is instantly doomed to degenerate. If this house was in the center of Istanbul -- with such a view -- it would be 5 million dollars. But there is no space left. So we are building skyscrapers. But they are dangerous. Turkey is an earthquake risk zone. But nobody bothers about earthquakes.</p>				
17	18:20		<p>Construction companies – to make money – they call this urban transformation (...) Our house in Etiler has five storeys. The other day they came up with some project – 80 meters tall – that means at least 20 storeys. This is it. No more Istanbul. It's finished.</p>				

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
18	20:55			<p>Look – there used to be a place called Sulukule. During the times of the Ottoman Empire, the Romani population – we now say Gypsy people – used to be located there. One day they said to them, "We are going to build beautiful new houses for you" and they brought them away from there to some place somewhere.</p> <p>Team: To TOKI houses.</p> <p>Bülent: They took them to those TOKI houses because people wanted to make money in this place. What I want to say is: These people cannot live there (in the social housing complex built by TOKI).</p> <p>What we realized was this: People who don't want to leave their lives in this place do not know how to live in an apartment building. What do I mean when I say they don't know how? Very simple. Open this door for instance. They would not even be familiar with a door there. Shoes, coats and the like would be in front of the door. All other stuff that you need for the house would be there as well. They are not familiar with the most common lifestyle. Because of this people who are resettled forcibly are most certainly going to be unhappy. So they start arguing: "Stop with this noise; the TV is too loud; turn it down". Look there is a guy who has a barbeque on the balcony. I bet in Germany there is no such thing, or do people have barbeques in front of the parliament?</p>			
19	25:40 ff						<p>Team: So you did not spend much time thinking "Let's take a look at the architect, or the developer".</p> <p>Bülent: No, dear. When this kid recommended this place to us saying it is by a good company – It was already finished at that time you see – because we cannot really trust if the construction is still ongoing. If this guy for instance had told us: "There is a project under construction, go and buy there". I would not have done it. A building that is just being put up – no! Something that is already finished can be of value. I can't wait for it to be finished.</p> <p>Team: So you saw this and bought it right away?</p> <p>Bülent: Yes, because it was already finished. We could have moved in the next day. In fact, everything here was already sold, except these two flats. They said the building quality is decent. We don't understand these kinds of things.</p> <p>Site manager: This construction company ranks amongst the top in Turkey. The building quality is high.</p>
20	09:05						<p>Bülent: People, when they come here are astonished. (imitates their noises of astonishment)</p> <p>We sometimes go to the restaurant, spend some time there – watch a match and so on. I don't go to the pool though. I don't like it. Anybody who has an infection can go into that pool. And there are a lot of children – a lot of noise. Turkish children, whatever they are doing have to do it screaming. German children don't scream. Turkish children do everything screaming.</p>
21	16:30			<p>Bülent: Be careful not to walk around too much in Istanbul.</p> <p>Site Manager: Yes, it's a bit dangerous.</p> <p>Bülent: Especially with these kinds of shorts (points to my jean shorts) Don't walk around like this in Fatih.</p>			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
22	18:30			Team: I was going to ask you what other places you frequently go to, in Istanbul. Bülent: We go to Akmerkez – for the cinema, theatre (...) Well, for the cinema we go to Kanyon (a shopping centre). We also go to Beyoğlu, but Beyoğlu is a bit ordinary (avam). For shopping we also go down to Besiktas sometimes and the Bosphorus. There is a place we go to in the mornings. We have breakfast there. It is in Istinye. They make really beautiful tea there. (long pause)			
23	18:30	Team: I go to Emirgan (an old village at the Bosphorus) a lot, for breakfast. Bülent: But it's very crowded in Emirgan. Plus – the breakfast there is huge. (gets very assertive) Katharina, the breakfast is massive. It has everything. Yoghurt, eggs... this ... that. Me: I eat all of it. (laughter) Bülent: You! But for us it's too much. This much black bread, (shows half of his finger) this much cheese, (shows a quarter of his finger) and tomatoes. That's enough.					
24	20:00			Team: Do you go to the Asian side? Bülent: No, we don't. I don't like the Asian side. It is really crowded on the Asian side – but even Maltepe. There are a lot of nice places near the coast. Kadıköy, Moda (...) Bülent: When the weather is not too hot, we go to Bostanci and from there, we take the ferry to Büyük Ada. Do you know Büyük Ada. Team: Yes. Bülent: In Büyük Ada we walk up to the top of the hill. – “Aya Yorgi”, If you go there, there is a lovely restaurant. Very nice view. You can drink raki. It is really a very nice and clean place. The prices are very moderate too. We go there very early.			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Damla Altug / lives in: Kemer Rose, Göktürk after moving from Kemer Life 21, Göktürk						
2	Until recently Damla worked at VAKKO, a fine clothing company, but she stopped since she had a baby. She grew up in Istanbul, Bagdat Caddssi. When she was 25 she met her husband with whom she moved into an apartment in Kemerlife 21, Göktürk. Her husband works in the finance sector which is why they have to live close to the central business district although Damla would prefer to live on the Asian side. When she got pregnant, they decided that they needed a bigger flat. So they bought a villa in a neighbouring SITE in Göktürk. The interview with her is about both SITES. Kemerlife 21 and Kemer Rose. Damla also mentioned other projects in Göktürk, because her mother-in-law owns an apartment in Arketip, the latest EAA project in Göktürk, and some other member of the family owns a house in Istanbul Istanbul.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4	2:30		Kemer Rose is a nice SITE. It's not nice architecture, but it's very practical. From the outside, it looks like a summer house, but from the inside it is very comfortable. Team: What does "summer house" mean? Damla: It is the outside facade. The air conditioning is visible from the outside – the colours. It's not modern architecture. It's standard architecture, but the inside is very useful for living.				
5	9:40		In the beginning, when I got married, I really liked the architecture of Kemerlife 21. Actually I really like architecture, but now only in magazines. Since we have the baby it became impossible. But in the beginning I really liked to decorate my home. For example – "Asi Seriyer" – I like his design. We have a table by him. It's like a cake. We got this table first. Decorating the home was very important at the beginning. It still is important, but you have to shape your home according to your child. Otherwise she could hurt herself.				
6	13:10		The thing I was the most dissatisfied with in Kemerlife, I'm telling you. It is very dark. If you live there, you have to use a spotlight. When we saw this place it left a bad impression on us. There is no light, but life there is very pleasant (...) because people are very much like us. They use the social facilities. It's a very social place – Kemerlife. The social facilities are very useful in Kemerlife. The open and closed swimming pools are very useful. Children, especially in the winter, like the closed swimming pool. All our men like to watch the match in the TV room. But they could create a very nice café. At the beginning, they opened a nice restaurant, but it didn't work out. It was a good opportunity for a restaurant but they did not manage.				
7	15:40				Team: Are people working in Kemerlife or are they double-income people? Or is it women staying at home? What is the profile? Damla: No, I think working people. For example, in my new SITE most women are not working but in my old SITE, Kemerlife, most are working.		
8	16:30				Damla: People are very social because after work they don't want to go home. I was working at VAKKO, (a very fine fashion company) After work I did not go home first. First I met my friends at the swimming pool – not for swimming – just for chatting. And then I went home. And if you want, you can go to the shopping mall part. There are lots of restaurants there. So you can see people from the SITE (...) So we were very social in Kemerlife. Team: Did you make new friends there? Damla: Yes, new friends – and my best friends now. Team: How did you meet them? Damla: Metal Yapi (the developer) organized a meeting. At the beginning, we had a lot of technical problems. And architectural issues. I met a very close friend at one of these meetings.		
9	19:13		Damla: Because we are working people we don't have any time to cook. Not everybody, but my husband and I, were like this. Now of course we changed because of the baby, but before, we were going out. You can also call and order a meal. The best thing about Kemerlife is all those restaurants. If you don't live directly above a restaurant.				

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
10	21:00	<p>Team: You did not live so long in Kemerlife did you? Damla: 5 years. If we changed our home now, yes, it would be very short, but we had to change. We did not have any chance. Well, actually we could have, but my husband – he wants his freedom. Because at the beginning he did not want a child. We did not plan our child. But then suddenly our baby came. But now he has fallen in love. Well, he said if we are going to lead a family life, then I am going to need some personal space. That's why we changed the house. He wanted a special room just for himself – where he could have his freedom. – where he could have his freedom. Now it's me who escapes upstairs. (laughs)</p>					
11	29:10	<p>Damla: I grew up on the Asian side. For 25 years I lived on Bagdat Caddesi. Actually, I prefer to live on Bagdat Caddesi. My mother and all my family lives there, but my husband is working. From 7 to 7 – almost 12 hours. We have to adapt to my husband's life. That's why we live here. And another thing: For example this SITE in Etiler (...) Just after Bosphorus University there is an area which has stayed empty for a long time. There is now some construction going on there. We thought about this place, but a flat with 3 rooms came at the same price as what we have now. Etiler is the city center. It's of course more expensive. In Kemer Rose we have 4 storeys. You come in – there is a big living room. 60 sqm salon. There is a 25 sqm large kitchen. When you come up the stairs, there are 3 rooms and 3 bathrooms. 2 of the toilets are inside the bedrooms; one is separate. Upstairs from there is a 45 sqm room under the roof. In the lower floor there is a room for the maid. And another room; and 2-car garage.</p>					
12	41:30	<p>Team: Shall we talk a little bit more about the architecture of the SITE, the design of the projects, because Istanbul Istanbul, Kemerlife and Kemer Rose are completely different. You mentioned your reasons why you moved from Kemerlife to Kemer Rose, but is the architecture also a reason of choice? Which one do you prefer in terms of style? Damla: I think if you don't have a child you want to make your choice according to your liking. But if you have a child you think differently. You think more about how it is going to be comfortable – practical. Functionality is more important. But design is very important. In our new house in Kemer Rose we just did it like this: We changed the interior architecture. It was very standard, wooden interior fittings. So we made it more modern.</p>					
13	48:00	<p>Team: Is it your mother who lives in Etiler? Damla: My mother-in-law. My mother lives on Bagdat Caddesi. Team: Do you also go further sometimes into the center? Towards Taksim? Damla: Taksim and Beyoğlu are my favourite places. Actually I like Terkos passage. Do you know Terkos?</p>					

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Birol Yücelen / lives in: Mesa Yanki, Göktürk						
2	Birol has lived with his wife in Göktürk since 2007. He has a daughter who studied at Stanford University and now works at Microsoft in the USA. He worked as a chemical engineer and is now retired.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4	00:00						Birol: Before Göktürk I was living in Etiler but my apartment was old. 50-60 years old. After the earthquake in 1999, I started to think about moving my apartment. And I heard about some complexes in Göktürk – new complexes – maximum 6 floors tall, and also according to the new earthquake regulations. Mesa is a building company. Mesa has a reputation in these kinds of complexes. Team: You mean a reputation concerning the earthquake risk? Birol: Yes.
5	1:45		Birol: I bought this house in the year 2005 directly from the project. You know there were no buildings here at that time – only land. There were no apartments. In January of 2007 they finished the construction and we moved 5 years ago. So have been living here now for 5 years. You know, now I am retired. And my wife is also retired. This place is maybe a little bit far from downtown, but you know we are not interested in the....(hesitates) Team: The city center is not quite your thing? Birol: Yes.				
6	8:30					Team: You are using the pool a lot, aren't you? (he showed us his swimming medals when we entered his apartment, and I knew that he would be swimming in a race the next day.) Birol: The pool is the only feature in this complex. Fitness center or other facilities like this don't exist. A children's play area is not part of this project. The only thing is the pool. I am the first in the pool in the mornings. At 8.00 o'clock I'm in there, I swim for about 45 minutes and then I get out. After that the kids and the women start coming, so for the training it's best to go when the pool is empty.	
7	9:30					Birol: I knew MESA (the developer). MESA has 4 projects here. Right next to us is Mesa Kemer Burgaz – the brown one, then past that is Mesa Studio Plaza, and next to it is Mesa Yamac. Mesa has 4 projects here. Team: So you chose one out of these 4? Birol: No, the others were already sold. There was this project available. So there was no choice, where I could have made my preferences or compare the prices. Something like this was not possible. The only project that was beginning to be sold "topraktan" (sold before construction) was this one. So at the time we paid for the apartments, there were no houses here. There was the confidence in MESA. Actually MESA is a company from Ankara, but it also set up in Istanbul. For example, the project opposite Capitol (A shopping centre in Altunizade) – Avrupa Konutlari – I believe is MESA's first project in Istanbul.	

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
8	18:00						There was a range of material suppliers. Though the construction was done by Mesa. When we talked about the supervision of the project, they said something I won't forget. When I asked how many years they would give us for quality guarantee they said: "For life"!
9	20:30		There is one thing one could complain about. There are about 160 house owners and 140 renters. For renters there is a problem. Regarding the property circulation – moving in and out. My problem would be that the elevator cabins are very small. They are supposed to be for 4 people but they fit 3 people at most. There is also the staircase, but the flats in fact don't have a problem. They are spacious. 175 sqm and the like. Because my daughter lives in the States we have a chance to go there rather often. They have a cabin like this: (makes a gesture with his hands) It fits all the stuff (he means furniture) and people. There is no need to separate. Here, on the other hand, you cannot move. One person alone can't do it.				
10	23:15				Team: Do you have any relations with the neighbours? Biol: No, not really (...) a little bit, I would say. Perhaps it's due to us. We don't approach the neighbours. Generally the people that live here are rather young. Older families like us are a minority. It's mostly young mothers and fathers who give preference to this place because it's a safe play area. There is no traffic and the kids can run around freely.		
11	25:15			Biol: To have a chance in the swimming competitions, I need to do a lot of training. This winter for example I went training at Istanbul Technical University for a month. After that I went for 5 months to the pool of a gymnasium in Sisli. The pool was in Levent. They also offer training courses so I participated in 2. Then I use the pool of the SITE. There I do my own training programme (complains about the fact that various sports clubs in Istanbul do not take pensioners) Team: So you often go to Levent, to Sisli. Biol: There are three buses to Mecidiyeköy from here.			
12	55:00		Biol: Construction is very fast here. When there is construction, there is a need for the construction of a Black Sea highway. There is Erdogan's project. For a population of 1 million people, there will be a new city at the Black Sea. It is called: "The New City". There will be a marina. I believe this city will be connected to the existing highway ring with a new highway – 3 lines in one direction. Team: Do you think they will really build it? Because a 1 million satellite city is very large, and I don't think Istanbul is growing that much. Do you think it's a real project? Biol: Yes, a new city, near the Black Sea Coast. Not Marmara. Team: Yes, Yes. I read it in the newspaper, but we're not sure whether this is really going to happen. You know, 1 million people have to move there. Where are they all coming from? Biol: I don't know, but...(searching for words) Team: It is going to be built you believe. Team: Yes.				
13			Biol: Look, I have seen this place. Katharina. It's a perfect location. In earlier times there used to be coal mines. Brown coal was skimmed. It was an area left deserted. That is why the area is very convenient. Team: So there aren't any problems to build a city there? Biol: You don't have to pay for the land. Team: For the land or to the people? Biol: There will be a marina – for example. Team: So it will be close for you to get there as well. Biol: Yes, about 40 kilometres or something. Team: Do you go now? – Sometimes, to the Black Sea? Biol: Just one time I went there. Just to see the Black Sea Coast. I mean, that area.				

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Selin Yuçe / lives in: Yali Konaklari, Gökürk						
2	Selin was born in Ankara, but moved to Istanbul as a baby. Her family worked for the government. She studied foreign relations and worked in the tourism sector for a short time. She retired quite early. In the next year she and her husband will move back into the city centre. Into a new SITE called Seba Flora.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	On the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4	00:00	<p>We moved here 12 years ago. Actually we liked Kemer Country. Have you ever been there? Team: I know Kemer golf and country club. Selin: Yes, yes, we are members of it. It's the same company. They started with Phase One and then finished the second, third, and this was the fourth. We lived for almost three – three and a half years in the USA. In Palm Beach. So when we returned to Turkey we found the place. We knew Esad Edin the founder of Kemer Country. He helped us and we bought the house and then we waited for 3 years I think – until everything was finished.</p>					
5	1:30	<p>The reason why we moved here was the country club. Because we used to play golf in the United States and we liked the swimming and the pools and there is also a place for riding. It appeared to us very European or very modern. So we moved here. And afterwards I became pregnant and my son was born and he started to go to the Hisar School (it is adjacent to the SITE). Actually he is very lucky because he is still able to use his bike. So it was really comfortable. I mean, for a child to play in the garden and to use the social club. He joined the Karate Club. We did what we liked – tennis or yoga. It is something you cannot do in the city. Actually that was the main idea.</p>					
6	3:00	<p>Team: So you bought this house before it was built. It was “topraktan”. Selin: <i>Topraktan</i>. Yeah, yeah. Team: And how did you know what it was going to be like? Did you look at models? Selin: It was like gambling actually. We already saw the first phase, then phase two – so we trusted them. By the years gone we were lucky. Because you know the history of Esad Edin. He is almost bankrupt. So we were lucky. Do you see this lake? There was nothing here. It wasn't even here (...) within a few months this was done. It was part of the project. We knew that this lake would be here. We enjoyed it. There were many animals. Fish, frogs, ducks and swans. It was good to be in nature with a child growing up. But we also had a hard time. Because when we moved there was just a dirt road. The main road. There were not even lights on the road. It was always under construction.</p>					
7	3:00	<p>Selin: If you continue this road. There will be the biggest airport in Istanbul. Team: As part of the Yeni Sehir project? Selin: I don't know about the Yeni Sehir Project. I just know about the airport. I think it will be a very big difference then. The population will be more. I don't know what is going to happen. But it was good until now. It was not crowded. Not so noisy. Now it has started to become part of the city. I don't know if it is good or not, What do you think?</p>					
8	7:45	<p>Selin: Actually im from Ankara, but I moved to Istanbul when I was 40 days old – so I never lived there. Also my Grandparents are both from Istanbul and Ankara. My motherside they worked for the government. So Ankara was the capital. Team: Where did you grow up.? Selin: On the other side. Do you know Caddesbostan or Bagdat Cadessi? It was walking distance. Maybe six buildings to Bagdat Cadessi. Team: And during university you also lived there. Selin: I lived there but my university was on this side. We were in the Austrian college. St. Georg. It was in Karaköy and my university. Have you ever been in Nisantasi?</p>					
9	10:10	<p>Selin: I think we missed a big chance. You know they should not have let them build those five-storey buildings and everything. They should have stayed at three-storeys. Without apartments. Keep this part private and with the green. So if people want to have something green, they could live here, now they are making so many apartments and everything. So many small places (...) I don't like either (...) I mean there are so many things in the city. Small buildings without gardens. I think it could have been better if they kept it like this. I'm sure they are going to build something here (makes a gesture to her back yard).</p>					

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	On the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
10	11:30			<p>Team: So would you consider moving then again? Selin: Actually very soon. Team: Oh really! You already thought about it? Selin: Actually we already decided and we bought a house. In the middle of the city. Because it was getting too crowded here. We moved here because of the green and also (...) my boy is grown (...) he is in his highschool years. He wants to go out at night. Soon he will start to drive. We don't find it very safe here. And especially during the summer we are not here – so we can't use this garden. It is small, but you know we are somewhere else most of the time, for swimming. And my husband (...) we are both almost retired. So we can travel around the country and the world. It is not logical to keep this house because your responsible for everything.</p>			
11	13:00	<p>Team: What part of the city did you buy the house? In Beyoğlu? Selin: No in Levent. Do you know Zorlu? Probably you are familiar with Emre Arolat. It is right next to it. You can see the building. Almost across from it. They are building it right now, so we are planning to move there. Team: Oh, it is also a project you haven't seen. You like surprises. Do they have a sales offices or how did you... Selin: A friend of ours (...) we found it and we liked it. It is again 2 storeys. I hope we will enjoy it. I mean – he is grown and there will be concerts during winter. We enjoy going to classical music concerts. It used to be easy 10 years ago. The traffic wasn't so heavy. Now it really takes a long time. If we stay here, we have to enjoy this part only, we cannot be part of the city. The nights and everything – and already he is grown – he just needs a girlfriend. After he has a girlfriend, they will try to go to restaurants and to movies.</p>					
12	16:40	<p>Selin: That's the reason actually we chose our new location. We did not choose any Bosphorus part. He (the son) is a teenager. He needs to be in the middle of the people. To be with people. If we are here, there is always the community with Kemer Country. You know – wealthy people, driving around with the car, you know, but the real world is different. He has to take a bus, a ship, he has to cross the bridge, and he has to learn this with us right now, otherwise it will be too late. I mean now he is 14 years old. Now it is time to get used to the crowded city and meet different people. Here it was good for growing up. Now we decided to move. That's the reason. You have to meet different challenges. You know what I mean. He has to take the bus – do stuff by himself – protect himself. Here it is more protected. He just goes with his mother or father. If you have your own child you will understand. We have a word – in English. It means to walk on one's own feet. You know it's that time for him. So we are also planning for him to study abroad. Either in the States or in England. So then it will be very risky. Actually for me as well. You know what is he going to do by himself, abroad?</p>					
13				<p>Team: How do you use the city? What parts of the city do you go to? Do you travel around a lot? Selin: Actually we like to, but we live probably in a safer and nice part of the city. I can say. We are not going down to Eyüp or Kagithane. I mean, we are usually around, as you see, Taksim and Nisantasi and the nice places, and clean. We drive our own car. Like Europe, you know. We drive our own car and come back. So actually we are probably lucky. We can live wherever we like. But I also cross the bridge many times because my family lives there. But of course some chosen places. How can I say. Where we feel comfortable. Team: And Taksim? Do you go to Taksim? Selin: Yes sometimes I meet Elif (a mutual friend) or go to a restaurant – or a concert. There used to be, right across Taksim, a concert hall. They are refurbishing it now – AKM (Atatürk Cultural Center) – and there is another concert place – the Borusan (...) in Beyoğlu. So for the concerts we go there. We enjoy classical music and jazz. So yes, we use this part. And also Nisantasi and Etiler. But if you ask me for Ümraniye, I haven't been there for such a long time. It is always the same also in Europe or England probably. If you live in Chelsea or somewhere you are always around there. The people you meet. And you agree with. Same mind, same expectations. It's important.</p>			
14	25:00			<p>Team: And here? Did you get to know your neighbours? Selin: Yeah, actually I would like to introduce them but she is a lady from Kiev, her husband is at work now probably. And the other one is a very nice lady. She and I are the first owners. We are the original owners. And they (makes a gesture) they are renting it. And those are the fourth owners. They just bought the house and they are now renovating.</p>			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	On the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
15	28:30			Selin: Towards the back of Zorlu Center, there is a nice project – “Selenium”. It is almost I think, Emre Arolat Style – with the wooden stuff – the brown and everything. Seba Flora is brand new. It is also wooden stuff. It is 8 buildings, 5 stories, no highrises. We prefer this type. We did not like the highrises.			

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Serdar / lives in: Kemer Life 21, Göktürk						
2	Serdar is a lawyer. He is a freelancer, working from his apartment, or sometimes a cafe he finds comfortable.						
3	Rec. Time	personal story/ activities	On the SITE	on the city	neighbours / behaviour	use of facilities / space	on the developer/ architect
4		<p>Serdar: I lived in Mecidiyeköy. I was born in Istanbul – always lived in Istanbul. Before that I lived in Baltilimani and before that in Yesilyurt. Team: And how long have you been in Kemerlife 21? Serdar: It has now been 5 years. Team: Are you living alone? Serdar: Yes, I'm alone. Team: You mentioned that you saw this place when it was still under construction. Did you have any information about the architect or the developer. Did you know them? Serdar: No, beforehand I was not familiar with them. But as I said, when I took a look, some units were already finished, and I really liked the work. So I talked to the developer company and I got to know the architect – a well-known architect. Then I figured out when the construction work was going to be finished. I was convinced that this is a good place. And I'm quite satisfied, because I don't like living in the city very much. I like the peace. Team: Mecidiyeköy... Serdar: It's right in the middle (...) Yes, some things are easier there but (...) sometimes I don't leave the house for 3 or 4 days.</p>					
5		<p>Team: So you basically came across this place here by taking a look? It was not by researching a developer or architect, looking at their projects. Serdar: No, not at all. Team: So, sometimes you don't leave the house for some days. When you go out, to what parts of the city do you go? Serdar: Well, there are not a lot of places that I go to for my amusement. If I leave the house, I go out for work. For a court case, or I go out to visit family. But I'm not a person who goes out all the time. Team: Do you go to the other side sometimes? Serdar: Yes, I go for work sometimes. My doctor is there. Could be for a match as well. It's not possible to never go. It's a part of Istanbul. It's connected. (laughs) Team: Sure, we were wondering rather (...) many of the people we talked to before had a number of particular districts they were visiting. Serdar: So it is true. I am not inclined to stay in these places. Of those there are but a few. Etiler, Levent, Baltilimani (Sariyer) and so on.</p>					
6							<p>Team: Returning to the SITE. In what way would you talk about your life in this SITE. Perhaps, referring to the facilities you have here. Serdar: (interrupting) What in concrete? I mean in this way I can talk to a wall for 3 hours. Team: May I just interrupt. I think you were talking about the architect at the beginning. You knew the architect? Serdar: I knew the architect, but I did not buy because of the architect. Team: Oh, you knew who the architect was but you did not know him personally. Serdar: I knew him personally, because he is famous. (long pause)</p>

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
7					<p>Team: So shall we then start with the neighbours for example? What we mean is neighbourhood relations. They are not necessarily like in the old days. It might have changed. Knowing the neighbours.</p> <p>Serdar: (interrupting) I understand. In those terms. After Kemer Country this place is the largest in Göktürk. There are 210 apartments. So it's about 700 people who live here. With the internal movement in this place, there is a greater than usual chance to meet friends. It's not like in places where there are just 2 people or 2 families. I'm quite satisfied generally. Here we have a group of 8 to 10 families. In Mecidiyeköy, for instance this was not the case.</p> <p>Team: You met here?</p> <p>Serdar: Yes, I met all of them here. (silence)</p>		
8						<p>Team: What about the facilities? Is there a pool or social amenities?</p> <p>Serdar: There is a pool. Both open-air and indoor. There are social amenities. But they are in use in the summer a lot. They are used a lot for watching matches. I cannot imagine that during the winter people say "let's meet there in the evening, when we get home". Certainly not.</p> <p>Team: But there are open air facilities and indoor ones right?</p> <p>Serdar: Yes, there is a pool inside and outside. There is a fitness salon, ping pong space, squash court. But as I said it's not a social gathering space. You just come, get into the pool and that's it.</p> <p>Team: Ok, what of these facilities would you personally use?</p> <p>Serdar: (sighs, shows himself unnerved) I play basketball. There is nice walkway in the SITE. I walk there a lot. I watch the matches. Is there something I have forgotten? I don't use the children's playground. (laughs) this is it. (silence)</p>	
9					<p>Team: So you mentioned the aspects that you liked about this SITE. Is there anything that you don't like?</p> <p>Serdar: First, the construction quality is not very high. It's the first construction site of this company. Metal Yapi. So it is not unusual. (he sums up a number of recent repairs) It is not terrible, but from this architect one should expect something better.</p> <p>The second negative side is people. There are some people whose behavior doesn't fit in – living in a SITE. For instance, dogs are not allowed to enter the social facility, but some people may bring their dogs there.</p>		
10	09:00		<p>Team: Do you think that there is a gap between the architecture, and the way it was planned, and the way it was put into practise?</p> <p>Serdar: Not a big gap. But there is a gap. Yes. This architecture does not deserve this kind of construction quality. It needs a very good construction quality. The materials used might be of a good quality, but the way they were applied is wrong. It shows. Like I said, they started with good intentions, but the construction work is very important. In Turkey, because the construction is done badly, if attention is not paid to these things, this happens. This is why there is never a high quality structure anywhere. A lot of people have leaks. On my terrace I have a problem with rainfall. If you want to live comfortably in a house that you have bought anew, if only for ten years, you will not find it. The roof leaks. It is not a classical roof. It is flat. Because this is a very new thing in Turkey one has to pay attention to how this is done. The architecture is not enough. It has to be put into practise.</p>				

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
11	12:10			Serdar: In Turkey it is very hard to find a project in which both the architecture and the construction are good. There are some SITEs that have a very high construction quality. You might have seen. Those of Mesa for instance, but they don't have nice architecture. These aspects don't come together. They used to, but it was very expensive. A strong developer sells his name and does not give any importance to the architecture. A new developer of course thinks how he is going to sell. Of course he uses the name of a good architect.			
12	15:10		Serdar: There is another thing that is rather positive about this SITE. I will tell you. There is technical maintenance service around the clock. This is a very nice and a very practical service. I don't call them often, but it's a very nice thing. Team: How does the general administration work? Serdar: (Sighs and demonstrates his discomfort about answering our questions.) It is hard. It is not like a factory administration. There are 216 apartments. And everybody has his own personal concern. Everybody thinks of his own rights. They don't have any idea about communal life. So it is not an easy thing. Even though the staff is good. If the manager is not good enough to direct the SITE and the administrative body to check the manager, it doesn't work. However, we couldn't find a good manager, and thus the administrative body necessarily had to be involved in the management of the site.				
13	19:45			Serdar: There are also people in the general administrative assembly who say they don't want the outer facades to be renovated but those who said this time, "Let's repair and redo the wooden panels" was a majority. Team: How would you voice your disagreement? Serdar: Well, there are people who say, "These wooden panels really cause us a lot of trouble. Let us just take them down and put a weather-proof kind of cladding up."			
14	21:00		Team: Is there a place that you would want to live next to? Serdar: No, I don't think of that. Well, as a dream I guess I would like to live in a villa somewhere in the forest, but as a professional that is not very realistic. Though I might live in a villa in the event that I earn a lot of money. That could be possible. But I prefer to live outside of the city. Team: So there are no inclinations to live in the city center. Serdar: Not at all, no, but I don't have a particular obsession with Göktürk either.				

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Future visions of the city	Self perception	References to places in the city	History of the city
2	Cem	<p>They started to landfill the sea. Some parts of it had already been landfilled anyway and the process continued with more speed. I saw that the Bosphorus had gotten a lot narrower. I saw very pessimistic images -- not positive at all. In my vision the sea had a muddy colour. There were some blue areas but mostly it looked very murky. It was dirty just like the Golden Horn before it was cleaned. There was no greenery left at all. I noticed that there weren't any birds in the sky or any fish in the sea. Even the sun, like Nebahat said, looked hazy. Everything was grey and black. There wasn't any greenery left and the sky and the sea had no colour,</p>	<p>Yes, like you said. We have Western minds but in our hearts we belong to the East.</p>		<p>There is an incredible amount of disorder and complexity in Istanbul. Always has been and still is. Istanbul also has something unique that no other historic city has. Nowhere else in the world have so many different civilizations coexisted together. I agree, between 90 to 95% of Istanbul's population is Muslim today but the Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Muslims have peacefully coexisted together for many centuries in this city. We can't say the same thing for any of the other major cities in the world, like Athens, Rome, Moscow, Berlin or Paris. I think this could be one of the messages of Istanbul.</p>
3	Cem	<p>Yes. People are becoming like robots. It looks like they have been brainwashed, too. People don't ask, "What am I living for?" anymore. They just live to survive. Isn't it already happening? The world's population will grow drastically in the future. The natural resources have already started to deplete – of course there may always be wars or natural disasters but that's different.</p>	<p>Actually, everybody's trance seems to have gone well except for mine.</p>	<p>There is a bridge in Bostancı built by Sinan the Architect. In the old days, Istanbul had a unique 'visa' system. People from Anatolia weren't allowed to migrate to Istanbul whenever they wanted. The river under that bridge in Bostancı used to be a lot bigger in the past; its water used to run faster. People couldn't walk across the river, so they had to walk through the bridge. Soldiers waited at the entrance to Istanbul and questioned people as to why they had come to the city.</p>	
4		<p>You see, people are trying to make the buildings colourful since everything else around them is colourless. The air is polluted, the city is infested with crime, people are suffocating. They are always inside a tube or a tunnel. They are always indoors. They can't walk around freely outside. That's why I drew them inside tunnels or vehicles.</p>	<p>If it helps preserve the city, then why not? It's like population planning, which is also a bit oppressive, but I think these types of preventive measures can be really good for the city in the long run.</p>		

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Future visions of the city	Self perception	References to places in the city	History of the city
5	Cem		Of course, I have to admit, both of my parents had come to Istanbul from different cities. But I was born and raised in Istanbul, so, in the trance state I thought about how to save Istanbul from bad situations in the future, and I kept asking myself, "How can Istanbul be saved?"		
6					
7	Çiğdem	Then, as I continued on, I saw some underground tunnels in between the two shores. They were built to facilitate transportation, and I also had the following thought: The boat that I was sailing on as well as the ships and speedboats would become nothing but tourist attractions in the future. I thought it was going to cost me a fortune to get on these boats. In other words, the vessels that I am allowed to use today would not be available to me tomorrow.	In the meantime I get the following feeling about the people here: When I talk to them, I feel like I'm becoming a part of the system. People treat me like I am one of their own. But, I can't treat them the same way as I do Uncle Ahmet, whom I always greet at the corner of the street. Their way of life is somewhat foreign to me. I am aware that I came to a foreign place.		
8	Çiğdem		People are separated into different groups, that's what I see. They alienate each other saying, "You are not one of us" to each other. They don't feel like they belong to the same group. That's why this here represents people going in opposite directions. In my mind, I even start labeling people as "Those who are in my group" and "Those who are not". Those who are in my group are against this kind of grouping and separation. They are the ones who try to find a balance between everybody and everything in Istanbul. And the others are the ones who deny the need for such an effort.	The separation into groups is reflected in the city's architecture and general appearance. The brown dots, these areas here, represent the city's chaotic, outcast and crime-infested neighbourhoods inhabited primarily by an angry group of people whereas these pinkish grey areas represent protected neighbourhoods of Istanbul where more problem-free people live. I have the following two ideas in my head.	

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Future visions of the city	Self perception	References to places in the city	History of the city
9	Ciğdem		A lot of foreigners come here to settle permanently and, perhaps due to their mindset that is different from ours, they start to embrace and protect certain things in their neighbourhoods. They take certain values of ours that we are not aware of and say, "I will not change this. I will preserve it". So, they act as though they own those values, and when we try to reach out to live and experience those values we feel that we have been left behind. That's the way I see it.		
10	Ciğdem		I clearly saw that some illegal operations and businesses were being carried out in certain parts of Istanbul. I think they are even on an international level.		
11					

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Future visions of the city	Self perception	References to places in the city	History of the city
12	Tuğçe		<p>In the past, the beach used to belong to the islanders only. We used to leave our houses, go for a swim in the sea and then go back home. Now, the beach is crowded with a lot of people who come from Istanbul, and that's one of the biggest problems of the city – the population explosion caused by people who migrate to Istanbul.</p> <p>In my view, the islands have been victimized in order to satisfy the vacation needs of the immigrants; because it's cheap and not too far, thousands of people flock to the islands and that gives you an odd feeling of alienation.</p> <p>Of course, neither I nor my Armenian friends on the island have any intention of alienating anybody, but you can see the difference very clearly. The behaviours, manners and everything...for instance, the way some of these people sit on blankets at the beach...the fact that they bring a whole watermelon with them. I found all that really funny when I was a child. Now, I know better, but my friends still think it's funny. And these people even knock on your door sometimes and ask if they can take a shower at your house.</p>	<p>I felt a decreasing sense of belonging throughout this journey. At one time, I even said to Tuğçe as I helped her get on the boat, "You have suffered a lot here, so get out of here." And I sent her off.</p>	<p>Then, you could always find a candy seller or a halva seller there; I saw them. I remembered the games I used to play as a child. Children always used to play games in front of the butcher shop. There used to be birthday parties. To me, the island was synonymous with summer. Perhaps it's because I spent only my summer holidays on the island after the age of ten; I based my social life on that. Meeting people, talking or not talking to them, showing off in brand name clothes, and things like that.</p>
13	Tuğçe			<p>My parents were invited to attend a wedding ceremony at the Çırağan Palace; we will have our wedding there, too!" We broke up three days later, but still, I can never forget it. It wouldn't be inaccurate if I said I had something like a Çırağan Palace fetish. Every time I see it, I mean Çırağan Palace (...) it is like my fantasy place; it is magnificent and luxurious, and serves as an image especially for people who are newcomers to Istanbul and who look at it from a tourist's point of view.</p>	
14					

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Future visions of the city	Self perception	References to places in the city	History of the city
15	Mehmet				<p>Since my mother passed away when I was very young, they used to call me and give me food to eat, and stuff like that. There was that kind of solidarity between people. Muslims used to live side by side with foreigners and non-Muslims. In fact, in Kumbaracı Yokuşu, there was an Anglican church right beside an old mosque. I can't remember its name at the moment. I mean, back then those people all coexisted together. But, from 1975 to about 1995, people started drifting apart and moving away. Now foreigners started coming to settle here again. In fact I took an English language course twenty years ago, and I got along really well with the foreigners, perhaps because they were really kind to me when I was a child.</p>
16					
17	Fadil	<p>I love Istanbul and I am proud of it. Istanbul is almost synonymous with Turkey. Furthermore, sixty percent of the government's tax revenues come from Istanbul. I love Istanbul but I can't really take advantage of all the benefits it has to offer. I feel really bad about that. I take a break every now and then for five-ten minutes, that's all.</p> <p>I run a store and as those of you who have experience in running a store may know, the store hours in Tophane are from eight in the morning until one or two at night. We don't even get to take the weekends or official holidays off, and that makes me feel stressed out. I remember my village, my hometown. That's why I was remembered my village when you were talking about the past. I remembered my childhood, my black school uniform with the white collar, and my teachers. It made me realize that I feel somewhat alienated from Istanbul.</p>			

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Future visions of the city	Self perception	References to places in the city	History of the city
18	Fadil	I am exhausted. I can't even enjoy all the good things that this city has to offer.			
19					
20	Hamdi		Yes, I like simplicity, but I am not talking about low-class here. Just the simplicity of everybody. Perhaps plain is a better word. I liked the fact that they were all plain and that there was no distinction between social classes. Istanbul is home to more than 17 million people, so yes, sometimes I see things that make me angry, because I like order. Actually, I like chaos but there should be order in it. I like complexity but there should be simplicity inherent in it. It's ironic.	Meanwhile, I went to Ortaköy; there is a beautiful mosque there, which I adore. The Bosphorus Bridge looks really nice behind the mosque. I looked at the other side of the Bosphorus; it was stunning. Then, I went across to the other side and looked at this side from there. This side looked equally stunning.	
21	Hamdi			This is not Badgat Caddesi.	
22	Nebahat	But, in the meantime, animals are disappearing as well as the historical buildings and artifacts. We can't see any seagulls, other birds, cats or dogs. Our neglect causes them to disappear and become extinct. The little greenery that we see today despite all the odds also disappears and grey dominates the scenery; and even the sun tries to show its smiling face behind a grey veil. I imagined Istanbul in this hectic pace. I hope it will not be like that in reality because I love Istanbul very much. Maybe we will improve culturally and everything will be better, so we won't have to face any of those problems. Actually, I have so many feelings in my heart that I wish to express. Despite the negative developments that we witness today, I still don't want to say anything bad. I think we should just wait and see.			Those were truly different times when one's word was as good as a contract. Back then, social relationships especially good relations with neighbours, were valued and people always treated each other with love and respect. It was a very different atmosphere.

	A	B	C	D	E
1		Future visions of the city	Self perception	References to places in the city	History of the city
23					
24	Nur			<p>That's what I experienced. It's not much but (...) it was truly invigorating. I felt other things that I couldn't express; a feeling of captivity, for instance. Like being trapped somewhere and not being able to come out – I couldn't express that feeling in my drawing. And even though I love Istanbul and I enjoy living here, -- in fact my husband and I went away from Istanbul in 1984 for a year and a half and I really missed Istanbul during that time. I still had an intense feeling of captivity.</p>	<p>I have lived in Istanbul for 33 years. I wasn't born and raised here, though. But still, the first thing that came to my mind was the image of Istanbul in the 1950's when women who had been given a bit more freedom after the Ottoman era were walking on the cobblestone streets of the city. They were wearing hats, modern clothes and high heels. I sensed them. I heard the sound that their high heels made on the cobblestones.</p> <p>Then, in an older era, I saw someone who was seeking to find peace in a religious group or a place of seclusion. I know that this place was a dervish lodge. I felt an enormous sense of peace there. It felt as though I became one with that person.</p> <p>After that, I saw the silhouette of Istanbul in my mind's eye. Istanbul looked like a bright, golden coloured city. It was really bright and shining, and I felt all the vibrant shades of blue and turquoise.</p>
25					
26	Irem		<p>Çiğdem: Maybe your experience was more objective.</p> <p>Irem: Yes! When you (Cüneyt) first said it, I felt like I was going right into a photograph. It was an image. The things you said in the beginning directed me towards a more distant past and an image of something that I haven't personally witnessed rather than any references related to my own recent past. In other words, I went to places that were shown to me rather than the ones that were products of my own imagination.</p>	<p>And this one is, I mean, remember the time when the shores in Bostancı were not too developed? There were still dirt roads and tea shops. There was a park there and people used to sit in that park. On the ground, you could see mounds of sunflower seed shells. People used to sit there and eat sunflower seeds, and have a picnic.</p> <p>I used to love that place. These places as well, it looked like a little hill. They used to look huge to me; you could slip through this fence and fall into the sea. That's why I remember my mother used to hold me really tight when we sat there to prevent me from falling into the sea. These are the things I saw. That's all.</p>	